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I. Athens under the Thirty, 9 

II. Athens after her Restoration, . . . .78 

III. Sparta and Persia, 165 

IV. The Corinthian War, 235 

V. The Consequences of the Peace of Antalcidas, 315 



I. The Uprising of Thebes, and her struggle in 

Self-defence, 349 

II. The Offensive Wars of Thebes, .... 429 

Index to Vol. IV., 525 


From Ol. xcit. 1 (b. c. 404) to Ol. c. 2 (u. c. 379). 




The strusjorle between the two leading states of Greece 
was at an end. This was not the result of mutual ex- 
haustion, nor of a treaty defining ain-w the Supre macy 
limits of dominion on either side; but of ter&errto-" 

complete victory on the one, and absolute sub- tor y- 
mission on the other. A victory more brilliant than the 
expectations of the most ambitious Spartan had been able 
to imagine during the long series of years of war had 
been gained suddenly, without danger or difficulty, with- 
out sacrifice of money or effusion of citizens' blood ; it 
had fallen like a ripe fruit into the laps of the conquerors. 
Theirs was the gain of the whole of this unmeasurable 
success, although it w T as foreign money which had ena- 
bled them to assemble their naval force ; their own re- 
sources w r ere unimpaired, and the means of support upon 
which the enemy had so long relied for resisting them 
were now at their disposal. Sparta was now T the single 
state powerful by land or sea ; she was on terms of inti- 
mate friendship w T ith the Persians, who attached to their 
auxiliary services no conditions in any wise oppressive to 
her. Sparta's former foibles, mistakes, and defeats were 
forgotten ; once more she was regarded with reverence by 
the Hellenes, who offered her a deep confidence, and 

1* 9 

10 History of Greece. t BoOK v - 

hopefully hailed the triumph at last achieved by her over 
Athens as the beginning of a new and happy era. From 
Cythera to Thrace there existed no Greek community 
where any cavil against Sparta's hegemony over Hellenic 
affairs made itself heard. Neither Sparta nor any other 
state in Greece had ever possessed such a power as this. 
For it was one resting upon ancient tradition, and firmly 
supported anew by material and moral bases. 
Expectations -^ u ^ *° this authority there also attached 
founded upon momentous claims and demands. Sparta 

her position. * 

might fairly be expected to have prepared 
herself for her new task. She was the most ancient state 
which had held the hegemony, and her exclusive right to 
this position of honor had never been renounced by her- 
self and her adherents ; since the expedition of Brasidas 
she had come forth from her narrower sphere of action ; 
she had become a naval power, had acquired a familia- 
rity with all European and Asiatic relations, and an 
experience of the widest variety. She could not be blind 
to the necessity of creating a new order of things in Hel- 
las. Therefore, all eyes were turned towards Sparta ; 
and upon the way in which she would use her power, so 
as to fulfil the demands of the epoch, would necessarily 
depend the further course of Greek history. 
Lysander ^e nrst measures were left to the man to 

whom Sparta owed her victory. For hardly 
ever has a decisive victory been gained in which the 
victorious state itself and its citizens had so small a share, 
as on the day of iEgospotami. Lysander alone had 
made this victory possible, and had alone gained it ; in 
his hands lay the means, without which it seemed impos- 
sible to gather in the fruits of the victory ; for he alone 
held the threads by which he directed the action of the 
political parties, and in the name of Sparta regulated 
the affairs of Greece. In his conduct of these matters he 
followed the traditional principles of Lacedaemonian policy. 

,:,,A '*- L J Athens under the Thirty. 11 

The chief source of danger to the authority of Sparta 
in Greece had always lain in the fact that other prin- 
ciples of constitutional life than those prevailing in 
Sparta had asserted and developed them- p u f 
selves. Accordingly, wherever she could pro- Sp****™ p e- 

° J ' L lopomiesua. 

ceed as she desired, Sparta endeavored to 
remove political institutions contrary to her own, and, by 
the introduction of a constitution homogeneous with the 
Spartan, to recover her influence over the communities 
which had become estranged from her. Such had been 
her course of action at Argos, at Sicyon, in Achaia (vol. 
iii. p. 316) ; and, indeed, the contest against Tyrannical 
government, wherein Sparta had of old developed her 
best forces, was at bottom nothing but a struggle against 

This policy Sparta had only partially sue- T}u% . . 
ceeded in carrying through within Pelonon- ( ; f s i" ri;i •'"■ 

J ° G l deleat of de- 

nesus ; while beyond the l'eloponnesian boun- mocracy. 
daries she had never been able to apply it except in Iso- 
lated instances. The peculiar development of Athens had 
thoroughly established the ancient opposition between con- 
stitutional systems as an opposition of state againsl .-tate; 
and, in proportion as the Attic community shook off all 
restrictions upon its free-will, and without pausing for re- 
pose continued its advance, Sparta had straitened and re- 
strained her own development ; the guidance of her public 
affairs had been given over to circles which became more 
and more narrow ; and she had become more and more a 
polity of warriors and officials, which recognized as its 
sole task that of averting all innovations. Accordingly, 
this contrast in home policy could not but more and more 
decisively assert itself as the cardinal point in foreign pol- 
icy : the constitutional question inevitably rose into one 
of authority abroad. Every victory obtained in a Greek 
city by the democratic party removed that city out of the 
sphere of Sparta's influence, and caused it to leave the 

12 History of Greece. [Bouk v 

ranks of her allies for those of her adversaries. For the 
Athenians had also pursued the same policy. In the 
spread of democratic constitutions they had perceived the 
most effective means for closely attaching to themselves 
the island- and coast-states ; and Sparta had repeatedly 
been obliged to recognize this group of states, to which 
the principles of democracy gave union amongst them- 
selves, as a power legally established in Greece (vol. ii. 
pp. 420, 432 ; vol. iii. p. 208.) 

This recognition had been cancelled by the war ; the 
entire power of the state which had forced Sparta to grant 
it had been destroyed ; and she was free to act according 
to her own will. Under such circumstances, how could 
her statesmen have any other intention than that of at 
last thoroughly carrying out her ancient policy, of utterly 
sweeping away the anti-Spartan constitutions, and of re- 
moving, if possible for ever, the difference which had per- 
petually obstructed the power of Sparta, and thus putting 
an end to the division which had split Greece into two 
hostile camps? 

The Spartan Herein, then, Lvsander merely followed the 
Hannosts. traditional principles of his native city, when 
he availed himself of his strength to dissolve the popular 
system of government in all the towns which had belong- 
ed to the Attic confederation, and to commit the govern- 
ment to a fixed body of men enjoying his confidence. As 
at Athens the Thirty, so elsewhere Commissions of Ten 
were established; and in order to give security and 
strength to those governing bodies, detachments of Spar- 
tan troops w T ere placed by their side, under the command 
of a Harmost. This measure again was by no means a 
novel invention. From an early period the Lacedaemo- 
nians had been in the habit of despatching Harnxostoe, (i. 
e. military governors) into the rural districts, to hold sway 
over the Perioeci (vol. i. p. 203), and to keep the latter in 
strict subjection to the capital. Such Harmosts were sub- 

1 '»'■"'■ 'I Athens under the Thirty. 13 

sequcntly also sent abroad ; and this, of itself, showed how 
the Spartanfl had no intention of reeogniziug various kinds 
of subjection, and how they at bottom designed to make no 
essential difference between subjeet rural communities in 
Laeonia, and the foreign towns which had of their own 
accord, or otherwise, submitted to the power of Sparta. 
The duration of the Harmosts' tenure of office was not de- 
fined; it was thought well, in places of importance, to al- 
low them to remain long enough to become thoroughly 
domesticated there — so in the case of Clearchus at Byzan- 
tium (vol. iii. p. 507.) Nor was their sphere of duties ac- 
curately marked out; they held both a military and a 
civil authority, and were accordingly not dependent upon 
the Kings as commanders-in-chief, but upon the Ephors 
directly; and it was to the latter that tiny were responsi- 
ble. The Harmosts were, in Bhort, confidential servants 
of the government, and were allowed to form an independ- 
ent judgment of affairs in their several localities. For 
this reason these commissioners of Sparta abroad were se- 
lected among men of advanced age, from whom sound 
judgment and a prudent exercise of their official authority 
might be expected. To Amphipolis had at first, in 01. 
lxxxix. 1 (b. c. 424), been sent a man of youthful years; 
and this is expressly mentioned by Thucydides as a viola- 
tion of ordinary usage. Twelve years later two commis- 
sioners of war were sent to Eubcea with a detachment of 
three hundred men.* 

♦There was nothing prr *t offensive in the term ap/nocm??, which is even 
contrasted, :is one of less severity, with those of the Attic federal inspect- 
ors (en-t'o-K-orroi ^i/AouceO. Theophr. ap. Harp. e7riV»co7roi : cf. Diod. xiv. 3 
(apn.6£ovTe<; ixiv r<Z Aoyw, rvpawot 6e toi? npayfiao'ii'). The name was not a new 
one ; it was not. however, derived from the Peloponnesian federal system, 
but was the official appellation of the governors sent by Sparta into the dis- 
tricts of the Perioeci (Sehol. Pind. 01. 6, 154. Schomann. Gr. Alt. vol. i. P. 2, p. 
212). Since, then, it was again Harmosts who were sent into the subjected 
federated towns (oi nap' avroU KaAou/ue^oi apfx. ; Diod. xiv. 10), it may assured- 
ly be hence concluded that the federated towns were regarded as bailiwicks 
or governments abroad, with which moreover, they had in common the pay- 
ment of tribute. The term is used in a more general sense by Thuc. viii. 5, 

14 History of Greece. t BooK v - 

Personal in- What had formerly occurred in isolated 
fluenceofLy- instances was now carried out on a large 

sander upon o 

Spartan poii- scale ; and thus a net-work of Spartan garri- 
sons was spread over Greece, in order to bind 
down all elements of resistance, all the forces of the re- 
volution — for it was in this light that the entire democra- 
tic movement appeared from the old Spartan point of 
view. But, if the policy of Sparta was to be thus com- 
prehensively realized, a man was needed such as Lysan- 
der was. Without Lysander, the scheme would never 
have succeeded ; for, while at Sparta no thought was ta- 
ken of what lay beyond the immediate future, he alone 
had long provided for what had now occurred, and had 
prepared the measures to be taken after the overthrow of 
Athens. He was acquainted with the relations of parties in 
all the towns of Greece ; he knew the party-leaden who 
were the right men for introduction into the oligarchical 
governing commissions; he had incited them to enter into 
closer combinations with one another, and had accus- 
tomed them to look to him for their instructions, and to 
him for their advancement to power and honors. Lysan- 
der acted in the name of his native city, in the spirit of 
her policy, and, as we are expressly informed, under or- 
ders from the Ephors ; but all measures bore the charac- 
ter impressed upon them by himself; and his influence was 
of so personal a nature, that it could not be shared with 
any other man. Upon the person of Lysander depended 
the absolute dominion which Sparta for the moment pos- 
sessed ; but herein also lay the germ of its weakuess. 

For it was only in isolated cases that the 

Isolated ea- ,. , . . . . n . , 

ses of reward- proceedings were taken which the true inends 

ed loyalty to n , , . ,, 

Sparta. oi oparta were bound to expect, viz. that 

those communities to whom their devotion to 

where it is applied to such a position as that held by Gylippus at Syracuse. 
As to the exceptional case with regard to age, see Thuc. iv. 132; ruv i)fSwvT<ar 
trapai'6/ avSpat e£r}yoi> e< 2wapTJ7?. This happened b. c. 423, and was perhaps 
intended as an annoyance to Brasidas ; cf. vol. iii. p. 199. 

Chap l 1 Athens under the Thirty. 15 

Sparta had brought mi.sfortune were, as far as possible re- 
warded by compensation and restoration. Thus, indeed, 
the jEginetans and Melians, or as many of them as sur- 
vived, recovered their native country; in Histisea, too, 
and in Scione and Torono, the wrongfl inflicted by the 
Athenians were in Borne degree repaired; the Attic derur 
chi on the islands were forced to quit their holdings ; the 
Messenians had to evacuate Cephallenia and NaupactUS, 
and the latter city was restored to the Locrians.* 

Thus the Spartans endeavored, at isolated n . . 

* » General dee- 

points, where the Athenians had proceeded P° ti8 n>°' 
with exceptional violence, to exercise justice 
and to expiate wrong; and, in truth, these endeavors 
were also dictated by political interests. In general, 
however, the Spartans themselves displayed an extreme 
degree of violence ; nor could any one have been less 
adapted than Lysander for appearing in the character of 
the champion of order and Legality. Instead of being 
elevated above the political parties, be Stood in the midst 
of them. He was the leader of those who, by means of 
their secret combinations, had undermined the tranquilli- 
ty of the communities ; and the most violent members of 
the political clubs were his associates and his tools. 
When, therefore, it was to such men as these that he gave 
full liberty of action, he was well aware that they would 
employ it for appeasing the lust of vengeance upon their 
fellow-citizens, which they had so long been forced to re- 
strain ; and this accorded with the real intentions of Ly- 
sander. Far from desiring to establish tranquillity and 
peace, in which the cities might recover from the miseries 

* Concerning Lysander acting as Nemarekn§ by orders of the state, see 
Diod. xiv. 10. As to the restoration of /Egina and Bfelos : Xen. Ilellen. ii. 
2, 9; Plut. Lys. 14; Scione (vol. iii. p. 180), ib. As to the expulsion of the 
Messenians from Naupactus and the islands : Diod. xiv. 34 (from Cephalle- 
nia), and 78 (from Zaeynthus) ; Pans. x. 38,10; Lycon n-poSous ~Xavna.KTov 
' Homeros' of Metagenes ; Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. ii. 755; Bergk, Iiel. Com. 
Mt. 423. 

16 History of Greece. £ BoOK v - 

of the war, he was well content to see the civic communi- 
ties destroying themselves by internal feuds and seditions. 
It was not a cruel whim, but politic design, which caused 
him to favor the exhaustion of those communities which 
still appeared capable of resistance ; the ends of his poli- 
cy demanded that the unhappy land of Greece should 
yet be further weakened and unnerved by loss of blood. 
It will be remembered how three thousand Athenians 
were, by his orders, slaughtered on the Hellespont ; how 
at Miletus, where the contending parties were on the 
point of arriving at a reconciliation, he had insidiously 
instigated a sanguinary massacre, in order to make a 
clean sweep of his opponents in this quarter (vol. iii. p. 
548.) The same course was pursued in Thasos, where the 
civic community, after it had been tranquillized by means 
of solemn promises, was fallen upon, and the greater part 
of it put to death. And, in the end, no distinction was 
any longer observed between the communities which had 
sided against, and those which had sided with, Sparta in 
the war. Inasmuch as there were none to fear, neither 
w r ere there any to be considered. The ruthless severity of 
Spartan policy was allowed to assert itself unrestrictedly ; 
and any notion of being bound by the principles of a 
Brasidas or a Callieratidas was cast to the winds. And 
yet the former of these had, in the name of Sparta, sol- 
emnly vowed conscientiously to respect the autonomy of 
every community, and to favor no party whatever ; 
while Callicratidas had openly declared that he desired 
no other supremacy for his state than such as free Hel- 
lenes would voluntarily grant to it. 

its oppres- Principles directly contrary to these being 
Piveness. now officially approved, and the just expecta- 

tions of the Hellenes most bitterly disappointed, it 
was impossible that Greece should be tranquillized ; it 
was impossible that anything should result but a new 
agitation. Public opinion, brutally disregarded, imme- 

Cmxr. I.] Athens under the Thirty. 17 

diately turned against Sparta. The states formerly op- 
pressed by Athens, instead of drawing new breath in 
the atmosphere of liberty, as they had hoped, were terri- 
fied to find themselves delivered up to a far heavier op- 
pression than the Athenian. For, however harsh and 
severe the sway of Athens had been, yet it was no arbi- 
trary terrorism ; it had been founded in a spirit of justice, 
regulated by legal statutes, and organized with intelli- 
gence ; it treated the individual life of each community 
with as much tenderness as the interests of the leading 
state permitted ; it offered a strong protection against 
foreign enemies, under which trade and industry might 
flourish ; and it possessed a national significance which no 
candid judge could fail to perceive. The Spartans, on 
the other hand, had already in three treaties sacrificed 
the towns of Asia Minor ; and although, after their vic- 
tory on the Hellespont, they were loth to deliver up cer- 
tain towns of special importance, as e. g. Abydus, where 
they had placed a Harmost of their own, yet even in this 
quarter they lacked courage to withstand the claims of 
their powerfully ally ; and the Persian viceroys ruled in 
the name of the Great King more absolutely than ever 
before, along the whole coast-line of the Archipelago and 
the routes of the sea, which were of so high an import- 
ance for the liberty of the Greeks and for their com- 
merce ; although the tributes originally introduced for 
the protection of the Greek sea were levied as heretofore. 
A further grievance lay in the brutality of the men 
whom Sparta deputed into the Hellenic cities ; for the 
large number required of itself put a special selection of 
men of proved competence out of the question. On 
the contrary, they were, for the most part, men taken 
from inferior walks of life, servile towards Lysander and 
his friends, and brutal towards the unprotected citizens. 
Thus, the best element which had survived in the Greeks, 
their communal sentiment, was everywhere exposed to 

18 History of Greece, tBoo* v. 

the cruellest insult ; and no man of clear judgment could 

fail to perceive that the much-abused maritime dominion 

of Athens could not have been followed by any more 

striking justification than that offered by the system of the 

Spartan Commissions of Ten and military governors.* 

This reaction in public opinion and crow- 
its weak . . -en o 
points. ing excitement against feparta, of course, from 

the first contained the germ of the weakness 
of her dominion. In the same direction tended the dis- 
cord which necessarily made its appearance between the 

authorities of the Spartan state. A growth 
against'ly- °f jealousy was here inevitable, for the com- 
Sparta at missions of Ten, or Decarchies of Lysander, 

were the mainstays of his personal power. It 
was, therefore, easy to perceive how dangerous this power 
was to the state, and how much it was against the inte- 
rest of Sparta to charge herself with the hatred of all 
Greece, in order to maintain the authority of Lysauder. 
But those who perceived this proposed no other course of 
action by which they were resolved to abide. Thus, the 
divergence between Lysander on the one hand, and the 
Kings and Ephors on the other, undoubtedly crippled his 
authority, but at the same time it impaired that of Sparta ; 
and it hereby became possible to the conquered cities to 
withdraw themselves from the crushing oppression of the 
overwhelmingly powerful state. 

Finally, a third circumstance operated upon 

Sparta and ir»i n /~* t 

the states of the further progress of Greek affairs — viz. the 
rank. relations of Sparta to the states of secondary 

rank. These states had been her most zealous 
allies against Athens, but all their exertions during the 
war remained disregarded; they found themselves de- 
ceived in all their expectations, and saw their clearest 

•As to Thasos; Corn. Nep. Lys. 2; Polyaen. i. 45, 4. Helots employed as 
Harmosts : Xen. Hellen. iii. 5, 13. Tributes rising to the amount of 1,000 tal- 
ents: Diod. xiv. 10; Plut. Lys. 17. 

chap. L] Athens under tJie Tfiirty. 19 

claims for a share in the spoils of victory and for a voice 
in the resettlement of affairs in Hellas coldly rejected. 
Hence arose a vehement opposition ; the feeling of inde- 
pendence in the secondary states was aroused to new en- 
ergy, and occasioned a series of attempts to shake off the 
odious supremacy of Sparta. Thus we see by the side of 
the latter new centres of independent political life form- 
ing themselves ; — and these contain at the same time the 
germs of fresh struggles for the hegemony over Greece. 

These three points of view determine the events of the 
next few decades. They explain why, after the battle of 
jEgospotami, Greek history, instead of becoming a his- 
tory of Sparta and of Spartan dominion over Greece, as 
Lysandcr intended, recovers its ancient manifold variety 
of independent city histories. The first and most instruc- 
tive example is furnished by Athens. 

In the violent changes which after the vie- p i itioa i 
tory of Sparta took place in the cities of JJjJJlJ at 
Greece, the native parties in each were every- 
where concerned. But this was most effectively the case 
in that city in whose busy life all political tendencies had 
found their most vigorous and characteristic development, 
— at Athens. 

Here the friends of the existing constitution had severed 
themselves most decisively from its adversaries. The for- 
mer thought that upon it depended absolutely the salva- 
tion of the state ; the latter regarded it as the source of 
all evil, as a system contradicting every consid- Thc Mod 
eration of reason. Between these two parties erates - 
stood a third, that of the Moderates, who could not of 
course point to principles of action as definite as those of 
the unconditional friends or foes of the constitution, 
but who agreed with the latter in acknowledging the 
abuses of the democracy and in strongly desiring certain 
restrictions upon the popular will, and with the former in 

20 History of Greece. t BooK v - 

being loyal adherents of the constitution, in abhorring 
any violation of it as high treason, and in equally abhor- 
ring any intervention of a foreign state brought about for 
party purposes. In these patriotic sentiments, therefore, 
they stood by the side of the Democrats proper, against 
the Oligarchs. The latter, never supported by any con- 
siderable number of adherents among the citizens, had 
always found themselves obliged to rely upon foreign aid, 
and contrived to excuse their good understanding with the 
enemies of the city to themselves and others by all kinds 
of sophistic arguments. 

The on- ^ e nave become sufficiently acquainted 
garchs. w ith the proceedings of this party, with its 

constant endeavor to provoke confusion in the state, in 
order to impair the respect paid to its laws, and eagerly 
to turn every disturbance and every public calamity to 
the account of their own ends. It was the party of those 
who despised the common people; who esteemed virtue 
and capacity for political action inalienable privileges of 
men of rank; who regarded the renunciation of mari- 
time dominion as the first step indispensable for returning 
to a rational course of action ; — the same party, whose 
political creed remains to us in the essay on the Athe- 
nian polity preserved under the name of Xenophon. The 
objects which this party had during the last century pur- 
sued in repeated attempts, and at the time of the Four 
Hundred had already in part realized, had now been con- 
summated ; with the establishment of the Thirty the 
Oligarchs had arrived at the goal of their desires. The 
destruction of the fleet and the levelling of the walls had 
disarmed the city and severed it from the sea ; Athens 
was no longer either a Democracy or a great Power ; she 
was reduced to one of the many country-towns of Greece 
which, without having any policy of their own, obeyed a 
foreign guidance, and placed their armed men under the 
supreme command of Sparta. For Sparta was once more 

c ** e - *•) Athen* under the Thirty. 21 

the sole head ; a single will was omnipotent in Hellas. 
Liberation from the troubles of war after they had lasted 
for seven-and-twenty years, reconciliation between tribes 
akin to one another, peace and harmony among the Hel- 
lenes, guaranteed by homogeneous constitutions, — in 
short, a return to the good old times, with their wise ordi- 
nances of law which democratic insolence had overthrown 
— such was the bright sign hung out for the new order of 
things which the partisans of Sparta lauded as alone 
beneficent, and as alone in accordance with Right. 
Not one of these partisans, however, can „. „, . . 

1 Ine Ihirty. 

have been short-sighted enough to believe the 
work of a reaction, which reversed the progress of 
Athenian history since Theniistoeles, or indeed since 
Clisthenea and Solon, to have succeeded on the spot. It 
was to be foreseen, that the civic community, though 
broken by war and famine, and weakened in consequence 
of unexpected calamities, would again recover its self-con- 
fidence. Accordingly, everything depended upon the 
measures whereby the Thirty would Becure their sway 
and carry out their principles; in other words, their 
party had arrived not at the close, but at the beginning, 
of their task. They had been established, on the motion 
of Dracontidas, amidst open contradiction which only the 
authoritative orders of Lysander had been able to re- 
move ; and they consisted throughout of men who, 
although they possessed adherents among the upper 
classes in the city, were odious, or in a high degree sus- 
picious, to the community as a whole. In part they were 
the same men who by their treason had occasioned the 
defeat of iEgospotami ; and, as was universally known, 
they had not merely accepted what circumstances had 
rendered inevitable, and abstained from availing them- 
selves of their relations to Sparta for bringing about the 
peace, desired on all sides, under as favorable conditions 
as possible ; but they had made Sparta serve their party 

22 History of Greece. [Boo* v. 

purposes, had taken refuge behind the authority of Ly- 
sander, had arrived at a secret understanding with him, 
and had required him to make such demands as best cor- 
responded to their selfish interests. Yet they were not- 
withstanding not established as an official government 
proper, but merely as a commission instructed to review 
afresh the fundamental laws of the state, which in recent 
years had been so frequently shaken, and to bring them 
into harmony with the altered condition of affairs. For 
this purpose only they had been entrusted, under the su- 
preme authority of Sparta, with the extraordinary 
powers which after the close of their legislative activity 
were again to expire. 

Their fust ^ n s P^ te °f ^' ls > tne Thirty were anything 
measures. Du t intent upon legislation ; their sole object 
was completely to subject to themselves all surviving 
factors of political life, and to disarm all possible opposi- 
tion. The civic community remained dissolved ; the 
republican offices retained a mere semblance of existence, 
and were, notwithstanding their absolute insignificance, 
filled by members of the ruling party. Thus Pythodorus 
became First Archon, and gave his name to the year 
which began under the Thirty. The Council too was left 
standing, although perhaps without its full numbers ; 
but it was throughout composed of persons who already 
at the time of the Four Hundred had proved them- 
selves adherents of the oligarchy. To this Council was 
at the same time, after the abolition of the popular tribu- 
nals and of the Areopagus, committed the penal juris- 
diction ; and, in order that even in so dependent a body 
no free and impartial decisions might take place, it was 
ordained that the members of the Council should vote 
openly and in the presence of the Thirty. The Pirseeus, 
from of old the focus of democratic movements, was 
placed under a special official Board of Ten, who were 
made responsible for the maintenance of tranquillity in 

chap. i,j Athens under tfw Thirty. 23 

that quarter. These Ten were undoubtedly, like the 
Thirty, named by Lysander and subordinated to him. 
Neither in the Upper nor in the Lower town were any 
official authorities tolerated which did not offer them- 
selves as ready instruments of the new government.* 

After a preliminary political system had been thus 
established, the despots began by introducing the new 
era to which they desired to advance Athens, by a few 
shrewdly calculated measures. For it was not difficult in 
those days to charge the abuses of the democracy with 
every calamity of which the consequences weighed upon 
the city. When, therefore, the Thirty employed their 
authority in removing such evils in civic society as were 
offensive to all right-minded citizens ; when they made 
short work of certain contemptible individuals who had 
plied the trade of sycophants with shameless effrontery, 
and expelled them from the city, these measures were 
approved by a considerable part of the population. A 
vigorous government was welcome after a protracted ab- 
sence of all counsel and means of protection ; the want 
of confidence in the constitution which had spread 
further and further since the Sicilian calamity, the long- 
ing for tranquillity which could only be expected to be 
satisfied if popular liberties were restricted and the good- 

*A9tothe rule of the Thirty, see Xen. HcUen. ii. Sff. ; the speeches of 
Lysias against Eratosthenes, Agoratus, and Nieomachus, Ac.; and Isocrates 
and other orators passim. For modern accounts: Lac'imann, Gesch. Gr. 
vom Ende des pel. Kr. bis Alex. (1839) ; Sicvers, Gesch. Gr. vom Ende des pelop. 
Kr. bis zur Schl. bci Mantineia (1810); Scheibe, Olig. Umiciikuny zu Athen am Ende 
des pelop. Kr. und das Archontat des Eukleides (1841); Weissenborn, Hellen. (1814), 
p. 197 f. Xenophon, in his first two books, follows the chronological order 
of Thuc; but the negligence of his narrative, and the very corrupt state of 
its text, force the reader to resort to combinations in order to arrive at a 
settled chronology. As to the institutions of the Thirty: Scheibe, 66. The 
abolition of the Heliastic tribunals is to be assumed as a matter of course ; 
that of the Areopagus is to be gathered from the correct interpretation of 
Lysias, i. 30 (Rauchenstein, Philol. x. 605). The Areopagus had fallen into 
disfavor, Lys. xii. 69. As to Pythodorus as a member of the Four Hun- 
dred (whose corporation was the seminary of the Thirty), Plut. Ale. i. p. 
119 ; Diog. Laert. ix. 54 ; lie was trained in philosophy, like his colleague 
Aristoteles: Bergk, Iiel. Com. 100; cf. vol. iii. p. 523. 

24 History of Greece. f BoOK v - 

will of Sparta courted, operated in favor of the new 
government ; and if the latter acted with ordinary- 
shrewdness, it might succeed in gradually attracting to its 
side many of the Middle party. 

But this moderation only lasted for a brief 

Spartan J 

garrison un- space of time. The members of the govern- 

der Calhbius L t ° 

in the Aero- nient were too decidedly partisans to be able 

polis. . 

to rest satisfied long with a cautious adoption 
of a rational political system ; too much wrath had accu- 
mulated in them during the protracted period in which 
the minority of men of property had been subjected to 
the sway of the hated multitude ; and they desired to find 
vent for the bitter hatred which they had restrained, and 
to take vengeance for the oppression which they had so 
long endured. But if they pursued such ends as these, 
they obviously could not enter upon an endeavor gra- 
dually to bring about a change in the sentiments of the 
citizens, and to secure the support of the Moderate party. 
The following of the Knights, the one corporation at 
Athens which adhered on principle to the oligarchs, was 
insufficient for their purposes ; nor could they find the 
guarantee desired in Sparta, so long as she merely stood 
in the background as a protecting power. They therefore 
despatched two confidential emissaries, iEschines and 
Aristoteles, with orders to convince the authorities at 
Sparta that armed assistance was required, if the new po- 
litical system was to be established permanently, and af- 
ter a fashion agreeable to Sparta herself. As they under- 
took to maintain the troops at their own cost, and as Ly- 
sander zealously supported their request, 700 Lacedaemo- 
nian garrison-troops under the command of Callibius en- 
tered Attica, and occupied the citadel. It may have been 
Lysander himself who, after he had taken Samos, and 
had carried out his measures of force on the coasts of 
Thrace, conducted the march of these men and estab- 
lished the Harmost. 

CuAP - L] Athens under the Thirty. 25 

This event was productive of many important results. 
For now all doubt was inevitably taken away even from 
all those who had been simple enough to believe in the 
moderation of the Thirty ; and indignation necessarily 
filled every patriot, when Spartan sentinels challenged 
him on the way to the sanctuary of the City Goddess, 
— that very goddess who had rejected the homage even 
of Lacedaemonian kings (vol. i. p. 413). It was now clear 
that the government was careless of gaining respect and 
assent, and that it was determined to pursue paths in 
which it needed the assistance of foreign arms ; it was 
evident, that this government esteemed more highly the 
gratification of its lust of vengeance than even its own 
honor and independence. For henceforth Callibius, a 
rough-spoken and overbearing Spartan, waa the foremost 
man at Athens; and the heads of the Thirty deemed it 
no condescension on their part to court his favor and to 
secure his good-will in every possible way : they were not 
ashamed to offer up as a sacrifice to his craving for ven- 
geance the young and beautiful Autolycus, famed as a 
victor in several competitive games. Callibius, annoyed 
by the loss of a lawsuit, had struck Autolycus in the pub- 
lic street, and then, when he had defended himself, had 
brought him as a criminal before Lysander. The latter 
disapproved of the conduct of the Ilarmost ; but when he 
had departed, Autolycus had to suffer the penalty of 

As a compensation for so humiliating a po- Thc new 
sition, the Thirty were naturally anxious to Sycophancy. 
reap a proportionately thorough harvest out of the ac- 
cession of power which had accrued to them by means of 
the garrison. They became more reckless and despotic 
in all points ; moreover, their undertaking to maintain 
the troops at their own expense obliged them to procure 

* As to Callibius, Xen. Hell. ii. 3, 13 ; Diod. xiv. 4 ; Paus. i. 18, ix. 32; Plut. 
Lij8. 15 ; Cobet, Prosop. Xenoph. p. 54. 


26 History of Greece. t BooK v - 

money in every possible way, and for this purpose to make 
inroads upon both public and private property. In short, 
the admission of these foreign troops converted the party 
sway of the oligarchs into a Tyrannis far worse than any 
Tyrannis of earlier times, because it was designed to chas- 
tise the people like a hated foe who at last lay at their 
mercy. All civic liberties having been abolished, together 
with the laws of Solon, it became possible to extend the 
persecution to every person who had incurred the ill-will 
of those in power; and this category included every one 
who might possibly become dangerous. The system of 
sycophancy, which it was intended to abolish, flourished 
to an extent which it had never heretofore reached ; it was 
partly in the hands of men who had formerly already plied 
this trade, and who now merely changed sides in order to 
keep up their lucrative occupation, while others of the 
new sycophants were men who were now, under the Thirty, 
first apprenticed to a service all the more lucrative because 
an accusation might now be confidently expected to suc- 
ceed. The most notorious among those bloodhounds and 
informers were Batrachus of Orcus in Eubooa, and Jvchy- 
lides. Under a government of this description of course 
a special importance attached to that authority, whose 
proper business was only the execution of penal sentences, 
The Eleven * nc S(>ca ^ 0( ^ Eleven, For not only wen- their 
hands now always full of work ; but their posts 
were always held by the most zealous adherents of tin- 
Thirty ; they were men who took a personal delight in se- 
curing their victims, and in gratifying the despots' lust 
of vengeance ; they were themselves an organ of a party, 
and the most important weapon in the hands of the gov- 
ernment. The most daring and influential of their num- 
ber was Satyrus. 

One of the first acts of violence, which laid 


and banish- b are f ne rea j character of the government, was 


the execution of the unfortunate men against 

Chap - l 1 Athens under the Thirty. 27 

whom Agoratus had informed as disturbers of the public 
peace (vol. iii. p. 573), and who were still in durance ; ac- 
cording to a popular vote they were to be judged by a 
jury of 2,000 members. Instead of this, they were sen- 
tenced by the council and put to death in prison : among 
them Strombichides, Calliades, and Dionysodorus. Nor 
was this all. It seems that, with the co-operation of Ly- 
sander, a list had been drawn up of all those whom it was 
designed to remove; and this included all who had al- 
ready formerly proved themselves champions of popular 
rights; above all Thrasybulus, the son of Lycus, the man 
who had, next to Alcibiades, been chiefly instrumental in 
obtaining for free Athens, after the fall of the Four Hun- 
dred, a new period of fame and prosperity, and Anytus, 
the son of Anthemion, an individual of low rank, but of 
considerable property, who was accounted a democrat of 
the old school. Both »vere sentenced to banishments. But 
even those at a distance were feared, particu- ..... . 

' * Alcibiades. 

larly Alcibiades, whom neither his friends nor 
his foes had forgotten. It was known that as long as Al- 
cibiades lived, he was also busy in the formation of plans 
and in the pursuit of momentous ends. He was now 
about forty-five years of age, and, notwithstanding his dis- 
sipated habits, full of vigor and eager to do great deeds. 
Reflecting upon the hapless situation of his native city^ 
he could not bring himself to relinquish the idea that he 
might be permitted to come forward once more as her 
saviour ; and now, as before, he hoped to reach the goal 
by means of Persia.* 

At Susa Artaxerxes II., Mnemon, had sat on the 
throne since the close of the year B. c. 405 (01. xciii. 4). 

* BaTpaxo? 6 napeSpo* 6 e'f 'Dpeou, Archippus ctp. Athcn. 329«. K. Fr. Her- 
mann, Staatsall. $ 13!*, and Meier, de bon. damn. 188. argue against the identity 
of the tvStKa. under the Thirty and during the Democracy. Yet it is surely 
impossible to assume two boards of Eleven with the same functions. The 
old board was officered anew and acquired a totally new significance 
(Scheibe, 68). As to the KardXoyos (6 <x«Ta Av<raV5pou «.): Rauchenstein, 
FhUol. xv. 338, and ad Lys. xxv. 16. 

28 History of Greece. t BoOK * 

The occasion seemed to be exceptionally favor- 

His relations * ^ J 

with Pharna- ^hle for forming a connexion with him. For, 


inasmuch as Cyrus, whose treasonable schemes 
were becoming more and more manifest (vol. iii. p. 516), 
had completely attached himself to Sparta, nothing 
remained for the Great King but to seek his allies at 
Athens. This was perceived by Alcibiades. Accordingly, 
after he had for a time maintained an attitude of quiet 
observation on the Hellespont, he recommenced negotia- 
tions with Pharnabazus. (After the appointment of Cy- 
rus as governor-general in the maritime provinces, Phar- 
nabazus had retained his satrapy, while Tissaphernes had 
been dismissed from his offices). Pharnabazus' seat of 
government was at Dascylium on the shores of the Pro- 
pontis ; here, following the traditions of ancient Persian 
policy, he gave a most hospitable reception to his former 
adversary, and gave up to him the city of Gryneum in 
^Eolis, which produced for him an ample yearly income. 
In these relations Alcibiades took advantage of his for- 
mer sojourn at the court of Tissaphernes, easily accus- 
tomed himself to Persian ways, and prepared himself for 
a personal visit to Susa, where he hoped after all to realize 
his old plans (vol. iii. p. 514) ; thinking, in accordance 
with his disposition, to intervene anew in the course of af- 
fairs as negotiator and as general. 

Proceed- Meanwhile his proceedings were watched 

ings against by hj s enemies. They remembered how al- 

Alcibiades. J J 

ready once before the dominion of their party 
had been overthrown by him ; and they therefore per- 
ceived the necessity of taking early measures to prevent 
his second return. To Critias no man was more odious 
than Alcibiades, his former friend, in whom he recognized 
a living test of the vacillation of his own political ca- 
reer ; and moreover, he was well aware that, if the peo- 
ple were looking out for any one man as capable of be- 
coming its saviour, that one man was Alcibiades, who at' 

chap. L] Athens under the Thirty. 29 

tracted the attention of all. So long as such a man re- 
mained alive, the Thirty could not hope to see the com- 
munity quietly submit to the yoke of their despotism. Here 
were sufficient reasons for persecuting Alcibiades even in 
his absence. His lands in Attica were confiscated ; his 
son was expelled ; and he was himself, like Themistocles 
of old, declared an outlaw, so that he was prevented from 
sojourning in any part of Hellas. But it was his death 
which was desired ; and accordingly the government ap- 
plied to Lysander, who was at this time in Asia, for his 
co-operation. As Lysander (so it is said) showed no in- 
clination to assent to this request, the enemies of Alci- 
biades at Sparta were stirred up, above all Agis and his 
following ; and thus it came to pass that definite instruc- 
tions reached Lysander from Sparta, to make away with 
Alcibiades. Probably he applied for this purpose to the 
authority of Cyrus ; and thus Pharnabazus saw no means 
of escaping the necessity, and was forced to lend his hand 
for the destruction of the man who was enjoying his hos- 

Alcibiades had started on his journey to 
the Great King, from whom he might expect 01. xci. 4 

(b c 404) 

a favorable reception; he had just taken up Autumn." 
his quarters for the night in the Phrygian 
hamlet Melissa, when the men sent out by the satrap 
came up with him. His dwelling was surrounded at 
night-time, like the lair of a wild beast, and then timber 
and bushes were piled around it. Awakened by the 
flames flaring up on all sides, he springs from his bed. 
He searches for his sword; it had been stolen away. 
Treason then must have had a hand in the plot. With 
rapid presence of mind he casts robes and coverlets into 
the flames, and thus proceeds through them, followed by 
his mistress Timandra and by a faithful Arcadian. Al- 
ready he has passed beyond the reach of the fiery sea which 
was to have destroyed him, when, the flames lighting up 

30 History of Greece. t BooK v - 

his position, a shower of missiles falls upon him from a 
distance, so that he falls to the ground, without being able 
to see a single one of his foes. When all is over, the bar- 
barians issue forth from their darkness, and cut off the 
hero's head, in order to carry it to the satrap in token of 
the accomplishment of their orders. His body is buried 
by the faithful Timandra.* 

Terrorism of ^ ne death °f Alcibiades was in any case 
the Thirty. to be regarded as an important gain by the 
rulers of Athens, if they considered what complications 
might have resulted from his negotiations with the Great 
King. Yet the difficulties of their situation could not be 
removed by means of isolated acts of violence. Its 
weakness lay particularly in the fact, that it was not a 
single Tyrant, but a board of Thirty, which held sway. 
This number had originally been intended to serve the 
purpose of diminishing the evil semblance of a Tyran- 
nis ; it was a kind of senate placed at the head of the 
state ; and it was doubtless not accidental that the 
number of its members corresponded to that of the 
Council of the Old at Sparta (since in the establishment 
of Ephors too, vol. iii. p. 578, it is impossible not to rec- 
ognize an adherence to Spartan political institutions). 
No permanent union could prevail among so many 
official colleagues of equal powers, least of all in the case 
of a government which ruled without laws and conducted 
affairs after an arbitrary fashion, devoid of any fixed 
standard or limit. It was inevitable that discord should 
arise among the colleagues as to the measures to be 
taken, and that party divisions should form themselves 
within the government. 

* As to Alcibiades' perception of the plans of Cyrus : Ephorus ap. Diod. 
xiv. 10; Nepos, -41c. 10. As to his death: Plut. Ale. 39. Timandra in Athen. 
574 is called Theodote. According to Ephorus, Pharnabazus was anxious 
that the news should not be carried by any one else from Cyrus to the 
court; but this fails to account for the deed of blood. This makes it prob- 
able that Cyrus co-operated ; who had the most cause for fearing Alcibia 
des. Cf. Grote, vol. viii. p. 427. 

chaf. i.j Atlicns wider the Thirty. 31 

Moreover, among the citizens also, after they had 
recovered from their first terror, movements of incalcu- 
lable significance became perceptible. Men began to see 
clearly as to the situation of the state, and the question 
suggested itself with increasing distinctness : " What is 
to be the end of all this ? " For so long as only those 
who had given open cause of offence were touched, all 
whose consciences w r ere easy remained tranquil. But 
now things had changed. Batrachus and iEschylides 
were always at hand, to prefer accusations on the expres- 
sion or hint of a wish on the part of any one of the 
Thirty ; and the accused were judged by their enemies. 
All security of life and property was now at an end, and 
any honest citizen might suddenly become the victim of 
an insidious informer. There was no longer any ques- 
tion of the party-standpoint ; the victims of the Tyrants 
were found to include men belonging to the noblest 
houses of the city, and averse, both by family tradition 
and by personal conviction, from the excesses of the 
democracy. Thus the w 7 orthy Niceratus, the son of the 
general Nicias, fell ; Eucrates, the brother of the general, 
who had refused to become a member of the Board of 
the Thirty, having already at an earlier date been 
removed. Leon of Salamis, and Lycurgus, the grand- 
father of the orator Lycurgus, w r ere likewise after a short 
mock trial delivered up to the Eleven. The citizens 
were dragged away from the market-place and from the 
temples ; the relatives of the murdered men were 
hindered from giving them the rites of burial ; to display 
sympathy was accounted criminal. In most cases of 
sentence a variety of motives co-operated — the desire of 
removing dangerous individuals, and that of satisfying 
personal appetites of vengeance and at the same time of 
obtaining money by the confiscation of property. 

The last-named motive, which had already Persecution 
dictated the proceedings against the heirs of oftheMetceci. 

32 History of Greece. t BooK v - 

Nicias, came more and more into the foreground ; and, 
from this point of view, the persecution was extended to 
the numerous class of Attic resident aliens, or 3fetceci, 
who lived under the protection of the state. Their pos- 
sessions consisted chiefly in money and moveable pro- 
perty, which being hard to survey and apt to be over- 
estimated, accordingly all the more tempted the greed of 
the Tyrants. In this case, as that of non-citizens, they 
thought to stand in proportionately small need of hesita- 
tion ; indeed, there was a certain specious pretence in 
their favor, when they represented this class in general 
as hankering after innovations and unworthy of trust. 
Hence two of the Thirty, Pison and Theognis, made a 
special motion with reference to the resident aliens ; the 
several members of the council were called upon to men- 
tion individual members of this class suspected by them ; 
and in order that the real motive of this persecution 
might not too palpably display itself, the subterfuge was 
adopted of including among the first ten selected as vic- 
tims two persons without means.* 

Reaction -^ won( ler, then, that in view of this pro- 
Thin 8 the g ress °f affairs even certain of the Thirty be- 
gan to hesitate, and that the opinion gained 
ground that it was assuredly impossible to proceed blindly 
in the path hitherto pursued, and that the security of the 
government itself demanded a consideration of means, 
whereby a support might be gained among the citizens, and 
a polity established containing something like a warrant of 
me- P ermanence - This tendency found its repre- 
nes - sentative in Theramenes. Involuntarily he 

*As to Eucrates and Niceratus: Lys. xviii. 4, 6. As to Leon: Andoe. 
Myst. 94 ; Scheibe, 83. As to Lycurgus : Vit. X. Orat. 841 ; Clinton, Fast. Hell, 
ad ann. 337 (not the father Lycophron, according to Scheibe, 101). As to 
Pison and Theognis; Lys. xii. 6; Xen. Hell. ii. 3, 21. The oppression of 
the mercantile class accorded with the political principles of the oligarchs, 
who wished to divert the state from its commercial tendency. Cf. 
" Xenophon," de rep. Ath. 

CuAP - l •] 4*/icws wic/er the Thirty. 33 

again fell into the same direction which he had pursued un- 
der the government of the Four Hundred (vol. iii. p. 486). 
His whole conduct at the time when the city was be- 
fallen by its great calamity, forbids our assuming it to 
have been a moral sense of shame which restrained him 
from participating in the progress of arbitrary violence. 
On the contrary, as Critiaa afterwards told him to his face, 
he had at first been among the most zealous, and had in- 
cited his colleagues to a sanguinary persecution of the op- 
posite party. But when he found himself outvied by 
others in this course of action, and felt his vanity of- 
fended by the predominating influence of Critias, who be- 
came de facto the head of the government, Theramcnes 
hoped by opportunely adopting a more moderate policy 
to provide best for himself individually. For he was too 
sagacious not to perceive the necessary consequences of 
such a system of terror ; he was therefore anxious in time 
to quit the ship whose sinking he foresaw. In this way 
he might also hope to rise to the position of a party- 
leader by the side of Critias, and, after the latter should 
have been brought to a fall by his abuse of his power, to 
gain by his own sagacious pliability an authority corres- 
ponding to his ambition. Moreover, a certain aversion 
from everything unmeasured and wild had survived in 
him as a remnant of his better self (vol. iii. p. 486), and 
this may now have co-operated as a motive. And, since 
he had already once before carried a clever change of 
characters to a prosperous issue, so at the present time, 
while the rest without any will of their own followed the 
bidding of Critias, he with growing boldness put forth a 
voice of warning and of free contradiction. 

He had begun by disapproving of individual measures, 
e. g. of the occupation of the citadel by Lacedaemonian 
troops, and of the execution of blameless men, such as 
Leon and Niceratus. Then, without allowing himself to 
be diverted by the bait of a rich share of profits, he deci' 


34 History of Greece. [ BooK v - 

sively opposed himself to the entire procedure of the gov- 
ernment. He declared it folly to exercise a despotic 
sway, and yet remain in a minority ; to drive brave men 
into exile, and thus create a hostile power abroad ; to put 
individuals to death, and thus provoke the enmity of 
whole classes of the population, whose power was, in 
reality, increasing at the very time when it was attempted 
to impair it. He averred that regard should be paid to 
public opinion, and a support sought for in the civic com- 
munity. He therefore demanded that full civic rights 
should be restored to the kernel of the population — in 
other words, to those who were able to furnish arms for 
themselves. Critias, on the other hand, held that any 
modification of the existing system was a sign of weak- 
ness, and dangerous ; he bade his associates beware of 
surrendering themselves to simple-minded illusions ; for 
the state must, once for all, be thoroughly purified from all 
corrupt elements, for which purpose the present was the 
right moment, such as would never hereafter return. 
The Thirty ought, therefore, to hold firmly together, and 
act in unison, like a single Tyrant surrounded on all 
sides by insidious foes. 

Meanwhile, the tension increased ; the two rivals mu- 
tually forced one another in opposite directions ; and, at 
last, Critias perceived the necessity of apparently giving 
way, in order that Theramenes might not become the head 
of a counter party. 
_. _. It was, therefore, determined to summon a 

The Three ' t . 

Thousand. civic body, in order, according to the view of 
Theramenes, to rest the oligarchic government on a 
broader bottom. A list was drawn up of citizens upon 
whom dependence could be placed ; and, in addition to 
the Knights ( who were regarded as a separate class ), 
3,000 was fixed upon as the normal number — which 
again may have intentionally corresponded to the tripar- 
tite mode of division peculiar to the Dorians. Thera' 

chap, i.] Athens under the Thirty. 35 

meiies protested against this proposal. He urged that 
the number was too small ; for it excluded many to 
whom the testimony of their being efficient citizens could 
not be denied. On the other hand, it was too large, 
inasmuch as it afforded no guarantee of those included 
in it being trustworthy adherents of the oligarchy. Mea- 
sures of this kind, he said, could not possibly lead to the 
establishment of an enduring polity. 

Hereupon Critias and his associates found 
themselves forced to pursue their own course, disarmed. 
and to proceed with measures of a thorough character. 
One day, they caused all the citizens to be assembled for 
a general muster. The Three Thousand met in the mar- 
ket-place ; the rest, in smaller bodies, in different locali- 
ties of the city. These places of meeting were surrounded 
by troops ; and the citizens, taken unawares, were obliged 
to deliver up their arms to the Lacedaemonian mercena- 
ries, who carried them away to the citadel. Thus, after 
the precedent of earlier arbitrary governments (vol. i. p. 
377), the people had been successfully disarmed ; upon the 
Three Thousand, who were left in possession of their arms, 
as secure a reliance was placed as upon any ordinary band 
of partisans. To the Three Thousand, therefore, were 
granted certain civic rights ; and, in particular, the privi- 
lege was secured to them that no member of their body 
should be punished without a judicial procedure. This 
arrangement was, in truth, not so much a protection for 
the Three Thousand, as a weapon of offence against the 
rest of the citizens. For the abolition of the most abso- 
lutely inalienable rights of Athenian freedom was expli- 
citly declared, when only a fixed number of citizens was 
specially excepted from the general forfeiture of these 
rights. And now further steps continued to be taken with 
increasing fearlessness. To be involved in a penal prose- 
cution, it sufficed to be personally on unfriendly terms 
with one of those in power, or even to be in possession of 

36 History of Greece. r Bo0 * v. 

a tempting amount of property ; and the more frequently 
the thirst after vengeance and booty was gratified, the 
more ardent it became. Houses and work-shops were 
searched, money-chests broken open, consecrated gifts and 
deposits attacked. Several members of the government 
selected their victims according to a mutual agreement ; 
they hereby attained to a more intimate connexion amongst 
themselves, but, at the same time, marked themselves off 
from those whose sentiments were more conciliatory. Thus 
a division formed itself between Ultras and Moderates, 
which, from day to day, became more manifest. Thera- 
menes, who recklessly attacked the bloody sway of the 
so-called " best citizens," became intolerable, and his over- 
throw a necessity. 

Critias v Accordingly, Critias, after secretly arming 

Theramenes. a band of his most faithful followers, sum- 
moned the council, and there preferred against Thera- 
menes a charge on life and death. This indictment of 
Theramenes was, at the same time, a justification of the 
policy of Critias himself. " In political revolutions," he 
said, "it is absolutely unavoidable that blood should 
flow ; this every one must perceive, who feels it his mis- 
sion to perform such tasks ; and he should, therefore, have 
manliness enough to command his personal feelings. 
Athens is the focus of democracy, against which we 
struggle as against the root of all social evils. Athens is, 
unfortunately for herself, a populous city, which has been 
trained in all the follies of popular liberty. After much 
labor, we have destroyed the popular government, and 
founded an oligarchy, which is alone capable of main- 
taining a lasting concord between Athens and Sparta. 
We must, therefore, stand firm, and not allow any oppo- 
sition in the state, and least of all in our own body. Now 
Theramenes never ceases to vituperate us, and find fault 
with us ; he is our foe ; and, inasmuch as at first he went 
hand in hand with us, nay, was more than any other 

c'uap. i.] Athens wider the Thirty. 37 

man instrumental in bringing about the existing order of 
things, and yet now deserts us, with the intent, in view of 
the undeniable dangers of our position, of keeping a re- 
treat open for himself: he is not merely our opponent, 
but also a traitor, and the most dangerous traitor of whom 
it is possible for us to conceive. True, his conduct can- 
not surprise us, for it accords with his character ; he is, as 
his well-known nickname testifies, an untrustworthy turn- 
coat. As member of the Four Hundred, as accuser of 
the naval commanders, he betrayed his own friends, and 
brought upon them their doom. Are we, then, now to 
wait until he succeeds in repeating this course of conduct? 
Assuredly, all of us who are here assembled honor the 
city of Sparta, as a seat of wise political institutions. Is 
it your belief that the Spartans would tolerate such a 
case as that one of the Ephors should unceasingly slander 
the constitution, and counteract the authorities ? Consi- 
der, then, whether ye will uphold this self-seeking traitor, 
and allow him to gain authority over you, or whether, 
with him, the hope of success shall, once for all, be cut 
off from all whose desires are like unto his ?"* 
Theramenes defended himself with un- 


shaken courage. He represented his indict- menes v. 


ment of the Arginusse generals in the light of 
an act of self-defence ; and, in order to retort upon the 
personal charges of his adversary, referred to the earlier 
career of Critias, which, he suggested, was assuredly 
equally little likely to conciliate confidence ; and, in par- 
ticular, to his guidance of the peasant-revolts in Thessaly 
(vol. iii. p. 576). Doubtless, he continued, the man who 
undermined the existing constitution was deserving of 
death ; but, let him ask every impartial judge upon whom 

* The Three Thousand were a new edition of the committee of the 
citizens. Theramenes ic69opvos" Hellen. ii. 3, 35. Schol. Aristoph. Ran. 47 •, 
the shoe fitting either foot symbolizes d/n^oTf/novAo? in politics. Poll.vii. 90^ 
91 ; Rhein. Mus. xx. 390. 

38 History of Greece. [Book v. 

this blame should fall ? Whether upon him who had 
loyally adhered to his colleagues, who had merely raised 
his warning voice against their excesses, and urged a se- 
cure establishment of the government ; or upon him who 
made it his task to incite the rest to deeds of more and 
more reckless violence, and to cast deeper and deeper 
odium upon the government, while swelling the multitude 
of its foes? Thus, Theramenes attempted to turn the 
charges inculpating himself against their author. "Al- 
ready," he proceeded, " a band of fugitive citizens has 
established itself at Phyle, in order to attract increasing 
accessions of malcontents. Nothing can be more warmly 
desired by these in their own interest, than that the state 
of things in Athens should become more and more unen- 
durable ; accordingly, he who contributes most to this re- 
sult is their best ally. Even as I opposed the Four Hun- 
dred, when they built the fortress in the Piraeus, in order 
to deliver it up to the Lacedaemonians, so I am now, as 
heretofore, the enemy of all those who wish to annihilate 
the political existence of Athens. So much even the 
Spartans had no intention of effecting, although the fate 
of the city lay in their hands. I am charged with being 
friendly to both parties ; but what is to be said of him 
who is the foe of both, and who, after the overthrow of 
popular government, is busily undermining the rule of 
those who regard themselves as the best of the citizens ? 
My view of the state has ever been consistently the same. 
I am the declared enemy of every democracy which 
places the decisive authority in the hands of such citizens 
as those who, for the sake of turning a drachm, force 
themselves into the public service, and who will not rest 
content until they have given to the slaves equality of 
rights with the citizens. But I am no less decidedly the 
enemy of those who, in their savage partisan fury, are 
not satisfied until they have subjected the state to the des- 
potic sway of a handful of men." 

C,,AP 1 1 Alliens under the Thirty. 39 

So powerful was the impression made by this speech, 
that, in spite of the lowering glances of Critias, a loud 
assent involuntarily ensued from the benches of the 
councilmen. Some had already, for a considerable 
period, favored the view of Theramenes, among them 
especially Eratosthenes and Phidon; indeed, a third of 
the body had been named by Theramenes himself. 
Many a one was becoming more and more clearly con- 
scious of the fact that, in his own interest, nothing could 
be more desirable than that greater moderation and 
caution should be resorted to, before it was too late. 
Critias perceived that nothing was to be effected by 
means of further speeches ; a vote, regularly taken, 
would have resulted in the acquittal of Theramenes and 
in the victory of the Moderates. He, therefore, as he 
had long ago resolved, resorted to measures of force even 
against his own colleagues. After exchanging a few 
words, in a low tone, with his friends, he caused the 
armed men to approach the bar of the place of assembly, 
declared it to be the duty of a conscientious ruler of the 
state not to permit those who shared his sentiments to be 
seduced by specious orations, and avowed the determina- 
tion of himself and his friends not to become guilty of 
any craven concessions. The new laws, he said, ordained 
that no member of the Three Thousand should be 
sentenced without the assent of the council ; but Thera- 
menes, as a traitor and enemy of the constitution, had 
forfeited his membership of this body ; he therefore 
hereby struck his name off the list of citizens enjoying 
full civic rights, and sentenced him to death. 

Theramenes sprang to the altar, before the Execution 
advancing catchpolls could seize his person. of Therame- 
He implored the council not to suffer such an 
act of arbitrary violence. The name of any other man 
might as easily as his own be expunged from the list of 

40 History of Greece. t BoOK v - 

the citizens by Critias ; no member of the council, or of 
the Thirty, could feel secure of his life. True, even the 
altar would be no protection to himself; but at least all 
should clearly perceive that to men such as Critias 
neither divine nor human ordinances were sacred. He 
was dragged away by the Eleven, out of the council- 
house, straight across the market-place, where a few friends 
were about to make a last attempt to save him. But 
Theramenes himself prevented them, and took the hem- 
lock-cup into his hands with an equanimity which in the 
last hours of his life gained for this man, devoid as he was 
of any true strength of character, the glory of a hero. He 
pledged " the dear Critias " in his death-draught, thereby 
prophesying him a speedy sequence.* 

ETects of ^ ne d ea th of Theramenes exercised a very 
his death. definite influence upon the attitude of the 
Thirty. An opposition had been removed which ham- 
pered and crippled the government ; the formation of a 
Moderate party within the governing body and the coun- 
cil had been frustrated ; in order to rid itself of Thera- 
menes, the victorious party had been obliged to violate its 
own laws, and to deprive an associate in the government 
of the narrow measure of security which they afforded. 
Henceforth it became necessary for the purpose of self- 
preservation to apply all the means of a relentless terror- 
ism. The act of violence which had been committed, and 
which no sophistry was capable of glossing over, blunted 
the consciences of the Tyrants, and impelled them on- 
wards in their career with a daemonic force. 

Further They proceeded to more comprehensive 

eMc S affairs measures than they had hitherto put in force, 

particularly with the intention of diminishing 

the masses of the city populace, which had always seemed 

* For the defence of Theramenes: Hellen. ii 3, 35. Xenophon is favor- 
able to him; Lysias, xii. 77, supplements Xenophon's account. Scheibe, 
93. The Liberals positively refused to acknowledge Theramenes as a mar 
tyr of their cause. 

Chap, i.] Athens under the Thirty. 41 

to the adherents of aristocratic principles the root of all 
evil. In order therefore to carry out a radical cure, the 
new list of citizens was made use of. All those whose 
names were absent from it, were deprived not only of the 
full civic franchise, but also of the right of dwelling in 
Athens. Thus, after a fashion far ruder than that, e. g. 
adopted by Periander, who desired to force his urban 
subjects to resume a peasant life (vol. i. p. 298), the ma- 
jority of the Athenians were expelled from their paternal 
abodes, and until further orders prohibited from entering 
the city, or visiting the market-place and temples. The 
tranquillity of a desert was to prevail in Athens ; and any 
conspiracy, nay any common discussion concerning the 
situation of affairs, was to be rendered impossible. Nor 
were the fugitives permitted to rest quiet in the country 
districts. In many cases lands were confiscated and 
given over to members of the government, out of whom it 
was designed to create a new class of great landed pro- 
prietors. For it was contrived to give a specious appear- 
ance to this criminal system of robbery by representing 
the misfortune of Athens to lie in the excessive subdivi- 
sion of land. The more real and personal property the 
Tyrants accumulated in their hands, the more enduring 
the foundations of their dominion seemed to become. 
Everything connected with the splendor of the democra- 
tic era was destroyed according to a fixed plan. The 
grand public works of the city which ruled the sea, 
especially the ship-sheds, were pulled down, and the ma- 
terials sold to the government treasury. The The 
place of the popular assembly was trans- lar assembl y- 
formed ; for it was held undesirable that the citizens 
should sit as heretofore on the rows of seats, rising like 
the tiers of a theatre, of the Pnyx ; indeed, it was in- 
tended not to have any civic assembly which remained 
together for meetings of considerable duration ; the 
ancient Pnyx was therefore closed, by the tribune of the 

42 History of Greece. £ BooK V. 

orators being turned round, so that henceforth a speaker 
stood with his face towards the citadel, as had been the 
case in the primitive times, before the Pnyx had been ar- 
ranged for the meetings of a consultative civic body. 
Henceforth the citizens had to listen standing to the 
edicts of the government which it was thought fit to com- 
municate to them from the orators' tribune, so that after 
a short stay they might again go about their business. 
This change of front in the tribune was therefore a genu- 
inely aristocratic measure, and designed to put an end by 
a single blow to the turbulence of the assemblies ; nor 
was it more than a witty gloss upon this ordinance, when 
it was suggested that its intention was to prevent the ora- 
tors from pointing as heretofore towards the sea, and 
thereby hinting at the lost greatness of Athens. For 
other and more effective provisions had been made to 
hinder the Athenians from taking thought any longer of 
sea or navy. 
Education. Again, in order to put an end to the whole 
perversity of the people, and to that false cul- 
ture on the strength of which any and every man thought 
himself called upon to contribute his opinion on public 
affairs, rhetorical instruction was placed under the strict 
control of the authorities. Nothing was to be taught ex- 
cept what seemed to accord with the principles of the 
despots ; and most especially the lower strata of the po- 
pulation were to be left untouched by any superior cul- 
ture ; and the power inseparable from this was to remain 
a privilege of the higher classes.* 

Thus the heads of the Thirty desired to 

False secu- * . 

rity of the transform the whole of Athens. In their fa- 
naticism they thought to be working for a dis- 
tant future, while the ground on which they had erected 
their artificial edifice was already beginning to quake be- 

* As to the changes in the Pnyx, cf. the author's Att. Studien, i. 56. As ta 
the prohibition of free instruction, Xen. Mem. i. 2, 31. 

Chap, i.j Athens under the Thirty. 43 

neath their feet. For, in the first place, the germ of op- 
position had not been destroyed in the heart of the gov- 
ernment itself; but continued to reappear, since Critias 
and Charides with increasing audacity demeaned them- 
selves as the real masters, and since it was manifest that 
the unmeasured ambition of the former pursued in addi- 
tion very special objects of its own. Moreover, the Thirty 
seemed to give themselves up to the fixed illusion, that it 
was only in the market-place of Athens that dangerous 
movements could originate. As to the city populace out- 
side the walls, they relied upon the uncontroverted au- 
thority of Sparta, and in the worst event upon the for- 
eign troops in their pay, to such a degree that they, in a 
feeling of absolute security, occupied themselves solely 
with internal affairs. It never even occurred to them to 
watch the proceedings of the fugitives, or to garrison the 
frontier fortresses which these fugitives might use as bases 
of military operations. 

Thus it came to pass that it was not in the 

1 The exiles 

depojmlated city, lying under the ban of the 
Tyrannical government, but outside Athens, that a revo- 
lution in the state of affairs prepared itself. For, inas- 
much as the news of the rule of the Thirty had provoked 
a deep indignation throughout Greece, Athens, only a short 
time before universally hated, now became an object of 
universal sympathy. Sparta had indeed issued strict orders 
that the exiles should be nowhere received ; her heralds 
impressed upon all Greek cities their duty of obeying this 
ordinance and delivering up those whom they had admit- 
ted ; and the recalcitrants were threatened with a pecu- 
niary fine of five talents. 

But this was a matter wherein, according to a noble 
Greek usage, the city communities were least of all ready 
to permit their autonomy to be restricted ; and, moreover, 
it was probably known that these threatening orders were 
not meant very seriously. Although therefore several of 

44 History of Greece. [ Bo0K v - 

the lesser states submitted to the odious demand, in others 
the bands of fugitives, seeking shelter in their helpless- 
ness, were not only hospitably received by individual citi- 
zens, as e. g. in Chalcis, Megara, and Elis, but also actu- 
at Argos a ^y placed under the public protection. This 
was done at Argos and at Thebes. The Ar- 
gives were generous and spirited enough to bid the Spar- 
tan heralds depart from the city before sunset, unless they 
wished to be regarded as enemies ; and Thebes pronounced 
a penalty upon those citizens who allowed fugitives to be 
borne away without affording them succor. 
and Thebes Thebes became the most important gather- 

ing place, because here those Athenians as- 
sembled who from the first kept an armed return in view, 
and who here found a centre in proved generals and cham- 
pions of popular rights. Among these Thrasybulus, Any- 
tus, and Archinus were prominent. Anytus, the son of 
Anthemion, was the proprietor of a tan-yard, like Cleon, 
and like him a plain-spoken man of the people, with a 
rough exterior, and rather proud of having remained a 
stranger to all modern refinement and aristocratic culture. 
He had already filled a series of important offices, and 
had recently been involved in a judicial prosecution, be- 
cause his negligence was said to have caused the loss of 
Pylus to Sparta (01. xcii. 4 ; B. c. 409). But he had 
been acquitted — as his enemies said, with the aid of bri- 
bery, for he was a rich man. The united fugitives had 
agreed to acknowledge Thrasybulus and Anytus as their 
leaders ; and Thrasybulus found himself for the second 
time at the head of a body of men, who, though far away 
from Athens, regarded themselves as the true Athens, as 
the core of her free citizens (vol. iii. p. 470). On the 
former occasion he had been surrounded by the fleet; 
now he had around him nothing but a small band of fu- 
gitive citizens in a foreign land. Archinus, who had like- 
wise seen service as a general, stood as a zealous associate 

chap, i.] Athens under the Thirty. 45 

by Thrasybulus' side, and was prepared to devise and ex- 
ecute in conjunction with him the plans intended to lead 
to the liberation of their native city.* 

The Thirty had in the interest of Sparta The f . 
not only deprived Athens of its strong walls, Ph y le - 
but also pulled down or dismantled the frontier fortresses. 
The whole district of Attica was to be a defenceless coun- 
try, which was precisely what the Spartans had demanded 
after the Persian wars. Yet after all, the Thirty had in 
these proceedings failed to do their work thoroughly ; and 
thus the exiles succeeded in discovering in the frontier range 
between Attica and Boeotia, on Mount Parnes, a spot whence 
they might commence operations under specially favorable 
circumstances. On the strait footpath from Athens to 
Thebes, beneath vertical walls of rock, which are visible 
from Athens, lay the fort of Phyle, a small castle with a 
circumference of about 900 feet, completely shutting off 
the narrow mountain-path, aud from its elevation (2,000 
feet above the sea) offering an open view over the whole 
plain of Athens and over the Saronic gulf, as far as the 
coasts of Peloponnesus. The castle-hill itself has a pre- 
cipitous declivity, and is only on the east side accessible 
by a small path ; further down wooded gorges descend, 
permeated by rivulets which in the winter render the lo- 
cality still more difficult of access ; while at the base of the 
mountain-range is spread out the broad district of Achar- 
nse, whose peasants were the most vigorous and liberty- 
loving among the inhabitants of Attica. The fortress was 

*Oi Trepi XapueKia, the Ultras and leaders of the Thirty, like the associates 
of Phrynichus among the Four Hundred (Arist. Pol. 205, 2). As to foreign 
participation: Pint. Lys. 27; Diod. xiv. 6; Demosth. xv. 22. Anytus (ttAovVio? e'/c 
o-KVTofiev/riKJjs, Schof. Plat. Apol. 18) detained by a storm with his squadron at Ma- 
lea, and indicted after the loss of Pylus (Diod. xiii. 64), offers the first in- 
stance of the corruption of the judicial tribunal (^aTf'Seife to SeKa^etv, Aris- 
tot. ap. Harp. Se»ca£wv). Archinus, perhaps a son of Myronides (vol. ii. p. 
436), fXfTa y€ tovs 0eov? aiTiwTaros t»js xaflooov tu» oq/^Dem. xxiv. 135; SieverB, 
p. 107. 

46 History of Greece. C BoOK v « 

admirably situated for obtaining forage from Boeotia, and 
men from the surrounding localities.* 
_. . . . In the winter season the exiles, seventy in 

Skirmishes ' * 

near Phyie number, crossed the frontier unobserved. They 

01. xciv. 1. ' J 

(b. c. 4o;j). occupied the empty castle, the walls of which 

January. x , . 

either were quite intact, or might be easily put 
in repair. When the news reached Athens, this expedi- 
tion of adventurers was at first deemed utterly unworthy 
of consideration ; but when it was announced that the 
band had been increased, a vigorous intervention was de- 
termined upon, in order to put an end to the nuisance. 
The Three Thousand, accompanied by the Knights, march- 
ed upon the fortress, which was about eleven miles distant 
from the city. A few eager spirits among the youthful 
chivalry attempted to storm the walls ; but this attempt 
having ended very lamentably, it became necessary to re- 
sort to a siege. A heavy fall of snow, which rapidly ac- 
cumulates in those gorges, happened to take place in the 
ensuing night. The besieging force was fain to look out 
for protection and shelter, and was brought into so much 
confusion by the stress of weather, that in the end a re- 
treat took place which resembled a flight, and which was 
accompanied by considerable losses. 

Hereupon it was no longer possible to mistake the dan- 
ger. The Thirty found themselves of a sudden involved 
in a serious war ; and inasmuch as they had no prospect 
of taking Phyle, they resolved to pitch a camp between 
Phyle and Acharnse, in order to observe the enemy, to 
cut off his supplies, and to prevent the extension of the re- 
volt. But in this too they utterly failed; for Thrasy- 
bulus, the numbers of whose force had increased to 700, 
made a night sally, and towards daybreak surprised the 
camp, where the troops lay asleep and the grooms were 
still occupied with rubbing down the horses. One hun- 

* For the destruction of the Attic fortresses, see Lysias, xii. 40. But 
Phyle had remained a \u>piov i<r\vp6v, Hell. ii. 4, 2. Eleusis likewise. 

Chxp. i.] Athens under the Thirty. 47 

dred and twenty heavy-armed soldiers were slain ; the rest 
made their way home in desperate flight. 

This rout of the Knights and garrison troops Eleusis pu- 
created so strong an impression, that the Thir- rified ' 
ty, who a few days before had not condescended to take 
any notice of the whole coup de main, now, their sense of 
security having been thoroughly shaken, endeavored to 
devise means for preserving themselves. They submitted 
to making proposals to Thrasybulus ; they offered him a 
share in the government, and the right of return to a pro- 
portion of the exiles. But such proposals as these Thra- 
sybulus, who had returned to Phyle laden with rich spoils 
of victory, could not think of accepting ; it was impossible 
that he should demand less than the complete restoration 
of the constitution and the return of the confiscated pro- 
perty. Thus nothing remained for the Tyrants, but to 
take up a position in the country as well secured as pos- 
sible against any attack. For this purpose Athens seemed 
to them ill-adapted, because there, and still more in the 
Pirseeus, the population was at all times unsafe; they 
therefore sought for a fortified place hard by the sea, and 
from this point of view the situation of Eleusis appeared 
pre-eminently advantageous. Here Lacedaemonian troops 
could more easily come to the rescue by land and sea ; and 
here they had Salamis close at hand as a last resort. But, 
before they set up their head-quarters at Eleusis, they 
resolved thoroughly to clear the ground and purify the 
population; a resolution which was actually carried out 
with a display of violence, proving that Critias adhered 
with fanatical obstinacy to his bloody course. The Ty- 
rants summoned all men capable of bearing arms to a 
muster at Eleusis, in order, as they pretended, to arrive at 
an accurate knowledge of the military forces of the city, 
and of the island lying in front of it ; and on the appointed 
day came across with their cavalry from Athens. Here- 
upon, all who were liable to military service had succes- 

48 History of Greece. £ BoOK v * 

sively to present themselves on the mustering-ground at 
Eleusis ; and after this presentation those whom the police 
agents had designated as unsafe (their number was 300), 
were ordered to take their departure singly through the 
city-gate leading towards the harbor ; but no sooner had 
they issued forth on the other side, than they were seized 
by the cavalry detachment drawn up there, laid in bonds, 
conducted to Athens, and delivered up to the Eleven. On 
the next day a judicial procedure took place in the 
Odeum by the Ilissus, to which the Three Thousand were 
summoned. For it was the intention of Critias to attach 
the Three Thousand more closely to himself, by making 
them participators in his crimes; and he demanded of 
them outright that they should share, not only in the 
profits, but also in the dangers of the oligarchy, which he 
declared to have been established for their benefit as well 
as for that of the Thirty. The Three Thousand were 
obliged to vote openly in the presence of the Lacedaemo- 
nian troops ; and thus the arrested Eleusinians and Sala- 
minians were, without any judicial trial, on the bare 
demand of Critias, one and all sentenced to death as 
public criminals, and executed.* 

Advance of While the Tyrants were endeavoring to 
prop their threatened dominion by such means 
as these, their opponents, encouraged by numerous acces- 
sions, were seen boldly advancing out of their mountain 
recess and proceeding to decisive measures, i. e. to an at- 
tack upon the chief places of the district. It was to the 
port-town that Thrasybulus first directed his attention. 
It had not been depopulated like the upper city ; on the 

* As to the purification of Eleusis, see Hell. ii. 4, 8 (and Salamis, Lys. xii. 
52, xiii. 44; Diod. xiv. 32). Three hundred was certainly not the total num- 
ber of citizens capable of bearing arms. Either a separation took place in the 
market-place of the suspected from the non-suspected, or the latter had 
already previously been taken out. The former is also assumed by Scheibe, 
who, however (p. Ill), speaks of a muster of the cavalry. According to 
Grote, vol. viii. p. 364, all the citizens were dragged away into prison. 

Chap * **1 Athens under the Thirty. 49 

contrary, more than 5,000 had escaped from Athens to 
the Piraeeus. Here, in consequence of the officious de- 
struction of maritime business, the discontent had arisen 
to its greatest height ; and here the democrats might ex- 
pect to find the greatest number of adherents. The Thirty 
had very ill provided for their own interests in the Pirae- 
eus ; in their blind zeal they had pulled down part of the 
walls encircling it, thinking thereby to annihilate the im- 
portance of the port-town ; but this very work of destruc- 
tion had opened a way to the liberating forces, and had 
made it possible for them, without a fight, to establish 
a firm footing in the Pirseeus. This Thrasybulus per- 
ceived, and five days after the victory near Acharme led 
his thousand men along the valley of the Cephisus past 
Athens, and occupied the port-town. His numbers were 
insufficient for holding the outer line of the walls ; accord- 
ingly, when next morning the entire armed force of the 
Thirty marched out, he withdrew to the fortified height of 
Munychia, where he was able to take up a very advantage- 
ous position. For his adversaries who followed his march 
were prevented, by the rows of houses in the street as- 
cending from the market of Hippodamus (vol. ii. p. 614), 
from developing their full front ; they had to fight as if 
they were standing in a narrow pass ; and the great depth 
of their column afforded this advantage to Thrasybulus, 
that the light-armed troops posted in the rear of his hop- 
lites could, from their more elevated position, hurl their 
darts and stones with double effect into the long and dense 
mass of the foe, while the rear divisions of the advancing 
troops were wholly unable to bring their missiles into 

Thus his forces, drawn up ten deep, stood Battle of 
awaiting the enemy as he ascended, while oi ul xc1v ia i (b 
Thrasybulus, full of confidence, encouraged <^403). Febru- 
them to the decisive struggle. He pointed out 

to them the advantages of their position, and reminded 

50 History of Greece. t BoOK v - 

them of the justice of their cause, and of the aid of the 
gods, who during this short campaign had already so 
manifestly proved themselves their auxiliaries and allies. 
Thereupon ensued a solemn pause ; for the soothsayer 
who accompanied the band directed that, in order to re- 
main guiltless of the approaching civil conflict, they 
should not commence the attack until one of their num- 
ber had been wounded or slain. And then he declared 
that he believed himself to be appointed by the gods as 
the first victim, and, as if carried away by his destiny, 
stepped into the front rank and fell. Thereupon the fray 
commenced in hot earnest for the possession of the sooth- 
sayer's corpse. Both sides fought with resolute bravery ; 
for both parties felt that all was at stake. In the end the 
troops of the Tyrants, in spite of all the exertions of Criti- 
as, were forced to give way, and were driven down the pre- 
cipitous ground. After their ranks had been dissolved, they 
Death of were pursued down into the plain. Critias 
Critias. himself fell in the melee; seventy citizens lay 
slain on the ground. Their arms were taken from them ; 
but in all other respects the dead bodies were given up in- 
tact by the victors ; for Thrasybulus had enjoined upon 
them as a most sacred duty to spare what could be spared, 
and to avoid all superfluous bloodshed. Indeed, while 
the last offices were being performed for the dead, there 
ensued a harmless approximation between the two parties ; 
and this state of feeling was taken advantage of by Cleo- 
critus, who held the office of herald at the Mysteries, and 
belonged to the patriot party, and who now, raising his 
powerful voice, exhorted the citizens on either side to 
. - concord. He reminded them how all who 

Speech of 

cieocritus. h a( j on this day stood opposed to one another 
as enemies, were in truth mutually connected by the holi- 
est of bonds. It was the impious Tyrants who were alone 
guilty of the whole calamity — they who had visited their 
native city with robbery and murder ; who had, within 

Chai> - *J Athens under the Thirty. 51 

eight months, put more citizens to death than the Pclo- 
ponnesians in the ten troublous years of the Decelean 
war. These men, therefore, he bade the citizens re- 
nounce, and the sooner the better. 

This speech had well-nigh induced the civ- The Tcn 
ic populace to declare its readiness for a at Athens. 

reconciliation, when the members of the gov- 01 - xciv •} 

. . . . ( B - ( '- 403 )- 

ernment still succeeded in conducting their March. 

troops in time back into the city, where they 
now endeavored to settle themselves anew as bast they 
might. They endeavored, but in vain, to restore the 
previous government. They had completely lost ground 
in Athens ; and while a desire for the constitution in- 
creased, the party of the Ultras was without a head ; 
those who still remained of the Thirty were at discord 
amongst themselves, and the Three Thousand likewise. 
For the latter, too, included not a few who would not 
listen to any suggestion of giving way : these were the 
men who had most participated in the acts of violence 
perpetrated, and whose evil conscience made them most 
afraid of a thorough revolution in the state of affairs. 
Finally a compromise was agreed upon. For, while the 
number of those preponderated who desired a gradual 
return to a constitutional state of things, on the other 
hand there was still sufficient fear of Sparta to cause an 
unwillingness against casting to the winds the institutions 
introduced by Lysander; and, moreover, the existing 
civic body was to a large extent composed of adversaries 
of popular government. Therefore, although the citizens 
decreed the dismissal of the Thirty, and established a 
new Board of Ten, who were, in the absence of a consti- 
tution, to govern the city in conjunction with the civic 
body, yet a mode of transition was adopted which 
mitigated the change ; i. e. the members of the new 
government were selected from the Thirty, of whom the 
more moderate, such as Phidon and Eratosthenes, had 

52 History of Greece. ^Book v. 

remained in Athens, from the oligarchic senate, and from 
the number of those who generally shared, their political 
views. Of the Thirty, Phidon was chosen, who was 
known to have, next to Theramenes, most vigorously 
opposed Critias and Charides. Hippocles, Epichares, and 
Rhinon were of the same shade of party. These men 
were the moderate oligarchs, who had been driven into 
the background by the death of Theramenes, and whom 
it was now intended to place at the helm of the state.* 
These measures onlv increased the confusion 

State of J 

parties at an d haplessness in Attic affairs. For the 

Athens and in x 

the country. l an( | was now split up into three parties. 
Those of the Thirty who adhered to the views of Critias, 
established themselves with their following at Eleusis ; 
and their partisans formed a separate civic community 
around them. The Ten, surrounded by those who by re- 
maining in the city had renounced the cause of the 
Tyrants, kept watch over the capital, and had their head- 
quarters in the Odeum ; while the Democrats maintained 
theirs in Munychia. There was no prospect of any 
reconciliation. For it soon became evident that the Ten 
had no intention of acting as Theramenes might have 
acted, and as the majority of the citizens desired, and of 
endeavoring to bring about an understanding with Thra- 
sybulus ; on the contrary, they very clearly displayed 
their resolution of maintaining the oligarchical constitu- 
tion ; they wished to preserve for themselves as much as 
possible of the authority which the Thirty had possessed ; 
and the fears entertained at Athens of a complete resto- 
ration of the democracy, of new quarrels with Sparta and 
new troubles of war, procured them adherents and sup- 
porters among the citizens. 

* For the fight at Munychia pee Hell. ii. 4, 10. Cleocritus, 6 tuv fivarQiP 
K-qpvg, g 20. Justinus, v. 10, attributes a similar speech to Theramenes. For 
the establishment of the Siica dvSpes auTOAepdropes, see Diod. xiv. 33; Sexc* 
Souxot, Harp. Suidas v. Bi<a ; Lys. xii. 55. 

chap, i.j Athens under the Tliirty. 53 

Meanwhile the strength of the constitutional party was 
continuously on the increase. Its nucleus was swelled by 
a crowd of persons of less trustworthy character ; adven- 
turers, who were anxious to take an early advantage of 
the expected change of things, in order to obtain a posi- 
tion of public consideration, and to bury in oblivion their 
former lives. The leaders of the party could not as yet 
dare to make difficulties w T ith regard to the admission of 
associates ; they received non-citizens as well as citizens 
into their camp, and even issued a proclamation, wherein 
they promised to all who should take part in the contest, 
isotehjy i. e. the position of those privileged resident aliens 
who as such could transact business directly with the civic 
community, and who paid no higher taxes than the actual 
citizens. But considerable accessions also arrived from 
the better elements of the rural population, in particular 
from Acharnte ; support was also given by such friends of 
the constitution as could not take a personal part in the 
conflict : thus the patriotic Lysias, the son of Cephalus, 
sent 2,000 drachms and 200 shields ; levied at his own ex- 
pense a band of more than 300 men and negotiated a loan 
of two talents from Elis. Foreigners, too, afforded aid to 
the enterprise, e. g. the wealthy Theban Ismenias ; and 
thus Thrasybulus was enabled continuously to improve the 
equipment of his troops, and to render them more dan- 
gerous to the foe. They hovered round the city, where 
confidence sank from day to day, and a want of the pro- 
visions of life became perceptible. The houses were too 
full of inhabitants, and the Knights suffered from the 
fatigues of guard-duty ; they were already terrified by pre- 
parations for storming the city from the north-east ; and it 
was only by rendering impervious the roadway leading in 
from the Lyceum (vol. ii. p. 615), that the threatened at- 
tack was for the nonce averted. 

But even now the Ten would not hear of any com- 

54 History of Greece. f Bo0K v - 

The Ten promise. They would not agree to negotiations 
apply for aid ^h Thrasybulus, which the community de- 

to Sparta. J ' J 

sired and ordered ; on the contrary, they turned 
to Sparta, where they announced the revolt of the city, 
and asked for aid. Phidon went in person to Sparta, and 
made use of all his eloquence, in order to induce the au- 
thorities there to despatch a military expedition against 
the democrats ; he particularly pointed to the dangerous 
connexion between Thrasybulus and Boeotia, and hinted 
at the possibility of the Thebans making themselves, in 
this way, masters of Attica, and forming a menacing 
power against Sparta. The government at Athens accord- 
ingly pursued precisely the same course which was taken 
by the Thirty at Eleusis, who likewise claimed the assist- 
ance of Sparta.* 

l sander Lysander hereupon exerted his whole in- 

fiekP th 1n t fi ueuce m support of these requests for aid. 
Thrasybulus. H e had been deeply agitated by the fall of the 
(b.'c. 403). Thirty; he saw his chief work in ruins, his 

April. honor offended, and all his schemes in peril. 

He hastened in person to Sparta, in order to save his sys- 
tem of policy ; and, at last, obtained so much as this : 
that Phidon succeeded in effecting a loan of a hundred 
talents at Sparta for the hire of troops against Thrasybu- 
lus ; and that Lysander was himself, in accordance with 
the proposition of Phidon, sent to Athens as commander 
of the troops, in order to restore order there in the capa- 
city of Harmost. At the same time he brought about the 
appointment of his brother Libys, who was to support his 
undertaking as admiral, with forty ships. He used his ut- 
most exertions in carrying the whole matter to the speediest 

* The Tyrants retained the official name of "the Thirty" even at Eleusis 
after the death of Critias, Hippomachus, and Theramenes, and after the se- 
cession of Eratosthenes and Phidon. As to the accession of men from 
Acharnse, Lys. xxxi. 15. As to Lysias, Vit. X. Orai. 835 (and Ismenias) ; Jus- 
tin, v. 9. As to the Isotely, Hellen. ii.4, 25. As to the suffering state of Atheni* 
Xen. Mem. ii. 7, 2. 

chap. L] Athens wider tlie Thirty. 55 

issue possible. In a short space of time Thrasybulus was 
blockaded from the sea, and Lysander stood near Eleusis 
with a thousand men. Of a sudden the cause of liberty 
seemed to be once more lost ; and on no side was there 
any prospect of salvation. 

And yet one opened at this very moment, The 
and in a quarter where it was least to be nen * s °f £y- 

* sander at 

looked for — viz. at Sparta. Lysander was s P» rta - 
odious to the kings. They knew that his proceedings 
were directed to a revolution in the political system, and 
more particularly to an alteration in the order of the 
succession to the throne. This suspicion was aided by the 
indignation in which the more high-minded of the citizens 
shared, that the name of Sparta should have been dis- 
honored by the criminal cruelties of Lysander and his 
followers ; and was further fostered by the jealousy 
against his still overweening authority, and by the wrath 
against his arbitrary proceedings. For it must be remem- 
bered, that the measures adopted at Athens had not been 
taken in pursuance of official orders ; that the entire 
change of the Athenian constitution, the consequence of 
which had aroused the indignation of all Hellas, was 
based solely on a personal agreement between the Attic 
party-chiefs and Lysander. If therefore he were to suc- 
ceed, at the head of an army of mercenaries, in establish- 
ing his party for a second time at the helm in Athens, 
and in regulating Attic affairs by virtue of his personal 
authority, the consequence would be an intolerable ag- 
grandizement of his power. And, inasmuch as at his side 
stood his brother, holding the office of admiral, which 
was in itself regarded as an authority hostile to the royal, 
there were, in truth, very reasonable grounds for the 
fear : that Lysander was thinking of establishing himself, 
by the aid of his party, at Athens, and of there founding 
a power independent of Sparta. 

In this view of the political situation the two kings 

56 History of Greece. t BooK v - 

were at one, because they saw themselves menaced in the 
interests common to both. They had availed themselves 
of the long absence of Lysander to arrive at an under- 
standing with one another, and with others who shared 
their sentiments ; and, in the autumn of the year 404, the 
Ephorate also had come to include men holding the same 
opinion. Hardly, therefore, had Lysander, by the exer- 
tion of all his influence, once more in the main carried 
his plans, and started with his army on the road to 
Athens, when the kings made a desperate attempt to frus- 
trate his intentions. 

tion 'of fau- ^ ^ ie * w0 k m g s > the really active one was 

sanias.oi. Pausanias, the son of Plistoanax of the house 

XC1V. 1 (lJ. C. 

403). May. f the Agiadse. In this house a standpoint is 
undeniably perceptible, which was opposed on principle 
to the spirit of Lysander, and which was utterly averse 
from any acts of heartless violence against Hellenes, and 
from a military despotism of Sparta. It was only a small 
body of Spartans which shared these sentiments ; and for 
this reason the pacific Agiada) were exposed to repeated 
cavils and attacks, and were only rarely able to exercise a 
decisive influence upon Spartan foreign policy.* 

But, on the present occasion, they were successful ; and 
the occasion was of critical importance for the entire his- 
tory of the Greek people. Pausanias gained over to his 
views three out of the five Ephors. They amounted to 
this : that the conduct of Attic affairs ought not to be left 
in the hands of Lysander, who pursued no ends but those 
of his personal ambition ; and that he, the king, must be 

* Phidon at Sparta, Lys. xii. 58; Eellen. ii. 4, 28; Plut. Lys. 21. Pausanias, 
«J>0ov7j<ra? Av<Tav8pip -ireL<ras to>v tyopotv rpeis, efayei </>povpav, Hell. $ 29. With 
reference to the Agiada?, we find decidedly Hellenistic sentiments in Leon- 
idas ; Plistoanax (vol. ii. p. 450) avoids war with Athens ; Pausanias likewise. 
His successor, Agesipolis, is the most decisive adversary of a despotic and 
specifically Spartan line of policy, and so again Cleombrotus. For this 
reason we also generally meet with Proclidae as generals in Attica : Sievers, 
p. 382. 

€hap - *•] Athens under the Thirty. 57 

dispatched after Lysander, to settle those affairs in the in- 
terest of the state. Pausanias accordingly entered Attica 
with a Peloponnesian army ; and, before anything had 
been done by Lysander, he was forced to subordinate him- 
self to the king, and, at the very moment when he was 
about to display the fulness of his power before friends 
and foes, was reduced to utter insignifiance. Pausanias 
was the sole authority ; it was from him that the solution 
of the existing troubles must come ; and his tent was visit- 
ed by those who thought themselves able to assert an in- 
fluence upon the settlement. Thus Diognetus, the 
brother of Nicias, made use of the ancient relations of his 
house with Sparta, to make representations to the king, 
and to instruct him with regard to the proceedings of the 
Tyrants, as well as to the sentiments of the population. 
From the first, Pausanias had no other intention than that 
of putting an end to the quarrels by pacific means. He 
accordingly drew up his army in a position within sight 
from the city, so as to divide the hostile parties, himself 
commanding the right wing in the neighborhood of the 
port ; and, after having first brought about a cessation of 
hostilities, soon let it be seen that his intentions were by 
no means to act in the interests of the Thirty, and to 
carry out a bloody reaction in their sense. He had also 
refused the gifts of hospitality proffered to him from Eleu- 

Then, however, he turned to the Athenians TC .. 

' ' Fight near 

in the Pirseeus, whom, from the Spartan point *J, e Pi.i ,oceus - 

'■ ' A r 01. xciv. 1 

of view, he could not but regard as rebels ; ( B - & 403). 

Juue - 
and demanded that they should disband, and 

place in his hands the destiny of their native city. When 
his demand was rejected, he prepared to surround the en- 
tire peninsula. For this purpose he examined the locali- 
ties, and, while thus engaged, was, against his will, in- 
volved in a skirmish, and even forced to pursue the adver- 
saries who had attacked him, as far as the height of Mu- 


58 History of Greece. t Bo0K v - 

nychia. Here a more serious conflict ensued, in which a 
number of his soldiers were slain. The Peloponnesians 
were driven back, until they serried their ranks anew on 
a neighboring elevation, and from it, after receiving con- 
siderable reinforcements, began a fresh attack, which com- 
pletely secured the desired result, and vindicated the 
honor of the Spartan arms. One hundred and fifty men 
of the troops of Thrasybulus fell. 

Negotiation ^ e * tn * s resu ^ °f the conflict was, notwith- 
mrties 11 the stan ding, fortunate for the patriots ; for other- 
(Juiy and wise, Pausanias might have been forced to de- 
velop his whole military strength. He now 
thought that he had done enough to prove to the demo- 
crats that he was in earnest, and that he might now come 
forward in the character of a mediator. Accordingly, he 
secretly made known to both parties, (thereby acknow- 
ledging the following of Thrasybulus as a portion of the 
people entitled no less than their opponents to a voice in 
the decision), in what sense he desired to receive proposals 
from them for the re-establishment of public peace. Both 
sides were weary of the civil war ; and, in the city, the 
state of things had already become so doubtful, that the 
citizens, on their own authority, expressed their desire for 
a reconciliation with the democrats, and their hope of be- 
ing able to preserve peace with the Lacedaemonians, even 
after this reconciliation had taken place ; while their gov- 
ernment, the Ten, continued to assert that they alone were 
the true friends of Sparta, and that, in order to prove this 
by their deeds, they were ready immediately to deliver up 
the city to the Spartans — a proceeding to which, as they 
suggested, the democrats could hardly be expected to 
agree with reference to the Pirseeus. There were accord- 
ingly now, without Eleusis being taken into account, three 
parties opposed to one another in Attica ; and, by direc- 
tion of the king, three embassies went to Sparta — one from 
the Piraeeus, a second from the citizens within the walls, 

chap, i.] Athens under the Thirty. 59 

and a third from the Ten. Pausanias was fully aware of 
the responsibility of the position whieh he had assumed, 
and of the many misrepresentations and cavils which 
every one of his steps might provoke ; he therefore com- 
mitted the decision of everything to the authorities at 
Sparta. And yet, in the main, he thoroughly accom- 
plished his object ; for from Sparta, where these strange re- 
lations could not possibly be clearly judged, fifteen pleni- 
potentiaries were despatched, who were, in conjunction 
with himself, to effect a settlement.* 

The negotiations were protracted for months ; 

j i i . -i ii • Their result. 

and there was this advantage, at all events, in 
the delay, that during it the recommencement of hostili- 
ties became more and more out of the question, and like- 
wise any despotic treatment of Athens in opposition to 
the sentiments of the people, which had time to develop 
themselves with increasing clearness and precision. In- 
asmuch, then, as Pausanias was himself elevated above 
all the parties, and pursued no other object than that of 
making peace, and of atoning, so far as lay in his power, 
for such acts of injustice as had been perpetrated, to the 
dishonor of his native city, in her name : the treaty, 
which was at last, under his influence, concluded between 
the Athenians in the Pirseeus and those of the upper city, 
was likewise exactly of the character desired by the com- 
mon consent of both parties. The exiles were re-estab- 
lished in possession of their property ; no vengeance was 
to be taken upon those who had remained behind the 
city ; the past was to be forgiven and forgotten. But no 
general amnesty was proclaimed ; and it was doubtless in 
full accordance with the wishes of Pausanias, that pre- 

* Diognetus : Lysias, xviii. 22. Pausanias institutes observations by the 
Kw<f>6* \ifirjv, Hell $ 32. This may be the innermost part of the Piraeus 
(called 'A\ai by Ulrichs), cut off by the walls from the Emporium ; as the 
author has conjectured de port. Ath. p. 34. For it was necessary to build a 
wall starting from here over towards the Phalerum, so as to cut off th« 
peninsula of the Pireeeus. 

60 History of Greece. E BoOK v - 

cisely those officials who had been established under the 
authority of Lysander were excepted from the amnesty : 
to wit, the Thirty themselves, their most zealous instru- 
ments the Eleven, and, thirdly, the Ten who had admin- 
istered the Pirseeus as a subordinate magistracy. In other 
words, the entire oligarchy, which had rested upon the 
support of Sparta, was acknowledged by Sparta herself 
to have been an unauthorized interruption of the public 
reign of law. A certain mitigation was to be found in 
the appended clause, according to which even those 
excluded from the amnesty should have the right of 
remaining, if they were ready to give an account of their 

official conduct before the community. After 
of plusan'ia.s, this agreement had been ratified by oath, the 
cedsemonian hired troops were dismissed, anu Pausanias led 

his army and the Lacedaemonian garrison 
home across the Isthmus. 

He had completely achieved his own main purpose ; 
for the second triumph which Lysander had intended to 
celebrate at Athens, and which he had already thought 
to have secured, had been frustrated, together with all 
the schemes dependent upon it. On the other hand, what 
the king had himself effected and arranged, was an 
utterly incomplete and half-done piece of work. For he 
had, after all, not dared simply to depose the Tyrants and 
expel them by force of arms. Such a proceeding would 
have constituted too dangerous a precedent for the other 
states placed under similar authorities. He had merely 
prevented their being forced back upon the city : he had 
then put an end to the discord existing in the Athenian 
plain between the Upper and Lower Towns, but had left 
the Thirty undisturbed at Eleusis ; nay, he had so far re- 
cognized this place as a second centre of Attica, that a 
clause had been expressly inserted in the agreement, per- 
mitting any citizen who on account of his previous conduct 
might feel insecure at Athens, or object to the entire com- 

chap L] Athens wider the Thirty. 61 

pact, to proceed to Eleusis. Thus the public peace of the 
district was not even externally restored ; on the contrary, 
the final settlement of affairs remained in the hands of the 
Athenians themselves. 

The Athenians for the present disregarded Rc8toration 
the fastness of the Tyrants; and, in accord- ^l Cousi[ ' 
ance with the treaty, hastened to consummate 
the reconciliation between the two main divisions of the 
population. On the 12th of Boedromion (Sept. 21st) the 
associates of Thrasybulus celebrated the day of their re- 
turn to Athens, the well-won day of honor, on which they 
reaped the reward of their bravery and patriotism. They 
halted before the great entrance-gate, the Dipylum. Here 
Thrasybulus came forward for the last time in his charac- 
ter of general ; he held a muster, and availed himself of 
it to eject as impure from the ranks such fellows as were 
unanimously held unworthy to enter the city in the ranks 
of the liberating army — in particular Agoratus, who, as 
will be remembered, had served as aider and abetter in 
the most shameful intrigues (vol. iii. p. 573). Thereupon 
the men disposed themselves as a festive procession, which 
was conducted by a certain iEsimus. It passed across 
the market-place up to the Acropolis, which was now for 
the first time again trodden by free citizens ; and from the 
temples of the City-Goddess it descended to the Pnyx, 
which was on the same day re-consecrated as the place of 
popular assembly. The Attic community was still com: 
posed of two halves, — the Three Thousand and the return- 
ing democrats. Thrasybulus addressed the former in the 
name of his party, in order frankly to expound to them 
the situation of affairs. The so-called rule of the best 
citizens had, he said, proved itself a delusive phantom and 
a lie ; for the scions of the noble families, ever boastful 
of possessing by inheritance what the rest were obliged 
laboriously to acquire, had now shown themselves to be 
more subject to all moral infirmities and defects, particu- 

62 Hutoi-y of Greece. C BoOK v - 

larly to avarice and the vilest love of self, than all other 
mortals. Nor could they any longer appeal even to the 
Lacedaemonians, after the latter had renounced them, and 
chained down the Tyrannis like a snappish cur, in order 
thus to hand over to the people those who had inflicted so 
many sufferings upon it. The Athenians were therefore 
now free to act as they desired, and ought, under the full 
teaching of recent experience, unanimously to proceed to 
establish a new constitution. 

On this head opinions were less harmonious than might 
have been expected after what had occurred. It was 
thought that in the settlement of the new institutions a 
certain consideration must still be paid to the Lacedaemo- 
nians, with whom any further conflict ought at any cost 
to be avoided ; it may be that secret promises had been 
mcide, tending in this direction. But, above all, the old 
suspicion against the thorough democracy was still widely 
spread among the citizens, and consequently likewise the 
opinion, that it would be prudent to restrict the measure 
of civic rights, so as to exclude the multitude of those 
engaged in industrial pursuits, of the traders and seamen 
(who, it was argued, were after all not in the full sense 
of the word domesticated in Attica), from the assembly 
whose majority was to decide the common weal. Hereby 
it was hoped to ensure a more quiet character to the civic 
assemblies, to prevent rash popular decrees, and to obtain 
fuller guarantees for a reign of law and order in the aifairs 
of the state. 

Proposition Those Athenians who held these views put 
of Phormi- forward as their spokesman one who could not 

sius. r 

possibly be accounted an adherent of the re- 
action ; for he had been outlawed by the oligarchs, and 
had fought under Thrasybulus for the cause of liberty. 
He was a man well esteemed among the citizens, Phor- 
misius by name. He advocated neither the introduction 
of any census, nor that of any fixed property qualification 

CnAP L 1 Athens under the Thirty. 63 

for the acquirement of full civic rights ; but he proposed 
that no man should be a full citizen of Athens who owned 
no landed property in Attica. His motion therefore 
implied a return to the principles of Solon ; he demanded 
the exclusion of the industrial classes, who only possessed 
personal property in the land ; and, had this proposal 
been carried, about 5,000 of the civic population would 
have found themselves excluded. 

The motion of Phormisius provoked very eager oppo- 
sition. Let not the citizens, it was said, be again deluded 
by the old pretences ; sufficient experience had, assuredly, 
been gained to leave no doubt as to the nature of the 
guarantee offered by landed property for the sentiments 
of the citizens. Moreover, the present was not the season 
for weakening Athens and depriving her of her men. 
Was it for this they had returned with victorious arms and 
under the manifest protection of the Gods, — to give up of 
their own accord the civic rights they had acquired after 
so hard a struggle ? Neither let them allow themselves 
to be intimidated by considerations for Sparta. For if 
absolute submission to her was recommended, it was better 
to perish in the struggle, than to remain in such a condi- 
tion of dependence. But in truth the Spartans had no 
intention of involving themselves anew in perilous con- 
flicts for the sake of the Athenian constitution ; were there 
not states less in size and much nearer to Sparta in local 
situation, who notwithstanding retained a thoroughly 
independent position and a free constitution? Why, 
then, were the Athenians, from poverty of spirit and blind 
fear, to abase and sacrifice themselves? It was in this 
sense that Lysias composed an oration against the changes 
in the Attic constitution proposed by Phormisius. 

The motion was rejected ; and the old civic 

, , • i . Euclides 

community was restored, together with its Archon. 
magistrates. Euclides was (probably before ™;* c ww), 
the month of Boedromion was at an end), 

64 History of Greece. [Book v. 

chosen by lot as First Archon ; and inasmuch as his pre- 
decessor Pythodorus (p. 22) was not acknowledged as a 
legal magistrate, his name was struck off out of the lists 
of Archons, and his year (01. xciv. 1), as one spent under 
an illegal government, termed the Year of Anarchy. It 
may be mentioned that the period devoid of offices ex- 
tended beyond the close of the year ; inasmuch as the do- 
minion of the Thirty lasted eirc. from June 404 into the 
beginning of the ensuing year ; for they had been in power 
eight months, when the conflict in Munychia occurred. 
And then the dominion of the Ten, the approach of Ly- 
sander, the intervention of Pausanias, and the negotiations 
w T ith the latter, occupied about another eight months, from 
February to September 403, when the return of the cham- 
pions of the constitution took place. Of the eight months 
of the Tyrants, three were generally distinguished as a 
pre-eminently evil time ; this was probably the period af- 
ter the arrival of the Spartan troops, which would accord- 
ingly have to be dated October 404.* 
The Tvrants ^ ne P ar ties of the capital and of the Pi- 
EiTusis at r3ecus na d been mutually reconciled; but At- 
tica still remained disunited. Eleusis was the 
gathering-place of all adversaries of the constitution, and 
the fastness of the still unsubdued Tyrants. Pecuniary 
resources still remained to them out of their extortions ; 
they had hired troops, and made expeditions of plunder 
through the district. They still deemed it possible to 
maintain themselves ; and cherished hopes of their friends 

* According to Plut. de glor. Ath. c. 7, the exiles (ol e< Heipatw?) make 
their entry into Athens on the 12th of Boedromion (Sept. 21st, according to 
Boeckh); this was the day of the x a P ttrn ?P ia eAev0cpia$, A. Mommsen, 
Heorlol. 217. AZ<riM°? (gtwere, was he the same as in Schol. Arist. Eccl. 208?) 
ominis causa conducts the iro/xn^, Lys. xiii. 30. For the speech of Thrasy- 
bulus, see Hellen.% 40. Phormisius (Dion. Hal. ; Lys. 32) was not an oligarch, 
as Grote thinks : see Schomann, Verfassungsgesch. Athens, p. 93. The expres- 
sion avap\ia, the " period devoid of offices, " designates the office of 
Pythodorus as illegal. 'Oktw nyves, HeUen. §21. The democrats seize, bmapa, 
g 25 ; accordingly the feud lasted as late as the close of the summer. The 
three months in Isoc. iv. 113, according to the interpretation of Benseler. 

chap. L] Athens under the Thirty. 65 

in Sparta, and of a change in the college of the Ephors. 
Yet their obstinate hostility could not but provoke the bit- 
terest indignation at Athens ; and, since this state of things 
became intolerable, the entire civic body took the field be- 
fore Eleusis, in order to make an end of disunion in At- 

The further events which hereupon occurred are only 
very imperfectly known ; and they were doubtless of a 
kind to give the Athenians good reasons for preserving as 
complete a silence as possible concerning them. The be- 
sieging force entered into negotiations, in consequence of 
which some of the Tyrants, induced by false pretences, are 
said to have come into the camp, and there been put to 
death. Probably, the leaders were unable to restrain the 
popular fury, which had been further inflamed by the re- 
membrance of the horrors recently perpetrated at the 
same city-gates (p. 47). It is however certain, that not 
all of the Thirty became victims of this act of ven- 
geance. Some of them never accompanied the rest to Eleu- 
sis. Others succeeded in escaping thence across the Attic 
frontiers ; and these continued for a long time to lie in 
wait abroad for an opportunity to return. The victory of 
the constitutional party was now complete ; and, if it is 
remembered how much of suffering abroad and at home 
the city had gone through since the Sicilian calamity, it 
becomes intelligible how now at last, after the removal of 
all its enemies, the population of Athens again drew a 
free breath. No rational man desired anything but peace, 
in order that the wounds might be healed, and the citi- 
zens might again accustom themselves to live in peace 
with one another.* 

The situation was, however, still full of The 
difficulties ; and the Moderates had to exert Amnesty. 
all possible energy to prevent an abuse of the victory. It 

* As to the end of the Thirty : Rauchenstein, Philol. x. 596 ; Trohberger, 
Jahrb. f. Philol. lxxxii. 408. "EKKr\pvm<.v iic rStv no\e<av, Lys. xii. 35. 

66 History of Greece. f BooK v - 

was necessary to avoid any step which might again bring 
a reproach upon the democracy, and arm the hands of its 
adversaries inside and outside Sparta. The old consti- 
tution was benefited by the form in which its antitype 
had appeared, and by the opportunity now given to its 
friends, of asserting themselves as the advocates of order 
and legality. It now became their task to prove them- 
selves the really better citizens ; and, with this goal be- 
fore them, Thrasybulus and his friends were unceasingly 
intent upon avoiding any bloody reaction. It was there- 
fore agreed loyally to adhere to the compact arrived at 
with King Pausanias, and to regard as public enemies 
only the surviving members of the Thirty, the blood- 
stained Eleven, and the Commission of Ten in the 
Piraeeus. Every one else, even the children of the Ty- 
rants, and likewise the Ten at Athens, (although the 
latter had so shamefully deceived the confidence reposed 
in them), and among them even Phidon, (although he too 
had been one of the Thirty), and Eratosthenes (who had 
not accompanied the rest to Eleusis), were one and all 
permitted to remain at Athens ; they were not to be 
called upon to give any account of their proceedings ; all 
the past was to be forgiven and forgotten. 

The Resto- ^° widespread an amnesty as this implied 
ration period m0 re than one contravention of a natural 

and its diffi- 
culties, sense of equity. For the men to whose 

? 1 ' x £«; 2 bravery and self-sacrifice the restoration of 

(B.C. 44JoJ. 

the constitution was due, had now not the 
slightest advantage over those who had quietly remained 
in the city. Yet the losses of those who had returned 
home were incalculable; and although a great part of 
their landed property could be made up to them by a 
confiscation of the spoils of the Tyrants, yet much which 
had changed hands could not be restored to its rightful 
owners. Furthermore, a few indeed of those whose repu- 
tation was eminently bad, preferred, notwithstanding the 

chap. L] Athens under the Thirty. 67 

amnesty, to take up their abode outside the walls of 
Athens, a3 e. g. Batrachus (p. 26) ; but others, who had 
likewise been abetters of the Tyrants, ventured to remain 
at Athens ; indeed, an actual member of the Thirty, viz. 
Phidon, contrived to retain a certain degree of considera- 
tion in the city itself; and this before the eyes of those 
citizens who had suffered the most terrible wrongs at his 
hands and those of his fellows. So again the Knights, 
who had after a fashion constituted the body-guard of the 
Tyrants, for the present continued to enjoy their civic 
honors undiminished. And since, finally, the Ten, who 
had followed the Thirty, were acknowledged as a rightful 
official authority, it became necessary, as a logical conse- 
quence, to take over as a national debt the loan contract- 
ed by them, although it had been designed for the sup- 
pression of the constitutional party, and to decree a tax 
upon the citizens, for paying off this very loan, devised in 
a spirit of hostility against them. 

This attitude was, however, imposed by the necessities 
of the situation. Consideration had to be paid to Sparta, 
which through its king had saved Athens, lest Transition- 
the upper hand should once more be given to al measures. 
the party of Lysander, and the old constitutional 
policy of Sparta be once more set in motion. Hence, of 
the three parties at Athens, it was necessary to blend the 
two which could go hand in hand, viz. the Democrats and 
the Moderates. And what would have become of the 
city, had it been desired to examine the past conduct of 
every individual, and to reward or punish each according 
to his deserts ! The Three Thousand, who had formed the 
civic community under the Thirty, could only be secured 
by tender treatment ; nor could the entire state be saved 
on any condition but this : that those who had returned 
exhibited sufficient self-restraint, to renounce even fair 
claims for the sake of the whole community. And the 
glory of having displayed this prudent and self-denying 

68 History of Greece. [Book v. 

moderation was earned in the highest degree by the 
liberators of Athens.* 

Law of Among them, besides Thrasybulus, Archi- 

Archiuus. nus was specially active. In intellectual ca- 
pacity and in the spirit of his opinions he was the fore- 
most man of the Restoration ; and he was above the rest 
seriously intent upon firmly establishing the recovered 
unity, and putting a stop to the petty conflicts among the 
citizens. In the year after the restoration of the constitu- 
tion he brought about a law, whereby in all judicial suits 
instituted against the operations of the amnesty the privi- 
lege of a demurrer (paragrapJie) was secured to the ac- 
cused ; who had the right of speaking first : so that, in 
case he had good grounds for appealing against the 
amnesty, the case itself never came to trial, and a fine 
had to be paid by the prosecutor. The regulation of the 
occupation of the soil likewise demanded exceptional 
measures. Conflicts occurred between the citizens, who de- 
sired compensation for their losses, and the 

ure - officials, who endeavored to retain as large a 

proportion as possible of the confiscated lands of the oli- 
garchs for the state. Two boards of public officers were 
therefore instituted: firstly that of the Syllogeis, whose 
business it was to register the whole of the lands to be 
confiscated ; and secondly that of the Syndici, who as so- 
licitors for the state had to guard the interests of the pub- 
lic treasury. 

Such were the measures of transition. But 

Revision of 

the law. it now became indispensable to regulate upon 

a permanent system the internal relations of the state ; 
and, after the ancient popular community, the popular 
tribunals, the Council, and the constitutional magistracies, 

* As to the oath of amnesty, see Hellen. §43; Andoc. Myst. $ 90 (koX twv 
SiKo. or ™«/ ev necpai«r ap^aurutv S«a, according to Valesius), to be distin- 
guished from the 5p*coi nepl o^oias, Lys. xxv. 27. As to the loan, see 
Demosth. xx. 11. According to Thirlwall this is referred to in Arist. PoliL 
iii., 1. p. 58. 

chap. L] Athens under the Thirty. 69 

had been restored, again to lay bare, to strengthen and to 
renovate, as the times demanded, the foundations of pub- 
lic law to which it had been resolved to recur. The an- 
cient sources of law were once more sought out. But 
their writing and language had gradually become unintelli- 
gible to the people ; so that the orators, when citing the 
precise words of laws of Solon, or, still more, of Draco, 
found in every sentence expressions requiring explana- 
tion, because they had disappeared from common par- 
lance. Moreover, much had become obsolete in meaning 
as well as terms, and had been altered by usage ; the an- 
cient laws seemed, as it were, buried under the accumula- 
tion of later statutes, which were in many points contra- 
dictory to the earlier ; and it was by no means an easy 
task to separate from later additions what was of genuine 
Solonic origin. 

These evils had already long become perceptible. 
Remedies had been attempted ; and Nicomachus (vol. iii. 
p. 555) had continued his malpractices up to the estab- 
lishment of the Thirty. Now, the old plan of a thorough 
revision of the law was with great energy resumed. The 
motion on the subject in the civic assembly was made by 
a certain Tisamenus, the son of Mechanion. According 
to his proposition, the ancient laws of the Athenians were 
again to have full validity, i. e. the laws of Solon and the 
weights and measures introduced by his legislation, as 
well as all those ordinances of Draco which had been ob- 
served in former times. These documents were to be 
written out anew, a id supplemented by such laws as were 
demanded by the circumstances of the present times. To 
perform this task, a college of 500 Nomothetce, The Nomo . 
or legislators, was appointed, and sworn in thetaJ - 
by the civic community ; and out of these again the 
Council was to nominate a select committee, to which was 
to be entrusted the drawing up of the supplementary laws. 
With the aid of the law-scribes, upon whom fell the ac* 

70 History of Greece. t BoOK v. 

tual work of drafting the laws, this select committee was 
to cause them to be written out on boards, to lay them be- 
fore the Council and the whole body of the 500 Nomo- 
thetse, and then to make them public, so as to afford an 
opportunity to every citizen of presenting to the council 
any comments, observations, and objections, which might 
occur to him with regard to them. After having been 
examined and approved, they were in the end to be en- 
graved on stone, and committed to the care of the Areopa- 
gus. But, until the new legislation had been accom- 
plished on the basis of a thorough revision and supple- 
mentation of the sources of the law, an official board of 
Twenty was to be established, for giving the necessary de- 
cisions, while the public law was still imperfectly regulated. 
In the select committee of the Nomothetse, for the 
duration of whose labors very definite and very brief 
terms had been fixed, we find, besides the name of the 
proposer of the original motion, Tisamenus, that of Nico- 
Nicoma- maonus recurring. It was thought, that his 
chus. business talents and legal knowledge could 

not be spared ; although it was known after how unwar- 
rantable a fashion he had formerly served the designs 
of the enemies of the constitution. It was in his favor, 
that he had subsequently also incurred the displeasure of 
the Thirty ; he had taken flight, and joined himself to 
the exiles, with whom he returned to Athens. Of these 
circumstances he contrived to take full advantage ; and, 
by means of his cunning and his high oratorical gifts, had 
recovered a position of consideration at Athens. He was 
now entrusted, in particular, with the revision of the laws 
concerning public worship, which stood on the three- 
faced pillars of wood (vol. i. p. 363) : in these, the 
changes which had taken place had been slighter than 
elsewhere, and Solon himself had, on this head, most close- 
ly adhered to earlier usage. 

chap, i.] Athens under the Thirty. 71 

In consequence of the want of trustworthy D ifficu itie 8 
and honest men, competent for the perform- of the task - 
ance of tasks of this description, the work of legislation, 
on this occasion also, protracted itself. Yet a portion of 
it must have been completed before the year was out ; for 
the introductory law proposed by Diodes or- Lawg of 
dained, that the laws drawn up under the au- Diocies, 
thorship of Euclides were to have immediate validity. 

Other important ordinances, belonging to the same 
year, further attest the zeal devoted to the entire transac- 
tion of this political reform. Among these was the law 
of Aristophon (of the district of Hazenia), de- and Aristo _ 
signed to purify the civic body, by its ordi- P hon - 
nance that none but children sprung from the marriage 
of citizens with daughters of citizens should possess full 
civic rights. This law was beyond a doubt occasioned by 
the circumstance that many of the Athenians, who had 
dwelt for a long time abroad, and who had subsequently 
been brought home by the measures of Lysander, had 
contracted a union with foreign women. This had filled 
the city with a multitude of non- Athenians ; and of these 
foreign elements it was designed to cleanse the city, so 
that the state might rise with superior vigor upon genu- 
inely national foundations. Inasmuch as this law deeply 
affected all domestic relations, and provoked much dis- 
quietude, it soon afterwards underwent a mitigation, by 
being deprived of ex post facto application ; the exclusion 
being confined to tnose born of foreign mothers after 
the year of office of Euclides. The entire proposition of 
Aristophon was merely a resumption of the TheAreo- 
law of Pericles* That, in order to assure a P a & us - 

* UapaypaQrj, " demurrer of inadmissibility" against all suits contradic- 
tory to the Amnesty, according to the law of Archinus (Isocr. xviii. 2). 
Rauchenstein, Einl. m Lys. 25. "2,v\\oyeZ<; and <rvVSi*oi (Harp.), Lys. xvi. 7. 
Tisamenus, Lys. xxx. 28; Andoc. M;jst. 82; Sehomann, Verfasmmgsgesch. p. 90. 
As long as the Twenty conducted affairs, it is impossible to suppose the an- 

72 History of Greece. £ Bo °* v - 

fixed political organism, even the period before Pericles 
was recurred to, is, however, specially manifest from the 
importance which was once more given to the Areopagus, 
— that venerable authority of ancient Athens, to which 
her citizens ever and again returned, when, in troublous 
times, they sought for guarantees of the common weal 
(vol. iii. p. 564). The Areopagus had behaved honora- 
bly in the days of the surrender of the city ; it had shown 
no complicity with the oligarchic intrigues ; and hardly 
had the oligarchs attained to power, when they deprived 
the Areopagus of the solitary function which even the de- 
mocracy in the fulness of its dominion had not dared to 
take from it — viz. the jurisdiction in cases of life and 
death. Thus, by acknowledging the action of the Areo- 
pagus to be irreconcilable with their arbitrary system, 
the Tyrants had contributed to re-invest the former with 
a popular character ; so that it now with new dignity 
took its place at the head of the state, and was entrusted 
with the duty of superintending the accurate observance 
of the newly-arranged laws, as well as their unimpaired 
preservation. The institutions of Solon being, therefore, 
on this head also restored, it is probable that those offices 
were abolished to which the rights taken from the Areo- 
pagus had been transferred.* Changes were likewise 
made, corresponding to existing circumstances, in the 
„ f, offices of finance. The office of the Helleno- 

jNew finan- 
cial offices. tamise or federal treasurers (vol. ii. p. 379) had 

Economical lost its meaning, since the maritime dominion 

reforms. ° 

of Athens had come to an end. In its place 

cient magistracy to have exercised its functions ; the restoration of the 
Council came before that of the offices, although the post of the First 
Archon was filled up at once. Cf. Frohberger, Lysias, i. 177. Supplemen- 
tary law of Diocles, Demosth. xxiv. 42; Meier, de bon. damn. 71. Aristo- 
phon : Carystius ap. Athen. 577 b ; Sch'Afer, Demosth. i. 123. 

* As to the seven voju.o<f»vAa»cc? (vol. ii. p. 385) and their conjectured aboli- 
tion, see Scheibe, p. 152; C. F. Hermann, de vest. inst. vet. per Plat, de leg. I. p e 
88. Andoc. Myst. 84. 

chap. L] Athena under the Thirty. 73 

two new annual treasury-offices were instituted, one for 
the treasury of war, the other for the Theoricum, i. e. for 
the fund out of which the expenditure for the state festi- 
vals was provided. Both funds were to be fed from the 
surplus of the annual revenues, and to be managed for the 
common weal by persons appointed by election ; so that a 
due balance might prevail between the requirements of the 
necessary defensive strength, and those of peaceful civic 
life. A wise economy was once more (vol. ii. p. 504) pro- 
claimed as one of the leading principles of political con- 
duct ; and there can accordingly be no doubt, that 
neither was the pay for attendance at the judicial tribu- 
nals, Council and popular assembly (vol. iii. p. 120), at 
this time re-introduced. This gave a totally new aspect to 
the civic assemblies of Athens. The multitude of com- 
mon folk who supported themselves by their daily wages, 
remained away, and quietly pursued their own avocations. 
Moreover, the agitation of dishonest popular orators was 
hindered by the growing intelligibility and perspicuity of 
the laws. The authorities took strict care that, when laws 
were recited, not a syllable was misquoted, and no arbi- 
trary interpretation admitted. And one of the most im- 
portant rules now established was the follow- chances in 
ing : — " Henceforth, no uowritten laws were to pubi f ° c rt docu- 
have any validity ; isolated ordinances of the ments » 
Council or of the civic assembly were in no case to over- 
ride the laws ; and, lastly, the laws to be newly pro- 
claimed were without exception to apply equally to all 
Athenians, and to require the sanction of at least 6,000 
citizens entitled to vote. For, while it had formerly been 
customary to mention in the preamble of laws only that 
one of the ten civic tribes which happened to hold presi- 
dency (vol. i. p. 408), besides the scribe in office during 
the Prytany in question, and the chairman of the day and 
the author of the motion ; it now became the practice, in 

order to facilitate regularity, to commence with the name 

74 History of Greece. t BoOK V. 

of the First Archon, which henceforth marked all the 
documents belonging to the same year. Such were the 
beginnings of a new Attic documentary style, which sub- 
sequently underwent several alterations ; in particular it 
was sought to elaborate the formulae of the preamble with 
more and more precision and fulness, so that the proper 
number of the Prytany, the day and month of the year, 
and the day of the current Prytany, were inserted.* 
«nd in the ^^ more important effects resulted from 
mode of ^he re form in the mode of writing. Two 
alphabets were used in those days, a more an- 
cient, consisting of eighteen letters, and a more recent, 
further removed from the Phoenician prototype as having 
been perfected and changed by the inventive spirit pecu- 
liar to the Greeks. In particular, special symbols had 
been introduced for the long vowels, and likewise for the 
double consonants, hitherto expressed by two symbols. 
These changes had been made by the Ionic Greeks. 
Samos was specially distinguished for the elaboration of 
literary inventions of the kind ; and individuals of high 
authority, such as Epicharmus and Simonides, had con- 
tributed to obtain a general acceptance of these innova- 
tions. Thus more especially in Attica the enlarged 
alphabet of twenty-four letters was already used in the 
times of Pericles ; moreover, since the eighty-sixth Olym- 
piad (b. c. 436) the earlier form of the letter S (*?) 
had been relinquished for the more recent (I) ; but in 
other respects the older "Attic" alphabet had been re- 
tained with remarkable conservatism in the public docu- 

* After Euclides there were no Hellenotamiee; before his year no racial 
rati' (TTpaTuaTiKtav, and no official cttI tw 0€o>pi*«. See Boeckh, Publ. Ec. of 
Ath., vol. i. p. 237 (Eng. Tr."). As to the abolition of the aypo^oi vo/xoi, and 
subordination of the ^(ftio-^ara to the vd^oi, Andoc. Myst. 86. Concerning 
the earlier and later form of public documents, see Schomann, Gr. Alt. voL 
i». p. 400. Cf. Boeckh, u. *. vol. ii. p. 15. In the case of treaties the name of 
the Archon occurs already in earlier documents, e. g. Corp. Inscr. Gr. No. 74, 
We have no certain information as to the date of the change. 

Chap, i.) Athens under the Thirty. 75 

merits. But now, when changes such as the times de- 
manded were being made, and when the obsolete was 
being rejected in every department of public life, Archi- 
nus proposed that the new or " Ionic " character should be 
officially also acknowledged and introduced. The an- 
cient law3 were re-written in this character ; and although 
the scribes of documents could not at once accustom 
themselves to the innovation, yet in the whole number of 
Athenian public inscriptions in stone we may distinguish 
between two main divisions, the pre-Euclidic and the 
post-Euclidic documents. The newly-written laws were 
set up in the market-place, which had been their locality 
since the time of Ephialtes, — in the royal hall. This was 
the identical hall where the Areopagus was wont to sit, 
so that this body was now doubly called upon to watch 
over the archives of their special importance, set up in 
a place of their own. Among these was the law of high 
treason, which was solemnly confirmed by oath imme- 
diately after the re-establishment of the constitution, in 
order to prevent in the most impressive manner possible 
any new attempt in the direction of a coup d'etat. This 
law assured impunity to the slayer of any Athenian who 
endeavored to obtain Tyrannical power, or who betrayed 
the city, or designed the overthrow of the constitution. 
It was set up on a pillar in front of the Council-house, 
so that it might meet the eyes of all who entered there. 
Thus the laws w^re written, arranged, and set up afresh ; 
and the ancient three and four-faced wooden pillars of 
Solon were henceforth merely preserved as a relic of an- 

Besides these, we observe a series of other other re _ 
institutions, concerning which it is not stated for ™. 8 iT \ the 

' o public docu- 

that they belonged precisely to the year of ments *n the 

J o r j j year of Euch- 

Euclides, but the existence of which from that des - 
period is to be demonstrated in the public ?'■ xc * v - *, 

x * (b. c. 403-2). 

documents. Thus, one mark bv which the 

76 History of Greece. [ BooK v - 

post-Euclidic popular decrees may be recognized is this : 
that in them the Scribes no longer go out with the Pryta- 
nies of the Council ; they were therefore now appointed 
for the whole year, a reform probably likewise intended 
to bring about a greater security in the control of the 
public documents. Among the minor reforms of this 
period may be mentioned the introduction of the name 
of the goddess Athene in place of the earlier form 

Pabli In the true Attic spirit thought was taken 

library. f maintaining the glory of the city as a nurse 
of arts and sciences ; and of advancing popular educa- 
tion, — in direct opposition to the oppressive ordinances of 
the Tyrants (p. 40). Before the year of Euclides had 
ended, a collection of literary works was begun ; perhaps 
w T hat had formerly existed of this description had per- 
ished through the fault of the Tyrants. Again, it was 
endeavored to animate a spirit of friendly rivalry among 
the citizens with reference to the city feasts ; the several 
civic tribes decreeing, that from the date of the year of 
Euclides those who had by means of pecuniary sacrifices 
and personal performances deserved well of the feasts 
of the state deities, should be honored by commemorative 

* Concerning the twofold kinds of writing, y ira\aia (th 'AttlkOl ypdixfiara) 
and i) fier Ev/cAei'Sijv ypafj.fiaTtKrj, see Franz, Elern. Epigr. Gr. pp. 24, 148. 
As to Callistratus of Samos, see Ephorus ap. Schol. Ven. II. viii. 185. As to 
the intermixture of the earlier and later character, see Boeckh, Staatsh. vol. 
ii. p. 764 [Germ.]. As to the setting-up of the revised laws in the Cerami- 
cus, Andoc. Myst. 95 ; Lys. in Leocr. 126; Bergk, ad Andoc. ed. Schiller, p. 129 ; 
Curtius, Att. Studien, ii. 66. As to the scribe appointed for a year in the case 
of the post-Euclidic documents, see Boeckh, Epigr. Chronol. Studien, p. 40 ; 
Sanppe, Philol. xix. 249. 'A0»jea: Boeckh, Staatih. vol. ii. p. 51 [Germ.]. The 
law of the Disetetse, according to Meier, belonged to the time of Euclides; 
contra Schomann, Verfassungsgesch., 44 f. The transmission of the Epipsephi- 
sis to the Proedri is to be dated after 01. c. 3. See Boeckh, MondcyMen, 46. 
The year of Euclides was an epochal year ; hence the proverb, rd irpb 
EukAci'Sov efera^eu' in Lucian. Catapl. 5. 

Chap, lj Athens under the Thirty. 77 

Lastly, neither was the duty of gratitude Dedicator 
towards the gods and towards friends abroad £i£ s of the 
forgotten. It was from Thebes that the libera- 
tors of Athens had issued forth ; and Thrasybulus, who 
adhered to the principle that the two neighbor-cities ought 
to continue in close union, together with his associates 
dedicated a work of art to Thebes as a token of gratitude 
and symbol of alliance. It represented the guardian 
divinities of the two cities, Athene and Heracles, and 
was set up in the Heracleum at Thebes. And altogether, 
on the motion of Archinus, 1000 drachms had been 
granted for distribution among the liberators of the city, 
to enable them to offer sacrifices and consecrated gifts. 
But no share in these was given to any besides the hun- 
dred who had been besieged in Phyle by the Tyrants. 
By this grant and by the bestowal of olive-wreaths they 
were acknowledged as the saviours of the city.* 

* Euclides, known among the ini o-vporywyj) reOavfiaa fiivoi, Athen. 3. 
Here the groups of collectors are distinguished : those who could com- 
mand public resources, and secondly private individuals, who are designated 
according to their station in life. The former group was doubtless composed 
of personages historically known ; accordingly, as I conjecture, we should, 
by the side of Polycrates and Pisistratus and the kings of Pergamus, read, 
not NiKOKpar*)?, but NikokAj)? 6 Kimpios (cf. Arch. F. 1844, 347), in which case 
the Euclides mentioned must be the famous Archon. Perhaps, too, we may 
read instead of Ev*cAei'S»jv tov koi avrbv ' Adrjvalov — rbu ap\ovra (or upijaPTa) 
teal a. 'A. But see the objections of M. H. E. Meier, Opusc. i. 85. Becker, 
Charkles, ii. 119 (Eng. Tr.), also considers a private library to be spoken of. 
For the decree of the tribe Pandionis on the motion of Callicrates, see 
Corp. Inscr. Gr. N~>. 213; Athene and Heracles, Paus. ix. 11, 4. As to the 
motion of Archinus in honor of the KarayayovT^ rbv Sijuov: iEsch. iii. 187. 



General Thus was it attempted to re-settle the Attic 

SSwSrt ° f state » after the constitutional life of Athens 
the C Rcstora- ^ a d ^ een mterru P te d Dv a government, which 
tion - in the course of a few months had passed 

through every stage of a ruthless terrorism (wherefore al- 
ready in antiquity it was called the dominion of the Thirty 
Tyrants). The minds of men could the more easily be- 
come reconciled with one another, inasmuch as of the 
three parties one had absolutely annihilated itself during 
its period of victory. This party had sealed its own con- 
demnation, when behind the pretence of peculiar political 
theories the vilest selfishness had nakedly displayed itself, 
while the moral worthlessness of its leaders had not been 
in any way compensated or made good. At home they 
had been ruthless despots, but neither had they in the 
foreign relations of the state obtained for it anything but 
shame and disgrace ; besides which they had at the criti- 
cal moments proved themselves weak, ruthless, and short- 
sighted. The common hatred against the oligarchs having 
united the remaining parties, the praiseworthy institu- 
tions of the year of liberation had been successfully 
called into being, and the year of Euclides had become 
an epochal year in Attic history. We cannot but ac- 
knowledge and admire the manliness of the leading per- 
sonages, and the spirit of moderation and prudence, as 
well as the earnest zeal for the truly good, which pre- 
vailed in the community. For assuredly the Athenians 
displayed their native generosity when they desired not 

chap, ii,] Athens after her Restoration. 79 

only to triumph over insidious foes, but also to improve 
and restrain themselves ; when they with wise intelligence 
made use of the experience which accrued to them, partly 
tasting off what had become obsolete, partly recurring to 
earlier institutions of their public life. For without a 
genuine loftiness of spirit they would not at the present 
moment, when they had hardly realized their liberation, 
have combined with measures for the restoration of peace 
and prosperity, a care for scientific institutions and for the 
cultivation of the arts.* 

But mere outward institutions could not suffice to reno- 
vate the commonwealth as it was desired ; if this was to 
be accomplished, it must result from the internal condi- 
tion of civil society, which could not be altered by means 
of particular laws and constitutional enactments. 

The healthiness of Hellenic civic life was above all 
based upon the fidelity with which the existing generation 
adhered to the traditions of the past, upon its belief in the 
gods of its fathers, upon its attachment to the common- 
wealth and its veneration for the rules of public and social 
life established by usage and legislation. But this basis 
of public prosperity had been seriously shaken long ago, 
and in particular by recent events. Within a few years 
not less than four thorough changes of the constitution 
had taken place ; and, instead of recurring with double 
determination after these violent interruptions of the con- 
tinuity of public law to the original rules of life, the ex- 
isting generation continued to exhibit a vacillation and 
an uncertainty, such as are displayed in the motion of 
Phormisius (p. 62). 

Moreover, the spirit of the age had always tended to 
weaken the authority of tradition, to loosen the cohesion 
of the community, and to direct the individual towards 

+ " Thirty Tyrants," Aristot. Rhet. ii. pp. 24, 105. Again in Diod. xiv. 2 ; 
Corn. Nep. Thrasybulus, 3 ; Justin. 5, 10. 

80 History of Greece. [Book v. 

reliance upon his personal judgment in all critical ques- 
tions. The outward vigor of social life had likewise be- 
come impaired. Land and people were exhausted by the 
results of the long war, which had annihilated public 
prosperity and destroyed that mutual confidence which it 
was harder to make good than any mere losses. Trade 
both great and small lay low. The soil was neglected and 
had lost its value ; husbandry could only be restored to 
its former condition by means of great sacrifices and ex- 
ertions. No task was more pressing than this ; but there 
was a want of money ; for in consequence of the prevail- 
ing insecurity many of the wealthy had invested their 
money abroad, and of the resident aliens who managed 
the money business a large proportion had emigrated, and 
the remainder had been mostly ruined or put to death. 
But, above all, there was wanting a love of agriculture, 
which could alone have conquered the existing difficul- 
ties ; men had been spoilt by the cheapness and abund- 
ance of imports by sea, and preferred buying their daily 
necessaries in the market to growing them on ground of 
their own. War and revolution had driven the small 
proprietors out of their customary ways of life, they had 
become estranged from their calling, addicted to idle ha- 
bits, and averse to continuous labor. This rendered im- 
possible a thorough improvement of the economical con- 
dition of the country, and there was wanting the benefi- 
cent influence of a tranquillized state of feeling, such as 
would have been obtained by a return to rural avocations 
and to the solid foundations of former prosperity. And 
yet the people had never stood in so sore a need of a 
calming influence of the kind. For the bitter hatred be- 
tween the parties, which had up to the last been more and 
more intensified, and which opposed not only the different 
classes of the population, but also the members of the 
same families, as adversaries to one another ; — the rapid 
alternation of victory and defeat, of arrogant exultation 

Chap. II.] Athens after her Restoration. 81 

and utter hopelessness; — the terrible diminution in the 
numbers of the citizens, resulting from the bloody war ; — 
the extinction of the ancient families ; — the influx of new 
men, Athenians neither by birth nor by education ; — and 
finally the entire series of extraordinary experiences crowd- 
ing together at the close of the w r ar : — all these causes had 
contributed utterly to unsettle the firm bearing of the civic 
community. Life had become more and more full of 
mysterious dangers and devoid of tranquillity ; and the 
inborn vivacity and excitability of the Attic people had 
degenerated into a passionate restlessness, which had been 
only temporarily suppressed in consequence of the general 
exhaustion. A constant fluctuation in the daily state of pub- 
lic feeling possessed the city ; and, says the comic poet Pla- 
to, he who had been absent from Athens during the space 
of three months was unable to recognize it on his return.* 

How was it possible, in the midst of this restless agita- 
tion, to find firm ground whereon the people might unite 
to carry out the re-settlement of the state ? The strongest 
of all bonds — religion — had lost its power; for its basis 
was a simple-minded devotion to the traditions of the 
past. In its place, protests against tradition, audacious 
contempt for the simplicity of past generations, doubt and 
mockery, constituted the tendency of the spirit of the age, 
which found its expression in Sophistry. Moreover, the 
minds of men had been brutalized during the years of 
war, am 1 the ordinances of their fathers had lost their 
authority. It was already rare to find an asylum respected, 
or an enemy taking refuge in a temple spared. f 

The calamities suffered by the state likewise „ .. 

J .Native 

contributed to weaken religious feeling. For religiosity 

o ©^ ousted by- 

it must be remembered that the Hellenic reli- forei s n . su- 

gion was not of a suprasensual kind, trans- 

* Investments of money abroad: Athen. 532; a-ravis ipyvpiov, Lys. xix. 
11 ; Fliton. Com. Fr. ap. Meineke, ii. G92. 

f Thus Agesilaus is held entitled to special praise for sparing those who 
"had taken refuge in the temple of Athene Itonia, Hellen. iv. 3, 20. 


82 History of Greece. E Bo °* v - 

cending space and time, and pointing to the consolations 
of a world beyond. On the contrary, it was most inti- 
mately interwoven with existing circumstances ; it was a 
national and state-religion, the maintenance of which 
constituted at once the condition and the guarantee of 
public prosperity. The state divinities were so organ* 
ically connected with the states themselves, as to be held 
responsible for the commonwealth, and accordingly to 
forfeit the confidence reposed in them, if the common- 
wealth placed under their protection was seen to decay. 
Thus after the Sicilian campaign prophecy came to be 
despised, because men thought themselves to have been 
deceived by the voices and signs of the gods, and, not 
unfairly, recognized in Nicias' orthodox fear of the gods 
a .cause of the utter loss of army and fleet. With this 
feeling co-operated the general tendency of the democratic 
populace, directed towards an escape from authority of 
all kinds ; thus an insurrection ensued against the gods 
not less than against other powers, and the former were 
renounced as having abandoned the state. But, inasmuch 
as men could, after all, not live without religion, the 
renunciation of the faith of their fathers was accompanied 
by an inclination towards the worship of foreign countries ; 
and, by the side of infidelity, a wild growth of supersti- 
tious conceptions and usages sprang up. For this the 
sea-trade of the city and the multitude of foreign settlers 
offered every facility. Just as already towards the close 
of the war the common parlance of the Athenians was 
alloyed by a variety of non-Greek words, so an increasing 
welcome was likewise offered to foreign divinities, to the 
Phrygian Sabazius, the Thracian Cotytto, the Syrian 
Adonis ; in the place of a healthy fear of the gods mani- 
festing itself in a pious attendance upon public worship, 
men's minds were seized by a morbid terror of the super- 
human powers (Deisidcemonia), which sought to satisfy 
itself in secret rites of all kinds ; and this continued to 

Chap, i i.j Athens after her Restoration. 83 

intensify the confusion of the minds of the citizens, and 
their alienation from ancient discipline and order. Dirty 
beggar-priests passed from house to house, to collect offer- 
ings for the " Great Mother," in return for which they 
promised expiation from sin and guilt. A large quantity 
of sayings and writings, ascribed to Orpheus, were carried 
about by adventurers, the so-called Orjjheotelestoz, and, in 
accordance with these, secret associations were formed, 
designed to purify the terrified souls of men in place of 
the mysteries acknowledged by the state. Ventriloquists 
attracted the gaping crowd, by pretending that a daemon 
dwelt in them and prophesied by their lips. A fellow 
of this kind, Eurycles by name, was a famous personage 
at Athens already in the former half of the Peloponnesian 
war; and such was the success obtained there by his taste- 
less jugglery, that an entire school of ventriloquizing 
prophets took its name from him.* 

Thus it is manifest how utter a want of order and dis- 
cipline resulted from the spread of infidelity ; and a hebe- 
tation of moral judgment directly connected itself with 
these sad aberrations of religious feeling. Together with 
the Hellenic gods, the human and civic virtues which 
they demanded fell into disrepute. While it was attempted 
to calm the conscience by means of external usages and 
charms, no value was attached to an inner purification ; 
the promptings of selfish interest were unhesitatingly 
o^ eyed ; and gradually all sense was lost of the truth, that 
a state cannot exist except by the virtues of its citizens. 
Some of the citizens may, in the secrecy of their homes, 
have still preserved an attachment to the ancient faith, 
but it was precisely those who set the fashion among the 

* As to the unsettlement of things human and divine, see Eurip. Iph. 
Taur. 560, Kirchh. As to foreign religions: Bergk, Rel. Com.Att.15. The 
language of the Athenians, Ketcpafievr} e£ airavrmv TW 'EAAjjfcov koX fiapfidpuv, 
" Xen." Resp. Ath. 8. Eurycles eyya^rpinvBoi (eyyaarpiTai EvpvKAeifiou) ; Arist 
Vesp. 1019 ; Schomann, Gr. Alt. ii«. 294. 

84 History of Greece. [Book v. 

rest who, together with the culture of the age, had also 
imbibed its poisou. 

Material- ^ ne anc i en k religion itself was defenceless 

Atheism against the hostile spirit of the times, and 

could not of its own strength withstand the 
rationalizing tendency towards making everything an open 
question. For such a resistance it lacked the essence 
of objective truth, which might have commanded respect 
and aroused conviction. Was it not undeniable, that 
already in the Homeric poems, which were regarded as 
the sources and documents of popular belief, the substance 
of religious belief was freely treated according to poetic 
inspiration ? And, since inquiring thought had found its 
expression in philosophy, all its tendencies, however 
widely they diverged in other respects, met in this one 
point, that they contested the popular views concerning 
the nature of the gods. Doubtless the ways of conducting 
these attacks differed greatly. Some, as e. g. Anaxagoras, 
in the true spirit of philosophy sought to rise out of the 
popular religion to a loftier and purer conception of God. 
Others refused altogether to acknowledge any dependence 
of man on divine powers. In addition, new tendencies 
of philosophy made their appearance, and, together with 
them, new elements of opposition against the ancient 
religion. Thus the teaching of Democritus developed 
itself, starting from a connexion with the philosophy of 
Nature. Democritus was younger by a generation than 
Anaxagoras, and during the earlier half of the Pelopon- 
nesian war attained to a great influence. He drew the 
conclusion from previous inquiries, that there is no other 
being than a corporeal one, and no motive power besides 
the force of gravity. In the mechanical world of Demo- 
critus there was no place for the God of Anaxagoras, for 
an Intelligence acting according to purposes of its own. 
He granted to the gods of the people nothing but a 
scarcely honorable existence as daemons, and declared the 

Chap, ii.] Athens after her Restoration. 85 

ordinary ideas of religion to have resulted from impres- 
sions of terrible phenomena of nature. 

This doctrine also found acceptance at Athens, and, in 
company with Sophistic teaching, disturbed many an 
otherwise believing soul. The best-known instance is 
that of Diagoras of Melos, a lyric poet and a man of a 
serious disposition of mind. He had been the confiden- 
tial friend of the legislator Nicodorus of Mantinea, at the 
time when that Arcadian town withdrew from its depend- 
ence upon Sparta and established its autonomy. Diago- 
ras afterwards came to Athens ; and, although he had 
formerly been a pious singer, he was now seized by the 
power of doubt ; he became (as is said, under the per- 
sonal influence of Democritus) an audacious freethinker, 
derided the gods whom he had celebrated, and hurled a 
wooden Heracles into the flames, in order that he might 
there undergo a thirteenth trial of his strength. But 
most of all he offended the feelings of the Athenians by 
his contempt for their Mysteries, the doctrines of which 
he gave up to publicity and to derision.* 

Thus the attacks upon the religion handed down to the 
Athenians by their fathers were intensified and multi- 
plied ; the great mass of the people being incapable of per- 
ceiving the distinction between philosophy and sophistry. 
For them the final result of the intellectual movements 
referred to was utter insecurity ; and with the exception 
of those who, guided by the impulse of inner piety, held 
fast to what was old, and knew how to secure for them- 

* Democritus of Abdera, according to Diog. L. xix. 41, was junior by 
forty years to Anaxagoras ; he was therefore born 01. lxxx. tire. His elfiwAa 
resembling human beings, tH (xev ayadonotd, ta Sk KaKonoid. (Sext. Emp. ix. 
19), correspond in certain respects to the daemons of the popular belief 
(Zeller, Gesch. d. Gr. Ph. i. 643). Diagoras, 6 afleos, 6 MtjAios, outlawed as a 
violator of the Mysteries (v. Suidas), and pursued in Peloponnesus as well 
as at Athens (Schol. Arist. Aves, 1073; Ranee, 320). Clem. Alex. Protrept. p. 7, 
Sylb., emendated by Cobet, Nov. Led. Prsef. p. 14 (Aiaydpa tov^ov Trapaovceva- 
aai). Athenagoras, npea/Stia jr. Xp. c. 5, Iva t4s yoyyvAas ti/roi, KaraKoiTTut 
rb tov 'Hp. fdayov. 

86 History of Greece. ^ BoOK v - 

selves the noble elements of religious and moral truth 
in the mythology of gods and heroes, the generality re- 
jected everything, and swam with the stream of the ideas 
of the age, unsupported by any remaining prop, and un- 
able to find a compensation for what they had lost. 

In the priests religion found no protectors. Occa- 
sionally, indeed, a feeling of holy indignation caused them 

Priestly re- to ta ^ e coura g e au( l n g nt f° r their gods ; they 
action. were unwilling to allow the operation of blind 

natural laws to be substituted for the living action of per- 
sonal beings. By means of a sagacious utilization of the 
existing relations of parties (vol. iii. p. 91), priestly 
authority in the person of Diopithes once more raised it- 
self to a power in the state. Anaxagoras fell a victim to 
it ; and whoever chanced to have been in any way con- 
nected with him was, as e. g. Thucydides the historian, sus- 
pected as a freethinker. Diagoras, too, was outlawed (01. 
xci. 2 ; b. c. 411) ; a price was placed on his head, and it 
was even attempted to render the hue and cry against 
him a common Hellenic matter. Protagoras and others 
were persecuted as men who denied the gods ; but what 
advantage could the cause itself derive from a fanaticism 
which merely blazed out on isolated occasions and ef- 
fected the condemnation of individual heretics? There 
existed no priestly class capable of guiding the moral con- 
sciousness of the people, of coming forward as the cham- 
pion of its belief, and of cherishing the treasure of true 
insight into the divine nature which that belief contained. 
Delphi was powerless, and its wisdom utterly obsolete. 
Nowhere existed any authority in things spiritual ; there 
remained no fixed rule, no sure basis of the national faith ; 
hence neither was any distinction possible which might 
have impressed its essential features upon the young; 
the antique wisdom, taught to them from the maxims of 
Hesiod, was unable to prevail against the attacks of the 
modern age; and, notwithstanding its recent discovery, 

Chap, ii.] Athens after her Restoration. 87 

the state was threatened with an inevitable decay, when 
religion and morality were falling.* 

If any remedy was to be obtained for these evils, it 
must come from another quarter — viz. from that of 
Philosophy and Art. Philosophy must re- The tragio 
trieve the damages inflicted by Sophistry, by sta s e - 
deeper reflection restore authority to the moral laws which 
had come to be contemned, and strengthen the forces of 
civil society whereby the life of a community is preserved. 
Art, and above all Poetry, must prove herself the teacher 
and guide of the people ; must, in the midst of the busy 
selfishness of ordinary life, represent ideal tendencies, 
maintain the honors paid to the national traditions, and 
offer a salutary counterbalance to the disintegrating ten- 
dency of the spirit of the age. Ancient art, it must be 
remembered, was no mere outward ornament of life, to be 
assumed or laid aside according to circumstances ; no 
mere luxury to rejoice men in their days of prosperity, 
and absent as a matter of course in evil times. Rather, 
it was a necessary element in public life, especially at 
Athens ; it was a power in the state which supplied what 
religion left wanting; it gave expression to the feelings 
common to the whole community. And, inasmuch as 
Athens could not exist without public dramatic perform- 
ances, very much depended upon the nature of the poets 
who composed the plays. Good poets were an essential 
public need ; and it was for this reason that comedy, in 
so far as it had a serious and patriotic character, in this 
age repeatedly recurred to the need in question, and de- 
clared it to be a well-grounded desire on the part of the 
community, that it should possess tragic poets whose art 
was generous and whose sentiments were loyal. 

* Thucydides accounted an atheist on account of his relations with 
Anaxagoras, according to Antyllus ap. Marcellin. ; Krttger, Krit. Anal. i. 36. 
Outlawry of Diagoras: Diod. xiii. 6. The statement is doubtful; in any 
case Aristoph. Aves, 1073, already assumes both prosecution and outlawry. 
Cf. Kock, ad loc. 

88 History of Greece. f BoOK V. 

For the serious drama was undoubtedly, above all other 
kinds of art, called upon to exercise a momentous influ- 
ence. This form of art was the wealthiest in resources? 
and at the same time the most public, and that which pre- 
eminently addressed itself to the entire civic body ; and 
again, it was the most Attic ; it specially contributed to 
mark out Athens as the intellectual capital of Greece. 
The Attic stage was at the same time the stage of Hellas ; 
and whoever desired to acquaint himself with the artistic 
performances of which no description could furnish a con- 
ception, or whoever believed himself possessed of gifts 
which he wished to develop or assert, made his way to 
Athens, where no obstacles were allowed to impede a free 

Thus we have already become acquainted with Ion of 
Chios, who, endowed with all the many-sidedness of a true 
Ionian, shone among the Athenians both as a poet and a 
prose-writer, both in elegy and in drama (vol. ii. p. 555). 
From Eretria came Achaeus, a younger contemporary of 
Sophocles. He gained a dramatic victory at Athens, and 
in particular contrived, by means of his inventive genius, 
to invest the satyr-drama with new attraction. From Te- 
gea in Arcadia came Aristarchus, who became so tho- 
roughly domesticated at Athens, that he is said to have 
acquired a decisive influence upon the usage of the Attic 
stage with regard to the extent of individual dramas. 
Lastly, from Sicyon came Neophron, an uncommonly fer- 
tile dramatist, whose happy tact introduced new subjects 
into the sphere of dramatic poetry, e. g. the myth of Me- 
dea. This lively intellectual intercourse with other cities 
was of course rendered difficult and obstructed by the 
w r ar ; particularly in its concluding years Athens could 
not remain as heretofore a gathering-place of the com- 
peting talents of Greece ; and the calamity which at its 
close destroyed the political power of Athens likewise be- 
came a fatal epoch for the history of her stage, inasmuch 

Chap. ii. l Athens after her Restoration. 89 

as a year before the siege and capitulation Sophocles died 
(01. xciii. 3 ; B. c. 405). Rightly did Phrynichus in his 
Muses (performed at the same time as the Frogs of Aris- 
tophanes) honor Sophocles as one highly favored by the 
gods, in that after a long life of beneficent labors he had 
passed away without having seen the evil day. As the 
poetry of Sophocles is the mirror, wherein the glory of 
Athens shines upon us in its fullest lustre, so his life is the 
plainest measure of its brief endurance. He sang the 
paean of victory, when the sun of prosperity rose, and he 
died before it sank under the horizon. Nor was the war 
allowed to abate the honors of his burial ; undisturbed by 
the hostile skirmishes, the funeral rites were performed in 
Colonus, and a charming legend added that Dionysus 
himself, the god of the Attic stage, had taken thought for 
his favorite by appearing to the hostile general in a vision 
and bidding him honor the great poet.* 

His poetry survived even after his death. The Ruc 
For his last work, the GEdipus Colonceus, a J£| 8 £J at of 
noetic conception of peculiar loftiness, which Mis- 
represents the end of the king as the harmonizing close of 
a human life laden with suffering and guilt, was brought 
on the stage by his grandson, the younger Sophocles, in 
01. xciv. 3 (b. c. 401, March). iEschylus, too, not only 
survived like a demigod in the memory of the Athenians, 
but his art also remained an inheritance unto the fourth 
generation. His son Euphorion, his nephew Philocles, as 
well as the son of the latter Morsimus, and the grandson 
of iEschylus, Astydamas by name, were dramatic poets ; 

* The hostile general in the autumn of 406 can only have been a com- 
mander of the troops in Decelea (not Lysander, as the Biographer of 
Sophocles, and Plin. viii. 109, assert); and it is quite conceivable that after 
the battle of the Arginus» the Lacedaemonians pressed more closely upon 
the city, in order to take vengeance by land for the destruction of their 
fleet and to render the Athenians inclined to peace (vol. iii. p. 530). The 
tomb of the poet lay on the road to Decelea, doubtless in the district 
of Colonus. Cf. v. Leutsch, Philol. i. 129. As to the descendants of Soph- 
ocles, eoe Sauppe, Sophokleische Inschriften, in Gutting. Nachr. 18G5, p. 244. 

90 History of Greece. i* 00 * V. 

and it is indeed a remarkable testimony to the firm and 
continuous cohesion in single families, which notwithstand- 
ing the innovating and restless spirit of the age was still 
to be met with at Athens, that the rivalry between the two 
masters was continued in several generations of their de- 
scendants. Philocles had competed with Sophocles himself 
for the prize, and had been able to gain a victory over 
the (EdipusEex; and Astydamas and the younger So- 
phocles contended in the period after the war as the most 
fertile dramatic poets. The families of artists became 
schools of art, in which the style of the great masters was 
piously retained and cherished. The old plays, too, were 
revived : in the case of jEschylus a special popular de- 
cree had ordained that no poet, who should desire to 
briug any JSschylean play upon the stage, should be re- 
fused the chorus ; and it would doubtless have been an 
advantage to Athens, had the classical works been more 
frequently recurred to and afforded means of edification. 
But the public demanded change, and the great annual 
festivals of Dionysus required new plays. And thus it 
came to pass, that, as the management of language and 
versification grew in dexterity, a continually increasing 
number of persons from all quarters forced their way in, 
and that the number swelled of those who, without being 
born poets, tried their hand at the drama, and more or 
less successfully composed in the style of the old masters. 
Thus a large number of poets of the second rank 
gathered at Athens, and contrived to obtain a cer- 
tain consideration, although it was only by outward re- 
sources of art and by a certain degree of general culture 
that they supplemented the lack of original genius. Com- 
edy, far from preserving silence as to their defects, vigi- 
lantly observed the progress of tragic art; and many a 
straggler belonging to this aftergrowth of dilettantism was 
made to suffer under her bitter mockery ; e. g. Theognis, 
a member of the Thirty, whom Attic wit named the 

chap, ii.] Athens after her Restoraticm. 91 

" snow-man," because his was an artificial and frosty poe- 
try. " All Thrace," announces an envoy in the AcJiarn- 
ians of Aristophanes, " was snowed up, and all rivers were 
rigid with ice ; it was about the same time when, at 
Athens, Theognis was competing for the dramatic prize," 
as if the character of his plays had some connexion with 
the extraordinary cold of that year's winter. So, again, 
Aristophanes celebrates the charms of spring, on condi- 
tion that Morsimus, the son of Philocles, produces no play 
during its course. Sthenelus is blamed for adorning him- 
self with strange feathers; Carcinus, together with his 
whole poetic clan, is derided on account of his rhythms, 
the artificial prettiness of which provoked mockery ; nor 
was Meletus more tenderly treated, a personage much 
talked about at Athens ever since 01. lxxxviii. 4 (b. c. 
425). This Meletus was a restless being, gifted with in- 
tellectual vivacity and full of talent, but devoid of char- 
acter, and dissolute in his habits of life ; as a poet he 
sought to attain to consideration, first by means of lyrical 
efforts, and then upon the stage, by zealously imitating 
iEschylus, and venturing to compose an CEdipus-trilogy. 
But his plays likewise lacked that inner warmth which 
genius alone can bestow ; and accordingly Aristophanes 
in his Gerytades (produced as early as 01. xcvi.) makes 
Meletus descend into Hades, where, on account of his own 
poverty of intellect, he wishes to ask aid from the de- 
ceased great masters ; — in other words, true poetry has 
perished with JEschylus and Sophocles, and the poets of 
the age merely support their existence by the crumbs 
which they pick up under the abundant tables of the old 
masters. Similarly Aristophanes says of one of the later 
poets, that he licks the lips of Sophocles " like unto a jar 
overflowing with honey."* 

* As to the continuance of the tragedies of ^Eschylus on the Attic 
stage; Schol. Ar. Ran. 892; iEsch. Agnm., Schneidewin, vi. Theognis: Arist. 
dcham. 140 ; Thesm. 170. Morsimus : Ar. Par, 800. Concerning Morsimus, 

92 History of Greece. [Book v 

The poet A P oet of infinitely higher originality was 

Agathou. Agathon, the son of Tisamenus. He was the 

model of an Athenian bel esprit. Handsome of person 
wealthy, open-handed, amiable in manner, he was a centre 
of the higher society, which loved to assemble at his 
hospitable board, and by virtue of not absolutely unselfish 
friendship shared in his triumphs. Already previously to 
the Sicilian expedition he had gained his first poetic vic- 
tories ; and he had a well-founded claim on such successes, 
in so lar as an exquisite culture, a vivacious intellect, and 
the full command of all resources of art gave a title to 
them. He contrived with exceeding skill to turn Sophis- 
tic training to account for the stage, and, after a fashion 
well adapted to the taste of the times, to combine the arts 
of rhetoric (wherein he was a scholar of Gorgias) and 
poetry. In his case, then, an attempt was made to give 
a new development to the drama. Agathon was anxious 
to be no mere member of a school ; he was conscious that 
dramatic art must not remain stereotyped in its forms, if 
it was to exercise a living influence upon the existing gen- 
eration. His independence in the choice of his subjects is 
already evident from the names of his pieces ; for whilst 
the ordinary titles of tragedies as a rule make it easy to 
guess their contents, the name Anthos (the Flower), given 
to one of the plays of Agathon, is thoroughly mysterious, 
and shows how far he had removed himself from the tra- 
ditions of the Attic stage. He was skilful in construction, 
and fresh in ideas ; but on the other hand, his plays exhi- 
bited more brilliancy than warmth, more wit than depth 
of thought and feeling ; and rhetoric was perceptibly ob- 
liged to supplement the want of creative power. Aga- 
thon's character lacked manliness ; he was effeminate, 
spoilt, and vain ; instead of being subject, like the true 

Sthenelus and Melanthius : Cobet, Plat. Com. Eel. 184. Gerytades : Meineke, 
Fragm. Com. ii. 1,005. 'O 5' au 2o<£o/<Ae'ovs tow /ncAm KtxfH&ixivov taanep 
KabicrKOV nepieAcix* T ° orofia, ii. 1170. 

Chap, ii.] Athens after her Restoration, 93 

poet, to the force of higher powers, so as to forget himself 
in his works, they were a mirror of his individuality ; and 
this delight in himself was everywhere transparent. Aris* 
tophanes describes Agathon sitting down to write poetry, 
while his servant offers up a sacrifice of myrrh and fumi- 
gates his dwelling. The whole choir of the Muses is in- 
voked in a pompous prelude, and to this bombast the emp- 
tiness and tameness of the work itself stands in a doubly 
notable contrast. For Agathon's forte lay in an artificial 
technical skill, which was unable to cheer the soul ; his 
eager search after small sensations, which were in particular 
to be excited by means of surprising figures of speech and 
plays upon words, became tiresome ; there was wanting 
the total effect, which is based upon the inner cohesion of 
a drama thoroughly thought out ; and the poet himself 
acknowledged his weakness as a dramatist, when he at- 
tempted to furbish up his plays by means of inserted 
songs, the so-called Embolima, which had no connexion 
with the action of the piece.* 

Such was the condition of dramatic art at Athens. 
Either it exhibited an absolute dependence upon the 
classic models, such as notably preserved itself in the 
family schools of the two great masters, or innovations 
were attempted, wherein homage was paid to the spirit of 
the age. We are unable to form a judgment in detail 
concerning the performances in either direction, because 
the works produced are lost, and hardly any traces have 
remained of a remembrance of them. But the reason of 
this is that in the times when a critical judgment was de- 
finitively established concerning the dramatic literature 
of Athens, the innovations in question were regarded as 
nothing but a decay of true art ; wherefore the works of 
Agathon, as well as those of the mere imitators of iEschy- 
lus and Sophocles, were given up to oblivion. 

* Agathon "6 KaAos," Ritschl, Opusc. i. 411. As early as the year 405 he 
had gone to Pella, ei? nanapav cvajxiav, Arist. Ran. 85. 'Efi/3dAi^a, Aristot. 
Poet. 18. 'Avflo?, c. 9. 

94 History of Greece. £ Bo °* v 

,. , But one poet asserted his title to perma- 

Tragic poet, nence. The fertile power of his genius raised 
him above the multitude of mediocre associates in his art, 
and acquired for him so high a fame, that, instead of 
being obscured by his great predecessors, he obtained a 
place as a third by their side. Doubtless each of the three 
represents a new epoch in Attic history; yet iEschylus 
the soldier of Marathon, and Sophocles the witness of the 
Periclean age, had their footing on one and the same 
ground : the age of the one was the older, that of the other 
the younger, and a mighty progress is observable from the 
former to the latter — but no rupture. Just as Cimon and 
Pericles were able to arrive at a mutual understanding, so 
the poetic representatives of their time could also be con- 
scious of a spiritual community. Sophocles survived to 
see the whole of the revolution produced by the war ; he 
lived in the same atmosphere as Agathon and Euripides, 
and under the same influences ; but in his poetic grandeur 
he stood forth from the nebular exhalations below, and 
never allowed the fermenting agitation of a collapsing 
world to disturb the harmony of his mind. Euripides, on 
the other hand, stood in the midst of the movement of his 
age, and was fully exposed to its influence. His greatness 
lies in the fact, that he was possessed of sufficient power 
and courage, in such an age and for such an age, further 
to develop dramatic art. But the mighty nature of the 
change undergone by Athens during the years of war is 
most clearly manifest from a comparison of these two 
poets. Is it not as if a long human generation lay between 
them ? — and yet Euripides was only sixteen years junior 
to Sophocles, and died even before him. 

Euri ides- Euripides, the son of Mnesarchus, was 
bom in Saia- sprung from a noble house. He grew up in 

01. lxxv. 1 well-to-do circumstances, and had ample op- 

(b. c. 480) ; > ... 

portunity of availing himself of all means of 
culture offered by his native city to her youth. He was a 

chap, ii.] Athens after her Restoration. 95 

zealous scholar of Anaxagoras, the mighty thinker, who 
exercised so potent an influence upon the widest variety 
of minds ; and his glorious delineation of the true Wise 
Man, in the picture of whom Anaxagoras was recognized 
by his contemporaries, attests how deep was Euripides' 
conception of the mission of philosophy. He had in- 
tercourse with Socrates ; he eagerly participated in the 
many-sided efforts of the Sophists ; in his house Protago- 
ras recited those writings on account of which he was per- 
secuted as having denied the gods. Furthermore, Euripides 
collected the writings of the ancient philosophers, among 
whom Heraclitus in particular made a deep impression 
upon him. These studies were to him a matter of para- 
mount importance ; and when he was not listening to the 
disputations of the Sophists, he preferred the society of 
his book-rolls, inquiring and meditating upon the courses 
in which Hellenic thought had endeavored to realize a 
clear conception of things divine and human. And yet 
he did not allow this occupation to become the task of his 
life ; nor was he satisfied by study and inquiry. For this 
his mind was too open, and his power of imagination too 
lively ; he possessed a brilliant gift of invention and expo- 
sition, and it was this which led him to dramatic poetry.* 
But here again a difficult task awaited him. The grand 
style of Sophoclean poetry admitted of no further per- 
fection ; if therefore Euripides desired to distinguish him- 
self from the circle of mere imitators, it behooved him to 
bring upon the stage the new movement in the minds of 
men, to make use of the philosophy of the day for the 
drama. And to this task he actually devoted himself, 

* Concerning Euripides, see Suidas and the biographies; with occasional 
use of Philochorus. Gellius, xv. 26. Salamis was his birthplace (probably 
at the time when the Athenians took refuge there), and subsequently too a 
favorite sojourn of the poet. Welcker, Alte Denkmaler, i. 489. The ideal 
Wise Man : Fragm. 105. Dindorf, Clem. Alex. Strom, iv. 536 d ; Bernhardy, 
Gr. Lilt. ii. 365. Protagoras recites Trepl 0ea>v in the house of Euripides, 
Diog. L. ix. 8, 54. He was the most famous collector of books before 
Aristotle ; see Note to p. 77. 

96 History of Greece. t BooK v. 

with an endurance and a fidelity which offer a doubly 
glorious testimony to the energy of his character, inas- 
much as the times were in general unfavorable to poe- 
tic art, while he was personally exposed to painful attacks, 
insults, and depreciation. It was his misfortune not to 
survive his great predecessor, for he was hereby prevented 
from ever attaining to a full enjoyment of his fame. For 
the Athenians, changeable as was their character, and 
much as they had altered during the years of war, yet 
from force of habit and from a true sense for art re- 
mained attached to the old dramatic style ; and, however 
lively the interest which Euripides excited, yet the com- 
bination of art and sophistry, of reflection and poetry, 
appeared inadmissible. Sophocles remained the classic 
poet. It was he to whom the first prizes fell year after 
year, while of more than ninety plays of Euripides only 
about five received the crown. All the Conservatives 
were against him on principle ; above all Aristophanes, 
although the latter and those who shared his views per- 
ceived indeed the weak points of the new style, but at the 
same time could not indicate any other courses for the 
further development of the drama, and were still less able 
to point to any poets who were pursuing a truer path. 
The labors of Euripides, however, were not in vain. In 
proportion as the number of fertile poets diminished, his 
popularity and influence increased, and towards the close 
of the war he was the dramatist proper of the people, the 
favorite of the general public. Pleasure was taken in the 
boldness and independence with which he treated the an- 
cient myths, bringing them upon the stage in so living a 
form that the spectators fancied they were witnessing pre- 
sent events in these mythical stories. The common people 
had grown weary of the mysterious pathos of ancient tra- 
gedy, and enjoyed listening to a poet who made every- 
thing intelligible and familiar, who spoke the language of 
the multitude, and who brought before it heroes whom it 

Chap, h.] Athens after her Restoration. 97 

might regard as men of its own kind. The verses of 
Euripides were easily impressed upon the memory ; his 
maxims went from hand to hand like current coin, his 
plays were heard with delight and largely read. For it 
was precisely at this time that the diffusion of writings 
had advanced with extraordinary rapidity ; when a suit 
was instituted against Protagoras, the judicial prosecution 
extended to his writings likewise, and all copies sold had 
to be delivered up to the authorities. 

A real mania for reading prevailed in the Attic public ; 
the very nurses in tragedy appeal to their knowledge of 
myths derived from ancient writings. In his reading 
the Athenian felt less dependent upon the traditions of 
the stage, and gave himself up more freely to the feeliug 
of satisfaction offered to him by the poet in whom he 
found a mirror of himself and of his age. Therefore the 
plays of Euripides accompanied the Athenian by land 
and by sea, and offered him a consolation in foreign re- 
gions and in the midst of misery.* 

And yet Euripides did not remain among his fellow- 
citizens. About 01. xciii. 1 (b. c. 408), when already of 
advanced age, he accepted an invitation from King Ar- 
chelaus to Macedonia, where he was attracted by the new 
Hellenic culture unfolding itself there. He was one of 
the first whom the dramatic Muse of Athens led among 
a population not Greek ; he had a presentiment of the 
mission of Hellenic art to become the common property 
of all peoples striving after a loftier conduct of life. As 

* "Euripidem M. Varro ait cum quinque et septuaginta tragoedias 
scripserit, in quinque solis virisse," Gell. xvii. 4, 3. The Alexandrine 
writers were acquainted with 92 from the Didascalia, where only those plays 
were entered which had gained one of the three prizes. Nauek Eur. xxiii. 
As to Protagoras: Diog. L. ix. 8, 52. Learned nurses: Ilippol 453. Euri- 
pides as travellers' reading: Aristoph. Ran. 52; as the consolation of 
prisoners (vol. iii. p. 408), who offer their thanks to him after their return, 
Plut. Nic. 29. Ignorance of the writings of Anaxagoras is accounted so 
decisive a proof of an uneducated mind (aireipia ypaftfidriav) that it is an 
insult to think it possible in Attic jurymen. Plut. Apol. 26 d. 


98 History of Greece. r BooK v - 

iEschylus celebrated the foundations of Hiero, so Euri- 
pides commemorated those of Archelaus. When there- 
fore we find him joyously glorifying the king, who, after 
the manner of the ancient heroes, was establishing civili- 
zation in the north by levelling and making secure the 
public roads, or blessing the primitive abodes of the 
Muses on the Pierian shores, where Hellenic festivals 
dies at Peiia were once more flourishing, — we understand 
u'c X 406) 3 now P r °ductive an impulse was given to the 
poet by his migration. Even here, however, 
he met with enemies, who grudged him the enjoyment 
of the royal favor ; and, after a two years' sojourn at 
Pella, the old man, in the 75th year of his age, fell, as it 
would appear, a victim to their guile.* 

Character Though Euripides may be called more than 

and h'is Plc Sophocles a child of his times, this is not in- 
poe ry ' tended to imply that he was totally subject to 

the tendencies described above as connected with the 
moral decay of Athens, and that he was by them estranged 
from the loftier aims of his predecessors. He was not 
only pure in his life, and far removed from lightly de- 
spising ancient morals and manners; but there was also 
in him an ideal tendency of great strength and depth. He 
was possessed by an active religious craving, by a warm 
love of calm meditation on things divine and human, by 
an irresistible longing to solve the enigmas of the system 
which rules the universe ; and this louging was intensified 
in him by his ardent sympathy with the sufferings of hu- 
manity, and by a deep sense of justice which he sought to 
satisfy. But his constant search led him to no goal ; he 
found it impossible to harmonize opposing forces, and to 
find a satisfactory conclusion either in faith or in doubt. 
He was too religious to rest contented with mere negation, 

* M\. Y. H. xiii. 4. Insults at court, avenged by Archelaus, who thereby 
himself incurs hostility, Arist. Pol. 220, 7. Fragment of the Archelaui, 34: 
eitava oSovpovc Xu^tewvas. 

chap, ii.] Athens after her Restoration, 99 

and too freely enlightened to follow tradition. In the tran- 
quil soul of Sophocles the grand forms of the pre-historic 
age mirrored themselves, and he gave himself up to them, 
expanding the traditional conceptions of Gods and Heroes, 
deepening them, and bringing them into accord with the 
ideas of his age, just as Phidias did in his department of 
art. Euripides, on the other hand, was never able to for- 
get his own individuality and his doubts ; and the deep 
excitement in which he lived communicated itself to all 
his works. They were, therefore, incapable of exercising 
a tranquillizing effect, and lacked that impress of happy 
harmoniousness which was borne by the older works. 
Euripides, both as a man and as a poet, was a lifelong 
sufferer from the unsolved conflict between speculation 
and art, and this all the more, inasmuch as he possessed 
no means of balancing his internal dissatisfaction either 
by public business and glad participation in the affairs of 
the community, or even by the enjoyments of social life. 
He was therefore, in direct contrast to the serene and 
affable Sophocles, sullen and discontented, bitter in his 
judgments and prone to find fault ; everywhere he saw the 
dark side of things, heard the discordant notes, and gave 
vent against gods and men to the discontent which pos- 
sessed him ; for even against the gods he inveighs on ac- 
count of their sins of commission or omission. 

But the very fact that Euripides was placed in relations 
so unfavorable to the growth of poetic works increases our 
admiration for his courage in giving a new development 
to the Attic drama, and for the success which attended his 
efforts. Moreover, he doubtless chose the right starting- 
points for his innovations. 

The Gods and Heroes of earlier tragedy were figures 
handed down in fixed outlines ; mythology furnished the 
characters, poetic fancy added its impress with a definite- 
ness and clearness of form, wherein we recognize the same 
plastic sense of the Hellenes which created the national 

100 History of Greece. f BoOK v. 

images of the Gods in marble and bronze. Mask, cothur- 
nus, and dress contributed to distinguish the several char- 
acters according to traditional usage; and, in consequence 
of the pious awe with which the personages of tragedy 
inspired the poets themselves, the latter never ventured to 
humanize them. They were to be measured by a differ- 
ent standard ; they passed over the stage superhuman in 
height, resembling the Phidian figures in the temple-frieze 
of the Parthenon, in which every one immediately recog- 
nized a higher order of beings. Sophocles was indeed 
able to bring the figures of mythology into closer contact 
with the feelings of the spectator, and to represent in these 
figures the inner life of the soul. In his plays the rela- 
tions between parents and children, between husband and 
wife, between brothers and sisters, are exhibited with more 
warmth, truth, and humanity. At the same time, how- 
ever, the figures appearing before us are not single indi- 
viduals, but, as it were, symbolic examples, comprehending 
entire species and groups of human beings. Notwith- 
standing their human weaknesses they remain ideal char- 
acters, and the lofty grandeur surrounding them has its 
origin in the circumstance, that only the settled principal 
features of each individuality are delineated. 

Unless this mode of exposition, which gradually could 
not but fall into a certain monotony, was to be continued 
without change, it was indispensable to dare the attempt 
of bringing real men and women on the stage — and not 
merely as subordinate personages (such as, e. g., the mes- 
sengers, guards, and nurses, into the representation of 
whom already the earlier tragic poets had introduced 
striking features of ordinary life), but also as leading 
parts. This was ventured by Euripides, who hereby 
opened for himself a new sphere, where he could take ad- 
vantage of all his natural gifts and of all the acquisitions 
of his experience and culture ; of the quick sensibility of 
his disposition ; of his brilliant gift of finding the right 

Chap ii.] Athens after her Restoration. 101 

word for every phase of feeling ; of his accurate know- 
ledge of all the impulses moving his generation ; and of 
his sophistic training, which enabled him incisively to il- 
lustrate and account for all standpoints of human opinion. 
After this fashion he boldly renounced the traditions of 
the tragic stage ; drew forth his characters from the mists 
of the pre-historic age, and placed them under the clear 
light of the present ; reduced the diction of tragic pathos 
to the standard of ordinary Attic parlance ; and, instead 
of contenting himself with representing the Heroes in 
large and general outlines, depicted their woes and joys 
with the utmost elaboration through all stages and 

But in this course he was met by very seri- Hig t ic 
ous difficulties ; for he continued to treat the art - 
same epic subjects with his predecessors, and thus arrived 
at a contradiction which made itself disagreeably per- 
ceptible. His heroes bore the names of a Heracles or 
Agamemnon ; they issued forth from palace portals clad 
in gorgeous robes, mounted on the lofty cothurnus, and 
reverentially surrounded by their serving-men ; but the 
personages themselves had dwindled into ordinary mortals, 
who ill accorded with the parts they played. They were 
human beings, too feeble to allow a struggle with the 
Powers of Fate to be suitably depicted in them — human 
beings, worried by love's labor and by wedded discord, by 
poverty, and by all the troubles of earthly life. From 
the mighty character-masks, invented for the figures of 
the iEschylean drama, issued the thin voice of ordinary 
mortals, claiming compassionate sympathy, such as we are 
wont to bestow upon the misfortunes of any of our neigh- 
bors. Herein necessarily lay an offence against the 
healthy sense for art ; for it was a humiliation of the 
Homeric figures, nay, it seemed like a desecration of the 
venerable treasure of popular tradition. 

Euripides himself was not indifferent to popular my- 

302 History of Greece. [ Bo °* v. 

thology, which he had studied as a scholar. He contrived 
to adorn the earlier dramatic subjects with many a feature 
overlooked by others, and very skilfully to avail himself 
of new subjects, possessing a popular interest for the 
Athenian public, or specially adapted for effective repre- 
sentation. In the former respect his Ion is distinguished, 
the scene of which lies at Delphi, where the son of Apollo 
and of the Attic princess Creiisa dwells unrecognized as a 
ministrant of the temple, until he is restored from his 
sacred retirement to his native land, where as one of its 
born kings he is to found an era of the highest glory. 
The fragments of the Erechtheus likewise attest a deep 
and warm conception of the popular legends of his native 
land. Nine of his tragedies treat Attic subjects ; but in 
the rest too he loses no opportunity of glorifying his 
native country ; and when we find him with heart and 
soul celebrating the favor of the Gods resting upon At- 
tica, the intellectual possessions of Athens, her laws and 
rights, and her great men, he must have touched the 
souls of his fellow-citizens, fostered their patriotism, and 
encouraged them to the imitation of illustrious ensamples.* 
In the other respect those pieces are specially distin- 
guished, where female characters play the principal part ; 
Phaedra in the Hippolytus is an instance, in whom is de- 
lineated with admirable and masterly skill a criminal 
passion — her love for her stepson — in its gradual develop- 
ment from the vain effort of struggling against it up to 
its confession, and then from the outbreak of fury at her 
rejection up to her expiation of her guilt by means of a 
voluntary death. Not inferior was the poet's success in 
his representation of the inner struggles of a Medea, and 
naturally so : for in this case his peculiar gifts could most 
thoroughly assert themselves, without impairing the 

* Attic subjects are treated in the following : JEgeus, Alope, Erechtheus, Hera- 
clidse, Hippolytus, Theseus, Sciron. Cf. Schenkl, Polit. Anscliauungen des Euripidet 
(Vienna, 1862). 

Chap, ii.] Athens after her Restoration. 103 

dignity of the subject or defacing tradition. To such sub- 
jects as this Euripides accordingly devoted himself with 
special predilection. 

But in general it was otherwise. Euripides, instead of 
abiding in the contemplation of the Heroic world, like 
iEschylus and Sophocles, saw no lustre either in the pre- 
historic past or in the present, and was only attracted by 
characters as well as subjects, in so far as he might hope 
by means of a neater construction of the plot and of a 
more lively delineation of character to exhibit his talent 
and the advantage of advanced culture. Instead of 
trustfully and reverentially accepting tradition, he placed 
himself in opposition to it as a keen critic, rejected the 
myths of Homer, in which he saw inventions improperly 
connected with the gods, and unhesitatingly allowed a 
sharp note of doubt and negation to make itself heard 
in the very midst of his pieces, so that all interest in the 
story was at an end. Where all Olympus is called into 
question, and the popular faith is met by a compassionate 
smile, its divinities could not but become empty theatri- 
cal figures, while a breath of icy frost blew across the 
stage whence the gods themselves had been banished. 

Since, then, Euripides himself took no genuine delight 
in his subjects, and could not be blind to the degree in 
which their significance suffered under his treatment, he 
sought for other means whereby he might invest them 
with attractions. For this purpose he employed an artifi- 
cial complication of dramatic situations, endeavoring by 
means of delicately planned plots to provoke an eager 
curiosity in his hearers, which had never been an object 
of the earlier poets. Furthermore, he sought so to choose 
and arrange his dramatic subjects, that a reference to 
circumstances of the day gave them the charm of novelty. 
Thus about 01. xi. (b. c. 420) he wrote his Supplices, in 
glorification of Athens, which city forcibly obtains the 
burial of the Argive princes slain before the walls of 

104 History of Greece. [Book v. 

Thebes. This service to Argos is insisted upon, in order, 
as is explicitly stated at the close of the play, to induce 
that state to maintain a close alliance with Athens ; and 
again, the ancient conflicts with Thebes possessed an 
immediate interest after the battle of Delium, after which 
the Thebans had actually refused to permit the burial of 
their fallen adversaries (vol. iii. p. 195). The Heraclidce 
has the same date and object. In this tragedy the 
generosity of Athens towards her enemies of those days is 
celebrated, in order to mark the ingratitude of Sparta and 
to strengthen the Attic party in Peloponnesus, quite in 
the spirit of the policy of Alcibiades, which the poet 
manifestly espoused (vol. iii. p. 309). Besides these, there 
occur in the most different plays isolated allusions, which 
could not fail to have great effect upon the assembled 
people. So e. g. the concluding lines of the Hipjiolytus 
(01. lxxxvii. 4 ; b. c. 428), which could not fail to re- 
mind every hearer of Pericles, whose death had quite 
recently taken place ; the outbreak of wrath against the 
perfidy of Sparta in the Andromache, which in 01. lxxxix. 
2 (b. c. 423) must have evoked the fullest possible assent 
(vol. iii. p. 198), &c. In general, however, these inten- 
tionally significant passages and plays doubtless indicate 
no progress in tragic art ; for it could not be otherwise 
than hurtful to dramatic works, that myths were con- 
verted into symbols of modern events and relations, and 
that the main interest was placed outside the action of the 
piece. The attention of the spectator was hereby divided, 
and the harmony of the whole destroyed. 

The best way would have been for Euripides to have 
entirely abandoned the ancient myths, towards which 
after all he had no genuine inclination. For it became 
harder from year to year to produce any novelty ; all the 
subjects had been treated repeatedly, all the characters 
were known, and all the relations between them fixed. 
"If," says the poet Antiphanes, "one merely mentions 

chap, ii.j Athens after her Restoration. 105 

the name CEdipus, they know all the rest : locaste, Laius, 
children, guilt, troubles and all; and if Alcmieon is 
merely named, every child cries out : * That is the man 
who killed his mother.' " The retrospect of earlier treat- 
ments of the same subject deprived the poet of a fresh 
and natural attitude towards his subject ; and it was the 
most doubtful proceeding of all, when (as not unfre- 
quently occurs in Euripides) he allowed himself to be se- 
duced into casting critical side-glances upon his predeces- 
sors, blaming violations of probability committed by 
them, and thus introducing into poetry relations utterly 
foreign to its true nature.* 

Accordingly, nothing seems more natural, than that 
gifted poets should have sought after subjects where their 
freedom of creation was less impeded, as was not without 
success done by Agathon. The national history offered a 
wide field ; and grand models existed in the Phoenissce, in 
the Fall of Miletus, and in the Persce (vol. ii. p. 581). 
Euripides in his Archelaus approached nearest to this 
course. Yet he lacked original power for developing a 
new and independent species of drama in this direction ; 
for this he, who was ever intent upon the search after 
general truths, was deficient in the sense of the actual, i. 
e. in the historic sense. In consequence of the preponder- 
ance in him of a love of reflection, which constituted a 
main feature in his character, the mythical subjects 
seemed after all the most suitable, because into these he 
could introduce most underlying meaning, and because 
they offered him occasions, in more or less suitable pas- 
sages, for developing his views concerning God and the 
world, concerning domestic relations and the value of the 
several forms of government. 

* Reference to the death of Pericles : olov oreprjtreaO' avSpos, Boeckh, Trag. 
Princ. p. 181; H. Hirzel, de Eur. in comp.div. arte, p. 64. Antiphanes in Meineke, 
iii. 100. A concealed blame of earlier poets occurs in the P?t<mwse, (752 k), 
the Philoctetet, the Electra, Ac. Cf. Schneidewin, Introd. to Philoct. 


106 History of Greece. C BooK v. 

„ . . , For in truth the intellectual capital at the 

Euripides * 

p. Sophist and disposal of the poet was specially the Sophistic 

as a poet. r r r j sr 

culture. Euripides understood, better than 
any other, how to reproduce its doctrinal propositions in 
words of incisive force ; and therefore he is regarded as 
one of the most influential of its representatives, and was 
as such praised by the one side with passionate admira- 
tion, while the other assailed him with wrath and indigna- 
tion. The adherents of ancient usage and ways of 
thought could not pardon his expressing views concerning 
marriage and family discipline of so dangerous a nature, 
that the multitude found in them an excuse for immoral 
connections and a justification of impure appetites ; nor 
could they pardon the fair face which his specious elo- 
quence put upon craft and guile, when, in accordance 
with the teaching of Protagoras, he propounded the ques- 

" Why, what is wrong, if to the doer it seem not so f 

or when he placed in the mouth of a faithless one the 
excuse : 

" The tongue has sworn it, but the heart remains unsworn." 

These were expressions of Sophistic refinement, which 
seemed blasphemy when attributed to a Hero ; expres- 
sions of despicable sentiments, which ought in no case to 
be heard on the Hellenic stage, although they were justi- 
fied in the connexion of the play, and were by no means 
advanced with any evil intentions by the poet himself. 
From the point of view which e. g. Aristophanes advoca- 
ted, it was demanded that the poet should preserve silence 
on what was evil ; — or to what end was the theatre visited 
at the festivals of Dionysus, except to forget the wretched- 
ness and vileness of life and to be elevated into a world 
whence the base was excluded ? According to this view, 
even the wrong-doers and the guilty ought to preserve a 
superhuman grandeur. This was undoubtedly a narrow 
and one-sided standpoint ; but it had given to ancient 

chap, ii.j Athens after her Restoration. 107 

Tragedy her peculiar perfection, her ideal dignity, and her 
moral significance ; nor was Euripides able to compensate 
or make good iu other ways what he destroyed in this poe- 
tic world. For poetry the Sophistic culture, by virtue of 
which he transferred the sentiments of modern Athens to 
the Heroic world, ever remained a barren soil, wl*ence no 
fresh springs were to be charmed forth; and therefore 
Euripides, as a poet not less than as a man, was a true 
martyr to Sophistry. It possessed, without satisfying 
him ; he employed it in order to bestow a new interest 
upon art ; he contended for the right of every individual 
to approach in inquiring meditation all things human 
and divine ; but at the same time he was not blind to the 
dangers of this tendency. He openly declared them, ut- 
tered warnings and pronounced invectives against it, and 
at last wrote an entire tragedy, with no other object than 
that of representing the miserable end of a man who op- 
poses his reason to the system of the gods, and who refuses 
to acknowledge those as gods, whom, according to his 
idea of the Divine nature, he is unable to account as such. 
King Pentheus falls a victim to human arrogance, which 
refuses to bow down even before the irrefutable deeds of 
divine power, such as that which reveals itself in Dionysus ; 
and the entire tragedy of the Bacchce, one of the latest and 
at the same time one of the grandest of the poet's plays, is 
full of the most decisive attacks upon the overweening 
pride of human reason in divine things, and of the praise 
of the man who in simpleness of heart adheres to the 
teachings of tradition and to the beliefs of the people. 

It was this oscillation between irreconcilable stand- 
points and this want of inner contentment which prevent- 
ed Euripides, in spite of his manifold culture and of his 
decided tendency towards teaching others, from becoming 
even in his own sense a true instructor of the people. 
In the end, there remained nothing for him but to recom- 
mend a certain middle course ; but such a system for the 

108 History of Greece. [Boo* v. 

conduct of life as this, the meagre result of long years of 
study, was naturally ill-suited to warm the hearts of men. 
Euripides lacked the inner illumination of the mind 
which marks out the born poet, and thus he offered an in- 
stance of the truth of Pindar's words : " A master is he, 
who is wise by nature ; inborn greatness begets the power 
of accomplishing glorious works. He who clings to what 
he has learnt from others, staggers with uncertain step on 
a darkling path, and wearies himself in vain with artifices 

Hisinnova- ^he 11 the poet is without the genuine 
tions. sources of inspiration, the decay of art must 

likewise show itself by outward symptoms. Thus, not- 
withstanding the expenditure of inventive power in the 
plays of Euripides, we find them wanting in a lucid and 
logical development ; the significance of the whole is 
postponed to that of the details ; the centre of gravity 
mostly lies in individual problems and in their skilful so- 
lution, in individual psychological developments and cli- 
maxes of sensation ; thus scene succeeds scene, without 
any connexion of inner necessity subsisting between them, 
as in the works of Sophocles. Nor did Euripides mature 
all his pieces with loving carefulness. His high natural 
ability allowed him to write rapidly ; and thus he often 
trenched upon the limits of a technical skill rather me- 
chanical than artistic. If a subject was insufficient in ex- 
tent, he combined several actions together, in which it is 
extremely difficult to recognize a unity, as e. g. in the He- 
cuba. While he rejects the simple course of the tradi- 
tional narrative, he finds himself unable to conduct to its 
conclusion after a natural fashion, the complication which 
he has himself invented. In such cases some outward de- 
vice is needed to untie the knot; and for this purpose 
Euripides resorts to the expedient of causing, towards the 

* Ilipp. 607: 17 -yAwao-' 6/u.w/u.ox', V Se $pr\v dvcijAOTO* ; cf. N&gelsbach, Nach. 
homer. Theol. 439. The Bacchic were composed in Macedonia.— Pind. Nem. iii. 

chap, ii.] Athens after her Restoration. 109 

end of a piece, a God to appear in the air, who announce* 
the will of destiny to the helpless hero, and, by virtue of a 
higher authority, gives a calming conclusion to the action. 
This is the " Dens ex machina" as he was called, on ac- 
count of the machinery upon which he was borne aloft, 
and he in truth constituted a decidedly external artifice 
for terminating the halting action of a play. Similarly, 
Euripides introduced an invention for the opening of his 
pieces, w r hich at the first glance distinguishes them from 
those of the older masters. These placed the spectator at 
once in the midst of the events, as to the connexion of 
which a familiar knowledge might be universally pre- 
sumed. Euripides, on the other hand, in order to pass 
quickly to the scenes wherein he could unfold his power 
of exposition, made a single character come forward, who 
gave a clear summary of the state of affairs up to the 
point where the action of the drama opened. This was an 
invention very natural in a poet who, as against the older 
masters, claimed the advantage of clear intelligibility ; 
and it was at the same time a convenient artifice for 
evading the more difficult task of a dramatic construction 
perspicuous in itself, and for arriving from the outset at 
an understanding with the public concerning the form of 
the particular myth, which he often very arbitrarily al- 
tered. On the other hand, this innovation was assuredly 
no poetic gain. For, instead of the spectator being any 
longer in a fresh and lively manner placed in the midst of 
the course of the drama, the Prologue formed a strange 
and jejune addition, standing outside the organism of the 
tragedy and disturbing its unity. Moreover, these intro- 
ductions, while hastily stringing together well-known 
events, were apt to degenerate into the monotonous and 
perfunctory manner of a trivial story-teller, and thus es- 
sentially to contribute to deprive the tragedies of their 
grandeur and dignity. 

This thorough dislocation of the dramatic organism of 

110 History of Greece. t Bo °* V. 

tragedy could not fail also to affect the treatment of 
the chorus. Hitherto the latter had formed the neces- 
sary background to the action of the play, and the in- 
dispensable accompaniment of the Heroes, of whom 
it was difficult to conceive otherwise than as sur- 
rounded by personages belonging to the same sphere as 
themselves. A surrounding of this description was un- 
necessary and inappropriate in the case of the leading 
personages of Euripides ; indeed, by him the chorus was 
in truth regarded as an unwelcome extraneous addition ; 
accordingly, he employs it for delighting the public 
during the pauses of the action by lyric songs, for the 
composition of which he was by no means unqualified by 
natural gifts. But these songs more and more lost their 
connexion with the general course of the play ; as a rule, 
they treat subjects of general interest; and are frequently 
mere texts for music, such as a poet might, as the fancy 
seized him, write in advance and hold in readiness, so as 
incidentally to insert them in one or the other play.* 

But, while Lyric Poetry forfeited its importance in its 
original place, it assumed an all the more ambitious 
prominence elsewhere — not in the orchestra, but on the 
stage itself. For, in proportion as the poet sought to ex- 
hibit and assert the spiritual life of his individual per- 
sonages in accordance with the character of his times and 
of his own idiosyncrasy, he was naturally inclined to give 
expression in lyrical recitation also to the mental phases 
of his stage-heroes. And this he accordingly did on an 
extensive scale, by interrupting, in such passages as in- 
troduce the climax of passionate emotion, the iambic 
speeches, and inserting longer pieces to be sung, after the 

* That Euripides was not always facile in composition is attested by the 
not improbable anecdote in Valer. Max. iii. 7, text. The " Deus ex machina " 
occurs in Sophocles also (according to Bergk, Soph, xxxviii., in imitation of 
Euripides), in the case of a "nodus vindice deo digitus." Cf. H. Abeken, Trag- 
Losung mm PhiloUet de$ 8. (Berlin, I860). The prologues are criticised in 
▲ristoph. Ban. 1200. 

Chap. ii. j Athens after her Restoration. Ill 

manner of arias y where the chief personages of his plays 
express their sentiments with the full force of passion. 
His actors were specially trained to produce songs of this 
kind, which were accompanied by pantomimic dance- 
movements, with masterly skill ; and their very novelty 
sufficed to make a great impression upon the Attic public. 
Hence Euripides took no small pride in these " mono- 
dies ;" and Aristophanes makes him say, that by means 
of them, Tragedy, which he had caused to grow lean, was 
fed up into new vigor — i. e. that by these songs he made 
good the loss which would otherwise have occurred in 
significance and dignity. But neither in this respect was 
the innovation tantamount to a progress. For it was 
based on a destruction of the ancient system, and on a 
mingling of the several, rigorously distinguished, species 
of poetic recitation. The actors became 6rawntr-singers ; 
recitation degenerated into a dithyrambic ecstasy ; and 
because at this point passion was most unfettered, so at 
this point too the discipline of ancient art was most 
thoroughly broken ; the rhythms flowed through one 
another without any rule ; and this necessarily prevented 
the maintenance of a clear sequence of thought.* 

Altogether, there exists no more accurate Rhythmical 
standard by which to estimate the difference novelties, 
between the old and the new age, than the treatment of 
the rhythms. The old age demanded the subordination 
of the emotional meaning of each passage under a rigor- 
ously measured form ; and its art triumphed in allowing 
living ideas to develop themselves in natural freedom 
notwithstanding the form imposed upon them. Upon this 
subjection of ideas to discipline rested the moral force of 
poetry, and its significance for state and people, as evinced 
by it, particularly in choral song. The period in which 
choral lyric verse attained to its full and legitimate de- 
velopment, was simultaneously the age when the life of 

* 'AvirptQov novwSCous : Ar. Ban. 944. A parody of the monodies : ib. I330i 

112 History of Greece. f BoOK v - 

the Greek communities, as such, flourished — the age to 
which belonged the men of Marathon ; and choral song 
served for the youth of the country as a school not only 
of artistic culture, but also of civic order, of morality 
and of patriotism. The chorus itself was an ideal type 
of the community ; for, in the one as in the other, the in- 
dividual desires to be nothing but a member of the whole 
body, and knows of no higher duty than that of rightly 
filling the place which he occupies. The new age would 
have nothing to say to such a discipline as this ; neither 
in political life, where the supremacy of the laws was dis- 
regarded, in order that the popular community might ex- 
ercise an unbounded sway according to the changing 
humor of the hour, nor in public education, of which the 
ancient ordinances fell more and more into neglect, — nor 
again in art. 

The modem ^^ nere ^ was ^ e dithyramb which 
dithyramb. struck the key-note of the new age (vol. ii. p. 
573). For, after Pindar had lived to show how the full 
splendor of the dithyrambic song might well be united to 
a close observation of the laws of rhythm, the younger 
generation of poets neglected these, in order to free a 
loftier flight of thought from a burdensome fetter. The 
regular return of the strophse, which prevented a lawless 
outflow of emotion, was abandoned ; the poets delighted 
in a variegated sequence of different kinds of verse, and 
thought thereby to have gained a victory for the freedom 
of the intellect. But experience proved that no greater 
depth of meaning was attained by this absence of form. 
On the contrary, the new poets sank more and more into 
the manner of prose diction, from which they differed 
only by unnatural turns of expression and by forced 
figures of speech. 

This fashion befell the cyclic chorus (as the dithyrambs 
were called, to distinguish them from the quadrilaterally- 
arranged chorus of tragedy) already during the former 

chap, ii.] Athens after her Restoration. 113 

half of the war, when Melanippides of Melos 

.1 L p 7. i . Melanip- 

was the most famous master of this species of pides, 
composition. The same style was continued 
by Cinesias, whose hollow pathos is derided Cinesi as» 
by Aristophanes, and whose outward appearance — a tall, 
thin, and impotent figure — likewise contrasted with that 
of the ancient masters ; and after him with particular 
success by Philoxenus of Cythera, who from 

. . . J Philoxenus. 

being a slave raised himself to the highest 
honors of a far-famed dithyrambic poet.* 

As artificiality increased, the firmly-riveted organism 
of earlier art lost more and more of its cohesion ; the 
consciousness of a close connexion vanished, and with it 
the readiness on the part of the one art to serve the other. 
The flute-player was no longer content to be a mere as- 
sistant, but aspired to be an independent artist. The solo- 
voices came forward more prominently out of the sono* of 
the chorus with longer passages of their own ; and so ut- 
terly was the dignity of art forgotten, that attempts were 
made to imitate in the dithyrambs the thunder of the 
tempest, the rush of the rivers, and the voices of animals. 

The impulse given by the dithyramb exercised an effect 
upon the remaining species of poetry, because everywhere 
there existed the same tendency towards es- 

J Changes in 

capinar from the traditional rules. Apathon *£ e f rts of 

r ° ... * ne dance 

introduced artificial trickery into the drama. 
His natural effeminacy caused him to entertain a predilec- 
tion for lyric poetry, and he found it all the more easy to 
adopt the modern rhythms, since he treated his choral ly- 
rics simply as pleasant passages for singing. He there- 
fore in versification, and in music also, departed from the 
sobriety of the old school, introducing preludes and orna- 

* As to Melanippides: Suidas; Aristot. Rhet. iii. 9, 6, p. 125, 3 (ava/3oAal 
avTi Ttav avTicrrpo^wv). As to Cinesias: Meineke, Com. i. 228. Philoxenus in 
Attic captivity in consequence of the taking of Cythera (cf. vol. iii. p. 169); 
Aov'Awv, Hesych. Athen. 643 d. 

114 History of Greece. £ Bo °* v 

ments, employing artificial modulations of the voice and 
similar devices, in order to delight the ear of a multitude 
hankering after novelty. Thus light and loose dance- 
rhythms came into fashion, such as Carcinus had brought 
upon the stage : it was a kind of ballet, the supreme art- 
istic resources of which consisted in pirouettes, in tripping 
double-quick movements, and in twirlings of the legs. 
This new Orchestic art was, in the instance of the family 
of Carcinus, exposed with deep indignation by Comedy, in 
order that the decay of the noble art might be clearly dis- 
played.* But the change which had come over the artistic 
taste of the Greeks was most perceptible of all in music, 
and of mu ■ Music is essentially the most delicate and 
sensitive of all arts : it is more than any other 
affected by every change in the current of the times, be- 
cause it has the least power of resistance to oppose to 
them. Music above all the sister-arts served to educate 
the young, and to furnish a sure standard for the moral 
bearing of the community, and thus became the object of 
the most careful cultivation and superintendence on the 
part of the state, in whose interest it specially lay, that 
music should be preserved in harmony with the existing 
constitution. The salutary power of a well-ordered art of 
music, and the dangers of a degenerate one which should 
mistake its task, have nowhere found a more thorough 
appreciation than in Greece. 

The fundamental law of music was the preponderant 
significance of the words. Music is the bearer of the 
words uttered by the poet ; it is her function to vivify 
these by melody and harmony, to prepare their effect, to 
give strength to the impression which they create, and 
permanence to the significance which they possess. For 
this reason song is the most important part of music ; but 

* Carcinus : Ar. Vesp. 1501 ; Meineke, Com. i. 613. 

Phap. II.] Athens after her Restoration. 115 

even in song the unisono of the chorus is chief, in order 
that the words may obtain their due as clearly as possi- 
ble, and that their meaning may be asserted, not as the 
sentiments of an individual, but as the conviction of a 
community. We have already seen how changes were 
made at this point, with the intention of affording more 
space to the artistic skill of the individual, by the intro- 
duction of solo-singing on the stage ; and it is easily ex- 
plicable how the desire for greater freedom of movement 
should have pre-eminently asserted itself in music, be- 
cause no other art is better adapted for giving the direct- 
est expression to human emotion, and because in no other 
had there prevailed more restriction and subordination 
than in this. For music was not only an entirely sub- 
servient art, an assistant of poetry, but, even within its 
own sphere, instrumental music again occupied a tho- 
roughly subordinate position. Within these narrow bounds 
this art had indeed attained to an uncommonly full de- 
velopment ; nor assuredly was more brilliant proof any- 
where given of the delicate artistic sense of the Hellenes, 
which shows itself in their ability to achieve great results 
with small means, than in their music. They succeeded 
in presenting on the seven-stringed cither an admirable 
variety of tones and scales, and in thus producing the 
greatest effects upon the mind. Yet it was precisely in 
this department of art that the limited nature of the ex- 
isting resources, and the inconvenience of the traditional 
ordinances, were most vividly felt ; and for this reason it 
was here that the spirit of the times, in its revolt against 
all restricting ordinances, was busiest and most effective. 
The new rhythms of Agathon were specially calculated 
for the music of the flute. The latter was more indepen- 
dent than that of stringed instruments ; it was ,, , ~ 

& ' Music of 

able to serve as a substitute for the human the flute » 
voice, which it was unable harmoniously to follow; so 
that the attempt to subordinate or co-ordinate the flute to 

116 History of Greece. t BooK V. 

singing had been relinquished, after it had been made, at 
Delphi. In this kind of music, therefore, a greater 
measure of liberty had already been granted ; in addition 
to which, the flute of the ancients was pre-eminently effec- 
tive in exciting the emotions and expressing passion. 
The flute was the instrument of the worship of Dionysus ; 
in it ecstatic sentiment found its natural expression ; so 
that it specially commended itself to the tendencies of 
modern art. 

and of the "^ ut ne ^ ner was tne innovating spirit of the 

cither. a g e i \^ Q withstood by the music of the cither, 

— that chaste music of the Apolline religion, which allow- 
ed a prevalence to song, and would allow of no emotions 
incapable of finding an expression in clear words. This 
branch too was seized by the restlessness of the times, and 
experienced an essential transformation, taking its direc- 
tion from the very locality where the art of music had re- 
ceived the laws acknowledged in Hellas, — viz., the island 
of Lesbos. Here the race of Terpander still flourished, 
a guild of singers, who, in the spirit of their ancestor, 
diligently pursued the cultivation of song and cither. A 
famous master belonging to this family school 
was Aristoclides, who also came before the pub- 
lic at Athens, and attracted to himself artists of high talent ; 
so that it became an epoch in the further development of 
the art of music, when the young Lesbian Phrynis became 
his pupil, and was by him formed into an eminent cither- 

In the earlier times the rivalry of virtuosi was 
thrown into the background by choral song ; 
but already in the days of Pericles the former asserted it- 
self, as is proved by the construction of the Attic Odeum, 
designed for the production of the performances of indi- 
viduals before a smaller public. Phrynis himself is said 
to have gained the first victory in the musical contest at 

* Aristoclides : Schol. ad Ar. Nub. 965. 

chap, ilj Athens after her Restoration. 117 

the Panathensea. From this time the connexion between 
the several arts became less close in this field also, and it 
was Phrynis, above all, who renounced the school of 
Terpander, abandoned the strict rules of ancient compo- 
sition, gave a more independent movement to the music of 
the cither by the side of poetry, and attached more weight 
to brilliant skill in the management of the fingers and the 
voice ; from the earlier school of singers he came forth as 
a virtuoso on the cither, and found numerous followers 
in this new art, which was received with great applause.* 

Of course attempts were hereupon also made to increase 
the simple resources of the art, in order to secure its 
claims to an independent position ; and invention used its 
utmost endeavors to produce in the treatment of stringed 
instruments whatever might seize upon the soul, gratify 
the ear, elicit applause and excite wonder. The first 
efforts of Phrynis in this direction were continued by 
Timotheus, the son of Thcrsander. He was a Tirr)ot heus 
man of brilliant natural endowments, who 
came over from Miletus to Hellas, in order to domesticate 
there, in the place of the art of song, which was already 
growing obsolete, the new style of music with its new 
instruments and rhythms. He composed musical works, 
in which (as their titles, Niobe, the Persians, Nauplius, &c, 
indicate) mythology and history were represented, in a 
variegated mixture of manifold forms of art: epic recita- 
tion, arias and choral songs, poetry, pantomime, dance and 
music being combined into a brilliant general effect. 

But the innovations of Timotheus met with „,, , . 

The old 

a far more obstinate resistance in Hellas than ™ n ** G and 

the new. 

he had anticipated. At Sparta in particular, 

the Apolline music, as it had been regulated by statutes 

* Phrynis inl KaMtov apxovTo? (01. lxxi. 1 ; b. c. 456) : Schol. ; probably 
this should be KaAAi^axou (01. lxxxiii. 3; B.C. 446): Meier, Panath. 285. 0. 
Miiller, Hist, of Gr. Lit., vol. ii. p. 75, Note [Engl. Tr.]; Volkmann ad Plut. de 
mus., p. 77. Plut. 0: rj Kara TepnavSpov KiOaptaSii fie\pt. tijs $pufi£o? ijAixiaf 
navTfXutf airKrj Tts ou<ra 6tcreAct. Westphal, Harmonik, p. 97. 

118 History of Greece, t Booit v - 

emanating from Delphi, was so closely connected with the 
laws of the state and with religious orthodoxy, that who- 
ever wished to introduce into it arbitrary changes, was 
regarded as the most dangerous of heresiarchs. More seve- 
rity was exercised, and more sensitiveness displayed, on this 
head than with regard to the most important fundamental 
laws of the state ; for it was deemed the mark of a pro- 
perly-trained Spartan, that he was able on the spot to dis- 
tinguish between good music and bad ; and the latter 
epithet was given to any kind which excited the senses 
and debilitated the mind. All such it was thought neces- 
sary to ward off like infectious poison. The sevenfold 
number of the strings of the instrument, and its entire 
arrangement, were likewise at Sparta deemed to be matters 
consecrated by ancient custom and by law. But even 
the Athenians were strict on this head, and faithful to 
ancient usage ; they too had ancient statutes, which fixed 
the several species of music and imposed penalties upon a 
mixture of them.* 

Hence the obstinate struggle between the old music 
and the new. Not only were the supernumerary strings 
added to the cither by Phrynis and Timotheus officially 
removed again at Sparta, but at Athens too the innovators 
were exposed to violent invective ; and while they designed 
to free music from antique restrictions and thus to raise it 
to a new perfection, they were on the other side accused 
of desecrating the noble art, and their activity was re- 
garded as a sin against the Hellenic nation, and as a 
blameworthy defection from ancestral usage. In former 
times, to be sure, says Aristophanes, had the Attic boys 
dared to deface pure song by such artificial nourishes, 
roulades and cadences, as the school of Phrynis has 

* Plut. de Legg. 730 ; O. Muller, Dorians, ii. 332 [Engl. Tr.]. As to the 
enlargement of the ancient heptachord see Westphal, u.s., p. 95. The 
" Spartan decree " against Timotheus, ap. Boethius, de mm. i. 1. Philohgus, 
xix. 308. 

Chap. II.] Athens after her Restoration. 119 

brought into fashion, they would have been whipped as 
offenders who dishonored the Muse. In the Chiron 
(ascribed to Pherecrates, or perhaps more properly to 
Nicomachus), Dame Music appeared on the stage as having 
suffered shameful ill-treatment, and related her whole 
woful history. First, she complains of Melanippides and 
his twelve accursed strings ; next Cinesias the scoundrel, 
she says, fell upon her, " and worried me so terribly with 
" the twists and the turns of his strophse, that in the 
" dithyrambus, what ought to have been on the right side, 
" came to be placed on the left. But even he was far 
" from being the worst. No ; Phrynis came next, and 
" twined in his shakes and roulades, and bent and twisted 
" me quite to pieces, in order to force a dozen harmonies 
" into five strings. He, however, afterwards repented and 
" mended his ways. But Timotheus — alas, dear public ! 
" It was he who treated me worst of all, and entirely 
" ruined me, miserable woman." " Timotheus ? — what 
" Timotheus was that ?" " Why, no other than the slave 
" from Miletus ; he tousled me far worse than all the rest 
" together, he dragged me through the labyrinth of notes, 
" deprived me e'en of my last ounce of force, and by his 
" dozen strings I am undone !" 

Thus it is in the art of music that the decisive revolu- 
tion in Greek national feeling, the change in taste and 
moral bearing, the entire contrast between the old and the 
new, most distinctly present themselves to us ; it is here 
that war is most openly declared to tradition, and that we 
find two schools of art of absolutely contradictory and 
irreconcilable tendencies. In the ancient times rhythm 
ruled the Music arts ; it was the law which the words of 
poetry, the sounds of music and the movements of the 
Orchestic art obeyed ; to it classical art owed its clear- 
ness, its happy order and its serious bearing ; by it, tran- 
quillity in movement was assured, and thought acquired 
the sway over emotion. This rhythm was the expression 

120 History of Greece. [ Bo0K V. 

of a healthy and well-ordered moral condition, and the 
mark of internal tranquillity and security. It was ac- 
cordingly unable to maintain itself in art, after the life 
of men had become a different one ; and for this reason 
the decay of the old style of music was immediately fol- 
lowed by a decay in the life of the community. 

Timotheua Euripides had himself fallen under the in- 
p?def uri " fluence of the innovations introduced into the 
treatment of rhythms and music. He was 
one of the many who admired the art of Timotheus, with 
whom he was personally intimate. When Timotheus was 
perplexed by the obstinate protests opposed to him, Euri- 
pides endeavored to console him by the assurance that the 
time was no longer distant when he would rule the stage. 
And in truth Timotheus was destined to enjoy his fame 
for a longer season, and in fuller measure, than Euripides. 
For music had more resources at its command, by which 
to offer new attractions as a compensation for the lost dig- 
nity of the ancient school of art. On the stage, on the 
other hand, it was less posssible to mistake the mag- 
nitude of the loss, when the old masters were compared 
with the present, without any new results being obtain- 
able which could be regarded as in an equal degree satis- 

Decay of ^ or are * races wanting in the tragedies of 

t arto e fd h raiSa- Euripides, that the spirit of the age came to 
tic poetry. command him more and more, and to carry 
him away with it. For while in his earlier plays — in the 
Medea, the Hecuba, the Hippolytus, the Andromache, the 
Alcestis — we find stricter principles observed, in the later 
an increasing negligence is perceptible. The versification 
becomes less solid and careful, and the long syllables in 
the iambus are more frequently broken up. In the ar- 
rangement of the dialogue too, and in the longer speeches 
corresponding to one another, the earlier tragedies exhibit 
a certain artistic symmetry, which is absent from those of 

chap, ii.j Athens after her Restoration, 121 

a later date. It may be shown with much probability 
that the period in which the poet relinquished the severer 
style in composition and versification falls about the 89th 
Olympiad, — i. e. about the time when, after the peace of 
Nicias, Alcibiades became the leader of the state, and 
carried it away into the uncertain courses of his political 

In Alcibiades, that which made the restrictions of usage 
unbearable to him, seemed to be a superabundance of 
force ; and the same appeared to be the case with the 
artists of genius, who desired in their sphere to open the 
path for a freer movement. But in truth this apparent 
wealth of force was nothing but a weakness, inasmuch as 
the highest kind of force, that of self-control, was want- 
ing. Thus it was indeed possible to burst asunder the 
ancient moulds, but no new formations developed them- 
selves ; a perpetual oscillation ensued between that ab- 
sence of form which genius affects, and an artificiality 
of the tamest description. We see the ancient ordinances, 
which the reflecting strength of the Hellenes had esta- 
blished in political life and in art alike, perishing sim- 
ultaneously ; and, amidst this dissolution, the creations 
of the Greeks also forfeited their genuinely national char- 

This estrangement of art from its na- i n fl uence 
tional character, which from the Hellenic of Eu ripides 

7 upon sunse- 

standpoint could only be viewed as a degene- ^ n ^ nt s ene - 

x J ° rations. 

ration, was, notwithstanding, the point to 
which the significance of Euripides in the history of the 
progress of civilization attaches itself. For, inasmuch as 
during an age extremely unfavorable to poetic creations, 
while acting himself in the spirit of that age and by 
means of its resources, he made it possible to preserve 

* As to the epochs of style in metre and composition, see G. Hermann, 
Elem. d. Metrik, p. 123; H. Hirzel, de Eurip. in comp. div. arte, p. 92. The use 
of the trochaic tetrameter became frequent after the 91st Olympiad. 


122 History of Greece. f BoOK v. 

dramatic art alive among the Athenians, and this with so 
much success as to enable him to maintain a place by the 
side of Sophocles, and to be acknowledged by Sophocles 
as a master of his art, he formed the transition from the 
classical into the following period, and acquired a literary 
importance extending far beyond the immediate present. 
The real classics, such as Pindar, iEschylus, and Sopho- 
cles, are only to be thoroughly understood and appreciated 
by contemporaries, or by those who by study accommo- 
date to them their whole way of thinking : so closely was 
their heart interwoven with the public life and the moral 
standpoint of their age. Euripides, on the other hand, by 
the very circumstance that he put an end to the severe 
style of earlier art, stepped forth from the narrower sphere 
of the merely popular ; he asserted the purely human mo- 
tives of feeling which find a response in every breast, 
hence his clearness and intelligibility ; hence, without 
presuming any special interest in the subjects derived from 
mythology or claiming a higher strain upon the intellec- 
tual powers, he satisfies the demands which men at all 
times and in all places make upon the drama. He is at 
once interesting and entertaining, terrific, and affecting ; 
he offers a wealth of thoughts and reflections, which come 
home and are of importance to every one, and is a poet 
for every educated man who understands the language in 
which he writes. For the same reason, too, he was able 
to affect the minds of the foremost among his contempo- 
raries, such as Socrates; and the language of the Attic 
stage, as he developed it, became the standard for the 
drama, so that even Aristophanes was obliged to confess, 
that in this respect he stood under the influence of Euri- 
pides. For the same reason he also pointed out its path 
to plastic art, and showed it how it could do new and 
important things after the age of Phidias ; and therefore, 
though in his lifetime he had been unable to prevail 
against the still acknowledged tradition of earlier art, he 

Chap, ii.] Athens after her Restoration, 123 

filled the world with his fame after his death, and found 
numerous followers among the poets, who made use of the 
Greek myths in order to obtain dramatic effects of univer- 
sal human significance. In this importance of Euripides 
for the general history of the world lies a certain consola- 
tion for those who are unable to contemplate without 
painful sympathy the long and laborious, but dark and 
embittered, life of the poet, who was himself never cheered 
by a full enjoyment of his poetic calling. 

Externally, the organism of ancient tragedy was re- 
tained unchanged ; tetralogies were acted as of old, be- 
cause this had once for all come to be the form, conse- 
crated by usage, of the poetic competition at the great 
festivals of Dionysus at Athens. But since Sophocles 
had begun to dissolve the connexion between the plays 
produced together, so that each of them constituted a 
poetic whole in itself, this method of proceeding, so far as 
it can be perceived, remained the rule for his contempo- 
raries and successors. In proportion as the interest grew 
faint in the subjects of the myths, it became desirable for 
the dramatist to devote his whole art to the single plays. 
Hereby a greater popularity was preserved to the drama, 
inasmuch as a greater variety of enjoyment was offered 
to the curiosity of the multitude, while at the same time 
the repetition of the tragedies was facilitated on smaller 
stages and on occasions of less important festivities. On 
this head, too, Euripides appears to have attempted an 
innovation, when in his Alcestis (acted as the fourth play 
in the competition of 01. lxxxv. 2, b. c. 438) he produced 
a piece designed as a substitute for the satyr-drama, which 
according to its traditional manner offered only a very 
limited field of operation to the poet, and required a 
fresh, natural humor, such as Euripides had not at his 
command. The Alcestis is neither a tragedy nor a satyr- 
drama, but a composition of a new species, where a 
pleasant turn is given to a tragic subject, and where thus 

124 History of Greece. C BooK v. 

the desire of the Attic public, to recreate itself by means 
of a merry afterpiece, after the agitating effect of the 
tragedies, was gratified. But neither was this attempt, to 
create a new form of art within the organism of tragedy, 
made in any genuinely serious spirit, or with any lasting 

Comed Comedy was best able to maintain itself — 

comedy which, throughout the entire period of 
good fortune and ill, followed with its clear glance 
the life of the Attic people. And it is sufficiently remark- 
able that it was precisely for comedy that was reserved 
the task of withstanding with heart and soul the prevailing 
love of innovation, and of coming forward as the cham- 
pion, on the Attic stage, of what was good in the old times. 
Immediately before the fall of Athens we find the comic 
poets still engaged in a violent contest against the abuses 
of political life and the misdoings of the demagogues. 
Cleophon (cf. vol. iii. pp. 500, 558) is unsparingly at- 
tacked in the same year, 01. xciii. 4 (b. c. 405), by Plato 
and Aristophanes. After the fall of the city, political 
opposition ceased, and the poets retreated to a field where 
the contest was less bitter and exciting, attacking no 
longer the civic community and its popular leaders, but 
the public and the poets whom it favored. They opposed 
with special acrimony the dithyrambic poets, who thrust 
themselves forward after so intolerably self-conceited a 
fashion with their formless artificialities. The dithyram- 
bic poets in their turn took their revenge by endeavoring 
to deprive comedy of the subsidy reaching it from the 
state. In this they succeeded all the more easily, because 
the times were little favorable to the encouragement of 
merry festive plays, while in consequence of the general 
impoverishment the choruses were from year to year more 
and more neglected ; already in the year of the battle of 
the Arginusse it had been necessary to institute the prac- 
tice, of two choregi furnishing a chorus in common (c£ 

Chap, ii.] Atliens after her Restoration. 125 

vol. ii. p. 526). This practice it was contrived to keep up 
even after the year of Euclides, until the dithyrambic poet 
Cinesias, who had been most exposed to the wanton attacks 
of the stage, introduced a law, whereby the public expen- 
diture on the comic drama was restricted to such a degree 
that it had to renounce the chorus altogether. Comedy 
hurled the bolts of its wrath against this evil-doer. 
Strattis wrote a special play, the Choricide, against 
Cinesias : but this contest against the unkind- 

° # Changes in 

ncss of the times was in vain. The choral comedy, 
songs, written in connexion with the stage-play and 
practiced by the actors for its production, above all the 
terrible parabases, were abolished, and dances and light 
pieces of music inserted in their stead. The entire 
branch of art, the most characteristic production of Attic 
popular life, lost its former significance, and thus, about 
the 97th Olympiad (b.c. 390), Old Comedy was gradu- 
ally transformed into New. But so loug as the former 
continued to exist, it remained true to its mission of doing 
battle against all mistaken tendencies of the age. Thus, 
after already Cratinus in his Panoptoz had lashed the 
Sophists in a body, as the ultra-clever, all-seeing, and 
omniscient ones, there followed a series of comedies, 
which chiefly occupied themselves with the state of litera- 
ture and with the growth of a false taste ; such as the 
Muso3 and Tragozdi of Phrynichus, the Frogs and Amphi- 
araus of Aristophanes, and lastly, the same author's Gery- 
tades, in which he exhibited the bankruptcy of dramatic 
poetry at Athens, as confessed by the poets themselves. 
Most assuredly this contest was not without its effect in 
animating the sympathy with genuine art and keeping 
alive respect for the ancient masters ; but Comedy could 
do nothing more than hold a mirror up to the age, and in- 
sist upon the difference between the present and the past, 
at the utmost arousing in its spectators the repugnance 
by which it was itself pervaded against the new tenden- 

126 History of Greece. [Book v. 

cies of the times ; but it too was unable to point out a new 
path to Attic art, or to fill up the void of the age.* 

Such was the condition of the poetic art at Athens. It 
maintained itself for a season at its full height, even af- 
ter the symmetry of public life had been destroyed, — but 
only in the works of Sophocles, who continued to live in 
the spirit of the Periclean age. After his death poetry, 
like music, was seized by the same current which dissolved 
the foundations of the people's life, and which swept away 
the soil wherein the emotions of the classical period had 
been rooted. Accordingly in these times of general oscil- 
lation poetry was unable to supply a moral anchorage ; 
the old perished, but the modern age with all its readiness 
in thought and speech was incapable of creating a new 
art as a support to its children. In the same way the 
faith of former generations had been cast aside like anti- 
quated household gear, but without any other assurance 
of morality, without any other impulse towards the vir- 
tues indispensable for the life of the community having 
been obtained in its stead. The need of a regeneration 
was acknowledged ; serious endeavors were made to intro- 
duce improvements and order ; but political reforms could 
not heal such wounds as these, or furnish a new basis for 
the commonweal. What was required was, that men 
should arrive at a clear consciousness of the mazes of er- 
ror into which the modern free-thinking had led; that 
they should turn back, and train up a new generation, in 
which the virtues of a god-fearing loyalty and truthful- 
ness should again take root, that the building-up of a hap- 
pier Athens should be begun from below. This was a 
long and arduous path to the goal, and one which ill com- 
mended itself to the self-conceit of the highly educated 
Athenians ; — but there was no other. 

* Close of the Old Comedy: Cobet, Plat. 48, 146; Boeckh, Publ. Ec. of Ath. 
vol. ii. p. 215 [Eng. Tr.] ; K. F. Hermann, Ges. Abhandl. 41, Gl. Both means 
and patience were wanting for the drilling of the choruses, which might 
require months. 

chap, ii j Athens after her Restoration. 127 

But in order to lead into this path, and to Th taak ol 
make manifest the necessity of a moral reno- philosophy. 
vation, which should be achieved in the moral being of 
every individual, there was needed a man of the pro- 
phetic class, who should clearly recognize the aberrations 
of the age, but at the same time himself stand above it, 
who should be in possession of the intellectual resources 
demanded for a struggle against these errors, and who 
should, lastly, be so assured of his mission to save and 
help, that he should be unselfishly ready to live and to 
die for it. Such a man the Athenians had among them ; 
it was no other than that very Socrates, of whose doings 
in politics and society we have already on several occa- 
sions taken note (vol. iii. pp. 299, 544). 

If we contemplate Socrates in his whole Socrates 
wav of living and being, (and in truth no tl ? e so P of So " 

* o o» ^ phroniscus ; 

other personage of Greek antiquity is so dis- korn 
tinctly brought before our eyes), it seems to (*• c - f°"j), 
us, in the first place, as if at Athens he were 01 - xcv. l 

' r > ^ (B.C. 399). 

not in his natural place ; so foreign to Athens 
are his ways, and so dissociated from it is his whole indivi- 
duality. He cannot be fitted into any class of Athenian 
civil society, and is to be measured by no such standard as 
we apply to his fellow-citizens. He is one of the poorest 
of all the Athenians, and yet he passes with a proud step 
through the streets of the city, and confronts the richest 
and best-born as their equal ; his ungainly and neglected 
exterior makes him an object of public derision, and yet 
he exercises an unexampled influence upon high and low, 
upon learned and unlearned, alike. He is a master both 
of thought and of speech, yet at the same time an oppo- 
nent on principle of those who were the instructors of the 
Athenians in both ; he is a man of free-thought, who al- 
lows nothing to remain untested, and yet he is more dili- 
gent in offering sacrifices than any of his neighbors ; he 
venerates the oracles and reposes a simple faith in many 

128 History of Greece. [Book v. 

things which the age laughs at as nursery-tales ; he blames 
without reticence the dominion of the multitude, and yet 
is an adversary of oligarchs. Entirely his own master, 
he thinks differently from all other Athenians ; he goes 
his own path, without troubling himself about public opi- 
nion ; and so long as he remains in harmony with him- 
self, no contradiction, no hostile attack, no derision vexes 
his soul. Such a man as this seemed in truth to have 
been transplanted into the midst of Athens as it were 
from some other world. 

And yet, unique in his kind as this Socrates was, we 
are unable on closer examination to mistake him for 
aught but a genuine Athenian. Such he was in his whole 
intellectual tendency, in his love of talk and skill in talk 
— growths impossible in any but Athenian air — in the de- 
licate wit with which he contrived to combine the serious 
and the sportive, and in his unflagging search after a deep 
connexion between action and knowledge. He was a 
genuine Athenian of the ancient stamp, when with in- 
flexible courage he stood forth as the champion of the 
laws of the state against all arbitrary interference, and in 
the field shrank from no danger or hardship. He knew 
and loved the national poets ; but, above all, it is in his 
indefatigable impulse towards culture that we recognize 
the true son of his native city. Herein lay a spiritual af- 
finity between him and the noblest among the Athenians, 
a Solon and a Pericles. Socrates, like Solon, thought that 
no man is too old to learn, that to learn and to know is 
not a schooling for life, but life itself, and that which 
alone gives to life its value. To become by knowledge 
better from day to day, and to make others better, ap- 
peared to both to be the real duty of man. Both found 
the one true happiness in the health of the soul, whose 
greatest unhappiness they held to lie in wrong and igno- 

Thus, with all his originality, Socrates most decidedly 

chap, ii.] Athens after her Restoration. 129 

stood on the basis of Attic culture ; and if it is taken into 
consideration, that the most celebrated representatives of 
Sophistry and the tendencies akin to it all came from 
abroad, e. g. Protagoras from Abdera, Prodicus from Ceos, 
Diagoras from Melos, it may fairly be affirmed, that as 
against these foreign teachers the best principles of Attic 
wisdom found their representative in Socrates, Far, how- 
ever, from merely recurring to the ancient foundations of 
patriotic sentiment, fallen into neglect to the great loss of 
the state, and from opposing himself on an inflexible defen- 
sive to the movement of the age, he rather stood in the 
very midst of it, and merely sought to lead it to other 
and higher ends. What he desired, was not a turning 
back, but a progress in knowledge beyond that which the 
most sagacious teachers of wisdom offered. For this 
reason he was able to unite in himself elements which 
seemed to others irreconcilably contradictory; and upon 
this conception was based what most distinguished him 
above all his fellow-countrymen, the lofty freedom and 
independence of his mind. Thus, without becoming dis- 
loyal to his home, he was able to rise above the restric- 
tions of customary ideas, which he most notably achieved 
by making himself perfectly independent of all external 
things, in the midst of a people which worshipped the 
beauty of outward appearance, and by attaching value 
exclusively to the possessions which are within, and to 
moral life. For this reason too his personal ugliness, the 
broad face with the snub-nose, thick lips and prominent 
eyes, was a characteristic feature of his individuality, 
because it testified against the traditional assumption of a 
necessary union between physical and intellectual excel- 
lence, because it proved that even in a form like that of 
Silenus there might dwell a spirit like that of Apollo, and 
thus conduced to a loftier conception of the being of man. 
Thus he belonged to his people and to his age, but stood 
above both ; and such a man the Athenians needed, in 


130 History of Greece. [Book y 

order to find the path, whereon it was possible to pene- 
trate through the conflict of opinions to a moral assurance, 
and to reach a happiness containing its own warrant. 

Socrates appears before us as an individuality complete 
and perfect, of which the gradual development continues 
to remain a mystery. Its real germ, however, doubtless 
lies in the desire for knowledge, which was innate in him 
with peculiar strength. This desire would not allow him 
to remain under pupilage to his father ; it drove him forth 
out of the narrow workshop into the streets and the open 
places of the city, where in those days every kind of cul- 
ture, art and science, was offered in rich abundance ; for 
at the time when Socrates was in his twentieth year, Pericles 
stood at the height of his splendid activity, which the son 
of a sculptor might be supposed to have had occasion fully 
to appreciate. The youthful Socrates, however, brought 
with him out of his father's house a certain one-sided, 
and so to speak bourgeois, tendency, i. e. a sober, homely 
sense for the practically useful, which would not allow 
itself to be dazzled by splendor and magnificence. Ac- 
cordingly, he passed with tolerable indifference by the 
much-admired works of art with which the city was at that 
time filled ; for the ideal efforts of the Periclean age he 
lacked comprehension, nor do the tragedies of a Sophocles 
appear to have exercised much attraction upon him. If 
there was one-sidedness in this, on the other hand it bore 
good fruit, in so far as it confirmed the independence 
of his judgment, and enabled him to recognize and combat 
the defects and diseases from which Athens suffered even 
in the midst of her glories. 

His activit "^ ut ' though tne son 0I> Sophroniscus car- 

ried the idea of the practically useful into the 
domain of science, he gave to it in this so deep and grand 
u significance, that for him it again became an impulse 
towards searching with unflagging zeal for all real means 
of culture offered by Athens ; for he felt the impossibility 

chap, ii.] Athens after her Restoration. 131 

of satisfactorily responding to the moral tasks which most 
immediately await man, without the possession of a con- 
nected knowledge. Thus he eagerly associated with men 
and women, esteemed as highly-cultured ; he listened to 
the lectures of the Sophists ; acquainted himself with the 
writings of the earlier philosophers, which he found to be 
still of vital effect upon his contemporaries ; thoroughly 
studied with friends desirous of self-improvement the 
works of Heraclitus and Anaxagoras ; and in this constant 
intercourse he gradually became himself another man, t. e. 
he grew conscious of the unsatisfactory standpoint of the 
wisdom of the teachers of the day, as well as conscious 
of his own aims and mission. For, in putting questions 
of a kind which could meet with no reply, and in search- 
ing for deeper things than could be offered to him by his 
hearers, he gradually became himself the person from 
whom the impulse proceeded, and from whom in the end was 
expected an answer to the questions which had remained 
unsolved. He, the seeker after instruction, became the 
centre of a circle of younger men, who were enthusiasti- 
cally attached to him. In how high a degree that which 
he endeavored to supply corresponded to the deeply-felt 
needs of the age is evident from the fact, that men of the 
most utterly different dispositions and stations in life gave 
themselves up to him, — youths of the highest class of 
society, full of self-consciousness, buoyancy, and reckless 
high spirits, such as Alcibiades ; and again men of a 
melancholy and timid turn of mind, such as the well- 
known eccentric Apollodorus of Phalerus, who, perpetu- 
ally discontented with himself and others, led a miserable 
existence, until in Socrates he found the sole individuality 
appeasing his wants, and in intercourse with him the satis- 
faction for which he had longed.* To him, Socrates was 
all in all, and every hour during which he was away from 

* Apollodorus, 6 navinot : Plat. 8ymp. 172 f ; cf. Cobet, Prosop. Xen. 63 ; Arch. 
Ztg. 1858, 248*. 

132 History of Greece. P* 00 * V. 

Socrates he accounted as lost. Thus Socrates was able to 
re-awaken among the Athenians, among whom personal 
intercourse between those of the same age, as well as be 
tween men and youths, was disturbed or desecrated eithei 
by party-interests or by impure sensuality, the beneficent 
power of pure friendship and unselfish devotion. Sober 
and calm himself, he excited the noblest enthusiasm, and 
by the simplest means obtained a far-reaching influence, 
such as before him no man had possessed at Athens ; even 
before the Peace of Nicias, when Aristophanes made him 
the principal character in his Clouds, he was one of the 
best known and influential personages at Athens. 

His ways ^ Socrates gradually became a teacher of 

of life. tn e people, so his mode and habits of life, too, 

formed themselves in indissoluble connexion with his phi- 
losophical development. For this was the most pre-emi- 
nent among his qualities : that his life and his teaching 
were formed in the same mould, and that none of his dis- 
ciples could say whether he had been more deeply affected 
by the words or by the example of his master. And this 
was connected with the fact, that from the first, his philo- 
sophy directed itself to that which might make man bet- 
ter and more pleasing to Heaven, freer and happier at 
once. To this tendency he could not devote himself, with- 
out rising in his own consciousness to a continuously lof- 
tier clearness and purity, and without subjecting to reason 
the elements inborn in him of sensual impulses, of inertia 
and passion. Thus he became a man in whom the world 
found much to smile and mock at, but whom even those 
who could not stomach his wisdom were obliged to ac- 
knowledge as a morally blameless and just citizen. He 
was devoted with absolute loyalty to his native city, and, 
without desiring offices and dignities, he was from an in- 
ner impulse indefatigably active for her good, so that he, 
like the most hard-working man of business, throughout 
his long life knew no idle day, and only once (on a visit 

Chap, ii.] Athens after her Restoration. 133 

to the Isthmian games) quitted his native city. To what- 
ever extent his scope exceeded the demands made by the 
state upon its citizens, he yet entertained a feeling the 
very reverse of contempt for civic duties. Of these he 
claimed from his disciples the most loyal fulfilment, and 
on this head he set them the example of a devotion which 
clearly proved this to be a matter of conscience with him, 
and not merely an outward service which it was necessary 
to absolve. He ventured his life in more than one battle ; 
he fought in the thick of the fray ; and even on the oc- 
casion of defeats, when no man is wont to think of aught 
beyond his personal safety, he exerted himself with self- 
sacrificing affection for others. Thus he saved Alcibiades, 
who lay wounded on the ground, at Potidsea, and after- 
wards resigned in his favor the prize of valor. After the 
battle of Delium (vol. iii. p. 174), when all around him 
were hurrying away in wild flight, he went his way fully 
equipped, with as proud and tranquil a step as if he had 
been in the streets of Athens, and saved his own life and 
that of his comrade, the brave Laches, whom his dignified 
calm put to shame. Even his adversaries were forced to 
allow that the armies of Athens would be invincible were 
they composed throughout of warriors of as imperturbable 
a spirit as that of Socrates. And yet he attached no value 
himself to this branch of his activity ; he rather saw his 
real mission in holding up before his fellow-citizens as the 
soul of their moral efforts, a tranquillity and content 
which should be independent of any change of fortune. 
And, in order to point out the sole path leading to this 
goal, he preferred voluntary poverty to every kind of suc- 
cess in life, and, amidst a people eagerly pursuing profit 
and enjoyment, declared it to be the loftiest task to need 
as little as possible ; inasmuch as thereby man approached 
most nearly to the bliss of the gods, which consisted in the 
absence of all wants. He desired merely to have enough, 
not to be disturbed in the pursuit of his calling by the 

134 History of Greece. t BooK V. 

care for the daily necessities of life ; and in order to 
reach this end he was not ashamed to accept from his 
friends what they sent into his house. Such offices of love 
were notably proffered to him by the noble Crito. This 
was a community of goods among friends, for which he 
made the fullest return on his side and with the means at 
his disposal. For he voluntarily gave up the best of what 
he possessed to every one whom he might serve thereby, 
and on principle scorned any compensation, although it 
had become quite customary at Athens for the teachers of 
wisdom to live by the proceeds of their science. Had not 
from ancient times singers, prophets, and physicians, 
sculptors and painters, been richly rewarded, without any 
dishonor arising thence to their noble art ? Thus now, too, 
when a new and higher kind of culture belonged to the 
necessities of the adult youth of Athens, a reward might 
be claimed for its communication, as was actually done by 
the Sophists. Especially when they, like the teachers of 
the art of arms and of music, only in a higher sphere, 
compassed directly practical results, applicable to social 
life, these results, like any other communication of valu- 
able gifts, admitted of being estimated in money ; and it 
might be argued that a corresponding compensation on 
the part of those who reaped those results simply served 
to separate the merely inquisitive from those who were 
really anxious to learn. 

His unsei- ^ Ln( ^ y et tn * s v * ew stoo( ^ m a snar P contrast 
fisimess. to that of Socrates. It was not his wish to 

communicate to his disciples any special accomplishments 
of which the advantages could be estimated in money, and 
of which it might be said at any particular point of time 
that now the object, as fixed by mutual agreement, 
had been attained ; it was to change them into other and 
better men, to awaken in them a new life. For this pur- 
pose were required a free self-devotion and a relation of 
mutual affection, which would have been desecrated by 

chap. II. j Athens after her Restoration. 135 

any secondary consideration. Therefore he looked upon 
the Sophists in the light of courtesans, who offer their 
love for sale to whoever will pay for it. Moreover, ho 
took into account on this head the circumstance that the 
Sophists were strangers who paid the expenses of their 
journeys out of the gains of their profession, and who had 
no cordial feeling towards the Athenians as such. Now be- 
tween fellow-citizens, so Socrates thought, the noblest and 
best of what one has to offer to the other ought never to 
be made the subject of a business transaction ; for in their 
case no interest ought to be admitted on the one hand, be- 
yond that of a pure fellow-feeling of love, and on the 
other, no compensation except the grateful devotion of a 
heart moved by the same affection. 

For the rest, Socrates, with all his dislike of the pur- 
suit of profit and pleasure, was anything but a morose ec- 
centric, like Euripides ; from this he was kept by his love 
of human kind. He was merry with the merry, and 
spoilt no festive banquet to which he had been bidden. 
In the friendly circle he sat as a man brave at his cups, 
and herein likewise offered an example to his friends, how 
the truly free can at one time suffer deprivation, and at 
another enjoy abundance, without at any time losing his 
full self-control. After a night of festivity his conscious- 
ness was as clear and serene as ever ; he had after a rare 
fashion made his body an ever-ready servant of his mind ; 
even physically he could do things impossible to others, 
and, as if protected by some magic charm, he passed un- 
hurt through all the pestilences of Athens, without ever 
timidly keeping out of the way of danger. Fully assured 
of the inner mission which animated him, he allowed no- 
thing to derange or to confound him. Hostile attacks and 
derision touched him not ; nay, he was known to laugh 
most heartily of all the spectators, when that sinner Aris- 
tophanes exhibited him as a dreamer abstracted from the 
world and hanging in a hammock between heaven and 

136 History of Greece. t BoOK v 

earth, and when the other comic poets made the public 
merry with his personal appearance. For the same rea- 
son, lastly he was inaccessible to all the offers made to 
him by foreign princes, who would have given much to 
attract the most remarkable man of the age to their 
courts. The Thessalian grandees in particular, Scopas at 
Crannon and Eurylochus at Larissa, emulated one 
another in their endeavors to secure him. But he was no 
more tempted by their gold than by that of Archelaus, 
the splendor of whose throne, obtained by guile and mur- 
der, failed to dazzle Socrates. He replied with the pride 
of a genuine Republican, that it ill befitted any man to 
accept benefits which he had no power of returning. For 
himself, he said, he wanted nothing ; for at Athens, four 
measures of wheat-meal were to be purchased for an obol, 
and the best spring water flowed there gratuitously.* 

Socrates ^ ne re l at ion of Socrates to the intellectual 

a h^ t he S °" movement of his age is far more difficult to 
understand than his outward life. Thus it 
has come to pass that the same man, who was the most 
decided opponent of the Sophists, could himself be re- 
garded as a genuine Sophist. This finds its explanation 
in the circumstance, that Sophistry as a whole was an ex- 
pression of the movement which swayed the age, and that 
to this movement, in so far as it was justified and neces- 

* Socrates in three battles (Potidsea, Delium, Amphipolis): Plat. Apolog. 
28. The facts are confounded with one another, Athen. 21G. The story of 
the preservation of Xenophon's life at Delium is a mistake (Str. 403; Diog. 
Laert. ii. 22), as Cobet has proved, Mnemosyne, vii. 50 (Nov. Lect. 538). An 
authentic account of Delium is to be found in Plat. Sympos. 221, where the 
saving of the life of Laches is also ascribed to Socrates: fiib koI ao-^oAws 
an-Tjei km ovto? .-cat 6 erepos. Concerning Socrates' freedom from wants, see 
Xen. Memor. i. 6, 1 f. As to offers from abroad : Diog. Laert. ii. 5, 9 ; Ar- 
istot. Rhet. ii. 23, p. 98, 30: 'v/3pi? to m SvvaaOat a^vvaa-Oai o^oiw? ev itaQovra 
u>o~irep teal mum*. 1 As to the prices of provisions at Athens : Plut, de tranq. 
10 ; cf Boeckh, P. E. of A. vol. i. p. 127 (Eng. Tr.): the X o^ was the aver- 
age measure of daily food for one man ; 4 xoivi/ce? of meal at 1 obol=l«. 2d. 
The prices had already doubled since the times of Solon. 

€hap. ii.i Athens after her Restoration. 137 

sary, Socrates attached himself with full conviction. The 
ancient simplicity of Greek life was at an end, nor was it 
possible to return to the tranquil and easy acceptance of 
popular tradition, after the philosophical idea had once 
established its rights. The earlier philosophy, the philoso- 
phy of nature, had shaken the validity of the traditional 
views, without itself offering anything capable of helping 
man in his want of guidance ; and the existing religion 
was not of a kind to be able to preserve a vigorous and 
sufficient life after the changes which had come over the 
general condition of the people's culture. The age ac- 
cordingly needed another philosophy, a science which 
should be more practically useful for life, and enable every 
individual, since no general authority any longer existed, 
to take counsel with himself, and to acquire an indepen- 
dent judgment in all moral questions. 

This requirement, which all men felt who were tolera- 
bly alive to their times, had been met by the Sophists ; 
and the great skill which they displayed in this, their 
insight into the age, and their unflagging industry, ex- 
plain their extraordinary influence upon their contempo- 

In starting from the same requirement of the age, in 
demanding as decisively as possible from every individual 
that he should regulate all his affairs with knowledge 
and understanding, and at any and every moment act 
without dependence upon external authority with clear 
consciousness, Socrates undeniably took the same ground 
as the Sophists, who by a development of the arts of 
thought and speech sought to assure the personal inde- 
pendence of the individual. It followed, that in all 
doubtful cases every man is to himself the last and high- 
est authority ; and it was an absolutely inevitable con- 
clusion which Protagoras drew in establishing the propo- 
sition, which we may regard as the very kernel of Sophis- 
try ; that " man is the measure of all things." This daring 

138 History of Greece. l BooK v - 

proposition, which did away with all truth independent 
of the judgment of the individual, and universally valid 
and binding, found a most ready welcome in the world of 
those times. What was now hailed in the proposition of 
Protagoras flattered the impulse towards freedom, which 
deemed every ordinance burdensome ; it pleased the pride 
of the Athenian, who saw in it the triumph of his culture ; 
it seemed like a redemption from a long-borne pressure, 
like the restoration of a long-withheld right of man. 

Sophistic However, this proposition experienced the 

conclusions. f a ^ e f q]\ principles of the same kind, which, 
devoid of any positive inner meaning, admit of an un- 
limited application ; consequences were drawn which its 
author himself had not intended. The later Sophists 
applied the measure of their judgment to every existing 
institution in the state and in civil society ; and inasmuch 
as the one disliked this, and the other that, there arose a 
confusion of opinions, discontent, and contradiction 
against the existing ordinances, which, in so far as they 
failed to correspond to the standard applied, were regard- 
ed as oppressive and noxious. The result was, that some 
retired dissatisfied from the civic community, in order to 
escape all conflicts ; they deemed it best to live, wherever 
they lived, as strangers, — e. g. Aristippus of Cyrene, who 
had also begun by following the teaching of Protagoras ; 
others preferred to adapt themselves with clever flexibility 
to things as they were, and to make the best compromise 
possible with them ; while the more passionate combated 
against the public order of things, which, as they declared, 
had no inner justification, but was merely the effluence of a 
power superior to the individual. In other words, what 
is called Right in the state is at bottom nothing but the 
will of the stronger, to which the minority are obliged to 
subject themselves so long as they cannot do otherwise. 
But the methodical cultivation of the powers of the mind 
has for its object to assert as against the given Right that 

chap. II.] Athens after her Restoration. 139 

which is inborn and in accordance with reason ; the arts 
of Dialectics and of Rhetoric are to serve as the armory, 
with the aid of which the confining restrictions of arbi- 
trary will may be more and more left aside. According- 
ly, the ego of the individual is placed in the centre of the 
world ; in it lies the moving impulse of scientific as well 
as of other efforts ; and, in proportion as the standpoint 
sinks deeper and deeper, in proportion as one approaches 
the conception which interprets natural Right to mean 
above all the unhindered satisfaction of the craving for 
enjoyment and of ambition, the whole philosophical sys- 
tem of the Sophists becomes more and more a handmaid 
of that selfishness, which, with reckless arrogance, revolts 
against all the institutions of order, human and divine. 

Not all the Sophists, indeed, thought and taught thus ; 
a great difference existed among them. The character of 
Protagoras was conservative ; he had no idea of ad- 
vancing impiety, immorality, and rebellion. As little can 
the noble Prodicus be denied to have been animated by a 
desire to confirm principles of morality. But, as a whole 
and in the mass, the Sophistic tendency led to principles 
such as those to which Polus, Callicles and Thrasy- 
machus gave utterance — to a hostile revolt against all ex- 
isting forms of Right.* 

Selfishness being thus let loose, it was impossible that 
any, and least of all that of a Republican, political con- 
stitution should permanently endure. For if Right and 
Wrong, Honor and Shame, Virtue and Vice, — if all 
these are only things relatively existent, which appear in 
one light to one man, and, with equal justification, in 
another to another, the result must be the dissolution of 
all civil society. The greatest service, therefore, which 

* Aristippus: Xen. Memor. ii. 8. Thrasymachus : Plat. Rep. 338: "All 
Right is based upon the interests of the stronger." Cf. K. Fr. Hermann, 
Gesetz u. Gesetzgebung im Alterth. p. GG : Strumpell, Gesch, d. prahtischen Philoto 
phi* d, Griechen, p. 83. 

140 History of Greece. [Book v. 

any Hellene could perform for his country was to combat, 
by means of a deeper and more serious process of thought, 
that of the Sophists, which endangered the best possessions 
of the people, and to drive from the field this one-sided 
cultivation of the reason, which was altogether undesirous 
of attaining, by means of a studious research which laid 
bare the final causes of moral life, to any absolutely valid 
truth. This was what Socrates did ; and for this reason 
the affinity between his standpoint and that of Sophistry 
is far outweighed by the contradiction between them. 

The foun- Socrates was not blind to the truth under- 

popuiar°sys- V m S tne saying of Protagoras ; for man is in 
tcm of ethics. f act unaD ] e to determine his thoughts and his 
actions otherwise than according to his own judgment ; it 
is in himself that he must possess the standard for Right 
and Truth. But this standard is not in the possession of 
any and every one, not in the possession of the individual 
man, such as Nature has created him, but only in that of 
the morally-formed, the good man. This preliminary as- 
sumption, together with all the consequences connected 
with it, the Sophists, following their one-sided practical 
tendency, had left aside. They indeed in many ways 
touched the domain of morality, but only in its single 
phenomena and outward forms ; and even those among 
their ethical meditations which met with most recogni- 
tion, as e. g. the allegory of Prodicus concerning Heracles 
at the cross-way between Virtue and Vice, remained 
throughout on the surface only. Socrates, on the other 
hand, recognised the absolute void of moral meaning in 
Sophistry ; he constituted those questions, which the 
teachers of the philosophy of nature had wholly neglected 
and which the Sophists had shyly evaded or only play- 
fully touched, the main questions around which his whole 
reflection moved, and their solution the real task of philoso- 
phy ; and he thus gave to philosophy an essentially new 
tendency ; he called it, as the ancients said, down from 

Chap, ii.] Athens after her Restoration* 141 

heaven to earth : L e. instead of inquiries concerning the 
structure of the universe and the forces of nature he 
studied the laws of moral life, in order to attain to a 
knowledge of the true destiny of man, of the possessions 
for which it is his duty to struggle, and of the evils which 
it is his duty to avoid. 

Notwithstanding the novelty of this tendency of philo- 
sophical reflection, it yet attached itself to ancient Hellen- 
ic tradition, and was in this respect also far more national 
than Sophistry, which started from arbitrary propositions 
of the Sophists' own invention. For it was impossible to 
solve the question, " Who is the good man, possessing in 
himself the standard for judging things ? " otherwise than 
by means of a conscientious self-examination. Self- 
knowledge therefore was that which was contained in the 
first demand ; and, so far from Socrates setting up this de- 
mand as a new one, it was a primitive principle of Hel- 
lenic religion. Pure hands and a pure heart were de- 
manded by the gods in those who approached their thresh- 
old (vol. ii. p. 27) ; wherefore every man was bound to 
examine himself, before he offered up his gifts and 
prayed for salvation; this was the beginning, enjoined 
by Apollo, of all wisdom pleasing to the gods; and 
what Socrates asked stood already written in golden char- 
acters over the gate of the Delphic temple in the words : 
Know thyself! 

Nor was this connexion by any means a mere outward 
form on the part of Socrates, by which he sought to in- 
troduce and recommend himself — rather, in establishing 
it, he was in full and solemn earnest. For since there had, 
with continually growing force, arisen over the manifold 
forms of the Greek Olympus the idea of a world-ruling 
Reason, and over the gods the idea of the Deity, Socrates 
in this point too followed Heraclitus and Anaxagoras ; 
but he remained nearer to the popular faith than they, by 
conceiving of the Deity not in a cosmical energy, but pre- 

142 History of Greece. [ Bo °* v 

eminently in relation to man ; he held fast the personal 
element, and was able with a delicate tact, snch as only a 
deeply religious mind can possess, to lead the mind from 
the gods, in whom the people believed, to the Deity, which 
Reason demands. Such a transition was facilitated for 
him above all by the Apolline religion, that highest stage 
in the religious consciousness of the Hellenes ; in it there 
were already given the principles of a system of moral 
teaching capable of development. For this reason he in 
general adhered with simple faith to the ancestral reli- 
gion, and recognized in it a wholesome discipline for man, 
and a sacred bond which held together all the members 
of the nation ; while, like the ancient Wise Men of the 
people, he stood in a peculiarly close relation towards the 
Delphic god, and towards his oracle, the primitive centre 
of national religion. 

Deve Already Heraclitus had summed up the 

ment of the whole meaning of his philosophical thinking: 

Soeratic sys- o Mr r o 

tem of ethics. m t h e declaration: " I sought myself." So- 
crates, however, was the first to make the act of self-exa- 
mination the starting-point of his entire philosophy ; and, 
sterile as the injunction of Apollo may appear as a prin- 
ciple of philosophical doctrine, inasmuch as, instead of 
supplying anything, it only makes a demand, yet it was 
of the highest importance for the whole teaching of So- 
crates, that its beginning was a moral demand. Hereby 
all preliminary assumptions of any other kind were at 
once cut off; and thought was conducted, out of the 
mixed variety of diverse objects upon which the philoso- 
phically educated were wont with predilection to engage, 
to one main object, which directly affected every human 
being ; the mind was forced to retreat out of a confusing 
variety upon a single central point, to renounce those 
things concerning which nothing is possible but an opi- 
nion, and to confine itself to that which is accessible to a 
real knowledge. It was for this reason that Socrates con- 

Chap. II.] Athens after her Restoration. 143 

fronted the vainglorious pretensions of the Sophists to 
knowing many things, by his confession that he knew no- 
thing. For he recognized no acquisitions of knowledge 
gained from without, but descended into the depths of his 
own consciousness, in order there to seek for truth, of irre- 
fragable certainty. He began with the knowing nothing, 
and attached so much importance to this, that he affirmed 
himself to be considered by the Delphic god wiser than 
others for no reason but this : that he did not imagine that 
he knew what he did not know. 

This clear and resolute rejection of all merely appa- 
rent knowledge was the first act of his philosophy : by it 
he purified the ground, and removed the phantoms of a 
self-imagined wisdom conceitedly moving in a circle of 
vague possibilities. But this knowing nothing must be 
only the first step. The impulse towards knowledge is a 
claim which must be satisfied, w r hich man cannot escape 
without becoming false to himself; and that which it is a 
need of the soul to know, if it is to act with consciousness 
according to its nature, it must also be possible to know. 
Proceeding by this path, Socrates established the concep- 
tion of true knowledge. For if, he says, we thereby un- 
derstand a perfect appropriation and comprehension, we 
can only succeed in this in the case of that which has an 
internal affinity with ourselves, nay which is to such a de- 
gree ours, that the causes of it lie in ourselves, so that we 
can produce it out of ourselves ; everything else will al- 
ways remain to us something foreign and enigmatical. 
Now, in man's own consciousness certain laws reveal 
themselves to man, which admit of no doubt ; there, in 
proportion as he more seriously collects his thoughts, he 
learns, by watching himself, what is suited to his nature ; 
he experiences in himself the morally good ; he finds out 
in himself the essence of justice, valor, prudence, grati- 
tude ; and he progressively attains to a continuously in- 
creasing certainty in his consciousness and to assured judg- 

144 History of Greece. C BooK v - 

ments. For he who realizes the morally good in himself, 
must assent to it wherever it meets him, and recognize it 
as that which corresponds to the nature of man, as that 
which is true and normal ; just as the opposite actually 
attests itself as that which is contrary to nature, untrue, 
absurd and pernicious. 

Here, then, man finds laws of absolute validity and 
by the same path, in the progress of internal experience, 
he attains to a belief in the gods. For the certainty of 
their existence, which man can no more escape than the 
recognition of the moral laws aforesaid, — that certainty 
which shows itself the more vigorously, the less corrupted 
and the more rational a people is, — would be something 
utterly unintelligible, were it not implanted in human 
nature as a gift of the gods, who wish therein to attest 
themselves to the race of mortals. Thus Socrates from 
his first standpoint of knowing nothing attained to a defi- 
nition of true knowledge and of that which is contained 
therein, demonstrated the possibility of universally valid 
judgments, and laid bare in the human consciousness 
the foundations of a certain knowledge (Erkenntniss) irre- 
movably fixed. 

But a knowledge of this kind can be no dead know- 
ledge ; for as it is based upon a kind of thought, which 
presumes a serious self-inquiry and a renunciation of the 
sensual, it acts immediately, in the very process of its ac- 
quisition, upon the entire man. It is the light of truth it- 
self, which, opening upon the soul, dissipates all the delu- 
sions amidst which the thoughtless man leads his life from 
day to day. This knowledge becomes an impelling force 
in man, which leaves him no peace, till he has by action 
of his own expressed that which he has come perfectly to 
know. Accordingly, after he has arrived at a true and 
perfect knowledge of the essential nature of justice, valor, 
continence and piety, he must also desire to be just, 
valorous, continent and pious. No knowledge is genuine 

Chap, ii.] Athens after her Restoration. 145 

which fails to attract the will to follow it ; and virtue, 
which consists in the exercise of the moral will, is ac- 
cordingly of its essence nothing but a reasonable know- 

Thus directly upon the newly-gained foundation of per- 
fect knowledge, the Socratic doctrine of virtue builds it- 
self up. And, inasmuch as the consciousness of a God, 
as well as the belief in the immortality and responsibility 
of the human soul, can now be equally demonstrated as 
facts of the human consciousness, the principles of 
knowledge, will, and belief acquire a firm cohesion, such 
as no other before Socrates had yet demonstrated. That 
which hinders thought is nothing else than that which 
cripples the will ; these are the lower impulses of human 
nature. In proportion, therefore, as these are overcome, 
the harmony of the inner life increases, and with it the 
calm and the tranquillity in man ; and hereby he succeeds 
in hearing directly the voice of the Deity which attests 
itself to man in his inner nature, when it is not rendered 
inaudible by the external restlessness of life. Of such a 
divine voice, ever accompanying him and warning him 
against every erroneous step, Socrates was conscious ; he 
called it his Dcemonion : in it he felt the Presence of the 
Deity, which asserted itself as an authority, wherever his 
own reflection lacked reasons capable of determining a de- 

Although Socrates was far from intending to erect a 
system of doctrine artistically correct, yet he with un- 
erring hand defined the domain of that which science can 
come to know perfectly, and which is truly worthy to be 
known ; within the limits of that which man must know, 
in order to fulfil his destiny, he illustrated all the main 
points, and thus founded a system of ethics, which was 
inconceivable, until the inner connection had been demon- 
strated between Thought and Will, between the True and 

the Good. 


146 History of Greece. f BooK v - 

The method too of philosophizing owes an 
dialectics. nc essential advance in its development to So- 
metho°d. ra 1C crates. For, in view of his purpose of leading 
the soul to a certain goal, he could not be 
otherwise than specially anxious to apply a severe conduct 
of thought in lieu of the disputation to and fro of the 
Sophists ; for only by means of a connection, which could 
not be attacked and destroyed, being established between 
the ideas developed by him, was it possible irrefragably 
to establish the truths of morality. Starting from simple 
facts, he drew from what was readily conceded to him a 
second and a third fact as consequences to which it was 
impossible to deny the same assent ; and thus was formed 
a catena of propositions, the concluding link of which, 
however surprising it might seem on being originally pre- 
sented, was yet already implied in the first. This method 
of carrying on thought, the inductive method, Socrates was 
the first among the Greeks consciously to develop ; and 
he employed it with triumphant force, partly to demon- 
strate the looseness of customary conceptions, and partly 
to illustrate the mighty connexion in the domain of the 
True, and to strengthen in his friends the faith in the pos- 
sibility of a moral certainty. In the course of this pro- 
cess, all the ideas which come under consideration in 
ethical inquiries were for the first time sharply and clearly 
systematized, defined as against one another, and estab- 
lished with their distinctive characteristics. Thus Socrates 
became the founder of a scientific determination of ideas, 
i. e. of Definition. 

The development of these dialectical and logical 
methods marks an extremely important process in the 
intellectual culture of the nation. For it was precisely 
in a severe and consecutive mode of thought, more than 
in other domains, that the Greeks had remained back- 
ward ; and this defect had only apparently been remedied 
by the Sophists, when they communicated their dogmas in 

chap, ii.] Athens after her Restoration, 147 

a finished and complete form, without claiming any per- 
sonal exertion of thinking power on the part of their au- 
diences. But it was not admiring audiences, it was friends 
taking part in his inquiries, that Socrates desired ; and 
thus his system of teaching acquired a popular freshness 
and excited a keen interest, such as could never accom- 
pany ambitious lecturers. Every Socratic dialogue was a 
little drama, in its beginnings frequently bald and trivial ; 
but whosoever gave himself up to its progress, soon traced 
the power of a mind of original force, which seized and 
led him with so assured a strength, that he was unable to 
withdraw. And the final result was one which had been 
found in common ; for Socrates, it must be remembered, 
desired to put nothing into men, he had no desire of talk- 
ing them over with Sophistic skill into the acceptance of 
particular dogmas ; what he wished, was to arouse in them 
the slumbering impulse of their own powers of thought, 
and merely to assist them in bringing to the light of day 
the ideas existing in them, and to make them conscious of 
such truths as they unconsciously bore within their minds. 
For this reason he termed his art of treating the mind, 
the Mweutic art, i. e. midwifery. 

Thus this Athenian, who rejected the name of teacher, 
because he desired nothing more than to offer service and 
assistance to others, and to be one who was a searcher to- 
gether with his friends, was, notwithstanding, a chosen 
teacher of his age and of all the centuries ensuing, — a 
wise man who presented in himself the type of one truly 
free, and happy in unflagging inquiry and in self-denying 
love of his kind ; — a philosopher who destroyed the here- 
sies of a vainglorious sham-knowledge, and who, in an age 
denying any possibility of a reconciliation between con- 
flicting opinions, founded a domain of Truth beyond all 
doubt ; — and a patriot indefatigable in stimulating his 
fellow-citizens to a moral renovation, and in thereby gra- 
dually curing the diseases of civil society. If therefore 

148 History of Greece. t BoOK v - 

Science was to perform the service of which Art was in- 
capable, if Philosophy was to recover what Sophistry had 
spoilt : this could only be accomplished in the way pointed 
out by Socrates. He offered a saving hand to his fellow- 
citizens : how was that hand taken ? 

The The Athenians disliked men who wished to 

Socrates ° f ^e different from every one else, particularly 
Athemans wnen these eccentrics, instead of quietly pur- 
enemies a d sum g their own path and withdrawing from 
adversaries, the world, like Timon (vol. iii. p. 366), forced 
themselves among their neighbors and assumed towards 
them the attitude of pedagogues, as Socrates did. For 
what could be more annoying to an Athenian of repute, 
than to find himself, on his way to the council-meeting or 
the law-court, unexpectedly involved in a conversation, 
intended to confuse him, to shake his comfortable self- 
assurance, and to end by making him ridiculous ? In any 
other city such conversations would have been altogether 
hard to manage ; but at Athens the love of talk was so 
great, that many allowed themselves to be caught, and 
that gradually the number became very large of those 
who had been the victims of this inconvenient questioner, 
and who carried about with them the remembrance of a 
humiliation inflicted on them by him. And most of all 
was he hated by those who had allowed themselves to be 
touched and moved to tears of a bitter recognition of their 
own selves by his words, but who had afterwards sunk back 
into their former ways, and were now ashamed of their 
hours of weakness. Thus Socrates had daily to experience 
that the testing of men was the most ungrateful of tasks 
which could be pursued at Athens ; nor could he without 
the sacred resolution of an absolutely unselfish devotion to 
his mission have without ceasing obeyed the divine voice, 
which every morning anew bade him go forth among 

chap. II.] Athens after her Restoration. 149 

But that there were also more general and deep-seated 
grounds for the sense of annoyance manifested by the 
Attic public, is most clearly proved by the attacks of the 
comic stage. " To me too," it is said in a comedy by 
Eupolis, " this Socrates is offensive, this beggarly talker, 
who has considered everything with hair-splitting inge- 
nuity ; the only matter which he has left unconsidered is 
the question how he will get a dinner to-day." Far more 
serious were the attacks of Aristophanes. His standpoint, 
as well as that of Eupolis and Cratinus, was the ancient 
Attic view of life ; he regarded the teachers of philosophy, 
round whom the young men gathered, as the ruin of the 
state ; and although he could not possibly mistake the 
difference between Socrates and the Sophists, although 
moreover he by no means belonged to the personal ene- 
mies of Socrates, with whom he rather seems to have 
enjoyed a certain degree of intimacy, yet he thought it 
both his right and his duty as a poet and a patriot, to 
combat in Socrates the Sophist, nay the most dangerous 
of Sophists. The Athenian of the old school hated these 
conversations extending through whole hours of the broad 
daylight, during which the young men were kept away 
from the palcestrce, these painful discussions of topics of 
morality and politics, as to which it behooved every loyal 
citizen to have made up his mind once for all. If every- 
thing was submitted to examination, everything was also 
exposed to rejection ; and what was to become of the city, 
if only that was to be allowed as valid which found gra- 
cious acceptance at the hands of this or that professor of 
talk ? If everything had to be learnt, if everything was 
to be acquired by reflection, then there was an end of true 
civic virtue, which ought to be a thing inborn in a citizen 
and secured by his training as such. In these days all 
action and capability of action was being dissolved into 
an idle knowledge ; the one-sided cultivation of the intel- 
lect was loosening the sinews of men, and making them 

151 History of Greece. E Bo0 * v. 

indifferent to their country and religion. From this stand- 
point the poet rejects all such culture of youth as is 
founded upon the testing of the mind and leading it to 
perfect knowledge, and lauds those young Athenians who 
do not care for wasting their time by sitting and talking 
with Socrates.* 

The priestly party again was adverse to Socrates, al- 
though the highest authority in religious matters which 
existed in Hellas and had at all events not been super- 
seded by any other, had declared in his favor, — at the 
suggestion of Chserephon, who from his youth up was at- 
tached with devoted affection to his teacher. His was an 
enthusiastic nature ; and he desired nothing so ardently, as 
that the beneficent influence which he had experienced in 
his own soul might be shared by the largest possible num- 
ber of his fellow-citizens. For this reason he was anxious 
for an outward recognition of the merits of his so fre- 
quently misjudged friend ; and he is said to have brought 
home from Delphi the oracle which declared Socrates to 
be the wisest of all men. Now, although this oracle was 
incapable of giving a loftier assurance of his mission to 
the philosopher himself, although it could not even re- 
move the antipathy of the public, yet it might be expected 
that it would disarm the calumny representing Socrates 
as a teacher of dangerous heresies ; and in this sense he 
could not but personally welcome the Delphic declaration. 
For it must be remembered that he continued to regard 
the oracle as the reverend centre of the nation, as the 
symbol of a religious communion among the Hellenes ; 
and in disallowing all presumptuous meditation on the 
right way of venerating the gods, he entirely followed the 

* Eupolis, ii. 553: fjatrut rbv ~2.<*Kpa-n\v rbv tttwxoi' uSoKea-x^v ; Ar. Ran. 1491. 
Socrates defends himself against the attacks in the Clouds of Aristophanes; 
but there is no trace of any bitterness against the latter, either in himself 
or in any of his disciples. As to the «/rvxcyu»yia and the not quite 
satisfactory translation, " guidance of the soul " (Seelenleitung), cf. Rhein> 
Mus. xviii. 473. 

chap, ii.] Athens after her Restoration. 151 

precedent of the Delphic oracle, which was in the habit 
of settling questions of this kind by the answer, that it 
was according to the usage of their fathers that men 
should venerate the gods. At Delphi, on the other hand, 
there could be no question as to the importance of one 
who was leading the revolted world back to reverence for 
things holy, and who, while his contemporaries were deri- 
sively despising the obsolete ways of the past and running 
after the ignes fatui of the wisdom of the day, held up 
before their eyes the primitive sayings of the temples, a 
serious consideration of which he declared to be sufficient 
to reveal the treasure of immortal truth contained in 
them. If it was confessedly impossible to put an end to 
the prevailing desire for independent inquiry, then the 
priests could not but acknowledge that this was the only 
way by which the old religion could be saved. 

Even, however, the recognition by Delphi was unable 
to protect Socrates against the suspicion of heresy. The 
fanaticism of the priestly party increased in inverse 
ratio to its prospects of real success ; it regarded any 
philosophical discussion of religious truths as a desecra- 
tion, and placed Socrates on the same level as Diagoras. 
Finally, the democrats, who after the restoration of the 
constitution were the ruling party, hated philosophy, be- 
cause out of its school had issued a large proportion of the 
oligarchs ; not only Critias and Theramenes, but also 
Pythodorus, the archon of the days of anarchy (p. 51), 
Aristoteles, one of the Four Hundred and of the Thirty, 
Charmides (vol. iii. p. 578) and others, were known as 
men of philosophical culture. Philosophy and the ten- 
dency towards political reaction accordingly seemed to be 
necessarily connected with one another. In a word, So- 
crates found opposition everywhere ; some deemed him 
too conservative, and others too liberal ; he had against 
him both the Sophists and the enemies of the Sophists, 
both rigid orthodoxy and infidelity, both the patriots of 

152 History of Greece. [Book v. 

the old school and the representatives of the renovated 

Notwithstanding all this hostile feeling the personal se- 
curity of Socrates was not endangered, because he pur- 
sued his path as a blameless man, and because it was a 
matter of conscience with him to avoid every offence 
against the law. But after the restoration of the constitu- 
tion a variety of circumstances continued to imperil his 
position at Athens. 

Political Already before the complete overthrow of 

lawsuits. the Thirty, a multiplicity of lawsuits had been 
set in motion against the members and adherents of the 
oligarchy, — (just as had been the case after the fall of 
the Four Hundred). The best known of these suits was 
that of Lysias against Eratosthenes, who had remained 
behind at Athens with Phidon (p. 51). In itself no 
charge could have been more just, for nobody had suffered 
more severely than the son of Cephalus ; he had been de- 
prived of his inheritance without a shadow of reason ; his 
brother Polemarchus had been illegally executed ; and he 
had himself only with difficulty escaped death. The 
sacred duty of avenging the blood of his kin was the mo- 
tive which first brought him into court as the accuser of 
the author of this crime. But his appearance in this 
character was at the same time the first step towards a 
pitiless persecution of those who during the Terror had 
sinned against the people, and a call to vengeance in the 
name of the misused resident aliens under the protection 
of Athens, and of all the many citizens who had suffered 
the heaviest of wrongs. If this summons found willing 
listeners and followers, the whole city would inevitably be 
involved anew in terrible struggles. 

Accordingly after this suit had come to an end, the re- 
conciliation among the parties, which had hitherto been 

* As to Pythodorus and Aristoteles, cf. note to p. 23. Xap/ou'5ijs & 
TAav/cwvos : Xen. Hellen. ii. 4, 19. 

Chap. ii. j Athens after her Restoration. 153 

only outwardly accomplished, was renewed amid solemn 
oaths ; the law of amnesty (p. 46) was to prevent all simi- 
lar proceedings in the courts. It became the basis of the 
new political order of things ; the members of the Coun- 
cil and the judges were every year sworn to observe it ; 
and under the beneficent influence of Thrasybulus and in 
particular of Archinus (to whom, as Demosthenes said, next 
to the gods the city was most indebted for its salvation), 
peace and concord were successfully re-established. And 
the salutary policy of these patriots was supported by the 
general weariness of men's minds, by the consideration taken 
for Sparta, and by the just recognition of the fact, that 
tranquillity was above all other things necessary for the city. 

Soon, however, matters changed. Hostile Rene wed 
passions stirred once more ; the families which and^erScu- 
had lost members felt the old wounds as sore- "[{Jens 1 
ly as ever, and soon the confraternity of the 
Sycophants were at work again, in order to take full ad- 
vantage of the circumstances of the times, which were so 
uncommonly favorable for their trade. And they found 
the most suitable opportunity in the public examination 
(Dokimasia), to which according to the constitution all 
those were subjected who had been elected by lot or other- 
wise to a public office. Here it was easy to re-open the 
old account of wrongs, without violating the amnesty in 
terms ; and whosoever, after giving a lively description of 
the oligarchic intrigues, put the question whether men 
who had taken part in them were really worthy of filling 
offices of public trust, might rely upon applause, and 
cheaply acquire the glory due to a friend of the people. 
Nor were these invectives confined to those who had actual- 
ly borne a share in the deeds of the Tyrants, but a second 
class of citizens was proclaimed as suspect in the matter 
of their political sentiments, in which all those were in- 
cluded who had during the Terror remained undisturbed 
and free from annoyance at Athens. 


154 History of Greece. t BoOK v - 

T . , On the occasion of an objection being raised 

Lysias J ° 

warning. on grounds such as these to the confirmation 

of an election, Lysias came forward as speaker for the de- 
fence; and his words are the living expression of the 
views entertained in this period of agitation by the Mode- 
rates. For he adjures the Athenians, not once more to 
provoke division by vengefully casting suspicion upon 
citizens, and thus to tear asunder the community which 
had only just been reunited. " No man," he says, " is 
" wont to be an oligarch or democrat by nature ; but as a 
" rule every one supports that form of constitution which 
" best accords with his interests ; it will therefore depend 
" upon the conduct of the civic community, whether a 
" large proportion will be satisfied with the existing order 
" of things. Under the old democracy a great number 
" existed who were guilty of peculation, who took bribes, 
" who alienated the allies of Athens. Had the Thirty 
" chastised such men as these, they would have deserved 
" praise ; but you were justly wroth with them, because 
" they made the whole community pay for the sins of some 
" of its members. Beware lest you are yourselves guilty of 
" the same error ! Consider moreover what it was that 
" proved the ruin of your enemies ! For so long as you 
" heard that all those in the city were unanimous, you had 
" but a slender hope of returning home ; but when you 
" learnt that the majority of the citizens were excluded 
" from the public offices, while the Three Thousand were 
" in revolt and the Thirty in discord, the event came to 
" pass for which you had prayed to the gods ; for you very 
" well knew that you would compass your object rather by 
" the wickedness of the Thirty than by the valor of the 
" refugees. From this you ought to take an example, so 
" as to regard those as the true friends of the people who 
" adhere to the oaths which they have sworn : for there is 
" nothing more offensive to the enemies of the city than 
" to see you in concord among yourselves ; and the oli' 

Chap, ii.] Athens after her Restoration. 155 

" garchs who at the present moment are away from the 
" city desire nothing more strongly than that as many as 
" possible of the citizens may suffer in their reputations 
" and be deprived of their honor, because they hope to 
" find in those whom you have damaged allies for them- 
" selves ; they wish nothing more ardently than that the 
" trade of the Sycophants may flourish at its full height 
" among you, because in the vileness of these men they 
" see their own opportunity. Wherefore reflect, whether 
" the men who at the full risk of their own lives have re- 
" stored your freedom, and who now recommend internal 
" peace to you as the bulwark of the constitution, have 
" not a better claim upon your confidence than those who 
" owed their return from exile to others, and who now 
" come forward as calumniating accusers and recommence 
" the same work which has twice already led to the estab- 
" lishment of despotism." * 

But, clearly and impressively as the policy The 
of Archinus and men of his way of thinking, Sycophants at 

* °' work again. 

which alone could benefit the city, was advo- 
cated by the most talented of champions, a dark time of hos- 
tile insinuation and mutual recrimination ensued, in which 
those passions found vent which had remained unsatisfied 
immediately after the restoration of the constitution. Fel- 
lows of the vilest kind, only entitled to be tolerated in 
the city in consequence of the decree of Patroclides (vol. 
iii. p. 564), under cover of the amnesty, promoted the 
most shameless charges, and hired themselves out for mo- 
ney to annoy other citizens in the enjoyment of this very 
amnesty ; among these notably Cephisius, a Ce hisius 
man who had already once incurred the loss 

* Lysias, xxv., defence against an indictment, in which " overthrow of 
the constitution" (the mot cTordre of the democracy) played the chief 
party; whence the inaccurate designation of the Oration as "Synov Kara- 
Avo-ew? a7roAo7ia : " it was spoken immediately after the restoration of the 
constitution (cf. Frohberger, Reden des Lysias, i. 177), and constitutes one of 
the most valuable documents for the history of the period. See Rauchen- 
Btein, Lysias (1861), p. 99. 

156 History of Greece. t BoOK v - 

of all civic honors in consequence of misappropriation of 
public moneys. 

Persecution These attacks were, as before, principally 
of the directed against the members of ancient civic 

Aristocrats. ° 

families, and thus Andocides was by them 
again harassed, whose life, more clearly than that of any 
of his contemporaries, mirrors the restlessness of that age 
and of the party-doings at Athens. Once upon a time he 
had entered public life with the most brilliant prospects, 
being distinguished by birth, wealth, and talent, among 
the young nobility ; then, becoming involved in the perse- 
cution concerning the mutilation of the Hermse (vol. iii. 
p. 349), he had betrayed his associates, and, spurned by 
both parties, had fled the country and lost his paternal 
house (which it was his fate to see occupied by the dema- 
gogue Cleophon), had long moved about in foreign parts 
as a merchant, and had finally, in the year of Euclides, 
returned to his native city. Even now, however, he was 
not left in peace. In the autumn of b. c. 399 (01. xcv. 1) 
Cephisius, at the instigation of Callias, preferred an in- 
dictment against him ; charging him. as having, though 
still under the ban of the priests notwithstanding, im- 
piously taken part in the celebration of the Mysteries at 
Eleusis. The old tales were warmed up again which 
sixteen years ago had agitated Athens; laws already 
abolished were drawn forth once more ; laws and ordi- 
nances were jumbled together ; an unwritten code was as- 
serted against the written ; in short, there was a return of 
all the abuses which it was thought had been removed 
for ever.* 

Measures Among the upper circles in the city, the 

Mn1ghU be Knights were especially grudged the benefits 

of the amnesty ; and if in this instance again 

* Andocides was born circ. 01. lxxxiv. 3 (b. c. 442); and had passed the age 
of forty when he made his speech about the Mysteries (his birth is erro- 
neously dated 01. lxxviii. 1 ; b. c. 468). Cf. Kirchhoff in Hermes, i. 7, 14. 

chap, ii.] Athens after her Restoration. 157 

an entire class of citizens were attacked, there was in so 
far a certain excuse for it, that the Knights had in reality 
served the interests of the Tyrannis like a close corpora- 
tion, and had abused the distinguished position, bestowed 
upon them by the community, for its disadvantage. Ac- 
cordingly, the young men belonging to this order were 
not only in general regarded with suspicion, and excluded 
from the public offices, but soon after the restoration of 
the constitution a decree was passed, that all those who 
could be proved to have served under the Thirty should 
refund to the state the equipment-money provided by the 
public purse for those who entered the cavalry service ; in 
other words, they were classed among those who illegally 
had in their hands public property, which was demanded 
back by the officers termed Syndici (p. 68). Nor was this 
deemed enough. For when in 01. xcv. 1, (b. c. 399) the 
Lacedaemonians began the Persian war, and demanded 
for service in it a contingent of three hundred horsemen 
from Athens, these were taken from the number of those 
who had served under the Tyrannis. This was a measure 
of force, thoroughly opposed to the spirit of the amnesty ; 
but it was thought a clear gain for the commonwealth, if 
it were ridded of these men, and it was secretly wished 
that they might never return to their native city, to 
whose misfortunes they had unquestionably contributed.* 
These hostilities are a palpable sign of the exceeding 
growth of bitterness and irritation which had made its ap- 
pearance among the citizens of Athens soon after the am- 
nesty ; and this state of feeling in the end also reacted 
upon the one man who was most innocent of all the suff- 
erings of the state. Nor was it a single or recent offence 
which Socrates was said to have committed ; but the ill- 
will which had accumulated during a long period of 

* Xen. Hellen. iii. 1, 4 (vo(Ai£ovTts Ke'pSos tw Siqfita, ei anoSrifioltv icai ivairo- 
Aou/to). Repayment of the KaTaoraaif (Lys. xvi. 6): c£ Sauppe, Philol. 
xv. 69. 

15o History of Greece. [Book v. 

years came to an outbreak now that denunciation was 
again the order of the day, and that all those were pried 
on who had stood in any relations of community of senti- 
ments, or of intercourse, with the oligarchs. 

The prose- The cm?e f accuser was Meletus, probably 
Socrates. tne same m an who had a few months previous' 
ly supported Cephisius against Andocides ; a 
young and as yet unknown person, by profession a poet, 
and not more fortunate as such than his father and name- 
sake, with whom we are probably justified in identifying 
the tragic writer derided by Aristophanes (p. 91). With 
him were joined Lyco and Anytus, the former a professed 
rhetorician, the latter, the well-known statesman and one 
of the liberators of Athens. Doubtless in the present 
matter, too, Anytus was the chief mover, although he 
might have his reasons for leaving Meletus to play the 
first part. The former had repeatedly come into personal 
contact with Socrates, who had in particular taken him to 
task with reference to the education of his son. The son 
of Anytus was intended to continue the tanning business, 
in order to repair the fortunes of the family, which had 
been shattered by the period of exile. Thus all superior 
culture was neglected in his case, and, to the exceeding 
annoyance of Anytus, his son proved so entirely unsatis- 
factory as to confirm the warnings of Socrates. Anytus 
also thought it his duty, as a zealous democrat, to come 
forward against Socrates as the champion of the interests 
of the state. But in order that the result should be suc- 
cessful, it was necessary to transfer the entire suit from 
the domain of civil offences, which were rather judged ac- 
cording to the strict letter of the law, to another domain, 
where it was possible to move with greater freedom ; — and 
this was that of religious conviction and of moral conduct. 
Accordingly the indictment charged defection from the 
ancestral religion, the introduction of new gods, and the 
corruption of youth. Special prominence being given to 

chap, ii.] Athens after her Restoration. 159 

the first of these points, the suit came before the 
Archon-King (vol. i. p. 329), whose function it was to 
hear all suits concerning religious law, and to conduct the 
proceedings preparatory to the sentence of a jury. 

Nor was it difficult to find an apparent foundation for 
every one of the above three charges. The first and 
second, closely connected with one another, were based 
upon the assertion that in his Dwmonion Socrates had cun- 
ningly invented a new deity ; and with regard to the 
third, the circumstances of the times furnished the most 
welcome opportunity for attacking Socrates as the teacher 
of Critias, who was declared to have learnt from him his 
accursed political principles. Moreover, Socrates' satiri- 
cal remarks concerning the clever Athenians, each of 
whom thought himself capable of governing the state, and 
concerning the public officers who were called to the head 
of affairs, according as the beans were drawn by lot, were 
sufficiently well known, to serve for the purpose of throw- 
ing suspicion upon his sentiments with regard to the de- 

Meletus had demanded the sentence of death ; but it is 
certain, that the actual issue of the suit is only to be 
ascribed to the behaviour of the accused. For the entire 
peculiarity of the man, which had at all times annoyed 
the multitude, made itself manifest in full measure in the 
course of this suit ; and as the Attic popular tribunals 
were constituted, such currents of feeling were of decisive 

Socrates regarded the whole matter with Hig 
the utmost tranquillity, as if it had nothing demnation. 
to do with his own fate ; nay, if any one else had been 
the object of the attack in his place, he would doubtless 
have exerted himself far otherwise, in order, so far as lay 

* As to the accusers of Socrates, see Zeller, ii. 1, 131. According to Cobet, 
Mnemosyne, vii. 259, it was the Sophist Polycrates who first charged Socrates 
with having been the teacher of Critias and Alcibiades. 

160 History of Greece. r B <><> K v. 

in his power, to prevent an unjust judicial sentence. The 
proud calm of the accused, the resoluteness with which he 
declined to claim the grace of the judges according to the 
usage of the Athenian courts, or to promise to change his 
way of life, in so far as it gave offence, appeared to cor* 
roborate the charge, that he actually contemned the insti- 
tutions of the city, and was accordingly a bad citizen. 
His whole defence he merely conducted, in order to satisfy 
the law, and rejected all offers of assistance on the part 
of others. Thus his friends were unable to be of any 
real use to him ; and the wrath of the multitude was not 
to be appeased by mere words. The feeling of the city 
was against him ; and the only circumstance which seems 
strange is, that of the more than 550 jurymen nearly half 
allowed themselves to be induced neither by the prevail- 
ing sentiment, nor by the powerful Anytus, to abandon 
their conviction ; the accused was found guilty by a ma- 
jority of only five or six votes.* 

Death of ^e sen tence could not be immediately car- 
Socrates. r j e( j j n t execution, because the Attic festive 

°3t9i cv * l " * B ' sn *P na( ^ sa ^ e( ^ f° r Delos, an d until its return 
the city according to ancestral usage had to 
remain pure and unpolluted.! This circum- 
stance was the cause of a delay of thirty days, during 
which Socrates was able to converse with his friends in 
his prison, and to prove by his rejection of all attempts to 
liberate him, as well as by his absolutely serene tran- 
quillity of soul, how well he had weighed his whole 
course of conduct, and how he never for a single moment 
repented what had passed. Up to his last breath he re- 
mained loyal to the laws of his native city, and indefati- 

* Plat. Apolog. 36» (where rptaKOPra is a wrong reading). Cf. Lehrs, Neue 
JahrbUcher fur Philol. 1859, p. 561. The passage in Diogenes Laert. ii. f. 41, is 
obscure ; cf. Zeller, p. 135. 

t As to the Theoria to Delos, see Mommsen, Heortologie, p. 402. It was an 
ancient regulation of Hellenic criminal law: /u.»j olitokt ivvveiv iv eoprjj: Xen. 
Hellen. iv. 4, 2. 

chap, ii.] Athens after her Restoration. 161 

gably active in speech and in intercourse for the good of 
those dear to him. It was he, the man sentenced to 
death, who consoled those around him ; who, gently 
stroking the cheek of Apollodorus, wet with tears for his 
master's unjust doom, asked him, whether then he would 
prefer to see him die guilty ; who in the end gave the last 
commission to his friends, bidding them sacrifice a cock 
to Asclepius, i. e. offer up the tribute of thanksgiving for 
the healthful recovery which he perceived in death. For 
himself, he had a pledge in the faithfulness of his friends 
of the assurance that he had not lived in vain ; nor could 
the rest of his fellow-citizens long fail to recognize that 
he had died innocent. There is no reason to doubt that 
the Athenians were soon visited by a painful penitence ; 
they are said to have shed bitter tears in the theatre, 
when, on the occasion of the performance of the Pala- 
medes of Euripides, the following words reached their 
ears and consciences : " Ye Danai have slain the truly 
wise and innocent nightingale of the Muses, the best of 
the Hellenes." 

Thus died Socrates, at the age of seventy, Thecauseso f 
in the month of Thargelion (May) of 01. the sentence. 
xcv. 1 (b. c. 399) ; as a victim of the movement which, 
repressed from time to time, ever again re-asserted itself 
at Athens, in order to take vengeance upon those circles 
of the community which were hostile to the people and 
the constitution. It had been observed, that it was pre- 
cisely out of the upper classes of society that many had 
attached themselves to Socrates ; it was known, that rela. 
tions existed between him and Critias, Alcibiades, Thera- 
menes, Charmides, Charicles and Xenophon. Was it 
therefore astonishing, if many gave themselves up to the 
belief that intercourse with him encouraged the develop- 
ment of sentiments adverse to the constitution ? Did not 
Critias affirm, just as Socrates affirmed, that governing 
was not every man's business, but an art which required 

162 History of Greece. C BoOK v 

to be learnt ? — but then such was also the opinion of 
Pericles. Most assuredly it was a cruel wrong, to make 
Socrates responsible for the criminal misdeeds of those 
who had transitorily been in intercourse with him ; he de- 
clared decisively enough the breach between him and his 
degenerate scholars, he more than once risked his life 
against the oligarchs, he openly inveighed against their 
system of government, and refused all participation in 
illegal proceedings. For this reason the oligarchs too 
hated him, and endeavored to close his lips by prohibit- 
ing freedom of instruction. And his doctrine, that every 
official business, and above all that of government, ought 
to be founded upon intelligence, could, if rightly under- 
stood, only serve to raise anew and strengthen the demo- 
cratic constitution ; while the fact that the closest inti- 
macy with Socrates was not necessarily productive of 
reactionary opinions, is probably most clearly shown by 
the example of Chserephon, who of all his disciples was 
most absolutely devoted to his master, and at the same 
time one of the most zealous adherents of the democracy. 
Equally unjustified was the hostility of the priestly 
party, which, lurking in the dark, only made its appear- 
ance as a power at Athens on isolated occasions, — a party 
which suspected freethinking and heresy wherever there 
was intellectual movement. From its standpoint this 
party would and could as little acknowledge the religiosity 
of Socrates, as the statesmen his civic virtue. And yet 
no offence against the ordinances of the state could be 
proved against him ; he obeyed them in word and in deed 
to the day of his death, and kept the oath, sworn by 
Attic youths on the occasion of their admission into the 
civic community, more conscientiously than any one of his 
foes. For these were the terms of the oath in question : 
" I will not dishonor the arms now entrusted to me ; I 
" will fight for the sanctuaries and the common weal of 
" my native land ; I will subject myself to the appointed 

chap, ii.] Athens after her Restoration. 163 

" judges and be obedient to the existing laws ; and should 
" any one abolish the laws, I will not permit it ; and the 
" gods and the holy things of my native city I will hold 
" in honor ;" — and was not this venerable vow sacredly 
kept point for point by Socrates with a more than common 
fidelity, which he attested by self-sacrificing devotion ? * 

The accusers and judges were therefore not S ocrates 
justified as against Socrates. He suffered for Athenians 
crimes of which he was innocent, being con- 
demned by some from motives of malice, by the rest in 
sheer blindness and stupidity. He became the victim of 
a policy which had for its object the restoration of the 
Athens of old, without clearly realizing the means and 
the end. No advantage could accrue to the state from his 
condemnation ; but by it the Athenians rendered a real 
service to him whom they condemned. For they furnished 
him with an opportunity for setting the seal upon his 
teaching by a free obedience towards the laws, and by a 
heroic death. He had accomplished his task, and for the 
further advance of the work which he had begun there 
could be no more effective stimulant than his martyrdom. 

In the domain of art nothing new was to be gained ca- 
pable of giving to the civic community of Athens the 
moral anchorage which it needed ; the case stood other- 
wise with philosophy. In the latter no final stage had 
been reached, and the most important points still remained 
absolutely untouched. Socrates here only made the be- 
ginning, of clearly and distinctly setting before the mind 
those tasks of thought which were of the greatest moment 
to each individual. The habit of virtue which had once 
united the citizens and preserved the state, no longer 
existed : but this rule, unless the commonwealth were to 
fall to ruin, it was necessary to recover ; nor could this be 
effected in any other way than by putting free conviction 

* Socrates as the champion of Attic io-rjyopia as against the oligarchs: 
Scheibe, «.«. p. 76. For the civic oath, see Pollux, viii. 105. 

164 History of Greece. t BoOK v - 

in the place of the external authority of usage, and con- 
verting unconscious morality into one conscious of its 
causes. Against the false subjectivity of the Sophists 
there existed no other resource than that higher subjec- 
tivity which Socrates asserted — the subjectivity based 
upon serious self-examination, whereby alone could be 
obtained a valid standard for the gifts of the mind. 
Herein was pointed out the path for coming to the rescue 
of the state without breaking with the past, for founding 
a higher morality without which peace and tranquillity 
remained unattainable to both the state and the individual, 
and for the training up a happier generation. But the 
civic society of the age would not hear of any such reno- 
vation, and answered his offer of salvation by the hem- 



While Athens was entirely occupied with herself, 
Sparta stood at the head of the Hellenic world ; she was 
the only state possessing both the will and the power to 
regulate the condition of the remaining states, and the 
only representative of Greece as against foreign Powers. 
Accordingly, upon the policy of Sparta likewise depended 
the further course of Greek affairs; and this becomes 
manifest in the first instance from the position which wa3 
assumed towards the man to whom Sparta owed her 
dominion in Greece. 

It was soon found out, that this dominion L 8an der- 
was merely an apparent one ; for the oligar- worship. 
chical governments in the several towns paid little regard 
to the authorities of the city : their eyes were turned to 
Lysander alone. Whosoever was hostile to him, was a 
fugitive ; whosoever was in command, was a creature of 
his ; and the states where his creatures held sway were 
dependent upon his will. 

The longer that Greece had been a scene of general 
confusion, where opposite tendencies had combated one 
another in a perpetual oscillation, the more powerful was 
the effect now exercised by the phenomenon of a man, in 
whom a single will of a sudden asserted its absolute sway 
throughout all Hellas. This phenomenon dazzled men, 
so that even those who were not immediately dependent 
upon him, did homage to this man of might. Nor was 
this homage confined to the traditional marks of honor, to 
golden circlets and such-like gifts ; but it now for the first 


166 History of Greece. [ Bo °* V. 

time came to pass, that divine honors were transferred to 
a mortal. At Samos, which had held out against Lysan- 
der longer than Athens itself, the new government was 
not ashamed to transform the primitive festival of Here 
in such a fashion as to address it in the person of Lysan- 
der. Altars were erected to him, sacrifices lit in his honor, 
and hymns composed to the new Hero. 

Lysander himself rejected no form of flattery ; it was 
his intention to be regarded as a being of a higher order. 
Like Pausanias of old (vol. ii. p. 370), he surrounded 
himself with the arrogant pomp of a satrap. He formed 
a court around his person, attracting to himself all the 
men of talent from whom he could expect a heightening 
of his splendor; in the festival called after his name he 
made his appearance in person as judge of the festive con- 
tests ; and mediocre poets, such as Antilochus, made a 
rich harvest of money. But he was also able to adorn 
his circle by men of real distinction, such as notably the 
chceriius P oe k Chceriius, who, belonging by birth to the 
slave-class at Samos, had risen to eminence by 
his beauty and talents. He had become acquainted with 
Herodotus ; to his intercourse with whom he had owed a 
most felicitous intellectual development, and the sugges- 
tion of the choice of great national subjects. What Hero- 
dotus had produced in a narrative form, Chceriius made 
the subject of an epic poem ; and, although he was defi- 
cient in simplicity of sentiment and in natural warmth, 
he yet made it possible for his Perseis to find acknowledg- 
ment at Athens by the side of the Homeric poems, and 
to be read in the schools. But there was more talent 
than character in Chceriius ; and after he had gained so 
noble a fame as a patriotic poet, he submitted to do 
homage to the oppressor of Greek liberty, and became the 
inseparable companion of Lysander.* 

* Lysander-worship : Plut. lye. 18; Athen. 696; Choerili Samii qtug 
mjMrsunt coll. N»kius, p. 48. 

chap. HI.] Sparta and Persia. 167 

The measureless arrogance of Lysander, rt 

o if » Opposition to 

who allowed his poets unblushingly to cele- Lysander. 
brate him as the " Lord in War of Hellas," could not but 
excite an opposition of growing strength. He had seized 
upon a power exceeding all bounds, by virtue of his of- 
fice as admiral-in-chief, which office had in itself no or- 
ganic place in the Spartan polity, and of the special 
powers bestowed upon him for the settlement of Greek af- 
fairs. He accordingly endeavored more and more closely 
to bind in his person the soldiers serving on the fleet, who 
chiefly came from the lower strata of the population of 
Lacedsemon ; and this he sought to bring about by adopt- 
ing every possible way of enriching his men. It was 
known, how his devotion to the constitution at home was 
only a pretence, and how it would be intolerable to his 
ambition that he should again submit of his own free will 
to the regular political system of the Lycurgic state. 
Everywhere his enemies were astir, in order to induce the 
official authorities to interfere with energy. More effec- 
tive, however, than all the complaints on the part of 
Greeks who had suffered ill treatment at his hands, were 
those of Pharnabazus, who had throughout the last few 
years consistently continued to extend his favors to Spar- 
ta, and had afforded her the most important support. 

The first occasion on which Lysander met His humiiia- 
with resistance arose in connexion with the tlon ; 
measures ordered by him at Sestus. Here he had ex- 
pelled all the citizens possessed of homesteads, in order to 
distribute the houses and lands which were thus left with- 
out masters among such men as had served on his fleet. 
In other words, he sought to establish a kind of colony 
of veterans, at one of the most important of the points 
commanding the sea. Quite apart from the injustice of 
such an establishment, it could not be tolerated, if only 
for the reason that its single object was to create a solid 
basis for the personal power of Lysander himself. Ac- 

168 History of Greece. \Roo* v. 

cordingly, the Ephors, at the instigation of Pausanias, 
took courage, and ordered this measure to be revoked : so 
that the original citizens returned to their possessions. 
This was the first humiliation suffered by Lysander.* 

By way of a second attack upon his authority, one of 
his most faithful adherents, the Lacedaemonian Thorax, 
whom he had set up as a military bailiff at Samos, was 
called to account. The proceedings of Thorax had been 
those of all the other associates of Lysander. He had 
used his opportunity for acquiring money and property ; 
the ancient ordinances of Sparta were regarded as a dead 
letter, and under the standard of the all-powerful com- 
mander, who did everything in his power to stimulate and 
satisfy the greed of his partisans, they believed them- 
selves to be perfectly secure. It was therefore a heavy 
blow, when Thorax was dealt with at Sparta according to 
the ancient rigor of the law and put to death, on account 
of his illegal possession of private property .f 
and fall After this had been successfully accom- 

xSv* 2 1 -' plished, nothing but the last step remained to 

b. c. 403). b e taken. An opportunity was found in the 

repeated messages of Pharnabazus as to the utterly incon- 
siderate conduct of Lysander, whom he charged with dis- 
turbing him by expeditions of plunder in his own terri- 
tory. Hereupon the Ephors at once sent explicit orders 
to the fleet, commanding Lysander to return home and 
there give an account of his proceedings.^ In many re- 
spects what happened to him was precisely what in days 
past had happened to Pausanias. In the vertigo of his 
self-consciousness he had deemed himself indispensable 
and unassailable, without examining the foundation of his 
position of power. Thus in spite of all his sagacity it be- 
fell him that in the critical moment he showed himself un- 
equal to any attack, and resorted to the lowest kinds of 

* Sestus, conquered by Xantippus (cf. vol. ii. p. 321), a colony of Lysan- 
der's veterans : Plut. Lys. 14. 
t Plut. Lys. 19. t Ibid. 

chap, in.j Sparta and Persia. 169 

self-abasement in order to maintain himself. He was 
aware that of all the grievances urged against him, those 
of Pharnabazus had been urged with the greatest effect. 
To Pharnabazus he accordingly addressed himself, and 
begged for a letter which might cause his case to be more 
favorably judged at Sparta. The satrap pretended to 
give ear to his request, and even read to him a letter of a 
kind calculated thoroughly to satisfy him. But for this 
letter Pharnabazus substituted another, the tone of which 
was more bitter than that of any previous dispatch, and 
hereby brought the greatest shame upon Lysander, who, 
after confidently handing to the Ephors what he believed 
to be a favorable testimonial, had to hear a communica- 
tion of a directly opposite kind read aloud in his pres- 

He ventured neither to defend himself, nor to await the 
judgment upon his case. Pretending to owe the fulfil- 
ment of a vow to Zeus Ammon, he not without difficulty 
obtained permission for the journey. Considering the 
character of Lysander, who had by no means as yet re- 
linquished his schemes, it is in itself probable, that with 
this journey political designs connected themselves ; more- 
over, his family had from of old relations with Libya, as 
may be conjectured from the name of his brother Libys. 
The oracle of Ammon, the authority of which was recog- 
nized in Greece as well as its own country, might render 
effective service to the ambitious commander; and we 
observe several instances of a connection between Ly- 
sander and oracles, — a connection established by him in 
order to gain over the priestly bodies to the side of his 

Lysander having been humbled, the question now was, 
whether Sparta could obtain the supreme conduct of 

* According to Plutarch, the Libyan journey took place before the crisis 
had occurred at Athens. But it probably took place afterwards. Cf. Thirl- 
wall, Hist, of Greece (12mo. edition), vol. iv. p. 462 ; Grote, vol. ix. p. 283. 


1 70 History of Greece. [Boo* v. 

Hellenic affairs in any other way than the Lysandrian 
policy of force, and to what extent she was altogether 
capable of fulfilling the task which had fallen to her lot 
after the close of the Peloponnesian war. 

Spartan Sparta had undoubtedly made splendid pro- 

5°Sctor ntS & ress : s ^ e k a( * f ree d herself from the incubus 
of inertia, and had passed out of the narrow 
circle in which her action had formerly moved, to such an 
extent as to have utterly overthrown her adversary in na- 
val victories gained in distant seas. The power of money, 
too, she now held in her hand ; and a series of public 
works of art proclaimed to the Hellenes the glorious era 
which had opened for Sparta. On her acropolis were 
erected the figures of two goddesses of victory, dedicatory 
offerings of Lysander in memory of his two naval victo- 
ries at Ephesus (vol. iii. p. 526) and at ^Egospotami ; and 
in the sanctuary at Amyclae two tripods which overtopped 
the tripods placed there in earlier times in remembrance 
of the Messenian wars. But the most splendid honors of 
all were paid to the victory at Delphi by a grandly-de- 
signed group of statuary, the front rank of which repre- 
sented the Dioscuri, Zeus, Apollo, Artemis, and Posidon, 
the last of these in the act of placing a wreath on the 
head of Lysander ; Abas too, the soothsayer, and Her- 
mon, the steersman of the admiral's vessel, had 'places in 
the front rank. In a rank behind stood the statues of 
those who had taken a prominent part in the victory : 
men of origin the most diverse, who at the same time rep- 
resented the civic communities to which they belonged. 
Thus was figuratively brought before the eyes of the be- 
holder a new Confederation, that of the allies against 
Athens, who were designed to represent the very heart of 
the nation, like the allies against Persia of old. These 
and other works of art attracted a multitude of artists 
into the service of Sparta. And doubtless it was the in- 

Chap, hi.] Sparta and Persia. 171 

tention of Lysander, in this respect also, to obscure the 
glories of Athens, and to constitute his native city a cen- 
tre of the national art-life. Although it was impossible 
absolutely to exclude the pupils of Phidias, yet no Athe- 
nians were admitted among the artists in question, who 
were taken from Peloponnesus and the Islands.* 

But this brilliant advance on the part of Sparta was 
after all at bottom a mere empty show. The victory 
which she had gained was not of a kind to have been in 
any case capable of exciting genuine enthusiasm ; for it 
had been obtained by the money of the Barbarians, by 
the treason of Sparta's adversaries, and by cunning trick- 
ery : and in truth the entire movement which these gor- 
geous works were intended to celebrate, had brought with 
it more of loss than of gain. For, however ill adapted 
the Sparta of former days might have been to carry on 
the policy of a Great Power, yet she had been firm in 
herself and sure of herself ; her strength had lain in her 
limitation; and the entire conservative party in Greece 
had admired the state of Lycurgus, consistent and true to 
itself in the midst of all the changes around it and of the 
general growth of insecurity and confusion. 

But in truth this state now no longer existed. „. 

o Changes at 

For such was the nature of the constitution s P arta - 
of Lycurgus, that it must either perish, or be preserved 
unchanged. Now, its preservation was impossible, inas- 
much as it was only by renouncing their traditional prin- 
ciples that the Spartans had succeeded in carrying the 
struggle with Athens to a successful issue. In the state 
of Lycurgus the strength of its own men was to be all in 
all ; and it was only for extraordinary emergencies that it 
had at its command a treasure which, formed out of the 
tributes of the subject population, was far too insignificant 
to be a real source of power. The experience of the war 

* Paus. x. 9; Plat. Lys. 18; Urlichs, Skopag, 4. 

172 History of Greece. [Book v. 

had shown that the ancient Spartan valor was insufficient, 
and that success depended upon money : and for this rea- 
son resort had been had to most unworthy negotiations 
with the Barbarians. Thus, together with the honor of 
the state, the sense of honor had been forfeited. The last 
years of the war had brought large masses of silver to 
Sparta ; and the very fact that formerly the love of per- 
sonal property had been forcibly repressed, even the pub- 
lic moneys being deposited outside the country, in Arcadia, 
in Delphi, and elsewhere, in order that the seducing glitter 
of the precious metals might be kept away from the eyes 
of Spartans at home, helped to make the lust of money 
now break forth with irresistible strength. It was indeed 
possible in individual cases to apply the rigor of the law, 
as in the case of Thorax (p. 168) ; but it was not possible 
to introduce a general system of control. Even such men 
as Gylippus succumbed to a temptation so close at hand, 
and fraudulently appropriated public moneys. Thus, 
while one section of the community found ways and 
means of secretly enriching themselves, others were im- 
poverished in consequence of the rise of prices due to the 
greater abundance of money, and sank so low as to be un- 
able to pay their contributions as fixed by law. Accord- 
ingly they forfeited their full civic rights, and were 
excluded from the common table of the men, while the 
rich continued to sit at this table merely by way of 
pretence, afterwards indulging in luxurious banquets at 

A hypocrisy of this description pervaded the whole life 
of the Spartans. It was the inevitable consequence of 
their constitution excluding every idea of a progressive 
development adapted to the times. Lysander himself 
was the prototype of this external conformity to the law* 
In dress and fashion of wearing the hair he adhered with 

* As to the placing of Spartan moneys abroad : Athen. 233 ; Corp. Inscr. Gr. 
i. p. 697. As to Gylippus: Plut. Lysand. 16; Nic. 28. Diod. xiii. 106. 

Chap, in.] Sparta and Persia. 173 

pedantic rigor to ancestral usage ; but the moral princi- 
ples of the state he recklessly renounced, and was in his 
mind intent upon revolutionizing the entire constitution. 
The numbers of the full citizens had, in consequence 
of the extinction of individual families and the impover- 
ishment of others, dwindled more and more. Foreign 
elements were excluded as of old, and only a Social ills 
single exception had been made ; in the in- 
stance of the seer Tisamenus of Elis, whom at the time 
of the battle of Platsese there had been no means of se- 
curing except the bestowal of the civic franchise.* Nor 
had care been taken to supplement the civic body out of 
the lower strata of the population, although the constitu- 
tion left room for this, according to the intentions of the 
legislator (vol. i. p. 208). In times of difficulty, indeed, 
it had become necessary to seek resources for the pre- 
servation of the state, wherever they were to be found. 
Brasidas has shown, how the state might make use of its 
husbandmen and Helots. Lysander had gone a step 
further; he had employed Lacedaemonians not of the 
full-blood in the most important public offices, and had 
deeply wounded the feelings of many a Hellenic com- 
munity by causing it to be governed by persons of Helot 
descent. But at home the services performed by these 
men were rewarded by sheer ingratitude ; a narrow spirit 
of caste opposed any concessions to the non-Dorian popu- 
lation, or the admission of its members to an equal par- 
ticipation in landed property, although ever so many lots 
of land had fallen vacant. And among the Dorians 
themselves, again, the wealthier shut themselves off as 
against the poor, and formed a more and more contracted 
circle of families, a privileged class which ruled the state 
in accordance with its own interests. The place of the 
much-lauded equality had been taken by an oppressive 
oligarchy, by the supremacy of an aristocracy of wealth 

* Herod, ix. 33. 

174 History of Greece. t BooK v - 

or office, which guarded its privileges with a jealousy in 
inverse ratio to the legality of their foundations. And 
inasmuch as, in spite of this degenerating tendency, the 
semblance of the ancient institutions was carefully ob- 
served, and not a little altered in the fundamental laws 
of the commonwealth, the inevitable result was that a 
spirit of untruth spread in Sparta, the effect of which 
could not but be most demoralizing for the entire popula- 

. With these social evils were closely con- 

jj, 1 , 3 - „. nected the damages suffered by the constitu- 

te Kings. ° J 

tion. The kingly office, originally destined 
to watch over the equality of property and of rights, had 
sunk into impotence, partly through its own fault. Already 
by means of the Council of War being placed by the side 
of the Kings (vol. iii. p. 417), they had forfeited the full 
command over their most important honorary office, viz., 

the supreme military command.f The esta- 
Nauarchy. blishment of the nauarchy, the most essential 
innovation in the political organism, constituted a still 
more dangerous encroachment upon the royal authority. 
And, in proportion as the most important transactions 
of the war were decided at sea, the jealousy of the Kings 
against this new office increased ; and when Lysander 
arrogated to himself all the glory of warlike exploits, the 

* The old civic community supplanted by the so-called bp.0101, who 
perhaps form the p-ucpd. eKKk-qaia, and are also called skkAtjtoi: Xen. Hellen. 
v. 2, 33. These names and matters are, however, involved in considerable 

t It is true that the appointment of the ten <rv>j3ovA.oi was only a measure 
designed to meet the particular case, and had reference to Agis individual- 
ly ; but it became a precedent for subsequent times ; and for this reason 
TllUC. (v. 63) uses the expression v6p.ov eOevro, 6? ovtrut nporepov iyevero 
avroi?, which clearly indicates an epoch in the history of the royal 
authority. This is not disproved by the circumstance that Agis personally 
contrives to rid himself of this restriction (Thuc. viii. 5). These same War 
Commissioners reappear afterwards under different names, as Ephors 
with Pausanias (Xen. Hellen. ii. 4, 3G), as a avviSpiov (Diod. xiv. 79), as 
yyefioves ko.1 (rv/u£ovAoi (Plut. Lysand. 23), with Agesilaus, Agesipolis, and 
others. Cf. Sievers, Gesch. 35; Herbst, Neue Jahrb.f. Phil. 77, p. 681 f. 

Chap, hi.] Sparta and Persia. 175 

conflict in the end rose to such a pitch, that the Kings 
levied an army, in order to frustrate the undertakings of 
their adversary. In Attica the supreme political authori- 
ties of Sparta lay encamped against one another ; and the 
whole art of dissimulation peculiar to the Spartans was 
needed to hide the breach in their political system, and to 
preserve the outward appearance of concord. 

The other enemies of the kingly institution Th E hora 
were the Ephors, whose power increased in the 
same measure in which that of the Kings fell into disre- 
gard. From the beginning of the war we meet with no 
decisions whatever proceeding from the entire civic com- 
munity ; nor is there any political significance remaining 
attached to the " Council of the Elders," the Gerusia. The 
whole power lies with the Ephors. Their election is con- 
trolled by the wealthy, and they rule the state in the 
interests of the predominant party. In the quarrels be- 
tween Kings and Nauarchs, the Ephors occupy a mean 
position, and we find the most important decisions due to 
the vote of a single Ephor (p. 56). Now, since the Col- 
lege of the Ephors, which changed annually, was fre- 
quently filled by men accessible to corruption, it was not 
difficult for the several parties to secure the majority 
which would control the policy of the state. Such were 
the influences which decided the attitude of Sparta ; and, 
in so far as there was any question at all of a consistent 
policy, it depended upon the Ephors being the servants 
of the oligarchy of the wealthy, which, as a matter of fact, 
had supplanted the constitutional public authorities. 
And since, in addition to this, the two royal houses were 
as of old opposed to one another with hostile jealousy ? 
and were only very rarely induced by a community of 
interests to act in unison, the deep-seated disruption and 
decay of the Spartan state are easy to be understood. 
And, indeed, it is all but incomprehensible how that state 
still continued able to defy the manifold dangers threaten- 

176 History of Greece. t BooK V 

ing it in its territory, and to maintain a position com- 
manding respect abroad. 

Elements What prevented the state from falling to 

spa g rta? in pieces, was the inert force of habit — the habit 
old, f giving and obeying orders, which had ob- 

tained for centuries in the valley of the Eurotas. The 
subject population was without any centre, without any 
unity, without any organ of expression ; and if there was 
^anythin g in good order among the Spartans, it was the 
police-control ex ercised thro ughout the land by the 
Ephors, which the malcontent rural po pulation obeyed in 
fear and terro r. Moreover, in spite of the decay of publ ic 
life, man y an element of goo d had survived in private lifo 
out of the old times . Cert ain principles of good moral s 
and man ners h ad passed into the veryjife's^bloodjif -Spar= 
tan men : a chivalric spirit, valor and contempt of death, 
discipline and obedience, fidelity in the worship of the 
gods and in the care for the honor o f the dea d. These 
featur es of Spartan character never failed to display 
themselves in critical times; and this ex plains how even 
degenerate Sparta continued to have he r enthusia stic ad- 
mirers, and how her citizen s, even whe n they made their 
appearance as individuals Jn_ foreign stat es, were able to 
exercise personally the greatest influence, such as was 
inconceiv able in the case of the citizens of an y other state . 
, And, in addition to the elements of good 

and new. ' ° 

which had been preserved, certain acquisi- 
tions unknown to the old times had been made. The an- 
cient awkwardness, incapacity in speech, and one-sided- 
ness, had vanished : the culture of the age had found its 
way into Sparta as well as into other cities. What power 
of speech and action there was in such men as Brasidas, 
Gylippus, Lysander ! A great variety of different kinds 
of character had gradually formed itself; by the side of 
stern professional soldiers like Clearchus, there appear 
crafty Sisyphi such as Dercyllidas and Antalcidas. In 

Chap - m -l Sparta and Persia. 177 

the royal houses, too, a loftier spirit occasionally made its 
appearance, a freer view of the world and of its affairs, 
rising above the standpoint of a narrow-minded Dorism 
and of mere political partisanship. Thus Pausanias had 
some conception of the significance of Athens for the 
common Hellenic country, and he maintained amicable 
relations with the leaders of the democratic parties in 
other cities. Doubtless those men were rarest of all, who 
knew how to combine the good elements of the old times 
with the good elements of the new, how to unite the senti- 
ments of an ancient Spartan with an advanced culture, 
with intelligence and energy — such men as Lichas and 
Callicratidas. As a rule, we find either an inert adherence 
to the traditional forms of life, or a spirit of opposition 
to ancestral usage, and open revolt. 

The inner condition of Sparta determined The forei 
her attitude in its foreign relations, towards policy of 

° bparta. 

the Peloponnesian as well as towards the other 
states. For a state so out of gear with regard to its own 
institutions could not possess the capacity for creating in- 
stitutions abroad and controlling the circumstances of the 
times from definite points of view. Indeed, there was an 
entire absence of any serious desire to accomplish the na- 
tional task which, after the fall of Athens, had devolved 
upon Sparta, and at last to satisfy the long-suffering con- 
fidence of so many Hellenes. On the contrary, it now be- 
came manifest that the moderation and prudence dis- 
played by Sparta had merely been the results of fear. 
For since that motive had been taken away, what had 
formerly been timorous irresolution now changed into de- 
fiant arrogance. Of old, Sparta's ill success in the Arca- 
dian wars (vol. i. p. 244) had induced her to desert the 
path of conquest for the gentler method of leadership by 
virtue of her position of primacy ; now she unhesitatingly 
returned to her ancient policy of force. Instead of thank- 


178 History of Greece. t BoOK V. 

ing their faithful confederates for their good offices, the 
Spartans sent their Harmosts even into cities which were 
members of their confederation, and simply obeyed the 
brutal impulse of lust of dominion, intent upon nothing 
but turning to every possible account the momentary ad- 
vantages of the situation. 

Relations Sparta, however, overestimated her strength. 

Ttates° ther ^ n ^ ne res ^ °f Peloponnesus, too, much had 
changed. There prevailed a wide-spread dis- 
content with the management of the war ; and after al- 
ready, in consequence of the Peace of Nicias, the autho- 
rity of the state holding the primacy had been shaken 
(vol. iii. p. 207), this feeling of dissatisfaction was on the 
increase since the capture of Athens. Was not Sparta 
acting as if there were no confederates in existence, whose 
interests might come into question? The Arcadians, 
Achseans, and Corinthians complained that their long 
years of sacrifices during the war had brought them no 
profits ; and Elis had for some time maintained a hostile 
. . attitude towards Sparta (vol. iii. p. 288). Co- 

rinth once more came forward with the greatest 
boldness. Her proposal that Athens should be destroyed 
had been rejected ;* she now demanded at least a share in 
the spoils which were flowing in vast quantities into 
Sparta. But the mere utterance of such claims was there 
regarded as arrogance ; and any equitable consideration 
of them was refused. Thus the spirit of injustice and 
oppression prevailing in the inner life of the Spartan 
state also found its way into its foreign relations. 
„,, ^ The offended states entered into a union 

Thebes co- 
operates with -vvith one another, and sought points of sup- 
port beyond the Isthmus. Above all, Corinth 
sought the support of Thebes. Next to Corinth, Thebes 
had done most towards kindling the war which had re- 
stored to Sparta its absolute supremacy ; Thebes had with 

* Justin, v. 10. 

chap, in] Sparta and Persia. 179 

obstinate endurance opposed the Athenians, not, however, 
with the design of making Sparta great, but in order 
herself to gain freedom of action on the north side of the 
Isthmus. For this reason Thebes as well as Corinth — the 
former in consequence of her mainland, the latter in con- 
sequence of her maritime, political situation — had desired 
to see Athens annihilated. But when the Spartans placed 
a garrison at Athens, and made manifest their intention 
of making central Hellas, with the islands, a subject ter- 
ritory, Thebes changed her policy, because she could not 
but infinitely prefer that Athens should be a free city of 
limited power, to its serving as a strong military position 
for the Spartans. Thus Thebes, by encouraging the re- 
storation of the Attic democracy, was the first state 
openly to oppose Sparta ; and, together with Corinth, 
refused to send troops, when King Pausanias summoned 
the contingents of the confederates. 

Corinth was additionally irritated in a spe- Corinth Sy- 
cial degree against the Spartans by their pro- g^tf ' and 
ceedings at Syracuse. Here, during the last 
years of the Peloponnesian war, an incessant conflict had 
prevailed between the adherents of Tyrannical and those 
of Civic government. The leader of the citizens was 
Nicoteles, who had come from Corinth to save the consti- 
tution of its daughter-city, and who was the bitterest of 
the adversaries of Dionysius. Immediately after the 
battle of ^Egospotami, Sparta too came to be mixed up 
in these transactions. Probably the constitutional party 
applied for aid to the Spartans, the old repressers of 
Tyrants ; and they in consequence at once sent over 
Aristus, with the pretended mission of over- Mission G f 
throwing Dionysius. But in reality they had Anstus - 
far different intentions. For, inasmuch as their own 
thoughts were solely intent upon oppression, a Tyrant 
commanding a strong military force was a welcome ally 
to them. Accordingly, the good fame of Sparta was un- 

180 History of Greece. t BoOK v 

hesitatingly dishonored by proceedings of utter injustice. 
Aristus thoroughly abused the confidence of the citizens, 
and had made away with the noble Nicoteles ; and it was 
he who enabled Dionysius fully to establish himself in 
the possession of his unconstitutional authority.* 

Sparta and ^ u ^ ^ ne hig nes t importance and most COn- 
Persia. siderable consequences of all attached to 
Sparta's relations with Persia. The Persians had fur- 
nished the means for terminating the war ; and they too, 
alone among all the allies of Sparta, received their re- 
ward. For the first time after a long interval, Pharna- 
bazus again visited the whole of Mysia and the Troad 
under the suzerainty of Persia ; and though Lysander 
ventured to withstand the claims of Persia in the Helles- 
pont, yet the fall of Lysander himself is the clearest 
proof of the potency of the satrap's influence at Sparta. 
The case was different in Ionia. Here the situation of 
affairs was this : that, in spite of their renunciation of all 
Asiatic territory, a very favorable opportunity presented 
itself to the Spartans of asserting their influence and 
pursuing an independent policy ; everything depended 
upon the way in which this opportunity would be used by 

cvrus and King Darius had died in the year of the 
Tissaphernes. battle of iEgospotami, without Parysatis hav- 
ing succeeded in obtaining from him a declaration in fa- 
vor of Cyrus, for whom she hoped to be able to secure the 
royal dignity on the same grounds which Atossa had of 
old advanced on behalf of Xerxes (vol. ii. 271). On 
hastening to his father's deathbed Cyrus found himself 
completely deceived in his expectations, and had to wit- 
ness at Pasargadse the solemnities accompanying the acces- 
sion to the throne of his brother Artaxerxes. Indeed, in- 
stead of becoming king, Cyrus ran in danger of being exe- 

* Diod. xiv. 10; Todt, Dionysius J. (I860), p. 12. 

C » AI> - IU ] Sparta and Persia. 181 

cuted as a traitor against the state ; for Tissaphernes } 
whom he had taken with him to Susa, accused him of 
having designed to assassinate his brother on the occasion 
of the investiture of the latter with the regalia. Tissa- 
phernes contrived to prove this charge out of the mouth 
of a priest, Cyrus' tutor in religion ; and Cyrus would 
have been put to death instantaneously, had not Parysatis 
thrown herself between him and the royal body-guard. 
And she was able to obtain more than this for him : for 
Artaxerxes, being of a gentle disposition and pliable in 
his mother's hands, allowed himself to be persuaded to 
permit his brother to return with unabridged powers into 
his province. He hoped that Cyrus might be gained 
over by magnanimous treatment.* 

But Cyrus was after his return more firmly determined 
than ever to carry out his designs, and contrived to take 
advantage for his ends of the difficult state of affairs 
awaiting him in Asia Minor. For Tissaphernes, who 
had already taken offence at the original appointment of 
Cyrus to the supreme military command in Asia Minor, 
and who disapproved of the entire policy of Cyrus, viz., 
that of unconditional co-operation with Sparta, now, after 
the failure of his plot against the life of the prince, felt 
himself insecure, so long as Cyrus and his party remained 
in power. He accordingly stood by his side in an atti- 
tude of suspicion, and sought for new opportunities of ruin- 
ing his adversary. Indeed, actual hostilities occurred be- 
tween them. 

Besides the satrapy of Caria, Tissaphernes had under 

* That there existed at Susa no fixed order of succession, excluding 
^special determination on the part of the reigning king, is also confirmed by 
Herod, vii. 2; cf. Thirlwall, Hist, of Gr. vol. iv. p. 281. 'ApTafepfrj? ('Apro- 
£ep*rjs in Herodotus and Plutarch) Arta-khshatra magnum imperium 
habens. Cyrus took Tissaphernes with him d>? 4>i\ov (Xen. Anab. i. 1, 2) 
i.e. as if he had supposed him to be his friend. For Cyrus had for some 
time been aware of the hostility of Tissaphernes. Nicolai, Politik d. Tissaph- 
(1863), p. 44. As to the attempt at assassination, there is the evidence 
of Ctesias, £ 57, against Justin, v. 11. 

182 History of Greece. £ BooK v 

him a number of maritime towns on the Ionian coast, in 
which he exercised rights of sovereignty.* In these Cy- 
rus desired at any cost to be acknowledged lord and mas- 
ter. He had known how to conciliate the good-will of the 
Asiatic Greeks ; he had encouraged civic liberty in the 
towns, and had thereby drawn them over from his adver- 
sary to himself. When Miletus too fell away from Tissa- 
phernes, he proceeded against it with the utmost rigor, 
caused the leaders of the party of movement to be put to 
death as guilty of high treason, and drove the others out 
of the city. These exiles were openly received by Cyrus, 
and furnished him with the desired pretext for collecting 
an armament, apparently designed for no purpose beyond 
the siege of Miletus and resistance to the assumptions of 
Tissaphernes. For he managed to assert his claims at 
Susa ; and Artaxerxes, won over by the extremely atten- 
tive respect displayed towards him in all his messages by 
Cyrus, and by the great regularity with which his brother 
forwarded the sums of tribute due from him, allowed mat- 
ters to take their course without intervening in them. 
The position held by Cyrus was of so exceptional a char- 
acter — for his was a triple dignity as satrap of Lydia, 
Great-Phrygia, and Cappadocia, as commander-in-chief 
of the royal troops, and as Caranos, — that the official 
spheres of the chief public officers in Asia Minor inevita- 
bly interfered with one another, without its being possi- 
ble at all times accurately to keep the functions of the 
several authorities asunder. Moreover, it was not difficult 
to cast suspicion upon Tissaphernes as a jealous rival, and 
to represent his policy as one unworthy of the Empire 
and disadvantageous to its interests. On the other hand, 
the overthrow of Athens, effected through Cyrus, could be 
interpreted as a triumph of the Persians over their 
worst enemy ; and, in the same way, the present depend- 

* Tissaphernes held the cities of Ionia as a gift from the Great King. 
Xen. Anab. i. 1, 6. 

Ch ± p - m i Sparta and Persia. 183 

ence of Sparta, and the secure command over the coast- 
lands, as a success of the new system of policy. The 
levying and drilling of Asiatic troops could not give rise 
to any suspicion, since this was within the powers of the 
Caranos. The case stood differently with regard to Hel- 
lenic mercenaries, for an accumulation of these within the 
limits of the Empire could at no time be regarded as free 
from danger. Accordingly, Cyrus proceeded with cau- 
tion, and avoided assembling considerable bodies of troops 
at single points. Thus the Great King was deceived ; 
and indeed he was at bottom well contented to think of 
the unquiet prince as engaged in these feuds, which satis- 
fied his ambition, exhausted his resources, and employed 
him in distant regions ; while Parysatis did what was in 
her power to encourage this view, and thereby to secure 
for Cyrus liberty of action. 

In the further prosecution of his schemes he The arma 
was greatly aided by the circumstances of the ™ ei Ju S of 
times. For the violent revolutions of the 01. xciv. 2 

(b c 403— 2 ) 

Greek communities had driven a large num- 
ber of citizens from their homes ; the general state of dis- 
comfort, continuing after the war, the demoralization pro- 
duced by it, and the dissolution of home and family ties, 
were all in favor of Cyrus. He sent his emissaries in all 
directions, to enlist for him, on either side of the sea, by 
the most advantageous offers, all young Hellenes inclined 
for a life of military adventure. His court at Sardes was 
a refuge for all fugitive partisans ; paying no attention to 
rank, descent, or political party, he contrived to attract 
the most useful varieties of men, to take each as he was, 
and to assign to each his appropriate place ; he seemed a 
born organizer of bands of volunteers. As a youthful 
hero in manner and bearing, full of high thoughts, open- 
handed and courteous, a prince of the Persian blood-royal 
with the culture of a Hellene, he inevitably attracted all 
eyes to himself, and exercised a magical charm upon those 

184 History of Greece. t BooK v 

who came into contact with him. Under the influence of 
his presence men forgot friends and country, and by their 
enthusiastic descriptions tempted others to follow them in 
deserting their homes and repairing to him. Not only 
unripe youths were attracted, but men, too, sacrificed part 
of their possessions, in order to equip themselves and 
others. While at home everything turned upon petty in- 
terests, here they perceived the beginning of new develop- 
ments ; they saw a man with a great future before him ; 
they divined the authority which he must wield, who 
should have at his disposal the gold of Asia and the men 
of Hellas ; and the Hellenes, seeing themselves treated by 
Cyrus as a privileged race, found not only their ambition 
and love of lucre, but also their national pride most 
splendidly satisfied ; and they felt themselves lords and 
masters of the world, while taking service under this bar- 
barian prince. 

ciearchus ^ ne °^ * ne raen wnom Cyrus honored with 

his especial confidence was Ciearchus (p. 13). 
He had been called to account after the fall of Byzan- 
tium and punished ; but hereupon he had, shortly before 
the close of the war, been sent thither anew, in order at 
the request of the cities on the Bosporus to defend them 
against the Thracian tribes. On his voyage to Byzan- 
tium he was recalled by the Ephors, but refused to obey 
the summons ; and his proceedings there as governor were 
full of ruthless cruelty, until a Spartan fleet forced him to 
take his departure; whereupon he made his escape to 
Sardes. He was precisely the man required by Cyrus, 
and was immediately employed by the prince to enlist sol- 
diers in the Bosporus ; he induced the Greek cities there 
to espouse the cause of the Pretender, for whom he in the 
space of a single year collected a considerable military 
force, thereby arousing such self-confidence in Cyrus, that 
he now thought the time had come for a resolute advance 
upon the end which he had actually at heart. 

ClIAP - m -l Sparta and Persia. 185 

For this purpose he now entered into neero- XT 

. ° Negotiations 

tiations with foreign powers ; for he wished to of c y rus with 


engage not only individual Greeks, but Greece 
itself, i. e. the great Power absolutely supreme there, in 
his cause, and now to reap the harvest of his Philhellenic 
policy. He therefore sent envoys to Sparta, and reminded 
its authorities of the services which he had performed for 
their state, and how they owed its present position to him 
alone. He now called upon them to attest their recogni- 
tion of his good offices, and declared his expectation that 
they would in their turn act as his allies. He at the same 
time said that he demanded no sacrifices without ample 
rewards. Whosoever came on foot (thus he wrote with 
oriental exuberance), should receive from him a steed ; 
whosoever came on horseback, a pair of chariot-horses; 
the possessors of fields should be made masters of vil- 
lages ; and the owners of villages lords of cities. The 
pay for military service should not be told out, but mea- 
sured out.* 

Thus, for the first time since the beginning of the 
Peloponnesian War, Sparta stood again face to face with 
a momentous resolution, and was called upon to give an 
answer — aye or no — by which her future would be de- 
cided. Doubtless the prospect was a tempting one, of a 
proved friend of Sparta by her aid mounting the throne 
of the Achsemenidai ; such a connection with Persia as 
could be hereby gained, seemed to the Spartans the very 
coping-stone of their fortunes, and the securest guarantee 
for their supremacy over Hellas. The Lysandrian party 
set its whole influence at work, in order to support the re- 
quest of Cyrus ; nor were the Ephors unfavorably dis- 
posed towards it. And yet the Spartans ventured upon 
no frank and courageous resolve. With crafty caution 
they sought to avoid open hostilities against the Great 
King, without at the same time forfeiting the good-will 

* Plutarch, Artax. 6. 

186 History of Greece. [Boo* v. 

of their powerful ally by a refusal. They acted as if 
they knew nothing of his real designs. The Nauarch was 
instructed to support the undertakings of Cyrus, which 
were nominally directed against predatory tribes of the 
south coast of Asia Minor, in accordance with his orders ; 
and 700 heavy-armed men under Chirosophus manned 
the ships. All the steps taken were calculated upon 
either event : in case it were favorable, upon establishing 
a claim on the gratitude of Cyrus ; in the opposite case, 
upon remaining free from reproach as towards the Great 

Meanwhile Cyrus had completed his prepa- 
tion starts rations, and in the spring of 01. xciv. 3, (b. c. 

from Sardes. ' , , . . 

oi. xciv. 3 401) he commenced his campaign. Even 
(b. c. 4oi). now> he continued to conceal his actual de- 
signs, and deceived the multitude by pre- 
tending that his intentions were merely to secure the 
frontier of his satrapy against predatory incursions, and 
to chastise Tissaphernes. This untruthfulness could not 
but create a doubtful feeling in the army ; it was soon 
perceived that Pisidia was not the object of the march, 
and an awkward spirit of opposition began to manifest it- 
self: the Greek troops were unwilling to be the blind 
tools of a roving ambition. It was only by their pay 
being raised that they would be drawn further and 
further eastward ; and not till they had reached the 
Euphrates, was the full truth revealed to them, which now 
indeed could no longer excite surprise. 

The real causes to which was due the failure of this 
enterprise, which had seemed so full of promise, lay in 
the excessive self-confidence entertained by the leader of 
the expedition, and infused by him into his followers. 
They had gradually come to convince themselves, that 
the prize of victory would drop into their hands without a 
struggle. For wherever they had naturally anticipated 
that the localities would be taken advantage of to block 

Ch ± p - in-] Sparta and Persia. 187 

their passage into the interior, they had marched through 
unresisted : in the passes of Mount Taurus, where Syen- 
nesis had voluntarily abandoned his commanding position 
on the heights, and again at their transit out of Cilicia 
into Syria, whither Cyrus had ordered the fleet, so as with 
its aid to force a passage. But Abrocomas abandoned 
the whole of Syria, and retreated to the Great King. 
Next, the Euphrates offered a line of defence, at which 
the greatest difficulties seemed inevitable to the army ; but 
here again nothing had occurred, except that on his retreat 
Abrocomas had burnt all the boats at Thapsacus, a mea- 
sure which remained absolutely ineffectual, because the 
Euphrates happened exceptionally to be so shallow, that 
the foot-soldiers could wade through it without the water 
reaching breast high. Finally, the expedition was me- 
naced by the most dangerous of all obstacles at its entrance 
into Babylonia ; for here the Great King had caused the 
" Median Wall," an ancient construction probably dating 
from Nebuchadnezzar, to be restored and strengthened by 
a trench meeting the Euphrates with an interval of only 
twenty feet. This had been done expressly to ward off 
Cyrus ; here, therefore, he naturally expected to find the 
hostile army, and prepared himself for the decisive strug- 
gle. But when even this artificially constructed defile 
was left undefended, it seemed actually removed beyond 
all doubt, that Artaxerxes was without sufficient courage 
to fight for his throne. The consequence was, that all care 
was thrown to the winds, and that discipline was relaxed, 
so that the soldiers negligently strolled by the side of the 
wagons and beasts of burden, on which they had depo- 
sited their arms. They imagined that, in order for them 
to come into possession of the prizes of victory awaiting 
them, nothing was required but simply to march on. 

Of a sudden everything changes. Two days after the 
last danger seemed to be passed, the imperial armada of 
Persia is announced, advancing against Cyrus in the open 

188 History of Greece. t Boo,c v - 

plain with such suddenness, that time is hardly left him 
to gather and range his troops. Thus, then, in addition 
to all the advantages accruing to the Great King out of 
his tenfold superiority in numbers and complete command 
of all the resources of the country, he had also in his 
favor the fact, that he was acting on the offensive and 
taking his adversary by surprise. The nature of the 
ground was exactly adapted to give him the full advan- 
tage of his superiority in numbers ; such was the differ- 
ence between the lines of the order of battle on the two 
sides, that the left wing of the Greeks reached not even so 
far as the centre of the enemy. 

The result of the battle was, however, by no means 
decided as yet; a prudent coherence of operations on the 
part of the Hellenic troops would even now have perforce 
ensured victory to them. But, in the first place, Clearchus 
neglected his duty by failing to obey the well-considered 
plans of the commander-in-chief; and, again, the latter 
forgot himself in risking his person with the utmost fool- 

b ttic of Clearchus commanded on the right wing, 

cuan.ixa, which leant upon the river. He was ordered 

Ol. xciv. 4 r 

(b. c. 401), to advance upon the enemy's centre, because 

early in x * , , 

September. here the Great King had taken up his posi- 
tion, and because Cyrus foresaw that to break the centre 
would be to decide the battle, while the defeat of a wing 
would leave the main result undetermined. And yet 
Clearchus preferred to act according to the ordinary rules 
of Greek strategy, by hesitating to leave his flank un- 
covered. He therefore made a rapid attack upon the 
wing opposite him, easily drove it into flight, and pursued 
it with unrestrainable haste. This victory was, as Cyrus 
had foreseen, devoid of importance. The left wing of the 
Persians was indeed annihilated, but at the same time the 
right wing of his own army was removed from the field of 
battle, and rendered unable to co-operate in deciding the 

Chap, in.] Sparta and Persia. 189 

day ; while the centre of the army advanced unhindered, 
and began with its vastly superior numbers to surround 
the left wing of Cyrus. Hereupon Cyrus himself, although 
the Greek leaders had urgently entreated him to be care- 
ful of his person, (and in their own interest, too, they 
were fully justified in making this demand upon him,) 
with his squadron of horse rushed down upon the centre 
of the foe. His charge was irresistible ; the ranks of the 
body-guard were broken, and the horsemen of Cyrus scat- 
tered in different directions in their pursuit, so that at last 
he found himself with a small body of companions face 
to face with his brother. And now all prudence deserted 
him. He was solely intent upon killing the king with his 
own hand. Already his lance struck his brother, but only 
inflicted a slight wound ; while Cyrus himself, almost 
entirely isolated, and surrounded by enemies, sank heavily 
wounded from his horse, and was then slain. He fell as 
the victim of his knight-errantry ; and with him was 
wrecked the whole enterprise, which was to have been the 
beginning of a new era for both the West and the East. 

After the battle was over, the Asiatic army The return 
of Cyrus, numbering 100,000 men, had dis- ™ a / u c s h t0 Tra * 
persed; but the 13,000 Greeks stood as victors ge t 401 _ 
on the field, proudly spurned all overtures of March m b. c. 
treating with them, and felt themselves strong enough to 
offer the throne of the Achsemenidse to Ariseus, the friend 
of Cyrus, who had commanded the Asiatic infantry. But 
Ariseus preferred to seek the grace of the Great King, 
and to betray his brothers-in-arms to the foe. They had 
now to provide entirely for themselves and for their own 
preservation ; and upon the proud consciousness of 
victory ensued a perception of the terrible situation in 
which they had been placed by the death of Cyrus. 

In the midst of the strange continent, in the wide 
plains of Babylon, where no means of protection offered 

190 History of Greece. t Bo05 - v - 

themselves to them, devoid of aim or of counsel, bare of 
all resources, tortured by want, ignorant of the routes, 
hard pressed on all sides by armies infinitely superior to 
their own in numbers, deceived by false pretences, and, 
through the insidious guile of Tissaphernes, deprived of 
their commander, who had been murdered in his tent 
when they were about to make some agreement with him 
with regard to the homeward march, — thus the unhappy 
army found itself, which had started for those distant 
lands with such overweening hopes. But necessity steeled 
these Greeks, and made heroes of adventurers. They 
shook off the dull despair into which they had sunk ; in 
true Greek fashion they assembled as a community in 
council, in order to agree freely upon an organization of 
their body, and to act as circumstances demanded. The 
captains proposed new generals ; these were confirmed by 
the soldiery ; and a penalty was imposed upon any at- 
tempt to arrive at an understanding with the foe. And 
after they had thus recovered their self-consciousness, 
they cast aside all the baggage they could spare, and 
courageously commenced their march in firmly-ordered 
ranks up the left bank of the Tigris, in order to seek a 
passage through trackless and unknown highlands towards 
the sea-coast beyond, whence they might again put them- 
selves into communication with their native land. 

The march Although this eight months' military ex- 
Thousand Ten P^ition possesses no immediate significance 
for political history, yet it is of high impor- 
tance, not only for our knowledge of the East, but also 
for that of the Greek character ; and the accurate de- 
scription which we owe to Xenophon is therefore one of 
the most valuable documents of antiquity. We see a 
band of Greeks of the most various origin, torn out of all 
their ordinary spheres of life, in a strange quarter of the 
globe, in a long complication of incessant movements and 
of situations ever varying and full of peril, in which the 

chap, hi.] Sparta and Persia. 191 

real nature of these men could not but display itself with 
the most perfect truthfulness. This army is a typical 
chart, in many colors, of the Greek population — a pic- 
ture, on a small scale, of the whole people, with all its 
virtues and faults, its qualities of strength and its quali- 
ties of weakness, a wandering political community which, 
according to home usage, holds its assemblies and passes 
its resolutions, and at the same time a wild and not easily 
manageable band of free-lances. They are men in full 
measure agitated by the unquiet spirit of the times, which 
had destroyed in them their affection for their native 
land ; and yet how closely they cling to its most ancient 
traditions! Visions in dream and omens, sent by the gods, 
decide the most important resolutions, just as in the 
Homeric camp before Troy ; most assiduously the sacri- 
fices are lit, the paeans sung, altars erected, and games 
celebrated, in honor of the saviour gods, when at last the 
aspect of the longed-for sea animates afresh their vigor 
and their courage. This multitude has been brought 
together by love of lucre and quest of adventure ; and 
yet in the critical moment there manifest themselves a 
lively sense of honor and duty, a lofty heroic spirit, and a 
sure tact in perceiving what counsels are the best. Here, 
too, is visible the mutual jealousy existing among the 
several tribes of the nation ; but the feeling of their be- 
longing together, the consciousness of national unity, 
after all prevail ; and the great mass is capable of suffi- 
cient good sense and self-denial to subordinate itself to 
those who by experience, intelligence, and moral courage 
attest themselves as fitted for command. And v . „ 


how very remarkable it is, that in this mixed 
multitude of Greeks it is an Athenian who by his quali- 
ties towers above all the rest, and becomes the real pre- 
server of the entire army ! The Athenian Xenophon had 
only accompanied the expedition as a volunteer, having 
been introduced by Proxenus to Cyrus, and thereupon 

192 History of Greece. t BoOK v - 

moved by his sense of honor to abide with the man whose 
great talents he admired. Xenophon felt no impulse, and 
was called upon by no outward duty, to assume a promi- 
nent position in this band of soldiers without a leader ; 
his native city was still unpopular among the Greeks, 
and the bulk of the army consisted of Peloponnesians, 
Arcadia and Achaia being most largely represented 
among them. And yet it was he who, obeying an inner 
call, re-awakened a higher, a Hellenic consciousness, and 
courage, confidence and wise prudence, among his com- 
rades, and who brought about the first salutary resolutions. 
The Athenians alone possessed that superiority of culture 
which was necessary for giving order and self-control to 
the band of warriors, barbarized by their selfish life, and 
for enabling him to serve them in the greatest variety 
of situations as spokesman, as general, and as negotiator ; 
and to him it was essentially due that, in spite of their 
unspeakable trials, through hostile tribes and desolate 
snow-ranges, 8,000 Greeks after all, by wanderings many 
and devious, in the end reached the coast. 
Behaviour of They fancied themselves safe, when at the 
Sparta. beginning of March they had reached the sea 

at Trapezus. But their greatest difficulties were only to 
begin here, where they first again came into contact with 
Greeks ; for more dangerous than all attacks of the Bar- 
barians was the net of insidious intrigue spread for them 
by the Spartan authorities. For no sooner had the news 
of the battle of Cunaxa reached Sparta, than nothing 
else was thought of there but escape from the evil conse- 
quences which might now follow upon the connexion with 
Cyrus. Accordingly, not only was all participation in his 
enterprise on the part of the state denied, not only was 
the favor of the Great King anxiously sought by the 
Spartans, but they were actually not ashamed to refuse 
any support to the Greek auxiliary troops, when they re- 
issued out of the interior of Asia and came into contact 

Chap. HI.] Sparta and Persia. 193 

with Spartan officials, — in order that in any case Sparta 
might avoid the appearance of having had aught to do 
with any phase of the revolt. 

The Cyreans (this was the name given to the troops of 
Cyrus from the days of Xenophon) had sent Chirosophus 
from Trapezus to Byzantium, for the purpose of seeking 
there support and means for their return home. After a 
long absence, Chirosophus returned with empty promises 
to the army, which was now at Sinope. He was chosen 
commander-in-chief, Xenophon having declined this ho- 
nor, because he foresaw that the election of an Athenian 
would, now that they were approaching the territory un- 
der the influence of the Spartan dominion, inevitably 
create an unfavorable impression, and be disadvantageous 
to the army. When soon afterwards Chirosophus died, 
there was an utter want of a person of consideration fitted 
for upholding the interests of the army before the Spartan 
authorities. Xenophon once more, in the most unselfish 
way, endeavored to provide for the welfare of the army, 
by attempting to induce the Harmost of Byzantium, 
Cleander, to assume the supreme command. But he failed 
in his attempt ; and when towards the close of the sum- 
mer the army had reached Chrysopolis on the Bosporus, 
there commenced the treacherous proceedings of Anaxi- 
bius, who commanded as Spartan nauarch in those wa- 

This individual was a worthy representative Anaxi bi US 
of degenerated Sparta. He showed no move- 
ment of Hellenic sentiment, no trace of sympathy for his 
fellow-countrymen, who had reached the threshold of their 
native land as if by a miracle, and who in their anxious 
and difficult situation hoped for patriotic fellow-feeling. 
Heartlessly selfish, he was intent upon nothing beyond se- 
curing his own position, and his eyes were bent upon Per- 
sia, in order that he might obtain the favor of the satrap. 

For Pharnabazus had made the most splendid promises to 

194 History of Greece. C BooK v - 

Anaxibius, in the event of his providing for the removal 
of this dangerous military force out of his province. Ac- 
cordingly, Anaxibius caused the army to be 

The Cyreans *=> J ' > J 

at Byzan- transported to Byzantium. Thus of course 

tium; * J 

they could not but conclude that he was at 
last about to fulfil the promises which he had made to 
Chirosophus, and to take them into his own service. In 
this expectation they had renounced the advantages 
which were open to them in Asia Minor, where by pilla- 
ging Persian places they could amply provide for their 
own support. But they were most cruelly deceived in 
all their expectations. For no sooner had they arrived 
on European ground, and were now, as they hoped, 
beyond the reach of all danger, than Anaxibius marched 
them out of the city on the side towards the land, without 
donations and without pay, as if they were a band of 
marauders of whom men desired to rid themselves, the 
sooner the better. 

When the troops were again outside the walls, Anaxi- 
bius caused the gates to be closed behind them, and sent 
them orders to obtain supplies in the Thracian villages 
of the vicinity, as best they could, and then to continue 
their march to the Chersonnesus, where they should 
receive pay. Thus these unhappy men saw themselves 
once more cast out into a strange country, and, at the ap- 
proach of winter (it was now the beginning of October), 
bidden to rely for their support upon more marching and 
more fighting. This act of treason was too gross to be 
patiently borne. Rising in savage revolt, the troops 
turned again upon the city ; some of their own men, who 
had accidentally remained behind within the walls, help- 
ing them to open the gates. The army rushed in, eager 
for vengeance ; the Spartan commanders ventured upon 
no resistance ; and Anaxibius would have fallen a victim 
to the fury of the soldiery, had not Xenophon intervened 
and saved the general, as well as the citizens of Byzan- 

chap, iii.] Sparta and Persia. 195 

tium. His admonitions were successful in recalling the 
troops to discipline and reflection ; he made it clear to 
them, how they were on the point of provoking the 
hostility of the whole world, Persian as well as Greek ; 
the momentary success which they could not fail to obtain 
would be the commencement of the greatest .. _ 

° and in Thrace; 

calamities for themselves. Convinced by winter, 
these representations, the troops of their own 01. xcv.i[ B . c. 
accord abandoned the rich spoils already in 
their hands ; accepted the offer of a Theban, Cceratidas 
by name, who promised them the richest gains from a 
campaign in Thrace, if they would entrust themselves to 
his leadership ; and quietly departed from Byzantium. 
Anaxibius for the second time closed the gates behind 
them, and, as soon as his fears were at an end, issued 
orders, that if any soldier of the army should still be 
found within the walls, he should be sold into slavery. 

The agreement with Cceratidas soon fell to the ground 
again. In the absence of a supreme commander, while 
discord continued to prevail among the several leaders, 
the troops moved hither and thither in Thrace without 
object or counsel. Many fell away, returned home singly, 
or settled in the surrounding localities. The entire army 
was on the eve of final dissolution, to the intense satisfac- 
tion of Anaxibius, who now hoped to reap from Pharna- 
bazus the full reward of his conduct. But when he came 
into the presence of the satrap, the latter was well aware 
that the official year of the nauarch was ended (autumn, 
400 b. a), and that Anaxibius could henceforth be neither 
of any use nor of any harm to him. He accordingly had 
not the slightest intention of keeping his promise to Anaxi- 
bius, and entered, instead, into combinations with Aris- 
tarchus, who had arrived at Byzantium as the newly- 
appointed governor of the city. Aristarchus now began 
to play over again the part of Anaxibius ; and opened his 
administration by causing the Cyreans who had remained 

196 History of Greece. TBoo* v. 

behind sick at Byzantium, 400 in number, and who by 
order of his predecessor Oleander had been furnished with 
supplies there, to be sold as slaves in the market-place. 

But Anaxibius was singly intent upon taking vengeance 
on the perfidious satrap. It was his intention to prove to 
him, how even without official authority he could still find 
an opportunity for punishing treachery. Accordingly, he 
came to an agreement with Xenophon, induced him to 
return to the army which he had quitted at Byzantium, 
and to lead it across from Perinthus to Asia, with the 
intent of there beginning open war against the satrap. 
Xenophon accepted his proposals. Once more the war- 
riors assembled around their old general, and looked for 
marches full of success and booty under his command in 
the rich coast-lands of the Propontis. The roving expedi- 
tion turns again from west to east. But Aristarchus, the 

They enter new fri en d of the satrap, prevents it from 
of e se e uthes crossing the Bosporus ; and there remains 

PJ* cml nothing for Xenophon but to enter, together 

with the troops once more gathered around 

him, into the service of the Thracian prince Seuthes, in 

order to help him in subjecting certain tribes which had 

severed themselves from his paternal kingdom.* 

Thus failed the plan of Anaxibius, of involving Sparta 
in war with Persia for purposes of personal vengeance. 
Pharnabazus found his security assured more thoroughly 
than before by Spartan commanders ; and the entire series 
of transactions, which had so seriously threatened the 
good understanding between Persia and Sparta, viz., the 
revolt of Cyrus and the participation in it of the Hellenes, 
seemed to have passed by, in accordance with the crafty 
policy of the Ephors, without ulterior dangers, and with- 

* Anaxibius, according to Xen. Anab. vii. 2, 5 (Bufavriwv vavapxos, Diod. 
xiv. 30, an incorrect expression referring to his head-quarters), is nauarch 
up to the autumn of 400 b. c., and is succeeded by Pol us. Cf. Weber, de 
Gylheo, 88 f. As to Seuthes, cf. vol. iii. p. 551. As to his silver money as the 
Attic standard, see Due de Luynes, Num. des Satr. p. 45. 

Chap, in.] Sparta and Persia, 197 

out having exercised any lasting influence upon Greek 

And yet the Spartans deceived themselves, Ti , 
and their unworthy and cowardly peace-policy ? h ? r ^J? in 
was in the end of no use to them. For after 
the fall of Cyrus, Tissaphernes came to the front again. 
By means of the warning given by him he had enabled 
the Great King to prosecute his armaments in time. It 
was he who at the last moment had encouraged the timo- 
rous Artaxerxes to enter upon a vigorous resistance, and 
who alone among all the commanders had stood firm 
during the advance of the Greeks ; after the battle, too, 
he had taken the most strenuous measures for the interests 
of the Great King. Accordingly, the latter could not but 
reward the faithful servant, whom he had abandoned in 
his quarrel with Cyrus, and could not but now regard him 
as the sole personage fitted to re-establish order in the 
maritime provinces. Artaxerxes, therefore, sent Tissa- 
phernes with extensive powers into Asia Minor, and, in 
addition to his previous satrapy, entrusted to him the ter- 
ritory formerly under the command of Cyrus. 

Herewith a new epoch commenced for the affairs of 
Asia Minor. The Asiatic Greeks, whom Cyrus had 
treated like spoilt children, now fell under the disciplinary 
rod of a man who not only in general disapproved of all 
coquetting with the Hellenes and considerate treatment 
of their civic liberties, but who was, moreover, a personal 
enemy of the maritime cities, and desired to take ven- 
geance upon them for having espoused the cause of Cyrus 
against himself. His personal passion, therefore, accorded 
with his commission to put an end to the ambiguous 
state of things on the Ionic coast, and to restore the abso- 
lute dominion of the Great King. 

Thus the events of former times curiously repeated 
themselves. Of old, the Lydian kings had advanced in 
order to subject the coast-towns (vol. ii. p. 133) ; as had 

198 History of Greece. t Bo °* v * 

afterwards Harpagus, the general of the great Cyrus (vol. 
ii. p. 145), and thirdly the hosts of Artaphernes in the 
times of King Darius (vol. ii. p. 207). So now again 
Tissaphernes pressed forward towards the coast, and com- 
menced the siege of Cymse, with the intent of making one 
city after the other a provincial town of the Persian em- 
pire. And, as in the earlier transactions of the same 
kind, so now again a new complication with the Greek 
states was the result. As in the times of Cyrus and 
Darius, the terrified coast-towns applied to Sparta, asking 
aid from the state which more than ever commanded 
all the resources of the mother-country against the 
hosts of the Barbarians and the revengefulness of Tissa- 

One of the chief reasons why this application for aid 
was not at once declined, as it had been on former occa- 
sions, lay in the clear recognition of the fact, that the 
amicable relations with Persia were after all not to be 
maintained, even if a further degree of concession and 
servility were to be acquiesced in than had been already 
reached. It was impossible to deny the aid given to Cy- 
rus ; and at Susa the former friends of the Pretender 
were regarded as the enemies of the empire. It was ac- 
cordingly patent that, as Tissaphernes was about to put 
an end to the semblance of liberty possessed by the Greek 
cities, so he also intended to break the semblance of peace 
still existing between Persia and Sparta. 

War between Under these circumstances no great amount 
Sparta and f political intelligence and resolution was 

oi. xcv. i (b. requisite for beginning the war, before the 
c. 399). Greek cities had fallen back under the Per- 

sian yoke, and the Spartans had lost the harbors on the 
further side of the sea. Moreover, the war was warmly 
urged by the whole party which had never ceased to take 
umbrage at the last dishonorable treaties of peace with 
Persia, and which rejoiced in finding an opportunity of 

Chap - m -J Sparta and Persia. 199 

putting an end to them, and of thus expiating their dis- 
grace. And yet, even thus, the Spartans would have with 
difficulty brought themselves to resolve upon war, had not 
the most recent events permitted a glance into the inner 
life of the Persian empire, which considerably diminished 
the terrors of a collision with the Persians. Up to their 
occurrence, Persia had indeed been no longer feared as a 
state likely to act on the offensive ; but it had been re- 
garded as unapproachable in its interior, and inexhausti- 
ble in internal resources. But now could any respect 
continue to be paid to a state incapable of conquering a 
band of Greek troops, surrounded in the very midst of 
the land of that state itself? Had not Tissaphernes him- 
self by the assassination of the generals offered the most 
eloquent testimony to the fact, that he regarded a Greek 
army under efficient leadership as invincible ; while, even 
when this army had been deprived of its leaders, he had 
in spite of his vastly superior strength, neither dared to 
fall upon it in its encampment, nor to pursue it into the 
mountains? Even after these troops had dwindled in 
numbers, and after their discipline had fallen away, had 
they not still been able to inspire the potent Pharnabazus 
with such fears, that he had not recovered his composure 
till they had been safely carried across the Bosporus ? In 
short, the colossus of the Persian empire had suddenly 
lost the nimbus of greatness, by which it had hitherto 
after all continued to be surrounded. It was therefore 
determined this time not to refuse the demand for aid 
proffered by the Asiatic cities. Sparta thought it possible 
to recommence a Hellenic policy without any risk ; and, 
for the sake too of her reputation among the Greeks, was 
unwilling to lose this favorable opportunity of summoning 
them to arms under her command. At the same time 
there was every prospect of her being able to carry on 
the war with slight sacrifices ; the lesson had been learnt 
how a war will itself support the troops engaged in it ; 

200 History of Greece. [ BooK v. 

indeed, a profit might be anticipated for the treasury ; 

and the Spartans meant to go themselves to seize the gold 
formerly bestowed by Cyrus. 

Thibron in Tne first ste P token b y tiie Spartans consist- 
ionia. ec [ m t h e j r bjddjug Tissaphernes, as they had 
spring. formerly bidden Cyrus (vol. ii. p. 143), desist 
from besieging the cities. When this message remained 
without result, they sent an army across the sea, under 
the command of Thibron, numbering 1,000 Lacedaemo- 
nian new-citizens, 3,000 Peloponnesians, and 300 Attic 
horsemen. This was a Hellenic army; the war was 
treated as a national war, for which Sparta summoned the 
contingents, without having previously caused a regular 
resolution of the confederation to be passed. 
ioi V ia! in After Ending at Ephesus, the Spartans 
oi. xc. 2-3 (b. soon founcl themselves deceived as to the rein- 
c. 309-7). forcements which they had hoped to obtain in 
Asia itself. The civic communities showed so much effem- 
inacy and aversion from war, that it was useless to found 
any hopes upon them. Moreover, the want of discipline 
displayed by the Lacedaemonians was not adapted for 
securing good-will and support to the liberating army. 
Thibron was accordingly obliged to look round for aid 
in other quarters. And where could he have found a 
more favorable opportunity for strengthening his forces 
than that offered by the remnants of the Ten Thou* 
sand ? These brave troops had fought as occasion de- 
manded during two months in the service of Seuthes (p. 
153) ; but under him again they had, in spite of all their 
labors and successes, met with nothing but bitter injustice. 
The king's treasurer faithlessly withheld part of the pay 
promised them, so that the troops began to murmur, and 
the position of Xenophon, between Seuthes and them, be- 
came very painful and dangerous. At this moment there 
arrived the summons of Thibron, which was received with 
the most joyous welcome. Xenophon conducted the 

chap, in.] Sparta and Persia. 201 

troops back to Asia, and here near Pergamus placed them 
under the Spartan general. The migratory band had 
passed up and down the shores of the Hellespont and the 
Bosporus like a thunder-cloud, ever watched with anxious 
eyes by the Persians : and now at last they had come into 
the Persian land itself, and Tissaphernes saw before him 
once more the hated men whom he had assumed, on the 
day of Cunaxa, to be doomed to perish hopelessly under 
the swords of the Carduchi and amid the snow-fields of 

Deep hatred in their hearts, they hastened to begin the 
conflict with their ancient foe, and caused the authority 
of the Spartan arms to rise with great rapidity. A series 
of cities espoused the cause of the liberating army, in 
particular Pergamus and the towns in its vicinity, where 
the descendants of Demaratus held sway, and likewise the 
iEolian cities Gambreum, Myrina, and others, where 
ruled the house of Gongylus, the citizen of Eretria who 
had of old taken the side of Persia. But as a whole the 
results remained inconsiderable, because Thibron was not 
equal to his task. His successor, Dercyllidas, T ij ibron 
adopted more vigorous measures ; he belonged f)"rc e n!das by 
to the school of Lysander, and contrived to natter art of 
take advantage of the state of affairs in the , s ™ me1 '' B - c - 
Persian empire, then in so advanced a stage of 
dissolution that the several officers of the empire carried 
on wars and concluded treaties without taking heed of 
the Great King. Thus Dercyllidas by cunning negotia- 
tions obtained an undertaking from Tissaphernes, binding 
him to remain inactive while the satraps of the upper pro- 
vinces were attacked ; whereupon, after having thus cov- 
ered his rear, Dercyllidas invaded iEolis with Truce be _ 
all his forces, put himself in possession of a ^aTancP^ 1 " 
series of cities in this densely populated dis- Phamabazus. 
trict, seized the treasures accumulated there, and finally 
concluded a truce with Pharnabazus, whom he had reduced 


202 Histvry of Greece. [Book v. 

QO „ to straits ; which truce lasted till after the be- 
Summer. ginning of the summer of the year 397.* 

„ , While the Lacedaemonians were half 

nesus, against their will involved in a Persian war, 

they had simultaneously to carry on another war of 
which the scene lay in their own peninsula. For if they 
were at the present moment desirous of making their 
hegemony a reality, and of assuming the character of the 
sole Great Power in Greece in their relations to foreign 
countries, it was assuredly above all necessary, that they 
should be masters at home and suffer no recalcitrance in 

But the old system of states in Peloponnesus had be- 
come unhinged ever since the Peace of Nicias ; and not 
only had Argos, ever irreconcilable, and Corinth, ever 
arrogant and discontented, sought to oust Sparta from her 
present position, but Elis too had taken part in these 
measures of resistance (vol. iii. p. 288 f.). 

Sparta and ^ ne re ^ a ^ ons between Elis and Sparta were 
Eiis. f a quite peculiar kind. The close connex- 

ion between these two states was one of the foundation- 
stones of the common system of Peloponnesus. However 
insignificant the little territory of Elis was in political 
power, yet a disproportionate consideration attached to it 
on account of Olympia, and in affairs appertaining to the 
Sacred Law the Elean authorities enjoyed an authority 
acknowledged in the whole peninsula. Elis had therefore 
always been treated by Sparta with special favor and ten- 
derness ; Sparta had considerably extended the frontiers 
of Elis, and had guarded its flourishing prosperity. Elis 
was a confederate territory after the Spartans' own 

* ©i/3pwv (QLuPpiav), Xen. Hellen. iii. 1, 4. His march was perhaps in 
B. c. 400; cf. Kriiger ad Clinton, «. a. 399. As to the families of Demaratus 
and Gongylus, Xen. Hellen. iii. 1, 6 ; Herod., vi. 63, 70. Acp«cvAi6«v (AepxvAAf 
fia? ap. Plutarch and Diodor.) 2t<rv^os, Xen. Hellen. iii. 1, 8. 

chap, in.] Sparta and Persia. 203 

hearts ; a land without towns, pacific, free from politics, 
peopled by large landed proprietors, priests, peasants, and 

A change had befallen these relations, since a capital 
had been founded on the Peneus (vol. ii. p. 433). This 
event had immediately awakened political life and a spirit 
of independence, which revolted against the predominant 
power of Sparta. The Eleans were no longer willing to 
be permanently nothing but the henchmen of Sparta, and 
in particular objected to the campaigns abroad. To this 
was added the quarrel concerning Lepreum (vol. iii. p. 
288), to which the Spartans had given a turn most signal- 
ly disagreeable to the Eleans. For they not only confirmed 
to the Lepreata3 their immunity from dues, but also 
placed a garrison in their city, which constituted a perma- 
nent menace to the frontiers of El is. Hereby the feelings 
of mutual ill-will were deepened into an open rupture ; 
the democratic party gained the upper hand at Elis, and 
the state joined the Argive Separate Alliance, and here- 
upon entered into the league with Athens, Argos, and 

But the Eleans also took advantage of the p ert ina- 
peculiar resources at their disposal, in order to °{^n°P/ ) J^ e 
make the Spartans feel their wrath. They not f '^[^ to 
only caused a monument with an inscription 
to be erected at Olympia itself in commemoration of the 
league into which they had entered in despite of Sparta, 
but they also intervened with measures of the severest 
rigor, when during the term of an Olympic truce Sparta 
had marched troops into the territory of Lepreum. For 
this act the Eleans imposed upon Sparta a fine of 2,000 
minae,* hoping thereby to enforce the restoration of Le- 
preum. But when neither such a restoration nor the pay- 
ment of the fine ensued, the Eleans (in the twelfth year 

* 2,000 minne, ^Jginetan, at the value in silver of 51. 2$. 9d. ; two for every 
hoplite : a fine nominally fixed by law 

204 History of Greece. E BooK v - 

of the Peloponnesian war) excluded all the citizens of 
Sparta from participation in the national festival ; and, 
even after withdrawing from the Separate Alliance, they 
defied the Spartans ; caused a Spartan of consideration, 
who had in spite of the prohibition taken part in the 
Games (vol. iii. p. 457), to be flagellated ; refused admis- 
sion to King Agis when he was about to offer sacrifices 
for victory against Athens ; in their own state completed 
the edifice of a purely democratic constitution ; established 
a fleet ; and even after the victories of Lysander unhesi- 
tatingly supported the Attic democrats. The chief of the 
popular party and vigorous leader of the state was Thra- 
sydseus. * 

So pertinacious a system of resistance could not in the 
long run be tolerated by the Spartans. No sooner had 
they regained freedom of action, so far as Athens was con- 
cerned, than they resolved to use all necessary energy in 
settling the affairs of Peloponnesus, in restoring what was 
the fundamental law of these, viz. an absolute obedience 
to any Spartan summons of military contingents, and in 
punishing the recalcitrant members of the Confederation. 
They determined to make an example of Elis, in order to 
frighten off the remaining states from similar attempts ; nor 
could any more favorable time be chosen for the purpose 
than the present, inasmuch as, in consequence of the years 
of war, all the states were exhausted. Moreover, the Eleans 
had pursued their own separate interests with so much 
harshness and one-sidedness, that they could not calculate 
upon sympathy and support from the other Peloponne- 
sians. Finally, at Elis itself the Spartans were not without 
partisans, who had forfeited their authority under the 
democratic system of government, and who were therefore 
desirous of a restoration of the former condition of things. 

* QpaavSalot, Xen. Hellen. iii. 2, 27 ; TrpoetrnjKw? tou 'HAeiW Stjixof, Pausan. 
iii. 8, 4. He was the friend of Lysias, Vit, X. Oral. 835. 

Chap, ill.} Sparta and Persia. 205 

Sparta accordingly advanced the following The 
demands : that the Eleans should ex post facto jj® gJJSJjJ 
pay the war expenses for the campaigns in 
which they had irregularly abstained from taking part, 
and that they should relieve those neighboring towns, 
which they had subjected to themselves as periceci, from 
this relation. It is uncertain, what was the extent to 
which this proposal was made to apply ; probably the 
Spartans intentionally left their demands indefinite, in 
order to be able to raise or moderate them according to 
circumstances. Their immediate object was only to assert 
their right of intervening in the internal affairs of the 
several states ; and for this end they could not have found 
any better pretext, than by coming forward as the pro- 
tectors of the liberty of Hellenic communities against 
unjust measures of violence. This was the policy with 
which they had entered upon the Peloponnesian war ; and 
after they had dissolved the Athenian state, the Great 
Power, they now designed in the same way to weaken and 
humiliate the states of secondary importance which had 
increased their strength by incorporating lesser places in 
their vicinity. And the case of Elis seemed least of all 
to call for any hesitation ; inasmuch as Elis was regarded 
as owing its territory only to the grace of Sparta. 

The Eleans entertained no thoughts of The war . 
giving way; on the contrary, they made Elis - 
answer with defiant spirit : that the Spartans , ol ?£}?• 3 

> r r (b. c. 400). 

were least of all entitled to deny their rights 
over towns belonging to them by conquest and by the use 
of many years, inasmuch as the Spartans were themselves 
everywhere by ruthless force of arms asserting the right 
of the stronger. The war commenced, and the first 
events in it could not but serve to raise the courage of 
the Eleans. For when, in the spring of 401, King Agis 
invaded the country, coming from Achaia across the river 
Larissus, it soon became manifest, how the whole of tltia 

206 History of Greece. C Bo °* v 

enterprise troubled the minds of the Lacedaemonians 
themselves. They were filled with religious qualms, as 
they stepped upon the sacred soil of Elis ; and when an 
earthquake ensued, they saw in it a divine signal, warning 
them against continuing the violation. The army turned 
back. Hereupon the Eleans redoubled their zeal in 
endeavoring to unite all the states averse from the Spar- 
tans in a common armament against them. But for this 
the general feeling was not as yet sufficiently confident ; 
the jEtolians alone, a tribe of ancient kinship with the 
Eleans (vol. i. p. 133), responded to their cry for aid ; 
while the Thebans and Corinthians contented themselves 
with assuming an attitude of passive resistance against 
Sparta, and refused to send their quota of forces, when in 
the summer of the same year Sparta called in the contin- 
gents for a second campaign, 
second year ^ n * s ^ me > Agis advanced more resolutely. 
Eiis he War iD Entering from the Messenian frontier, he 
01. xciv. 4 marched through Triphylia into the district 
of the Alpheus, everywhere meeting with a 
friendly reception ; so that it must be assumed that the 
places of the district had been subjected to severe repres- 
sion on the part of the Eleans. Although in Olympia 
he found vigorous resistance, yet he succeeded in offering 
up sacrifice unhindered at the high-altar of Zeus, and re- 
storing the authority of Sparta in the national sanctuary. 
Hereupon the troops poured with avidity over the plains ; 
for in all Hellas there was no district which, naturally 
fertile and most carefully cultivated, had enjoyed so un- 
broken a peace. Peloponnesians and Athenians (for the 
latter too had furnished a contingent), employed the op- 
portunity to the full for providing themselves with stores 
of all kinds. The fair suburbs of the city of Elis on the 
Peneus were also plundered ; the city itself, however, was, 
notwithstanding its imperfect means of defence, not at- 
tacked, probably because here the best of the Elean troops 

chap, in.] Sparta and Persia. 207 

were assembled for a resolute resistance, and because 
King Agis hoped to be able to gain his end more certain- 
ly without sanguinary conflicts. For while he was de- 
spoiling the country round the port of Cyllene, at Elis 
itself the party of the wealthy landed proprietors, who 
had suffered the most severely of all, rose in his favor, 
with Xenias at their head. Their object was to remove 
the popular leader Thrasydseus, and thus to weaken the 
party of their opponents. But, in the confusion which 
ensued, another man was killed in his stead ; Thrasydseus, 
supposed to be be dead, appeared again among the peo- 
ple, who gathered around him with enthusiastic unanimity, 
and expelled the Laconizing party. Thus the enemy 
within the walls was overcome, while the national foe 
stood outside ; and Agis was forced for the second time to 
dismiss his army, without having broken the obstinate 
spirit of the Eleans.* 

But this time he left an occupying force be- The chag ^ 
hind him by the Alpheus, whence it was tjsementof 
gradually to exhaust the endurance of the 
Eleans, according to the precedent of what had been done in 
Attica from Decelea. The fugitive Eleans in the Spartan 
camp did what they could to make this method of opera- 
tions as disastrous as possible to their native city, so that 
in the following summer its power of resistance had be- 
come exhausted. Thrasydseus began to negotiate. Elis 
had to consent not only to the renunciation of all its 
claims upon Lepreum, but also to the surrender of the 
whole of Triphylia. On the northern bank of the 
Alpheus, too, Letrini, Marganese, and Amphidoli, had to 
be released from their subjection (these were small locali- 
ties belonging to the ancient district of Pisatis) ; the har- 

* Xenophon in the first instance mentions only with regard to the 
neighbors on the Elean frontiers (the Arcadians and Achaeans), that they 
provisioned themselves in Elis (ciri<riTto7x6?, Hellen. iii. 2, 26). But it seems 
as if the expedition had also included Athenians, with the object of 
purchasing plunder. See the following Note. 

208 History of Greece. l BoOK V. 

bor-port of Phea, recently constructed on a peninsula jut- 
ting out into the sea (now Katakolo), was demolished, 
and Cyllene, the port-town, abandoned. Finally, the 
Eleans also had to renounce the highland district, ex- 
tending in the rear of their capital towards Arcadia, the 
'Acrorea' and its capital, the mountain-town of Lasium, 
to which they had laid claim. The negotiations lasted 
longest with regard to Epeum, a Triphylian mountain- 
town commanding the valley of the Alpheus. Upon this 
the Eleans held that they possessed a special claim, be- 
cause they had purchased from it a renunciation of its in- 
dependence. But even this claim the Spartans rejected 
with cynical contempt ; it was much the same thing, they 
declared, whether the weaker were deprived of their 
liberty by force or by a commercial bargain. 

Thus the Elean state was utterly broken to pieces and 
dissolved ; the beginnings of its naval power were annihi- 
lated ; it had to abandon its arsenal and its ships of war, 
and to pull down the w T alls encircling its capital. It was 
cut off from the coast, and despoiled of the protecting 
passes leading into the country, of the highland district, 
and of more than half of its entire territory. It was 
henceforth to recognize a number of village communities 
as neighboring states equal in rank to itself. Nothing was 
wanting, but that the superintendence of the sanctuary at 
Olympia should be taken away from it ; nor did the 
places in Pisatis, which seemed now to have recovered 
their vitality, neglect this opportunity for reviving their 
primitive claims. But it now became manifest, how wise- 
ly the Eleans had acted in allowing no considerable place 
to continue to exist in the vicinity of Olympia. The La- 
cedsemonians could not transfer the honorary rights in 
question to a community of peasants, and thus allow the 
sacred festivals by their fault to fall into decay. They ac- 
cordingly contented themselves with opening to their 
power every point of access on the sea as well as on th© 

Chap, hi.] Sparta and Persia. 209 

land-side; but otherwise allowed the administration of 
the sanctuary to continue as before on the ancient foot- 

Such was the end of the Elean campaigns. However 
limited was the area in which they took place, and how- 
ever insignificant were the places whose independence was 
in question, yet no small importance attached to the quar- 
rel. Sparta had, by virtue of her so-called liberating po- 
licy, succeeded in converting a power which had been re- 
calcitrant and hostile for years, into a defenceless petty 
state ; she had now established her leadership over the 
communities on the Alpheus as absolutely as over the 
country-districts of Southern Arcadia ; and had in her 
power the harbors of the western coast. The remainiDg 
disaffected states were terrified by the awful judgment 
passed on Elis ; and the Athenians had themselves been 
forced to aid in demolishing the state which in the midst 
of their sufferings had accorded them sympathy and sup- 

* Note on the chronology of the Elean War. — Xenophon connects the war with 
the campaigns of Dercyllidas : Hellen. iii. 2, 21. Following this statement, 
Manso has dated it 399-8 b. c, and Kriiger 398-7 b. c. ; the latter being 
followed by Sievers and Hertzberg (Agesilaos, 242). On the other hand, 
Diodorus, xiv. 7, places its commencement in 01. xciv. 3 (b. c. 401). It is not 
'a necessary deduction from Xenophon that the quarrels in Asia and in 
Elis were contemporaneous; and this view is controverted (1) by the story 
of the Elean Phgedo, who had been sold to Athens before the death of 
Socrates, and had doubtless been made a prisoner in the Elean war, as 
Preller has shown in the Rhein. Mus. (Neue Fohje, iv. 394; cf. Ges. Abh. 3C5); 
(2) by the chronology of the Spartan kings. According to Diod., xii. 35, 
Agis reigned for twenty-seven years ; according to Thuc, iii. 89, from 
426 b. c. (Archidamus was probably already sick in b. c. 427 ; cf. Ley, Fat. et 
cond. 2Eg. 38). Thus Agis would have died in 400 or 399. But Agis' accession 
took place in 399, if his death is dated (as by Boeckh, Manethos, 369-71; cf 
Schaefer, Demostn. i. 442) in 358, and if his reign i3 held (in accordance with 
Plutarch, Ages., 40) to have lasted for forty-one years. Now, inasmuch as 
the 95th Olympiad was celebrated in the summer of b. c. 400, and celebrated, 
as we must assume, after the traditional fashion, the Elean war must have 
occured in 401-400 b. c. ; and Grote rightly conjectures (vol. ix. p. 316) that 
the Eleans were anxious to bring it to a close before the celebration of the 
festival. But he errs in extending its duration over three years. The 
statement that the Spartans met with resistance at Olympia is based upon 
Pausanias and Diodor., in contravention of Xen. Hellen. iii- 2, 26. 

210 History of Greece. [Book v. 

port. What was hereafter to prevent Sparta from con- 
tinuing, with all the forcible means at her disposal, the 
subjection of the Greek states ? 

The spar- * n tne ^ rst instance, the Spartans employed 
cJphliienia tneir newly-gained ascendancy on the shores 
andNaupactus, f fa e western sea in expelling from Cephal- 
lenia, as well as from Naupactus, the Messenians settled 
there by the Athenians, and pursued them with their ha- 
tred even into Sicily, where they had met with a hospita- 
ble reception from Dionysius.* On the other side, they 

and in the ren ewed their fortified military position under 
He a raciea aa Moun t CEta, where they had founded the Tra- 
chinian Heraclea (vol. iii. p. 143). Disturb- 
ances which had broken out there furnished them with a 
welcome occasion for sending thither a military gover- 
nor, by name Herippidas, who treated the citizens with 
the most arbitrary cruelty, expelled part of the CEtsean 
population, and, by his utterly despotic proceedings, terri- 
fied all the northern states, and Thebes in particular. 

Death of ® n n ^ s return from his campaign, Agis fell 

A s is - sick on the road at Hersea, and soon after- 

O1 o^ v1 ^ 400 wards died at Sparta. On his sick-bed he 

or 399 B. a). r 

had, in presence of many witnesses, acknow- 
ledged his son Leotychides as his successor ; but the fune- 
ral ceremonies were hardly at an end, when all Sparta was, 
by the question as to the legitimate succession to the 
throne, agitated to a degree unprecedented in the history 
of the two royal Houses. 

a esiiau Assuredly, the express recognition of Leo- 

and Lysan- tychides by his father would have put an end 

to all doubts, and have caused the series of 
ProclidsB on the throne to have continued in uninter- 
rupted succession according to ancient usage, had not 

* Diod. xiv. 34. Lycon, commander of the place in the times of the 
Thirty, irpofiow? Nav7ro»cTo»', ap. Metagen. : Meinek«, Com. ii. 755; cf. Bergk, 
Bel. Com. 422. 

chap, hi.] Sparta and Persia. 211 

Lysander taken advantage of the peculiar circumstances 
existing in the present case for the purpose of his political 
schemes. He had withdrawn from the world in gloomy 
resentment, since the power by which he had held all 
Greece as in a net had been taken from his grasp. He 
saw himself neglected and set aside ; his patron, Cyrus, to 
whom in reality he owed all his triumphs, had fallen, and 
his party was broken up. And yet he had not abandoned 
his ambitious designs. His hopes mainly rested on his 
relations to Agesilaus, the younger brother of Agis, and 
for this reason he had long been waiting for the death of 
the king. 

Agesilaus sprang from the second marriage of King 
Archidamus, which he had concluded at an advanced age 
with Eupolia, a wealthy heiress. Her personal appear- 
ance seemed so little to entitle her to the royal dignity, 
that the marriage was generally believed to have been 
concluded only for pecuniary reasons, and that the Ephors 
took occasion to find fault with the royal choice, because 
such a woman could never become the mother of kings. 
And, in fact, the son born from this marriage seemed to 
confirm the presumption. Agesilaus was, like his mother, 
small of stature and insignificant ; he was even lame in 
one foot. In this body, however, there lived an uncom- 
monly gifted mind ; an energy of will shrinking from no 
exertions for removing innate defects by incessant exer- 
cises ; a vivacious and cheerful temper ; wit and humor ; 
and a great versatility in personal intercourse with other 
men ; and, however modest his bearing, there yet dwelt in 
him something of his father's royal spirit, and from his 
youth up he was ruled by a fiery sense of honor. 

On this boy Lysander had concentrated his attention. 
Inasmuch as Agesilaus was a posthumous son of Archida- 
mus, and was therefore trained just like any other citi- 
zen's son, Lysander could, without provoking remark, at- 
tract him into intimacy with himself, the more so because 

212 History of Greece. [ Bo <>* V. 

he was himself related to the House of the Heraclidse. 
He entered into that species of intimacy with him which 
associated the men and boys of Sparta in couples — the 
man choosing whichever young Spartiate he pleased, in 
order by the influence of his personal intercourse to train 
him into a worthy citizen, and to infuse into him the true 
spirit of public life. Thus Lysander stood as a fatherly 
friend (elonvyXaq) by the side of Agesilaus as he grew up : 
he endeavored to kindle the sparks of ambition in him, 
and to form him into a man who might be of use to him 
for the execution of his own schemes. For in the case of 
a king's son, who felt himself created by nature for 
royalty, but saw himself excluded from the throne by 
the existing laws of hereditary succession, Lysander 
could calculate upon a steady support if he were about 
to execute his scheme of overthrowing the family-laws 
of the royal House of Sparta. 

The dis ute Circumstances were additionally favorable, 
about the sue- j n that the rights to the throne of the prince, 

cession to the ° # r ' 

throne at wno alone stood in Agesilaus' way, were not 

Sparta. n . J ' 

free from doubt. For it was generally ru- 
mored in Sparta that Queen TimaBa had been seduced by 
Alcibiades, and that Leotychides was not King Agis' son 
at all (vol. iii. p. 445). No hesitation was felt in taking 
ruthless advantage of this circumstance for the purposes 
of ambition. It was affirmed that Leotychides had only 
by prayers and tears brought about his recognition on the 
part of his dying father ; and Lysander was incessantly 
active to overcome any scruples which Agesilaus might 
entertain against publicly attacking the fair fame of his 
royal sister-in-law, and against despoiling his brother's 
son of all his honors and property. In Lysander's eyes 
everything was welcome which contributed to destroy the 
existing relations in the two royal Houses ; for every in- 
novation, if successfully brought to an issue, levelled the 
path for subsequent reforms. Accordingly, Agesilaua 

Chap, iil] Sparta and Persia. 213 

came forward as a claimant to the throne, and for the first 
time a question of disputed hereditary succession was de- 
cided at Sparta in the public assembly. 

The parties were sharply opposed to one another. All 
those who were afraid of the intrigues of Lysander were 
against Agesilaus, who was regarded as his adherent, and 
as devoid of a will of his own ; above all King Pau- 
sanias, the old adversary of Lysander, who desired to 
protect the throne from shame, and to see honor done to 
the last expression of his royal colleague's will. The 
priestly party too, with the powerful Diopithes at its 
head, espoused the cause of Leotychides as that of legi- 
timacy ; they took advantage of the physical defect of 
the Pretender, and produced an oracle, in which every 
evil was predicted for the Lacedaemonians, should a lame 
king come to rule among them. The decision wavered ; 
and there was a wish at all events to wait, until a declara- 
tion should have been obtained from Delphi with regard 
to the character of the oracle. But Lysander feared all 
delay, because for the nonce the prevalent feeling was in 
favor of his side. With happy presence of mind he 
acknowledged the oracle, which frightened his adherents, 
to be genuine and final ; only it ought to be rightly un- 
derstood. For the " lame " signified a bastard royalty : 
and it was this against which the warning of the god was 
directed. It is said that this device decided the question. 
The younger generation were upon the whole for Age- 
silaus ; many desired once in a way to have a king who 
had lived with them on the footing of a comrade ; it was 
hoped that he would bring with him better times, and put 
an end to the many evils disquieting the country ; in 
short, Agesilaus became king by popular election ; and 
thus, after a long term of neglect and impotence, Ly- 
sander had at last once more carried his Agesilaus 
desire. Unbending traditional usage, repre- KlDg - 
sented by the royal party, had been broken ; c ™-* cv - 2 C* 

214 History of Greece. t Bo °* v. 

and Lysander's pupil had been chosen, not only because his 
rights were good, but also because his merits were superior. 
Summer ^ e new ^ m & did all honor to his master's 

teaching. From Lysander, Agesilaus had 
acquired that worldly wisdom which renounces matters 
of secondary importance, in order to achieve main results. 
Spartan royalty was a splendid dignity without corres- 
ponding power. The efforts of Agesilaus were directed 
towards giving it a new importance ; but he concealed his 
ambition, and avoided furnishing occasion for any con- 
flict; he was more courteous towards the people, more 
ready to give way to the Ephors, and less careful with 
regard to external marks of honor, than any of his 
predecessors. As he had not grown into manhood in the 
exceptional position of a prince, he knew how to treat 
other men in daily intercourse ; he was one of the few who 
ever sat on the throne of the Heraclidse who had learnt 
to obey before they came to the throne. From calcula- 
tion, he was modest and humble ; like Lysander, he wel- 
comed any means for making friends in all classes ; and, 
again, like Lysander, he sought cautiously and quietly to 
extend his power by securing a personal following, in 
order thereafter together with his own power to raise that 
of the state.* 

s arta's Viewed on the outside, Sparta had never 

power been more powerful than at the time of the 

abroad ; * 

accession of Agesilaus. She was the first 
Power, by land and by sea, in the Greek world ; in the 
peninsula all resistance had been broken; beyond the 
Isthmus she had in Heraclea gained a new strong position 

* The date of Agesilaus' accession is 399 b. c. (he was born 442): Pauly, 
Realencyclopadie, I s , p. 552; Hertzberg, Leben des Ages. (185G). There was a 
similar dispute as to the succession between Leotychides and Demaratus 
[vol. ii. p. 232], but not at the commencement of the reign. Diopithes 
avT)p ev8oKi/i.os inl xP 7 l°'l l0 ^ y^ a > Plutarch, Ages. 3 ; Xen. Hellen. iii. 3, 2. He 
was the same man as the accuser of Anaxagoras (vol. iii. p. 47); cf. Arist- 
oph. Aves, v. 989 ; Equites, v. 1085. 

chap, hi.] Sparta and Persia. 215 

whence she could command the mainland, while in Thes- 
saly she had upheld the Tyrant Lycophron of Pherse 
against the attacks of his enemies; her garrisons were 
distributed in Megara, JEgina, Tanagra, and in the 
islands; beyond the sea, in iEolis and Ionia, Spartan 
troops stood in arms as victors against the satraps ; in 
Thrace, Dercyllidas was walling off the Greek peninsula, 
as Miltiades and Pericles had done of old, in order to 
place the cities in those regions under the protection 
of Sparta ; her navy ruled even the Western Sea, aDd the 
new despot at Syracuse, Dionysius, was only by Sparta 
enabled to maintain himself against his adversaries, do- 
mestic and foreign. But the dangers accumulating for 
Sparta at home more than counterbalanced these suc- 

The mutual hatred of the different classes and 
had grown from year to year; the state re- dangerous 

° J f t condition 

sembled two camps of hostile armies, of which at home, 
the one was only watching for an opportunity to destroy 
the other. The new election to the throne had intensified 
the prevailing excitement ; it was already regarded as a 
successful attempt at breaking with traditional usage. 
Lysander's intrigues further contributed to disquiet men's 
minds; for it was no longer a secret, that he intended 
innovations of a thorough-going character. Everywhere 
the ancient ordinances were called into question ; new 
views of life had penetrated among the population. How 
was it possible that the lower classes should remain 
tranquil in the midst of this general movement ? How, 
that the idea should not suggest itself to them, that for 
them too the time had come for freeing themselves from 
the intolerable oppression under which they lay ? 

In truth, a deep feeling of resentment agitated all those 
elements of the population which stood outside the narrow 
circle of the ruling houses. This resentment was shared by 
those Spartans whose families had, by becoming impover- 

216 History of Greece. [ BoOK v « 

ished, lost their full civic rights ; by the villagers or 
Periceci, who constituted the main part of the army and 
received no thanks for their services, who were forced to 
liberate the villages of the Eleans while themselves re- 
maining in a state of subjection ; and, lastly, by the 
Helots, who for centuries had borne the heavy yoke with 
gnashing of teeth, but who now bore it more unwillingly 
than ever, because far greater demands were made upon 
them in the foreign undertakings of the state, whereupon 
after serving its purposes they were forced to return into 
their pristine servitude. 

Thus the bulk of the free and unfree population was 
pervaded by an equal rage, and grew into a party, deter- 
mined on putting an end to the entire political system, 
full as it was of injustice, and on overthrowing the sway 
of the privileged families. 

Tho Cinadon, a young Spartan who himself be- 

conspiracy longed to one of the civic families fallen into 

of Cinadon. ° 

decay, a man of great gifts and of a fiery love 
of honor, placed himself at the head of the revolutionary 
party. On account of his ability, he had on several occa- 
sions been employed by the authorities in important af- 
fairs of state, but had remained excluded from all honors 
and profits. He organized the multitude for an attack, 
and indicated the means for creating an armed force ; all 
the implements of iron in the hands of the country popu- 
lation were to be converted into weapons. By personal 
application he sought to induce those who were still irre- 
solute to take part in the attempt. Thus, he is stated to 
have taken men to the side of the market-place, and to 
have asked them, what was their estimate of the numbers 
of the full citizens, and of the numbers of those not en- 
joying an equality of rights, and of the Periceci and the 
Helots ; and when he was answered, that probably, exclu- 
sively of the Kings, Gerontes and Ephors, there might be 
about forty Spartiatse in the place, and more than four 

ch^p. hi.] Sparta and Persia. 217 

thousand Lacedemonians without full civic rights, he 
said : " Well, then, all these are thy allies, and those few 
" are thy enemies. Is it just and endurable, to see those 
" few hold sway ? Is there any question as to the side 
" where the victory will be when the decisive day arrives?" 

Thus Cinadon prepared the rising, which was to bring 
about the annihilation of the class of the lords. The cer- 
tainty of victory made him incautious ; while the authori- 
ties were all the more vigilant, because their real power 
was so small ; and this time too they were informed by 
their spies in sufficient time to anticipate the revolt. 

They did not dare to seize Cinadon in Sparta itself. 
They accordingly sent him with an apparently very import- 
ant commission to Aulon on the frontiers of Messenia and 
Elis, and caused him to be seized on the way. Hereupon he 
was put on the rack, where the names of his fellow-conspira- 
tors were extorted from him. After these had been secured 
and every mutinous outbreak prevented, Cinadon was 
brought into Sparta as a prisoner ; led with his compa- 
nions through the streets of the city, with his neck and 
hands in irons, amidst flagellations and other tortures, and 
then put to death. After this terrible judgment the peo- 
ple sank back into stolid indifference, and the oligarchy 
was saved.* 

It was fortunate, that immediately afterwards p narnabazus 
events occurred which diverted attention from ** Susa - . 

UI. XCV. 4 

home affairs. The war in Asia Minor had ( B - c - 397 )- 
only been interrupted by a truce (p. 202) ; and this inter- 
ruption had been very effectively employed by Pharaaba- 
zus to weaken the authority of Tissaphernes, and to bring 
about an entirely new state of things. He had gone up 
to Susa, in order to represent to the Great King the 
shameful condition of matters in the maritime provinces, 
and the necessity of altering the mode of conducting the 

* Cinadon: Xen. Hellen. iii. 3, 4-11; Polyam., ii. 14; Aristot. Polit. 207, E7; 
Polyb., ii. 6, opos rr}? rroAireias rbu (jly) 6vvafi.cvov to tcAos (pepcty fir/ /AtTe'xeii'. 


218 History of Greece. C Bo °* * 

war. He pointed out how the political system of Tissa- 
phernes, based upon hatred and fear of the Greeks, was 
utterly undermining the Persian dominion ; and showed 
how the result of the disgraceful treaties which were now 
being concluded was, that the armies of the enemy were 
being kept up in the empire by royal payments. It was 
necessary, he declared, to restore to the power of the 
Great King its previous authority ; which could only be 
effected by a Greek commander being taken into the royal 
service and entrusted with a fleet. No more rational reso- 
lution could have been taken ; and Pharnabazus was 
moreover in a position to name the man pre-eminently 
qualified for such a commission, — viz., the Athenian Co- 

Conon and Conon, the son of Timotheus, had alone 
Euagoras. been free from guilt among the ten generals 
in command of the Attic fleet at iEgospotami (vol. iii. p. 
55).* He had escaped from the rout with eight vessels, 
and had repaired to Cyprus, where he was hospitably re- 
ceived by Euagoras. But Conon was not the man to 
remain contented with having brought his own person 
into security ; his heart beat loyally for his country, and 
his mind was strong in hope. He was incessantly intent 
upon the restoration of the greatness of Athens, and in 
his endeavor he met with the warmest response on the 
part of his generous host. It was an alliance of a rare 
character and of momentous import, which was concluded 
here, at the extreme end of the Greek world, between the 
Greek refugee and the lord of Salamis. 

In this age, poor in men and in deeds, no other figure 
is to be met with so attractive as that of Euagoras. 
While elsewhere we find nothing but reaction and decay 

* Conon, whose father and son were both called Timotheus (it was a 
family-name of the Eumolpidae ; cf. Rehdantz, Vitce Iph. Ch. Timoth., p. 46), 
was alone free from guilt. (Philocles however was, like him, free from 
dishonesty; cf. vol. iii. p. 552.) 

Chap. hi. j Sparta and Persia. 219 

in the public life of both Hellenes and barbarians, Cyprus 
is a land of a hopeful progress, entirely associated with 
the lofty efforts of this one man. He had with heroic 
vigor not only recovered the princely power of which his 
house had been despoiled, but he had also begun to make 
a Greek land of the whole island, which after the days of 
Cimon (vol. ii. p. 446) had been flooded by Phoenicians 
and completely estranged from the Hellenes ; so that the 
Cyprians now thoroughly detached themselves from the 
East, would marry none but Greek wives, and outvied 
one another in their devotion to Greek manners, culture, 
and art. Euagoras looked upon himself personally as an 
Athenian, because he sprang from the Teucridse, whose 
home was the island of Salamis ; already in the last years 
of the Peloponnesian war he had supported Athens by 
the importation of corn ; and he delighted in connecting 
himself in any way with Athens, as with the luminous 
prototype of that culture the spread of which he now re- 
garded as the task of his life. These were the fruits of 
the efforts of the Periclean age, to constitute Athens the 
centre of Hellenic culture. Conon, as a citizen of 
Athens, found Euagoras most ready to support his pa- 
triotic designs. 

But Conon very clearly perceived that conon' 

nothing could be effected by unaided Greek negotiations 

° J with the Per- 

resources ; he saw the necessity of returning sian court - 
to the policy of Alcibiades, and of endeavoring to direct 
the flow of Persian gold, whereby Sparta had gained her 
victories, in the interests of the Athenians. It was there- 
fore of primary importance to obtain influence at the 
court of the Great King ; and the circumstances of the 
times were favorable to Conon. The revolt of Cyrus had 
brought about an essential change in the feelings of the 
Persian court ; the veil had been torn from the pretended 
friendship of Sparta. Persia needed other friends, and a 
different policy ; never had the powers at Susa been more 

220 History of Greece, £ BooK V. 

accessible to friendly counsel than at present ; nor were 
there wanting Greeks, who played a considerable part 
among the suite of Artaxerxes (such as in particular thg 
court-dancer Zeno and the body-physicians Polycritus and 
Ctesias), and who were ready to act as mediators.* 
CT . , The negotiations were commenced in a very 

His war plans. © J 

skilful way. In the first instance, it was in^ 
dispensable to bring about amicable relations between the 
Great King and Euagoras ; for otherwise any proceedings 
originating at Cyprus would have been received with dis- 
favor. Accordingly, the fears created at Susa by the bold 
establishment of a Hellenic princely house in the island 
were appeased ; and ample payments of tribute served to 
prove Euagoras a loyal vassal, so that his friendship 
became a recommendation for Conon. Hereupon the 
latter drew up a report on the right method of conducting 
the war. He showed how absurd it was for Persia use- 
lessly to exhaust her resources upon operations by land, 
whereas it was by sea that the question must be decided 
as to who should hold the supremacy along the coasts. 
He explained how by sea Sparta was weak and unskilful, 
while the Great King had at command inexhaustible 
resources of money, and ships, and crews. All that was 
required was to make use of these, and to find a comman- 
der of proved experience against the Spartans, who might 
easily be placed in the most untoward position, inasmuch 
as they were hated by the Greeks not less than by the 
Persians. At the same time he offered his own services. 
Ctesias placed his letter in the royal hands, and advocated 
its contents. Euagoras urgently recommended the ac- 
ceptance of the services of the Athenian; whereupon 
Pharnabazus too, with whom Conon had already entered 
into relations, gave his support. Once before, already, 

* Euagoras: Isocr. Euag. Diodor., xiv. 98. Ctesias, p. 58, 77, ed. O 
M tiller. 

Chap.iii.] Sparta and Persia. 221 

the satrap had journeyed to Susa in order to plead for an 
alliance with Athens (vol. iii. p. 514) ; he now, under 
more propitious circumstances, renewed his recommenda- 
tions, which at the same time furnished him with an opportu- 
nity for humiliating Tissaphernes. For the same reason Pa- 
rysatis too must have been favorable to the plans of Conon : 
for her policy was determined solely by personal motives. 

A naval armament was therefore decreed. Pharnaba- 
zus was for this purpose granted 500 talents (122,000£. 
circ), and Conon was appointed to the command of the 
naval force. But notwithstanding this determination, so 
much timidity prevailed that the impression was feared 
which the armaments would create at Sparta. It was 
desired not to irritate Sparta prematurely; the Spartan 
envoy, who happened to be at Susa, was accordingly de- 
tained there, and a despatch was transmitted to the 
authorities at Sparta itself, intended to keep them in a feel- 
ing of absolute security. 

Thus the Great King was in trembling Th .... 
apprehension of the war-plans of the Spartans, reach Sparta. 
while these again were most deeply agitated, when a 
Syracusan, Herodas by name, whom business affairs had 
taken to Phoenicia, arrived at Sparta, and accidentally 
brought over the first tidings of the mighty armaments in 
progress in the Asiatic harbors of war. Not the remotest 
thought had been entertained of such dangers as these. 
All of a sudden the Spartans saw a new Persian war at 
hand; and, feeling incapable of resisting by themselves 
such event, in spite of the indifference which they had 
hitherto shown to national opinion, they now summoned 
the deputies of the confederate states, so that the imminent 
war between the two nations might be discussed as an 
affair of national Hellenic interest, and that resolutions 
might be arrived at upon it in common.* 

The present conjuncture was one which could not but 

* Herodas : Xen. Hellen, iii. 4, 1. 

222 History of Greece. t^ * * 

Spartan arouse iu Lysander the belief that his hour had 

armaments. come , This was the moment, when his vigor 

Lysander. ^ ' =» 

of action, his experience and good fortune in 
maritime war, his influence upon the Asiatic cities, and 
his skill in the contrivance of advantageous alliances^ 
could not but assert themselves. His ulterior schemes, 
too, he thought he might now bring to an issue ; for Iioav 
could he doubt that the king, who owed everything to him, 
vvould allow himself to be led entirely by the will of his 
benefactor ? Accordingly, Lysander called the whole of 
his influence into play, in order to determine his fellow- 
citizens to prosecute the Asiatic war with new energy, 
before the slow-moving Persians had passed to the offen- 
sive ; and to entrust the conduct of the war to their newly- 
elected king, thereby proving to Hellenes and Barbarians 
the thoroughness of their intentions. At the instigatioji 
of Lysander, convoys arrived from the cities beyond the 
sea, to request that Agesilaus might be placed in com- 
mand of the army destined for their protection. The 
king himself became a candidate for the office of general, 
and demanded not more than thirty Spartans as his per- 
sonal following, it being impossible, considering the diffi- 
culties of the aspect of things at home, to take a larger 
number abroad. But of these men it was designed to 
form the annually changing Council of War ; they were 
to act as a Commission of Control in the name of the state, 
as the Ten were wont to do (p. 174) ; but they were also 
to furnish the commanders of the several divisions. Ly- 
sander was placed at the head of the Thirty ; — doubtless 
in the case of this new institution, he had again taken the 
best means of advancing his own ends. Furthermore, 
2,000 men were levied out of the remaining population 
Unwilling- anc ^ 6,000 Confederate troops. But how ut- 
othIr°s f tatel ter ty tne Spartans had deceived themselves in 

supposing that a national war proclaimed by 
the Sparta of the day would meet with a response on the 

CHAP - HL] Sparta and Persia. 223 

part of the nation ! Who could trust Sparta to pursue a 
Hellenic policy? She was not even strong enough to 
force the states by fear to send their contingents ; at 
Athens, the great change which was, through the instru- 
mentality of Conon, being prepared, in the relations be- 
tween the Powers, was no longer a secret, and, on the 
pretext of exhaustion, the civic community there evaded 
its obligations towards Sparta ; Thebes refused outright to 
furnish her contingent, although to that city had been 
sent Aristomenidas, a relative of King Agesilaus, one of 
those who of old, in order to secure the favor of the The- 
bans, had condemned the Platseans to death (vol. iii. p. 
134). The Corinthians likewise failed to put in an ap- 
pearance, averring that they had received an evil omen in 
the inundation of their temple of Zeus.* 

This beginning was the reverse of encoura- . .. 

& ° Agesilaus at 

ging; and inasmuch as the Spartans had Aulis - 
quietly to submit to all reprisals, and could 01 xcv.4(b. 
not for the present think of measures of force 


or punishment, they doubtless had every rea- 
son to advance as modestly as possible with their small 
body of troops. But the contrary took place. Agesilaus 

* As to the activity at this point of Lysander, cf. Plutarch, Lys. 23 ; Ages. 6 
(the mission from the Asiatic cities is doubted by Herbst, u. ». p. 702). It is 
true that, as king, Agesilaus was commander by right of birth. Still, the 
expression "candidature" is justifiable, inasmuch as the case is not one 
of a regular levy of the ordinary Lacedaemonian army under its accustomed 
military chief, but of a quite extraordinary expedition, which it is re- 
quested that the king may command. The Thirty were certainly more of 
a kind of staff than of a board of control ; but they are called outright 
<rvfj.fiov\ot and <rvvd5piov ; nor can it be doubted that they were to fulfil 
functions by the side of the king, like those of the Ten attached to Agis 
(cf. Note to p. 174) ; althongh they as a matter of fact came to occupy a 
subordinate position, so that even the nomination of them was left to 
Agesilaus (Diodor. xiv. 79). A great want of fixity had come to character- 
ize all the public institutions of Sparta. Aristomenidas (query "ApiaTo/iijAt- 
805; cf. Keil, Anal. Epigr. 236) was the grandfather of Agesilaus on the 
mother's side, according to Paus. iii. 9. But Plutarch, Ages. i. mentions 
as such Melesippides ; cf. Hertzberg, «. s. p. 235. Pausanias' statement as 
to the strongly warlike spirit of the Corinthians is strange ; it sounds like 
irony. For ttaraKkvadivro^ Camerarius wrongly reads KaraKavOevro^ ; cf. 
Curtius, Peloponn. ii. 537. 

224 History of Greece. I- BoOK v - 

was solely intent upon opening his expedition with the 
utmost brilliancy of effect possible ; he desired to recall 
the most glorious reminiscences of the past, and to make 
it appear as if another Trojan war were commencing 
under his leadership. He therefore, instead of crossiug 
to Asia by the direct route, sailed with his troops along 
the Greek coasts to Euboea, whence he repaired to Aulis. 
Here, where the ancient king of the Achaean hosts had 
sacrificed before the temple of Artemis, ere he began his 
expedition against Ilium, Agesilaus, as his successor also 
designed to make his offerings. Inasmuch as the decisive 
influence in the army was still exercised by Lysander, one 
is tempted to assume, that he encouraged this absurd 
stage-play ; in which case his sole motive must have been 
to throw ridicule upon the king of Sparta, and, with him, 
upon the kingly office. At least he seems to have done 
nothing by way of opposing the childish vanity of Age- 
silaus, which speedily met with the bitterest punishment. 
For no sooner had the altar at Aulis been lit, and the sooth- 
sayer solemnly announced the favorable disposition of the 
gods, than a squadron of Theban horsemen galloped up 
and interrupted the ceremony, declaring that Agesilaus 
had, in defiance of the custom of the country, excluded 
the native priest of Artemis from the sacrificial act. The 
burning fragments of the sacrificial victims were scattered 
about the ground, and the new Agamemnon was forced to 
retreat in haste on board his ship.* 

., The kino; sailed to Ephesus, in hopes of 

Agesilaus in o r r 

Ionia. soon extinguishing, by successful exploits of 

oi.xcv.4(b. waTj the impression created by this evil omen. 

But neither was he here to prosper as he had 

hoped. For, although Tissaphernes had not yet com- 

* Gersestus was the regular port of transit between Asia and Attica, 
Strab. 446. It might be thought that Agesilaus took the circuitous route, in 
order to obtain further contingents, and especially in order to enter into 
negotiations with the Boeotarehs (Plutarch, Ages. 6). But Xen., Eellen. iii. 4, 
4, also mentions the sacrifice at Aulis as his main object ; and so Pausan, 
Iii 9. As to the failure cf. Xen. Heilen. iii. 4, 15. 

Chap - ra -J Sparta and Persia. 225 

pleted his armaments, yet Agesilaus was too weak to be 
able to act with vigor, and thus found himself obliged to 
accept a truce. The satrap promised to employ the time 
conceded, in obtaining the liberation of the cities of Asia 
Minor from the Great King ; and though it was out of 
the question to believe his intentions in this respect to be 
honest, Agesilaus consoled himself with the seeming glory 
of such an impression having been created by the mere 
fact of his arrival in Asia Minor; moreover, the cessation 
of arms was welcome to him for the purpose of securing 
an authoritative position in the strange land, and above 
all as towards his own followers. 

Ionia was to Lysander as familiar as home. He re- 
newed all his connexions of former times ; the famous 
general was surrounded by his ancient partisans, while 
the unknown and in itself insignificant individuality of 
Agesilaus was quite cast into the background. More- 
over, Lysander allowed it to be perceived clearly enough 
that he ought to be regarded as the chief personage. He 
demeaned himself on the old ground with the full self- 
confidence of old days, intending to show his friends that 
they had not counted upon him in vain ; he was ready to 
resume the work which he had then begun, — and to bring 
it to a consummation. But as he had formerly deceived 
himself with regard to the authorities at Sparta, so he 
now deceived himself as to Agesilaus. 

The King was by no means minded to L nd 
stand by the side of Lysander as a merely h»™i}iated. 
ornamental personage, such as had formerly been the case 
with Aracus (vol. iii. p. 547). He took deep offence at 
the homage which, asked and unasked, was paid to his 
companion ; and other persons around him, likewise hurt 
by the ambition of Lysander, further stimulated his sense 
of irritation. Thus he began to withdraw himself from 
the oppressive influence of Lysander ; next, he declined 
the proposals and recommendations of his counsellor, 


226 History of Greece. l B °°* v. 

because it was by him that they were made ; and finally 
he sought for an opportunity of openly humiliating him. 
He conferred upon him one of the court offices, which 
had remained in existence from the days of the ancient 
Achsean kingship, and named him chief officer of the 
royal table. What might even in this age have been a 
distinction in the case of insignificant men, was a mockery 
in the present instance ; and upon no man could the 
offence have rested more heavily than upon Lysander, 
who had invariably laughed to scorn the antiquated pomp 
of the royal Houses. After having been first humiliated 
by King Pausanias (p. 168), he was now for the second 
time put to shame in a far more cutting manner by his 
own pupil ; and his position had thus become untenable. 
He requested a commission in some other quarter ; where- 
upon Agesilaus sent him to the Hellespont, and in lieu of 
him found in Xenophon a man who could be of the 
greatest service to him, without burdening him with 
claims upon his gratitude, or constituting an obstacle to 
his royal authority. 

This time also Lysander fell, without his fall provoking 
an outbreak ; he whom the Ionic cities had once upon a 
time worshipped as a divinity, had long come to be re- 
garded with indifference there. Agesilaus, on the other 
hand, by the rigor with which he had ridden himself of 
his self-seeking guardian, obtained and assumed a totally 
new position. He was now for the first time acknowledged 
by the army as its actual commander-in-chief, and the 
members of the Council of War subordinated themselves 
to him, since he showed himself equal to his mission. 
For however audacious it might seem to make war upon 
the Persian Empire with so small a force, yet it was a 
task which even a general of mediocre military talents 
might hope to accomplish. The wealthy maritime cities 
furnished him with an admirable base of operations ; be- 
fore him lav an unguarded land, replete with material re* 

enAP. in.] Sparta and Persia. 227 

sources, inhabited by a population akin to the invaders 
and averse from the Persians, whence it was easy to draw 
the means necessary for supporting so moderate a number 
of troops. The climate was favorable to the expeditions 
in quest of booty, which were interrupted by convenient 
periods of rest in winter-quarters ; and the satraps, whose 
duty it was to watch over the maritime provinces, were 
animated by feelings of deeper hostility against one 
another than against the Hellenic commander. The one 
urged him to attack the other, or at all events looked on 
in absolute apathy when he saw his colleague hard-pressed. 
Tissaphernes remained chiefly in the interior of Caria, 
where lay his private lands ; and Pharnabazus in his 
satrapy on the Hellespont. Either sought to obtain in- 
formation as to the movements of the enemy, and there- 
upon to counteract them ; but there is no question of any 
vigorous resolution of advancing upon the coast, and of 
annihilating the hostile forces, or obliging them to take 
their departure. Finally, too, the vigilance and sagacity 
of the Persian military commanders were so small, that 
they allowed themselves to be deluded by the simplest 
stratagems. From the Phoenician fleet, on the other 
hand, there was in the first instance nothing to fear. 
Under these circumstances, the conduct of the war was by 
no means a very difficult matter, in particular no fixed and 
important ends were kept in view, but merely isolated 
advantageous undertakings intended. 

After Tissaphernes had broken the truce, The Ionian 
Agesilaus entered upon his campaign, in the JjJJ- cam 
summer of 396. He caused the march- P ai s n - 
through of his troops to be announced along (B °p3 9 c J L1 
the route towards Caria, in order thus to de- 
tain his adversary on the line of the Mseander. Here- 
upon he marched, unopposed, in a contrary direction 
towards the districts on the coast-line of the Hellespont, 
took possession of a series of towns and of an immense 

228 History of Greece. £ BooK v - 

quantity of booty, but was by the advance of the enemy's 
cavalry obliged to retreat again to Ephesus : there was 
manifestly a want of horses and of light-armed troops in 
the Greek force. The winter was zealously employed in 
improving its armaments. Ephesus became a great de- 
pot of arms and drilling-ground ; the effeminate mercan- 
tile city seemed utterly to have changed its character ; for 
all its store-houses were full of implements of war, in the 
fabrication of which all its artisans were employed. Re- 
cruiting progressed on the grandest scale. The rich 
booty excited a general desire for a soldier's life. The 
gymnasia and palaestrae were thronged ; Agesilaus caused 
stimulating competitive games to be held, and at the head 
of his youthful associates dedicated the wreaths of victory 
in the Artemisium. It seemed as if the ways and habits of 
life on the Eurotas had been transplanted into Asia Minor ; 
nor were any means of kindling a warlike spirit among 
the townsmen neglected. Agesilaus caused the prisoners 
to be exhibited naked, so that men might look upon the 
tender bodies of these Asiatics, who rarely doffed their 
robes, and who, accustomed to riding in carriages instead 
of walking, were unsuited for the fatigues of war. To fight 
against adversaries such as these, was obviously for men 
to fight against women. The Ionian townsmen, notwith- 
standing, preferred to provide substitutes in lieu of per- 
sonal service. Their money brought in recruits, and 
horses from the best breeding districts ; and doubtless 
this arrangement answered more satisfactorily both for 
themselves, who could now attend undisturbed to theii 
business, and for the interests of Agesilaus.* 
Second cam- ^ ne secon d campaign opened with a fresh 
victory of deception being practised upon Tissaphernes. 
the Pactoius. p or Agesilaus allowed his real intentions to 

* Xen. Hellen. iii. 4, 15. Agesilaus relieved the wealthy Ionians, who 
furnished a horseman each, from personal service; the remainder served 
in person. (These are the "militia," infra, p. 245.) 

Chap. III.] Sparta and Persia. 229 

become known, and hereupon, when the satrap 9^*V£ 1 
was on this occasion full of apprehensions on 
behalf of Caria, and was there awaiting the attack, marching 
with his army (which in the interval had probably grown 
to 18,000 or 20,000 men) inland up the valley of the Cays- 
ter ; then turned to the left, past the range of Olympus, 
into the valley of the Hermus, over whose exuberant and 
hitherto untouched plains the army poured, without meet- 
ing with any resistance. But, this time, Tissaphernes 
massed his troops together, in order to save the central 
point of the entire administration of Asia Minor, the an- 
cient capital of Lydia. Agesilaus saw the cavalry of the 
Persians descending into the plains of the Hermus, while 
their infantry yet remained behind. He therefore rapid- 
ly threw himself upon the vanguard of the army, with 
which he came up at the point of confluence of the rivers 
Pactolus and Hermus ; and by a skilful application of 
the various kinds of troops, which he had assuredly learnt 
from Xenophon, succeeded in utterly defeating the foe. 
The rich camp was seized, while Tissaphernes remained 
without stirring at Sardes, and lacked the courage to 
avenge with his fresh forces this shameful rout before the 
very gates of his capital. 

This was the first military exploit on a grander scale, 
and its consequences were important in several directions. 

The immediate result was the overthrow of -, „ - 

Fall of 

Tissaphernes, whose position at court had Tissaphernes. 
long been undermined. It was not, indeed, without diffi- 
culty that the Great King could be brought to let fall the 
servant to whom he owed his throne ; but the power 
of the party of Pharnabazus had steadily increased ; and 
the monarch was made to believe that Tissaphernes had 
by means of money-payments induced the enemy to spare 
his own province. The rout on the Pactolus settled his 
account ; and thus on him too was at last wreaked the 
vengeance of the blood-thirsty Parysatis, which contrived 

230 Histw*y of Greece. [Book v. 

to fall upon all the enemies of Cyrus, one after the other. 
He was summoned to a council of war at Colossi, where his 
person was secured by the same kind of stratagem in which 
he believed himself master ; and then he was given up to 
his successor in office, who began his tenure of it by send- 
ing the head of Tissaphernes to Susa.* 
Further con- The Greek s loudly rejoiced at the overthrow 
t S he U v e iSt C o e ry? f of their hated adversary ; and the authority 
S^afe,* of A S esilaus was raised higher among them 
than ever before. From home, too, the most 
brilliant mark of acknowledgment reached him. He was, 
since Leotychides the first king of Sparta who had de- 
feated the Persians in their own land, the first who at such 
a distance from his native city, in the midst of all the 
splendor of the East, and in possession of the fullest mili- 
tary glory and power, had yet remained thoroughly trust- 
worthy and loyal. The highest hopes were attached to 
his personal career; and it was therefore resolved to unite 
with the royal authority, from which strict law had 
hitherto kept it separate, the dignity of the nauarchy.*)* 
Thereby the land-war too advanced into a new stage. 
Hitherto it had consisted of isolated expeditions of pil- 
lage ; and this had been a method of conducting it suit- 
able to the circumstances, and one for which the king and 
his army were perfectly adapted. After the last victory 
the claims made upon them had risen ; more compre- 
hensive strategical plans were now to be made ; and this 
was perplexing to the victors. For a real war of conquest, 

* Various traditions existed as to the fall of Tissaphernes. It is 
accounted for by his revolting and committing treason against his 
sovereign: Nepos, Conon, 2, 3. Contra, Xenophon, Diodorus, Plutarch. Cf. 
Nicolai, Politik d. Tiss. 37. As to the growth of discouragement after the 
death of Tissaphernes, Xen. Ages. i. 35. 

f The nauarchy is termed by Aristot. Polit. xlix. 31, a erepa /SaaiActa; and 
Plutarch, Ages. 10, says: tovto fiovut navTutv inrrip£ev 'Ayij<riAaw. See also 
Pausan. iii. 9. It can therefore hardly be doubted that (probably since the 
treason of Pausanias) a legal usage had prevailed, prohibiting the combinar 
tion of the two dignities. 

chap. Hi] Sparta and Persia. 231 

a subjection of the interior, entered neither into the plans 
of the king, nor into such a policy as Sparta could rea- 
sonably adopt. 

What alone seemed feasible, was to annihilate the Per- 
sian power in Asia Minor by instigating the provincial 
governors to revolt. Results of this kind were not re- 
moved beyond the scope of a reasonable calculation. 
The satraps found themselves utterly incapable of offering 
resistance to the Hellenes by means of their own re- 
sources ; the successor of Cyrus, too, had been obliged vir- 
tually to acknowledge the independence of the regions of 
the coasts ; and the rigorous demands of the court, which 
never consented to renounce the tributary payments of 
the cities, caused intolerable difficulties to the governors. 
At the same time the latter, in consequence of their dis- 
tance from the court, were in reality so uncontrolled in 
the exercise of their authority, that it was not ventured to 
depose or summon such a man as Tissaphernes, and that 
it was only possible to contrive his removal by a treacher- 
ous device. Under such circumstances it could hardly 
fail to suggest itself to the rulers of the province, that the 
best policy for them was to arrive at an understanding on 
their own account with the Greeks, and to achieve their 
emancipation from the authority of Susa by Greek aid. 
Had not Tissaphernes himself, the worst enemy of the 
Greeks, a Greek body-guard, which he regarded as the 
solitary assurance of his personal security? After the 
overthrow of Tissaphernes, who was looked upon as a 
strict royalist, and on account of his extended powers was 
feared by the lesser governors, the bonds of discipline and 
of cohesion with the empire were still further relaxed. 
Asia Minor appeared to be dissolving into a series of 
states and races, whose princes were dependent upon 
Greek support, and who therefore must necessarily be 
found ready to make concessions. 

Agesilaus was active in this direction. He of AgesSaus! 

232 History of Greece. C Bo °* v - 

succeeded in inducing Otys, the local king of Paphlago- 
nia, openly to revolt. This negotiation was managed 
by Spithridates (a subordinate of Pharnabazus), whom 
Lysander had persuaded to take the side of the Greeks. 
Agesilaus contrived a marriage between Otys and the 
daughter of Spithridates, in order to attach the king 
still more closely to himself, and if possible to form a 
group of princes, united in a common support of the 
Greek interest. It was hoped to attract even Pharnabazus 
into such a union ; — but before these plans were matured, 
a complete change in the course of the events of the war 
occurred, which was likewise a result of the victory on the 

Tithraus- ^ ne P^ ace 0I " Tissaphernes had been filled 
tes. by Tithraustes, a man whom it was far more 

difficult to manage, because he pursued higher ends. 
Tithraustes in no wise deceived himself as to the realities 
of his position. He recognized the impossibility of ward- 
ing off the foreign armies by force of arms, and according- 
ly began to negotiate on a new basis. He declared him- 
self ready to acknowledge the independence and autonomy 
of the maritime cities, provided that they paid a certain 
rent to the Great King, whose notion of proprietorship in 
the soil on which the cities were built it was useless to 
contest. This proposal was doubtless the sole basis on 
which an understanding could be on either side arrived at, 
and the sole method of securing to the cities their civic 
liberties, without the presence of a foreign army in Asia 
Minor and the uninterrupted endurance of a state of war. 
Many Greek colonies existed on similar conditions, with- 
out their right to the name of free Greek cities ever being 

* Otys (Cotys in Xen. Hellen.): Plutarch, Ages. 11; Xen. Ages. ii. 26. 

f Tithraustes, commander of the royal body-guard, belonged to the 
party of Ctesias ; cf. Nicolai, u. s. p. 36. The negotiation with Agesilaus was 
managed by a certain Callias: Xen. Ages. viii. 3. Olbia is an example of 
colonies which paid a chief-rent. 

Chap, hi.] Sparta and Persia. 233 

But it was impossible for Agesilaus, after his victory, 
to accept such conditions ; and Tithraustes was for the 
present unable to do anything besides ridding himself of 
his adversary after the fashion of Tissaphernes, by paying 
him large sums for his troops, and obtaining in return a 
promise that he would turn again to the Hellespont. 
Thus neither did Pharnabazus derive any benefit from the 
fall of his opponent ; but his condition was worse than 
ever before. For his princely residence, Dascyleum on 
the Propontis, became the winter-quarters of Agesilaus, 
who indulged in the pleasures of the chase in the pre- 
serves of the satrap, while the latter wandered from place 
to place with his treasures, pursued by flying bodies of 

But meanwhile Tithraustes had found 

other, and more effective, means for putting tions with the 

His negotia- 

)ns with the 

Greek states. 

an end to the troubles in Asia Minor. If the 
war must inevitably be carried on by gold instead of by 
arms, it was better to give the gold, not to the king of 
Sparta, who was thereby merely enchained to the soil of 
Asia Minor, but to the enemies of Sparta in the mother- 
country. Tithraustes was aware how matters lay there, 
how vast an amount of combustible materials had accu- 
mulated, and how a war kindled in this quarter must 
furnish the safest means of restoring to the royal maritime 
provinces the peace which they had so long desired. By 
sea, Conon had already assumed the conduct of the war ; 
now (in the summer of 395), Tithraustes des- Mission of 
patched the Rhodian Timocrates to Athens, Timocrates. 
Thebes, Argos and Corinth. The Persian subsidies, for 
which in the Peloponnesian war the Athenians had so 
eagerly longed, and for which the Spartans had paid the 
price of manifold humiliations, were now voluntarily 
offered to, and placed before, the cities hostile to the Spar- 
tans ; the golden " bowmen," applied in the right quar- 
ters, had their due effect. The leaders of the democratic 

234 History of Greece. t Bo °* v - 

party, whose interests now coincided with those of the 
Great King, freed his land from the oppressive enemy, by 
making Greece, after a short cessation of arms, once more 
the theatre of a war, which was carried on by sea and by 
land for seven years, and which essentially altered the 
mutual relations of the Greek states.* 

* Agesilaus ftvpCott Toforai* e£cAavvd/ui€i'o? ti}* 'Acta? : Plutarch, Ages. 
15. The Great King's image as a bowman: Brandis, Munzwesm* in Vorderai, 
244, 3G0. 



When Agesilaus crossed the sea to Asia, in gtate of feel . 
order to attack the Great King in his own ing in Greece, 
empire, this might, viewed on the outside, have been 
deemed a magnificent sign of progress on the part of 
Sparta. But in reality she was hereby only evading the 
incomparably harder task incumbent upon her in Greece 
itself; and the utter incapacity displayed by her in the 
conduct of Hellenic affairs inflicted upon the state a 
damage far exceeding the advantages it drew from its new 
military glory. After the deeds of the Cyreans, triumphs 
gained over Persian satraps could no longer create any 
impression ; the appeals to national sentiment, artificially 
set in motion, met with no response, because they were 
mere figments ; and the age was too devoid of enthusiasm 
to allow itself to be deluded by the pompous demeanor 
of Agesilaus. During his campaigns the general feeling 
of discontent had increased instead of diminishing. 
Above all, the cruel treatment of Elis had provoked the 
bitterest indignation ; it was now seen what were the ulti- 
mate intentions of Sparta, when she had the power in her 
hands. And it was perceived at the same time, that 
while the small and defenceless states in her vicinity fell 
a prey to her lust of vengeance, the greater and more 
remote states remained unpunished for the most open re- 
sistance and the most callous insults. Thus the fear of 
Sparta gradually vanished : the disproportion became evi- 
dent between her claims to power and her power as it actu- 
ally was; and this facilitated the growth of an understand* 


236 History of Greece. [Book v. 

ing between the states which now desired to rid themselves 
of the pressure exercised by Sparta, some for the first time, 
others anew, — the latter recovering from their defeat, the 
former entering into the contest with vigorous freshness, 
in order to secure a position of independence. Thebes, 
Argos, Corinth, and Athens were the localities where the 
agitation was at work ; everywhere considerable men 
stood at the head of the movement : at Argos, Cylon and 
Sodamas ; at Corinth, Timoleus and Polyanthes ; at 
Thebes, Androclides, Amphitheus, and Galaxidorus. At 
Athens the popular orators Agyrrhius and Epicrates ac- 
quired influence, and the state more and more returned 
into the paths of the old democracy. The same tendency 
likewise manifested itself in the other states together with 
the movement against Sparta, and served as a common 
bond among them.* 

Mission of ^ n * s s^te of things was known in Persia 

Timocrates. through Conon ; and the instructions of Timo- 

01. xcvi. 2( B . crates were drawn up in accordance with it. 

C. 395.) m r 

The situation was so favorable, that no bribes 
were needed in order to gain over traitors, and to direct 
the policy of the several states into a new course. It was 
possible to negotiate openly ; and there was therefore ad- 
ditional security for the money not being expended use- 
lessly. The revolt had in fact already taken place : both 
Corinth and Athens had refused to send their contingents 
in compliance with the Spartan summons ; Thebes, which 
the Spartans had endeavored by special overtures to gain 
over through the mission of Aristomenidas (p. 223), had 
adopted the same course in a far harsher form, and had 

* " KoptvQtaKbs 7r6Ae/u.os" : Isocratcs ; Lsreus, Diod. xiv. 86 (who distin- 
guishes the Boeotian war, and yet allots eight years to the war in general) ; 
Paus. iii. 8; Sievers, Gesch. p. 59 f.; Hertzberg, Ages. 80; Spiller, Kritischo 
Geschichte des Korinih. Krieges (1852). Xen. Hellen. iv. 4, 7 (land- war) 4, 8—5,1 
(naval war), without chronology. The solitary indubitable basis of dates is 
furnished by the eclipse of the sun, Hellen. iv. 3, 10.— Kvkuv, 2w5a^ay, &c. i 
Paus. iii. 9 ; Xen. Hellen. iii. 5. 

chap. IV.] pfc Corinthian War. 237 

moreover publicly cast the rudest insult upon King Age- 
silaus. Such relations as these could not be maintained ; 
their end must be war; nor was it assuredly advantageous 
to wait until Sparta, enriched by the Asiatic spoils and 
encouraged by a fortunate peace with Persia, might per- 
chance for her part think the conjuncture of circum- 
stances favorable for chastising the recalcitrant states, 
and dooming one after the other to the fate of Elis. 
Nothing was wanting but resources with which to carry 
on the war ; when, therefore, these offered themselves un- 
asked and in abundance, it was neither possible nor per- 
missible to delay any longer. This explains the speedy 
effect following upon the mission of Timocrates, and bril- 
liantly confirming the prospects developed by Conon. 
The Thebans displayed the utmost ardor ; it T . 

* J ' League be- 

was they who caused the outbreak of the war. tween Athens 

J and Thebes. 

This they did, in order to avoid a direct ad- < B - c - 395 )- 
vance against Sparta itself, by occasioning a border-feud 
in their own neighborhood. The Opuntian Locrians, who 
stood under the influence of Thebes, were instructed to 
lay claim to a strip of land, of which the possession was 
disputed between them and Phocis. The Phocians, as was 
to be anticipated, invoked the aid of Sparta, and the The- 
bans sent word to Athens. Athens was a defenceless city, 
upon which a cautious attitude was accordingly incum- 
bent ; the Athenians had not accepted any war-subsidies 
from Persia, and hesitated to enter upon any open acts of 
hostility. On the other hand, however, they could not 
tolerate the renewed entry of Peloponnesian troops into 
Central Greece, and the resumption of the policy of Ly- 
sander ; for in this event they had to fear for themselves 
also the worst consequences. They therefore despatched 
envoys to Sparta, with the request that the Phocian bor- 
der dispute might be decided by a judicial tribunal. But 
when the answer was only a military armament, the reso- 
lution of the civic community of Athens was quickly ta- 

238 History of Greece. C Bo0K % 

ken. Though they saw the Spartan garrisons established 
round Attica on every side — in Euboea, Tanagra, iEgina, 
Megara ; — though they were themselves without walls and 
without ships, they were yet unwilling to leave the bene* 
factors of the city in the lurch. Besides such men as 
Epicrates, of whom it was at least rumored that they had 
accepted Persian money, Thrasybulus of Collytus, and 
Thrasybulus of Stiria, the liberator of Athens, addressed 
the citizens, and awakened the ancient spirit of warlike con- 
fidence. It was determined to send military aid to the 
Thebans ; and this resolution was the first act by which 
Athens came forth from her retirement, and the first suc- 
cess of the Boeotian party, which had begun to form itself 
simultaneously with the liberation of the city (p. 77). Al- 
ready in the autumn of b. c. 395 (01. xcvi. 2) Thrasybu- 
lus marched to Thebes with an auxiliary force, delighted 
to be able to prove his gratitude towards his former 
hosts, who received him with a joyous welcome.* 
Lvsander The zea ^ f° r war a ^ Sparta was based upon 

ascendant at tne ^ act tnat Lysander had re-established his 
Sparta. influence there. Undismayed by all the re- 

buffs which he had undergone, he had incessantly pursued 
his schemes, and had again gathered round himself a par- 
ty warmly attached to him. What he above all needed, 
was a new opportunity for proving himself to be the man 
alone able to effect the subjection of the Hellenes. The 
revolt in Central Greece was in itself a triumph for him, 
because the absurdity was thereby made manifest of the 
lax and forgiving policy which had been against his ad- 
vice pursued ; he hoped to be now once more the one in- 
dispensable personage, and to be able, in the absence of 
Agesilaus, to resume his interrupted work with better suc- 
cess ; so as to succeed in avenging upon both the kings 
the humiliations inflicted upon him. 

* Xen. Hellen. iii. 5, 3 : irei&ovo-t. Aotcpov?. § 2 (^ABrjvaloi ov ncrakafiovTcs roi 
xpvaiov) in opposition to Pausan iii. 9, 5 (Epicrates, aaxeoxpopos) ; Demosth, 
xriii. 96 ; Frohberger, Philol. xvii. 438. 

chap, iv.] fj^ Corinthian War. 239 

He obtained his nomination to the supreme command. 
He undertook to assemble a confederate army 
to the north of Thebes : Pausanias was com- JJ a iiartus. 

' 01. xcvi. 2 

missioned to collect the Peloponnesian troops, (B - c - 396 >- 
and to advance across the Isthmus. The two armies were 
hereupon to unite in Southern Boeotia, and to crush the 
hostile forces, before these had strengthened themselves by 
further accessions. Lysander in his impatience hurried 
in advance, gathered troops in Phocis and Thessaly, and 
marched upon Haliartus, where he was to effect his junc- 
ture with the king. But Pausanias was not found there 
by Lysander ; who, full of eagerness to accomplish the 
first military exploit alone, rashly advanced upon the 
well-defended city. On the one side he was Death of 
attacked by the besieged, on the other by the Lysander. 
Thebans hastening to the rescue, and in this unequal 
struggle he was cut down with part of his troops. 

Thus pitifully ended the life of a man, who Hjg charac . 
for a time was more puissant in Hellas than ter and P lans - 
any Hellene before him, who caused himself to be adored 
like a god, and who, after he had brought about the most 
important decision known to the history of the Greek 
states, thought that he also retained its further develop- 
ment in his hands. Lysander had a clear consciousness 
of the meaning of the remark made by the Corinthians 
to the Lacedaemonians at the commencement of the Pelo- 
ponnesian War : " For a state, which bears itself quietly, 
permanent institutions are excellent ; but if it engages in 
manifold undertakings, it cannot rest in its old forms, but 
must improve and change many things." Thus he too 
was minded to transform antiquated Sparta, in order that 
she might be equal to her new task. But that which im- 
pelled him to his innovations was not patriotism ; they 
were to serve his own purposes. Unconscientiously self- 
seeking, he desired to annihilate every obstacle to his 
ambition ; from his youth up he restlessly wrought for a 

240 History of Greece. C BooK v - 

single end ; but a curse rested upon all his doings, and his 
victories brought no blessing either to himself or to his 
native city ; it was his lot to survive his fame, to suffer 
the bitterest insults, and finally, in an enterprise which 
his error made a failure, to die prematurely and inglo- 

After his death a document was discovered, which he 
had caused to be drawn up by Cleon of Halicarnassus, 
in order to expound the ideas lying at the root of the 
constitutional changes intended by him. His plans re- 
main a secret, but so much is clear : that he wished to put 
an end to the conflict of powers, which rendered Sparta 
incompetent to pursue a vigorous and consistent policy. 
The kingship was to be preserved as an institution sancti- 
fied by primitive declarations of the gods ; but it was to 
become a different thing from what it had been : out of 
the whole body of Heraclidse, or out of the whole body 
of Spartans, the man suited to the office was to be raised 
to the headship of the state. Further, it was also neces- 
sary to abolish the Ephors, and to establish a new, and 
enlarged, civic community for choosing this head. The 
state was therefore to be renovated both as to its head 
and as to its members, and for the sham kingship was to 
be substituted a personal government, the sway of one 
strong will, able to rule Sparta, from Sparta, the entire 
Greek World. Lysander had laid all the states prostrate 
at the feet of his native city; and he accordingly 
deemed himself to be the man, whose mission it was, in 
the capacity of newly-elected chief of the state, firmly to 
establish the dominion which had been gained through 
him, and to unite Greece under a single dictatorship. 

But for a coup d'etat effected by violence Lysander 
lacked both the resources and the courage. His was not a 
heroic nature, such as would have assembled around him 
the people, and have advanced directly upon its goal ; he 
could not even make himself the centre of a strong party. 

chap, iv.] ffhe Corinthian War. 241 

Intrigue was the element in which he lived, and by en- 
tirely giving himself up to this tendency he, as time went 
on, lost more and more of his resoluteness and vigor 
of action. He sought to secure partisans in the priests, 
in order to transform the state, which was still governed 
in accordance with signs from heaven, without offending 
against legal forms ; he desired to receive his powers, as 
if he had been a second Lycurgus, from Delphi, where he 
had made himself a favorite by splendid dedicatory gifts. 
It was bruited abroad, that the Delphic archives con- 
tained divine oracles still unread, the contents of which 
none but a son of Apollo might reveal ; indeed, there 
was brought to Delphi, from somewhere near the Pon- 
tus, a youth, whom his mother declared to be the son of a 
god ; as such he was to be acknowledged at Delphi, and 
thereupon to announce the new revelations. If it is re- 
membered, how at Dodona and in Libya Lysander like- 
wise set the oracles in motion, the grandeur of the scale 
on which this game of intrigue was carried on must cause 
profound astonishment. But his devices were woven too 
finely, so that the threads were torn asunder even while 
he held them in his hands. Undoubtedly Lysander was 
the most gifted statesman produced by Sparta in her latter 
days ; no man was his equal in knowledge of men and of 
affairs ; and that in his political essay the evils of the 
Spartan constitution were accurately signalized, is as- 
suredly to be concluded from the very circumstance, that 
hesitation was felt about allowing the document to become 
public, notwithstanding the wish of Agesilaus to the con- 
trary. But Lysander lacked the courage of a good con- 
science ; and for this reason he, with all his great gifts, 
achieved nothing. He merely contributed to promote 
the disorganization of his native city, to make his fellow- 
citizens eager for money and prone to intrigue, and 
thoroughly to lower the spirit of Sparta. He thought no 

device too bad and no means too immoral ; and yet he 

242 History of Greece, C Bo0K v - 

fell in consequence of his policy being one of half-mea- 
sures, inasmuch as he desired to combine with one another 
the revolution and legality, and was perpetually oscilla- 
ting between timid hesitation and reckless arrogance. Per- 
haps this self-contradiction may be connected with a 
mental disorder, from which he is said to have suffered in 
his later years, and which is easily to be explained by the 
manifold self-delusions of his passionate ambition.* 

Misfor- ^ n ^ ne °^ a y a ^ ter the death of Lysander, 

times of Pausanias made his appearance with the Pelo- 

Pausanias. ri 

? 1 ' x 39- ? ponnesians. He saw lying under the walls of 
Haliartus the bodies of the fallen, an unpro- 
tected prey in the hands of the foe ; for after the failure 
of the surprise the Phocians had during the night dis. 
persed to their homes. The entire plan of the campaign 
had been frustrated ; nor was the spirit prevailing among 
the king's troops by any means encouraging ; they found 
themselves threatened by a superior force of cavalry, the 
Athenians having likewise in the meantime reached the 
scene of the conflict ; in short, the situation of Pausanias 
was one of the utmost anxiety. It was out of his power 
to obtain by force of arms that which it was his immediate 
duty to secure, viz. the rescue of the dead bodies out of 
the hands of the enemy; and he had accordingly, after 
listening to his council of war, no choice but to request 
the enemy to grant him a truce and a peaceable surrender 
of the dead. But even this was only granted to him on 
condition of his evacuating the country. He was forced 
at once to commence his retreat, during which he was 

* MeAayxoAux of Lysander: Aristot. ap. Plutarch, 2. As to the revolution- 
ary plans of Lysander, see Plutarch, 25 ; Diodor. xiv. 13 ; Nepos, following 
Ephorus. "A second Pausanias," Athen. 543. According to Grote, Cleon 
(Plutarch, 18) composed the essay on his own account: contra Lachmann, ii. 
394; Hertzberg, 282. In so far as Lysander intended essentially to change 
the nature of the kingship, Aristot., PolU. xciv. 31, states him efnxeip^crai «a- 
raAOcrat rr)v /SacriAetai/ ; but he does not state it as a fact. Nepos, Lymnd. iii. 
5. The story of the pretended son of Apollo is told by Plutarch on the au- 
thority of an ivr)p uTTopwcos xai <£(.A6(ro<£os (quaere Theophrastus ?). 

chap, iv.] ^ Corinthian War. 243 

pursued by exulting enemies, who would not permit the 
troops on their march out of the country to turn to the 
left or to the right out of the highroad, for the purpose 
of obtaining supplies. The king was received at Sparta 
with loud expressions of dissatisfaction : he was charged 
with tardiness and cowardice ; and the Lysandrian party 
availed itself of this state of public feeling, to make him 
pay the penalty of Lysander's rashness, and to render him 
accountable for Lysander's death. His former conduct 
in Attica was also now raked up as an accusation against 
him. Pausanias did not venture to appear before the 
judicial tribunal ; and, sentenced to death, took flight to 

In the enemies' camp this unexpected sue- The C(> 
cess had called forth an extraordinary revul- Jj^jj; 11 
sion of feeling. The most dangerous of their 3 5 
adversaries was now removed for ever ; Sparta 
was humiliated, and Thebes full of victorious confidence. 
There could no longer be any difficulty in bringing about 
an open alliance in arms against Sparta. Argos and 
Corinth, between whom an understanding already existed, 
joined hands with Thebes and Athens ; a federal fund was 
formed, and a federal council constituted which was to sit 
at Corinth, and thence to direct the common measures of 
the Confederates. Hereupon envoys went forth from 
Corinth, as in the days of Themistocles, to summon the 
remaining states to the struggle for their independence* 
The Locrians had been already gained ; but now the 
Malians likewise joined, who had been irritated by the 
foundation of Heraclea (p. 210), as well as the cities of 
Euboea, and in the West the Acarnanians, Leucadians, 
and Ambraciotes ; all having either to suffer or to fear 
Lacedaemonian oppression. On the side of Sparta there 
stood only those communities of the peninsula which were 
entirely without independence, and the states in which a 

* Xenophon, Hellen. iii. 5, 23, denies that Pausanias was guilty. 

244 History of Greece. C BoOK v. 

minority of the citizens or individual despots maintained 
by Sparta held sway. The Corinthian League summoned 
the Greeks to freedom as against every kind of oppression. 
Called into life by Persian money, it was yet supported by 
the feeling of the people ; it was accordingly no counter- 
league of seceders, as which it was regarded by Sparta, 
but a national league, and therefore soon became a re- 
cognized power, whose military aid was demanded, 
wherever the interests of civil liberty were in question ; in 
fact, this league took the place of ancient Sparta as the 
adversary of Tyrannical government. Such was the case 
Thessaiy * n Thessaiy. Here Medius, the dynast of 
ijea S u he Larisa, had for years been involved in a feud 

with Lycophron, the Tyrant of Pherse. The 
latter, being supported by Sparta, had the advantage in 
this quarrel. As soon, therefore, as the Larisaeans heard 
of the anti-Spartan league, they applied to it, and by 
means of an accession of 2,000 auxiliaries succeeded in 
taking Pharsalus, of which the citadel was garrisoned by 
Lacedaemonians. The whole of Thessaiy joined the 
League ; Heraclea opened its gates, and was occupied by 
Argive troops ; the highland-tribes in the vicinity sent 
their armed contingents ; and the Phocians, who were 
commanded by Spartans, suffered a heavy defeat at 
Narycus. In the space of a few months, the influence of 
Sparta in Central and Northern Greece had been virtually 
annihilated, and the new League was regarded as the 
Hellenic Power proper from the frontiers of Laconia up 
to Mount Olympus ; it possessed an army, ready for ac- 
tive service, of 15,000 men ; and it held in its hands the 
passes of the Isthmus. Sparta was surrounded on all sides, 
and at the same time by no means certain of her own 
population or of the remaining members of the Confedera- 
tion ; she was involved in a foreign war, of which the 
ulterior development was beyond calculation ; for the 
brilliant military exploits filling the despatches of Agesi' 

Chap - lv -l The Corinthian War. 245 

laus brought no lasting results with them, nor did they re- 
lieve Sparta from the fear of the Phoenician fleet This 
fear increased, as the consideration suggested itself, that 
this fleet might make its appearance off the coasts of 
Hellas in the midst of the war against the Separate 
League, and might make common cause with the enemy. 
At Sparta therefore the feeling was loud and deep against 
the whole of the complication beyond the seas which had 
been entered into ; and orders were without delay sent to 
the Asiatic army to return home with all possible speed. 
It was in the spring of the year 394 b. c. Return of 
(01. xcvi. 2), that the messenger of the Agesiiaus. 
Ephors arrived at the head-quarters of the 0l - x c y i- 2 
king at Astyra in Mysia, when he was on the 
point of opening the campaigns intended to remove the 
war into the interior, and to shake the empire of the 
Great King at its very core. In the midst of victory 
Agesiiaus saw himself overcome by the far-darting arms 
of Tithraustes, and was forced with a heavy heart to com- 
mence a retreat, which at once freed his foes from all 
dangers, and rendered useless all the combinations effected 
by him, while it led himself and his troops to a battle- 
field where heavy struggles with little glory, and great 
hardships without any spoils, awaited them. He sought 
to mitigate his ill-fortune by illusory promises to himself 
and others of a speedy return to Asia. He moreover did 
what was in his power to retain as much as was possible 
of the advantages already gained. He arranged that, 
during his absence, in addition to the fleet, an army of 
4,000 men under Euxenus was to defend the coast-towns ; 
and for this purpose he chose European troops, upon whom 
he could depend, while he took with himself to Europe 
the militia-contingents levied in the cities themselves : he 
wished these contingents at the same time to serve as 
hostages for the cities, and hereby to preserve the newly- 
founded defensive strength of the Asiatic Greeks : he in- 

246 History of Greece. [ Bo °* V. 

tended to accustom them to a brotkerhood-iii-arms with 
Spartan troops, and above all to secure the dominion of 
Sparta on either side of the sea, the establishment of 
which constituted his greatest glory. He contrived very 
skilfully to excite emulation among the cities in the 
equipment of their contingents, and was thus able to cross 
the Hellespont in July at the head of a large and well- 
appointed army. 

Meanwhile the struggle in the mother-country had 
more nearly approached the proper domain of the Spartan 
power, and the Boeotian had become a Corinthian war. 
For the Northern members of the League had in view 
nothing beyond the liberation of their territories from the 
pressure exercised by Sparta, and the confinement of that 
The passes of ^ute to the peninsula. The geographical and 
the isthmus, political boundaries were once more to be 
made identical : the passes of the Isthmus accordingly 
acquired a new significance, and everything depended 
upon obtaining possession, with the aid of Corinth, 
of three outlets from Peloponnesus; the pass of Cen- 
chrese, the gorge of Acrocorinth, and especially the broad 
road along the coast between Corinth and Lechseum* 
For these outlets were at the same time the inlets into the 
Northern districts, which here had a common bulwark, 
while on the hither side of the Isthmus they were open to 
the invasion of the enemy ; Athens in particular, so long 
as she was deprived of her own walls, had no walls to 
rely upon but those of the Isthmus. Thus Athens and 
Thebes were agreed in the point of view assumed by 
them, and in their strategical policy they counted upon 
the ancient aversion of the Peloponnesians from cam- 
paigns beyond the Isthmus, and upon the unskilfulness 
of the Spartans in the conduct of sieges. 

Division of But ^ e Peloponnesians could not assent to 
cSunc?iof the tnese points of views; for Corinth of course 
War - lay outside this line of defence, and even less 

chap, iv.] j^, Cori?ithian War. 247 

than Corinth was Argos protected by it. A mercantile 
city such as Corinth could not look favorably upon a 
long war, carried on, without any prospect of decision, in 
her own territory ; inasmuch as for her it was of supreme 
importance to maintain an open intercourse with the in- 
terior and with foreign lands. Corinth necessarily de- 
sired that the war should be brought to a speedy issue ; in 
other words, that Sparta should be humbled ; which 
humiliation could only be effected at Sparta itself. Timo- 
laus therefore, in the diet of the League, proposed an im- 
mediate attack upon the enemy. As yet, this enemy was 
discouraged ; Lysander was dead, and Agesilaus far away. 
The present, he urged, was the right moment. When one 
he said, wished to protect himself against a plague of 
wasps, he surely did not wait for the approach of the 
whole swarm, but set fire to the nest; and when one 
wished to cross a river, he crossed it as near as possible to 
the source. In the same way the enemy ought now to 
be sought out, before he had increased his strength by 
the accession of troops. The party reasoning thus was, 
however, unable to prevail. Thebes, which was the most 
powerful among the states, and which under its general 
Ismenias had gained all the notable successes hitherto 
achieved, retained the leading voice in the League, with- 
out at the same time being wholly able to suppress op- 
position. In the inner life, too, of the Peloponnesian 
states belonging to the League there prevailed a hostile 
opposition between different parties : the Democrats, who 
had kindled the war, regarded the smallness of the states 
as the foundation of the Spartan supremacy, and advo- 
cated a close alliance with other states and the formation 
of larger state-territories ; while the aristocratic party in- 
flexibly adhered to the principle of the independence of 
the several cities. This conflict was particularly keen at 
Corinth, where party-feeling was still more intensified by 
the fact, that the citizens suffered losses of such severity 

248 History of Greece. [ Bo °* v. 

in consequence of the war. In the other states of the 
League engaged in the war, the fields could be tilled un- 
disturbed ; Corinth had to bear its burden for all the rest. 
The discontent hereby excited answered the purposes of 
the Aristocrats, who desired peace with Sparta ; and it 
thus became difficult to maintain a harmonious under- 
standing in the Council of War. In short, the League 
was afflicted with all the drawbacks which are wont to at- 
tend combinations of secondary states, unaccustomed to 
pursue a policy of their own, and induced by events of an 
exceptional character to enter into a union with other 
states, with which they are not in the habit of co-operating^ 
and only have special interests in common ; while in the 
present instance the League was moreover formed of states 
hitherto mutually hostile, and accordingly found it pecu- 
liarly difficult to agree upon a common management of 

The Spartans had no intention of looking 

Nemea. quietly on, while they were being blockaded 

01. xcvi.2(B. i n the peninsula; moreover, further delay on 

their part mio-ht lead to further defections in 
July. . 

their Confederation. They accordingly assem- 
bled the contingents in Arcadia, in order to march upon 
the Isthmus ; but, instead of taking the shortest routes, 
probably because they feared to meet with enemies lying 
in ambush in the mountain-passes, they took a widely 
circuitous path along the shores of the Corinthian Gulf 
towards the district which was inevitably to become the 
theatre of the war, and chose Sicyon for their head- 
quarters.* Two bodies of troops, of considerable numbers, 
lay opposite to one another here. The heavy-armed in- 
fantry probably numbered about 20,000 men on either 
side ; in cavalry and light-armed troops the advantage 

* Xen. Ilellen. iv. 2, 13 : egrjevav tyjv an<f>la\ov. Herbst, Neue Jahrb. f. Philol. 
690, would read, a^l 'AXeav. Perhaps ayxtaXov. I believe 1 have correctly 
given the sense of the passage in the text. 

chap, iv.i y^ e Corinthian War. 249 

was probably with the Leaguers. On the other hand, 
they lacked a vigorous leadership, and were at issue as to 
the disposition as well as to the command of the troops ; 
probably because it was not wished to allow the Corin- 
thians, in whose territory the fighting was being carried 
on, to have the supreme command. The Spartans were 
led by Aristodemus, the guardian of King Agesipolis, 
who had succeeded the dethroned Pausanias. About 
the middle of the summer, 394 b. c, the armies met by 
the stream Nemea, the lower course of which formed the 
boundary-foss between Corinth and Sicyon. The Thebans 
prematurely rushed upon the Achseans fronting them, 
and thereby broke the cohesion of the line, so that it was 
possible for the Spartans to outflank the Athenians (who 
were fighting, 7,000 strong, under Thrasybulus ; while 
the rest of the army was driven back in extreme confu- 
sion. The situation became still worse, when the fugitive 
bands reached the gates of Corinth, and found them 
closed by the Laconian party : it was not till after some 
time had passed, that they succeeded in forcing an en- 
trance and reaching a safe retreat behind the walls. The 
forces of the League had suffered great losses, but they 
were able to maintain their position, and, as before, to 
control the passes. Aristodemus deemed it advisable to 
proceed to no fresh attack at present, because he might, 
in view of the approach of Agesilaus, expect the whole 
situation of the war soon to change for the better.* 
For neither in Northern Greece was the Se- ,, . . 

March of 

parate League, notwithstanding its rapid ex- Agesilaus. 

* Battle of the Nemea : Xen. Hellen. iv. 2, 18 ; Lys. xvi. 15. Demosth. xx. 
52 : »} ixeyaXtf M^X 7 ? *P&* A. ^ iv KopiVflw. Xen. Ages. vii. 5 : r\ iv K. M^X 1 ?- 
The date is fixed by Aristides, ii. 370 (Dindorf): t>?s iv K. fiaxw ««" tt}? iv 
Aexcuw /xe'cro? apxtov Ev/3ouAi5i)?. According to this passage, the first battle 
was fought in the year of the archonship of Diophantus, which ends with 
July 14th, 394 b. c. Cf. Kirchner, de And. quae ferlur tert. or. p. 19. Agesilaus 
receives the tidings of the battle at Amphipolis. According to this, the 
battle was fought in the middle of July, about the same time as the battle 
ef Cnidua. 


250 History of Greece. t BoOK v 

tension, possessed of sufficient power and influence, to be 
able to stay the march of the king, who was irresistibly 
urging on his approach. It was easy to see what school- 
ing he and his troops had received beyond the sea. They 
displayed an agility and power of marching, of which for- 
merly no conception had been entertained ; a series of 
common winter and summer campaigns had created 
among them a firm cohesion and a thorough feeling of 
comradeship, and under proved commanders they had at- 
tained to exemplary discipline. They had learnt to pro- 
vide themselves everywhere with supplies, to vanquish 
every difficulty, and to apply craft and force, according 
as either was opportune. Thus Agesilaus passed success- 
fully through Thessaly, hostile though it was ; he found 
the pass of Thermopylae open ; was able undisturbed to 
unite with his forces the Phocians, as well as the Orcho- 
menians, the neighbors and enemies of Thebes ; and thir- 
ty days after he had crossed the Hellespont, on the 17th 
of August, (the day is fixed by an eclipse of the sun), he 
stood, ready for the conflict, in Bceotia. 

Battle of ^ WaS n0W ^ na * P ar ^ °^ ^ e I jea g uers fi^ 

Coronea. came across Mount Helicon into the plain of 

01. xcvi. 3 . . 

(b. c. 394). Coronea, where, reinforced by an accession of 
troops from Bceotia and the surrounding dis- 
tricts, they took up a position by the temple of Athene 
Itonia, the federal sanctuary of the district, — where once 
already, fifty-three years before, the Boeotians had suc- 
cessfully defended their independence (vol. ii. p. 449). Age- 
silaus advanced from the Cephisus, and disposed his 
forces for battle ; his right wing consisting of the Lace- 
daemonians, the centre of the Asiatic troops, and the left 
of the Phocians and Orchomenians. The left of Agesi- 
laus was directly fronted by the Thebans; next to 
whom, in the centre, stood the Athenians with the other 
Leaguers, and then the Argives. Agesilaus had a superior 
number of light-armed troops ; in other respects the ar* 

chap. IV.] y/tc Corinthian War. 251 

mies were about equal. But while the forces of the 
League came from a defeat, and on the present occasion 
again were not led by any firm hand, their adversaries had 
been invariably accustomed to victory, were command- 
ed by masters in the art of war, and were mostly veterans, 
— as above all the Cyreans. This time also the Thebans 
rushed forward at once, and drove the enemy's left into 
flight; the battle severed itself into three battles ; and, while 
the Thebans after this advance were already falling upon 
the camp of the Lacedaemonians, they saw the remaining 
two divisions driven from the ground, and taking refuge 
upon the heights of Mount Tilphussium in the rear of Coro- 
nea. It was impossible for the Thebans to keep the field 
unassisted ; but they intended to cut their way through to 
their allies. It was then that Agesilaus advanced to meet 
them with his whole army, highly gratified to see before 
him the most hated of all the Greeks, and evidently in- 
tent upon taking bloody vengeance for the insults suffered 
by Sparta. Instead of surrounding them on the flanks, 
he declined the advice of Xenophon, and by directing a 
general attack on the whole line forced them to a des- 
perate struggle. A terrible melee ensued. The king, 
fighting in the thickest of the fray, was covered with 
wounds ; but in spite of his utmost exertions he was unable 
to prevent the Thebans from forcing a path through the 
very midst of his army, and from successfully effecting 
their juncture with their allies. Twice the Thebans had 
been the victors ; but the ground remained in the hands of 
the Lacedemonians, who bore the corpses of their foes into 
the centre of their camp, in order to force the Leaguers to 
supplicate for the delivery of their dead, and thus to ac- 
knowledge their defeat. The king had saved his honor, 
but the actual gain of the battle was so slight, that the 
Lacedaemonians were unable to maintain themselves in 
Bceotia. Agesilaus himself went to Delphi, in order to 
see to the healing of his wounds, and to dedicate to the 

252 History of Greece. £ BooK v. 

god the tithe of the Asiatic booty, amounting to not less 
than one hundred talents (243,000/. circ). But how soon 
was the glory of his victories to pale ! Already, before the 
battle he had received the tidings of the utter revulsion 
which had taken place in affairs in Ionia ; and therewith 
his exploits were wholly cast into the shade by the under- 
takings of Conon.* 

conon at ^ was ^y Conon that Attic ideas and Attic 

Caui 39G-5 policy first again acquired influence upon the 
relations among the states on the iEgean. 
With equal sagacity and energy he had taken advantage 
of the situation of the Persian empire, in order to make a 
position for himself at Susa, to prepare the fall of Tissa- 
phernes, and, in conjunction with Pharnabazus, to lay the 
lines of a new war-policy, for the execution of which he 
was indispensable. Thus the treasures of the Great King 
were placed at the disposal of the homeless protege of the 
prince of Salamis. This had happened before Agesilaus 
had yet crossed into Asia. But the work advanced 
slowly. The empire was in so lamentable a condition 
that every naval armament had to be begun at the begin- 
ning, and it was a matter of considerable trouble, to collect 
in the first instance even as many as forty vessels, which 
Conon exercised in the waters of Cilicia, in order to 
obtain the nucleus of a fleet. The promised pay failed to 
make its appearance ; the adverse party still continued 
powerful; and the Southern coasts formed part of the 
satrapy of Tissaphernes, who contrived in every possible 
way to hinder the easy progress of the armaments. Conon 
was forced to withdraw before the Lacedaemonian fleet 
into the harbor-of-war at Caunus, and remained blockaded 
here for a long time (396-5) ; so that Agesilaus began to 
contemn the new danger which had excited terror at 
Sparta, and hoped to be able to bring the whole war to a 

* The statement as to the corpses is only to be found in Xen. AgtM. 
ii. 15 ; cf. Herbst, «. *., 692. 

chap, iv.] rp ne Corinthian War. 253 

close by land. Meanwhile Conon waited patiently, and 
relied upon his friends. He perceived, how the Spartan 
plundering expeditions could not but contribute to inten- 
sify the eagerness of Pharnabazus to support him. Phar- 
nabazus actually relieved Conon from the blockade, so 
that he was now able to unite with his fleet the newly- 
built ships, and to increase it to eighty vessels, and after- 
wards to double that number. 

Hereupon he without further delay began Cononat 
the execution of his schemes ; established com- Babylon. 
munications with the democratic party in Rhodes ; pro- 
voked the revolt of this important island from Sparta ; 
and captured the transports carrying Egyptian corn to 
the Spartan fleet. Of these first successes he availed him- 
self, to claim by virtue of them a fuller confidence and a 
more assured position. If the work was to progress, he 
could not any longer afford to depend on court-coteries 
and on the whims of satraps. He repaired in person to 
Babylon, and conducted his negotiations there with much 
success ; in the council of the king it was determined to 
make war upon Sparta simultaneously by land and by 
sea ; the financial resources were to be entrusted to Conon, 
to whom was to be committed the supreme conduct of the 
war. He was sagacious enough to request that Pharna- 
bazus might be associated with him in his office, and to 
leave the honor of the supreme command to the satrap. 
But Conon was the soul of the entire undertaking. The 
ancient coyness of the Persians had been overcome ; they 
perceived that their military and naval forces could only 
be of effect against Greece, if directed by a Greek. They 
confided themselves, their power and their treasures, to 
this Athenian citizen, and allowed him to provide for 
them ; so that it seems that these relations at this time gave 
rise to the proverb : " The war is the business of Conon." * 

* Conon in Susa, acccording to Paus. iii. 9, 1 (before the arrival of 
Agesilaua in Asia; according to Justin, vi. 2, during the blockade of 

254 History of Greece. P 00 * v. 

Battle of ^ tne same time, however, the other side 

cmdus. collected its forces. Agesilaus became com- 

01 c x 39 v 4). 3 (B * mander-in-chief by land and sea (p. 230). He 
Beginning of contr ived to animate the ardor of the coast- 
August, towns ; they furnished 120 ships ; but by ap- 
pointing his brother-in-law, the inexperienced Pisander, 
admiral, he conferred the greatest obligation upon Conon, 
who already in August had an opportunity of justifying 
in the fullest measure the confidence bestowed upon him 
by the Great King. He met the fleet off the peninsula 
of Cnidus. Pisander could not avoid a battle, although 
he was in no respect capable of contending against his 
adversary. He suffered the most thorough of defeats. 
Pisander himself fell in the conflict, and fifty vessels were 
captured. The tidings of this battle reached King Agesi- 
laus on his entry into Boeotia ; but he kept them secret 
from his troops until after the day of Coronea, on which 
he was himself already fighting with broken hopes. For 
not only all the results of his two years' campaigns, but 
all his future victories, were destroyed by a single blow. 
All Ionia was lost ; it was no longer possible to detain the 
Ionian troops with the army ; and all thoughts of return- 
ing to Asia were at an end for him. Thus the battle of 
Cnidus directly affected the state of affairs in either con- 
tinent ; and Agesilaus returned to Sparta with the rem- 
nant of his troops, as if he had lost instead of gained a 
battle (autumn of 394 B. a).* 

Caunus) ; in Babylon, the winter-residence of the Great King, according to 
Diod. xiv. 81. Nepos, Conon, 3, follows some good authority (instigated by 
Pharnabazus to undertake the journey, and introduced by Tithraustes, 
Conon brings about the overthrow of Tissaphernes). Diod. xiv. 81 : HLovw 
®apvdpa£ov iXofievos. Pharnabazus was not ouiy treasurer to Conon (Nep. 4), 
but also nominally commander-in-chief : Xen. Hellen. iv. 3, 11. To the time 
of his armaments in Cilicia and of his command of the fleet belong the 
Pharnabazus-coins from Tarsus : Luynes, Monn. des Sairapies, p. 7 ; Brandis, 
p. 236. The Hellenic ships (to nerdL K. 'EWrjvtKov, Hellen. iv. 2, 12) were 
chiefly Attic (<f>vydScs Kal iOckovrai, Plat. Menex. 245a). HoAe/AO* fie Kocwh 
fteA»;o-et, Diogen. vii. 75 ; Rehdantz, p. 2. 
* According to Diod. xiv. 83, Pharnabazus and Conon had more than 

chap, iv.] ^ ne Corinthian War. 255 

Meanwhile the victorious fleet sailed up the Defection 
coast from Caria. By the advice of Conon °?.. the Ionian 

J # cities. 

all Hellenic cities were promised liberty and 
autonomy ; and, inasmuch as the presence among them 
of Agesilaus had after all invariably entailed upon them 
many sacrifices and inconveniences, they were all the 
more ready to accept the changed condition of things. A 
free commercial intercourse with the empire remained the 
primary interest for these cities ; and since all their de- 
sires were now liberally granted, they one and all, even 
Ephesus, renounced the Spartan alliance, — as far up as 
the Hellespont, where Dercyllidas maintained himself in 
Abydus and Sestus. 

In the following spring the fleet took its conon in 
course towards Greece. Just a century had Greece, 
passed away, since the first maritime expedi- 01. X ^ L 3 
tion had started from the shores of Asia 
against Attica. But this time the Perso-Phoenician fleet 
was a liberating force, a considerable proportion of it was 
Greek, its admiral an Athenian, and its task the restora- 
tion of his native city. All the Cyclades were freed from 
the Spartan yoke ; and the Harmosts, wherever they had 
contrived to maintain themselves hitherto, were driven 
away. Cythera was occupied, and the coast of Messenia 
threatened ; whereupon Conon conducted the fleet to the 
Isthmus, in order to arrive at an understanding with the 
Council of the League, and to concert measures for the 
vigorous prosecution of the land war. Thus he was ap- 
proaching his real object. For he found no difficulty in 
representing to the Persians, as well as to the Greek 
League, that the matter which as an Athenian he had 
nearest at heart was also in their own interest ; the 
Spartans, he declared, would never renounce their claims 

ninety, and Pisander eighty vessels. Xen., Hellen. iv. 3, 12, is obscure. 
The accounts of the battle are quite inadequate. Newton believes that he 
has discovered a monument of the battle; cf. Gottmger GeL Ameigen, 
1864, p. 383. 

256 History of Greece. [Book v. 

to dominion over Greece, so long as the walls of Athena 
The wails ^ m rums - ^ was not till these had been 
buift thens re ^stored, that the city would be enabled to act 
, as a counterpoise, as was demanded by the 

policy of the Great King and by that of the 
League. Pharnabazus agreed to everything, and, while 
returning himself to Asia with part of the fleet, allowed 
Conon to anchor with eighty vessels in the Pirseeus. The 
crews were disembarked ; architects and masons were en- 
gaged ; hundreds of workmen came from Thebes and 
other towns ; and thus the work of Themistocles, Pericles, 
and Cimon, the walls enclosing the port-town and the 
Long Walls, was, while paid for by the money of the 
Great King, restored by the joint labor on the one hand 
of Phoenicians, Cilicians, and Cyprians, on the other of 
Athenians and Boeotians. Since of the three Long Walls 
the Phalerian had already become superfluous by the con- 
struction of the Middle Wall (vol. ii. p. 513), it was 
naturally considered enough to build two parallel walls, 
which sufficiently united the Upper and Lower Towns. 
In many places the construction still remained incom- 
plete, but the main object was achieved. Sparta's plans 
of dominion seemed now for the first time to be securely 
frustrated, and amidst endless rejoicings Athens cele- 
brated her regeneration. For now, and not before, the 
work of liberation seemed accomplished, and the humilia- 
tion of the past expiated. The deeds of Thrasybulus and 
his comrades were cast into the shade ; Conon and Eua- 
goras were the heroes of the day, the second founders of 

Fortunately for Athens, the Lacedsemonians were still 
barred off in the peninsula. Their victories had availed 
them nothing for the main progress of the struggle ; they 
were extremely unskilled in the new method of conduct* 

* Building of the walls: Xen. TTellen. iv. 8,7-10; Diod. 85; Demosth. xx, 
«8. Thrasybulus and Conon ; Philol xvii. 439. 

chap, iv.j The Corinthian War. 257 

ing war in which they were involved. They lay inactive 
at Sicyon, unable to break through the lines of the Isth- 
mus ; nor is it likely that they would have effected this, 
had not treason in the enemy's camp come to their aid. 

For in Corinth the mutual hostility of the Massacreat 
parties opposed to one another had become Corinth, 
more and more intense. The power of the oi.xcvL4(b. 

r C. 392). 

Democrats was strengthened by the presence . 
of the Persian fleet, and they had moreover 
with Persian money again built ships in Lechseum ; their 
object was to recover the command of the Corinthian 
Gulf; this was the easiest method of approaching the 
enemy's camp, of gaining influence over the riverain 
states, and of finding a compensation for the troubles of 
war weighing upon the Corinthian territory itself. Al- 
ready in the year 393 Agathinus commenced operations 
with Corinthian vessels. 

But meanwhile the discontent on the part of the large 
and small landed proprietors had continuously increased ; 
the dragging progress of the land-war inflicted upon them 
the most sensible losses in cereals, herds, and slaves, and 
had swelled the following of the peace-party. To this 
state of things the members of the League could not 
remain indifferent. Once already they had experienced 
that the gates had been closed to them by the adherents 
of Sparta ; it was necessary for them to secure the most 
important military position. An agreement was accord- 
ingly effected with the leaders of the Democrats, for the 
purpose of destroying those who took advantage of the 
discontent of the citizens, in order to hinder the opera- 
tions of the troops, and to play into the hands of the 
Lacedaemonians. For the execution of the plot advan- 
tage was taken of the festival of Artemis Euclea (in the 
spring of B. c. 392). More than a hundred citizens were 
cut down in the theatre, in the market-place, and even at 
the altars ; the remaining partisans of Sparta retreated 

258 History of Greece. [Book V. 

to the citadel, where they thought to defend themselves. 
But, cut off from all assistance, and terrified by unfavora- 
ble omens, they were induced to enter into a reconcilia- 
tion with their fellow-citizens, and to submit. 
The The democratic and war-party now pre- 

41 Argoiizers." V ailed ; and yet the attitude of Corinth re- 
mained oscillating and uncertain. By itself Corinth was 
too incapable of independent action ; and the Leaguers, 
who had helped to bring about the victory of the demo- 
cracy, in their turn put forward demands in consequence, 
and thus occasioned new party-combinations. For al- 
though the war-party desired that the city should lean 
upon a powerful state, yet the large majority was opposed 
to any concession being made to the Athenians or The- 
bans. It was the old conflict of feeling between the Pelo- 
ponnesians and Central Greece, which drove them rather 
to enter into a combination with Argolis. Thus was 
formed out of the Democrats the party of the "Argoii- 
zers." These prevailed. The boundary-pillars between 
the two territories began to be removed ; Argive troops 
occupied the citadel ; and while Corinth vanished out of 
the number of independent states, Argolis, as in the days 
of Agamemnon, extended its territory from the frontier 
of Laconia to the Isthmus.* 

But this revolution again awakened new indignation in 
the circles of the aristocracy. To the Aristocrats it 
seemed an abomination, an intolerable crime, that their 
native city should be allowed to become an integral part 
of Argolis. Moreover, the authority of the ancient fami- 
lies of Corinth was hereby broken for ever ; and, finally, 
the formation of a North-Pel oponnesian state of larger 
size involved a serious danger to Sparta and to all the ad- 
herents of Sparta. Everything therefore depended upon 

* Eu/cActo (according to the analogy of the festive calendar of Corcyra) in 
February: Kirchner, p. 10. Oi apyoAi£bire? : Ephorus ap. Steph. $.v. *Apyos. 
Amalgamation of Argos and Corinth : Xen. Hellen. iv. 4, 6 ; cf. Vischer, 
Staaten u. Bands, p. 25. 

chap. iv.l The Cwintkian War. 259 

the overthrow of these innovations, before they had firmly 
established themselves ; and the Aristocrats accordingly 
entered into treasonable combinations with Sparta, — just 
as the Laconizers at Athens had done, when in their na- 
tive city they desired at any cost to prevent the construc- 
tion of the walls (vol. ii. p. 416). 

Two party-leaders, Alcimenes and Pasime- Battle 
lus, opened to the enemy a portal in the bifur- wans en the 
cate wall stretching in the direction of Sicyon. °J- J^ 4 
The Spartans entered, entrenched themselves fcJumnaer - 
between the two walls uniting Corinth with Lechseum, 
and collected around them their partisans. On the next 
day a bloody conflict ensued, the Argives, Corinthians, 
and Athenians having approached with the intent of driv- 
ing the enemy out of the lines of fortifications. But the 
Spartans remained victorious, and continued to hold their 
position. Corinth was thus cut off from the sea and the 
fleet ; part of the connecting walls was pulled down ; and 
even beyond the Isthmus, Crommyon and Sidus, the inlets 
of the passes towards Megara, were taken. 

By this brilliant success of the Spartan arms the entire 
plan of operations of the League seemed frustrated. But 
while Sparta failed to take advantage of her victory, the 
Athenians displayed the utmost activity. It was neces- 
sary for them to do everything in their power to detain 
the foe at the Isthmus, so long as their walls were still un- 
completed. They had sent to the theatre of the war Iphi- 
crates, a young man of obscure origin, who had distin- 
guished himself in the recent naval engagements (doubt- 
less, therefore, under Conon). Through Iphicrates the 
subsidies obtained by Conon first acquired their true sig- 
nificance for Athens ; for he contrived to discipline, and 
to make use of, the mercenaries engaged by this money, 
in such a way as thereby to restore the fame of the Attic 
arms. In the battle between the walls he was unsuccess- 
ful : this was no suitable field of operations for his light' 

260 History of Greece. &™* v. 

armed bands. But only a few months later he had suc- 
ceeded in establishing what resembled a blockade over 
the Lacedaemonians in their entrenchments. He com- 
manded the entire districts, made requisitions on Sicyon 
and Phlius ; nay, far into Arcadia the inhabitants trem- 
bled before the flying bands of Iphicrates. Under the 
protection of his arms the walls of the Isthmus were re- 
stored ; the whole body of the citizens of Athens hastened 
across, in a few days built up the western wall, and then, 
more leisurely, the eastern (spring of b. c. 391). 

. ., This revulsion in the state of things at the 

Agesilaus o 

takes. Le- Isthmus was irreconcilable with the honor of 


0] .. Sparta ; and, in particular, irritation was ex- 
(b. c. 391). cited there by the Corinthian fugitives ; for, 
since the day of the treason, it was they who had inces- 
santly urged Sparta forwards, and who had exercised a 
decisive influence upon her resolutions. They pointed to 
the importance of their native city, as the gate-keeper of 
the peninsula, and declared that, unless the Spartans were 
secure of it, their days as a great power were at an end. 
Accordingly, it was determined to set seriously about the 
task, and Agesilaus had to assume the supreme command, 
however little it might agree with his inclinations to mea- 
sure the distance of the entire peninsula, in order to pull 
down a wall which in all probability would speedily be 
built up again behind his back. Fatiguing marches 
without any prospect of glory or gain — this was the direct 
opposite of the Asiatic campaigns which had spoilt the 
king. In the spring of B. c. 391, immediately after the 
second walling-off of the Isthmus, he set out on his 
march ; and, in order to give his undertaking a more im- 
pressive and dignified character, he caused himself to be 
supported by a naval squadron, equipped out of the trea- 
sure captured in Asia and commanded by his brother 
Teleutias. The co-operation of the pair led to advan- 
tageous results. The walls were rapidly destroyed ; and 

chap, iv.] The Corinthian War. 261 

Lechseum, with the ship-sheds, now first fell completely 
into the hands of the Lacedaemonians. After this the 
king returned home.* 

The Corinthian fugitives, ill-satisfied with Agesilaus in 
this speedy departure, invented a new plan of Pirfieum - 
operations which better suited the tastes of ^J^JS^ 2 
the king, and was to exercise a more impor- 
tant influence upon the position of their native city ; for 
their object was, from first to last, to disgust their fellow- 
citizens with the war, and thus to overthrow the war- 
party. To this end they recommended a campaign di- 
rected towards the Pira3um. This was the name of the 
portion of the Corinthian territory lying on the further 
side of the Isthmus, and jutting out from the mountain- 
range of Megara into the Corinthian Gulf, like a large qua- 
drilateral peninsula. Towards the west it forms a beak- 
shaped projection, which, together with the coast of Sicyon 
opposite, surrounds the bay of Lechseum ; while in the 
northeast the peninsula projects towards the coast of Boeo- 
tia. Its position was therefore of extreme importance ; for 
it constituted, in the rear of Megara, the communication 
between Corinth and Boeotia. Moreover, in this moun- 
tainous peninsula were the pasture-grounds of the Co- 
rinthians, and more particularly so at the present time, 
since the more immediate vicinity of the city had become 

* Battle between the walls (6vo-x«pia, Plat. Menex. 240). The capture of 
Lechseum is to be distinguished from the conflict near Lechseum according 
to Grote and Herbst, u. «. p. 694. The probable sequence of events is as 
follows: Commencement of the war, 01. xcvi. 1-2, b. c. 395, summer; 
Haliartus, 01. xcvi. 2; Cnidus, beginning of August, b. c. 394; Coronea, 
middle of August ; Agesilaus dismisses his army, autumn, 394. Encamp- 
ment at Corinth and Sicyon, 393. Conon at the Isthmus ; naval armament 
of Corinth; agitation in Corinth, 392. Euclea, February; destruction of 
the walls; occupation of Crommyon and Sidus (e* 6rj tovtov arpanctl pteyaAai 
SiendnavvTo, Hellen. iv. 4, 14). Flying expeditions of the mercenaries, 391 
(winter, spring). Teleutias (6ju.o/m^Tpio5 of Agesilaus, Plutarch, Ages. 
21 : quaere, son of the ill-favored Eupolia by a second marriage? Herbst, u. s. 
p. 703) nauarch. Lechseum taken, 01. xcvii. 2. Dismissal of the army. 
Isthmia, 390. Agesilaus in Pineum. Defeat of tlie^opa; Hyacinthia, May. 
Agesilaus in Acarnania, 339. This chronology follows Grote and Kirchner 

262 History of Greece. t BooK v - 

the theatre of war. Its chief place was Pirseum, a forti- 
fied position which communicated with other smaller 
strongholds. It is very probable that these fortifications 
were, at the time in question, not perhaps constructed, but 
at all events renewed, in order to secure the connexion 
between Corinth and its new allies. For, inasmuch as 
Megara was hostile, it was necessary to take advantage 
of these means for the purpose of communication with 

In every respect, therefore, this remote hilly district 
(which would hardly have suggested itself to any one at 
Sparta, had it not been for the Corinthian fugitives) was 
a locality extremely well adapted for inflicting sensible 
damage upon the enemy : and doubtless the fugitives 
had also purposely selected the time of the campaign ; for 
it was about midsummer (390 b. a), and the Isthmian 
festival was at hand : and, in their eyes, it was an abomi- 
nation that this ancient Corinthian festival should now, 
for the first time, be celebrated in the name of Argos. 
They therefore reached the Isthmus with the Spartan 
army, precisely at the commencement of the great sacrifice 
to Posidon, dispersed the festive assembly, and hereupon, 
themselves, as the true Corinthians, resumed their inter- 
rupted sacrifice. After this, Agesilaus continued his 
march into the hilly district, and found the expectations 
held out to them by his guides fully confirmed. He took 
an enormous quantity of spoils within a narrow area, and 
his proceedings there were animated by savage wrath. 
The captives were made slaves, or even given up for de- 
struction to their enemies, the fugitives. The Thebans, 
terrified by the unexpected appearance of the hostile 
army on their frontiers, sent envoys to Agesilaus to nego- 
tiate for peace. He conceived the best hopes of a success- 
ful termination of the case. 

But of a sudden he was disturbed in the midst of the 
intoxication of success ; for the tidings arrived, that an 

chap, iv.] The Corinthian War. 263 

entire division of Spartan warriors, about six i P hi C rates 
hundred in number, belonging to the army s^J^J 8 a 
at Sicyon, had been destroyed near Corinth. ^ora. 
They had convoyed the Amyclseans, who, Ma y- 
according to ancient usage, desired to celebrate at home 
the festival of the Hyacinthia, and were then, on their 
return to the camp, surprised by Iphicrates. This was 
an irreparable loss to Sparta, poor as she was in men 
and at the same time a deep humiliation ; for the victors 
had been the despised mercenaries. In vain Agesilaus 
rushed to the scene of the battle, in order, at all events, 
to secure the dead bodies in honorable conflict ; they had 
already been returned in answer to a supplicatory request. 
The defeat therefore stood confessed, and nothing remained 
for the king but to take his departure after a terrible 
devastation of the open country. So far, therefore, as the 
main progress of the war was concerned, nothing had been 
gained by the victorious campaigns of the two years. 
Iphicrates controlled the Corinthian territory more abso- 
lutely than before : indeed, immediately after the depar- 
ture of the king, he reoccupied the position beyond the 
Isthmus, so as to keep the route to the north open. Mean- 
while in Lechseum and Sicyon the Spartans lay, from first 
to last, without knowing what course of action to pursue ; 
and such terror now prevailed, that the Corinthian fugitives, 
who never ceased to carry on petty warfare, ventured 
to cross from the one camp into the other by water only. 
Moreover, the state of things in Peloponnesus became 
more and more anxious and difficult ; for the news of the 
misfortune which had befallen the Spartans had been re- 
ceived in the Arcadian towns with open manifestations of 
delight ; and when the king had united with his forces the 
remnant of the luckless band, and was returning home by 
Mantinea and Tegea, he deemed it advisable to arrange 
his plans of march, so as not to enter his quarters for the 
night till after sunset. Doubtless this was a bitter con- 

264 History of Greece. t BooK v - 

trast to the campaign in Asia, where Agesilaus had in- 
dulged in easily-won glory, and had been honored like a 
demi-god by friend and foe. It is not hard to understand 
his unwillingness to resume the Isthmian conflicts.* 
„ fl . , . But neither could he reconcile himself to 

Conflict be- 

» tw 5 e » n Achaia the narrow limits and the lowering atnio- 

and Acarna- ° 

nia - sphere at home. He looked around impa- 

b. c. 390. tiently for new opportunities of warfare, and 
therefore welcomed the convoys of the Achseans, who 
about this time arrived at Sparta, with a request for 
military assistance. A vigorous and high-minded spirit 
still lived in the population of Achaia ; and inasmuch as 
they could in no direction extend their small territories 
landwards, they sought to make new acquisitions on the 
further side of the Gulf. Here it was now easier to ope- 
rate ; for the dominion of Athens had been broken, and 
that of the Corinthians had not yet been restored. The 
Achseans had accordingly with the troops of their Con- 
federation boldly crossed from Patrse into iEtolia, and had 
formally admitted the city of Calydon into their league 
of cities. But this acquisition involved them in hos- 
tile relations with the Acarnanians. The latter, at that 
time a vigorous and flourishing people, had no intention 
of confining themselves to the western banks of the Ache- 
lous ; and the Achseans stood in the way of their exten- 
sion eastwards. Already in former times the Acarna- 
nians had taken the side of the Athenians (vol. iii. p. 
146) ; and now again they had joined those who had 
leagued themselves together against Sparta, and with their 
aid intended as decisively to ward off Peloponnesian inter- 
vention from the Achelous-country, as did the Athenians 

* Pirseum: Curtius, Peloponnesos, vol. ii. p. 552. The celebration of the 
Isthmia took place every three years ; in the second and fourth years of 
each Olympiad, not long before the Olympic festival. Isthmia, we 
know, were held in the spring of 412 b. c. (Poppo ad Thuc. viii. 9), and 
therefore also in 390. Kirchner, 12.— Pilgrimage to the Hyacinthia after 
the commencement of the spring. 

chap, iv.] The Corinthian War. 265 

and Thebans from their districts. They demanded the 
evacuation of Calydon ; and Attic and Theban troops had 
entered their land to support the demand. The Achseans 
had a right to claim an acknowledgment on the part of 
Sparta for the faithful support which they had accorded 
her ; it was necessarily the interest of Sparta to allow no 
hostile power to assert itself in the Corinthian Gulf ; and 
Agesilaus was all the more ready to take the matter up, 
inasmuch as here a theatre of war opened for him, such 
as he desired : rich, virgin districts, inhabited by pastoral 
tribes, to which he might hope by his tactical skill to be 
wholly superior. Nor was any effective support of them 
on the part of Athens and Thebes to be apprehended, in- 
asmuch as the ardor of the allied states was already per- 
ceptibly on the decrease. Thus he prosecuted the war in 
favor of the hard-pressed Achseans, and felt himself once 
more in his element, when in the spring of b. c. 389 he 
crossed the Gulf with a considerable army, liberated 
Calydon, and marched to the banks of the Achelous. 
With hesitating caution he at first remained . ., 

© Agesilaus m 

at the rim of the district, as if he neither in- Aearnania. 
tended nor dared to penetrate further into the ? l xcvii - * 

r , (b. c. 389-8). 

interior ; so that the Acarnanians in the high- 
lying districts gradually came to think themselves quite 
safe, and allowed their flocks and herds to graze in the 
open. Then, he suddenly advanced by forced marches ; 
surprised the enemies on the banks of their fair lakes ; se- 
cured immense quantities of booty ; and, although he did 
not succeed in taking one of the fortified cities of the 
Acarnanians, yet so thoroughly broke their courage, that 
they resolved to abandon the Separate League, and to 
join the Spartan Confederation, in order not to expose 
themselves to a second campaign of this description. For 
Agesilaus carried on the work of destruction with so re- 
volting a ruthlessness, that he not only annihilated the 

harvest of the year, but even caused the fruit-trees to be 

266 History of Greece. [ Bo °* v - 

torn out of the earth by the roots. Thus the main object 
was rapidly achieved, while the Achseans were ill-pleased 
with this mode of prosecuting the war : it was a savage 
expedition of pillage, which secured no pledge for the fu- 
ture ; and no thought whatever was taken of establishing 
a closer connexion between the districts of the Achelous 
and the system of the Peloponnesian states, which now 
more than ever required reinvigoration. 

Agesipoiis ^ ma y seem most surprising of all, that 
in Argohs. we f m( j g0 little notice in the history of the 
b. c. 388 circ. war f ^hat state, which in fact among all the 
members of the Separate League lay nearest to the ven- 
geance of Sparta, and which from the first had taken 
part in the war with special ardor and with far-reach iug 
plans — viz. Argos. A strange contradiction is observa- 
ble in the history of this state. Argos with audacious 
arrogance extends her territory even beyond the Isthmus 
and asserts herself as' a new Peloponnesian great power, 
and yet on the other hand she lacks vigor and self-confi- 
dence for defending her own land against the neighbors 
whom she treats with such defiance. Accordingly, the 
Lacedaemonians being about to cross the frontier, the Ar- 
gives urged religious pretexts and ancient compacts be- 
tween the two neighbor-states ; they once more took ad- 
vantage of the festive month of Carneus and of other holy 
periods, in order to protect their threatened boundaries. 
The Spartans w T ere simple enough to respect Carneus, 
which patiently allowed itself to be moved backwards 
and forwards by the Argives ; and led back their troops, 
when the heralds, wearing their wreaths, came to meet 
them, and admonished them to stay their advance. 
Finally, however, they lost patience. They sought con- 
solation for their conscientious scruples at Olympia and 
Delphi ; and, after already Agesilaus had before the cap- 
ture of Lechseum invested Argolis, King Agesipolis in- 
vaded the country from Nemea, and devastated it. But 

chap, iv.] jfa Corinthian War. 267 

on this occasion also hearty spirit and vigorous action 
were wanting ; unfavorable omens occasioned a speedy 
retreat ; and in all her enterprises against Argos, Sparta 
seems incomprehensibly crippled. For the rest, Argos 
must after all have been more frequently a theatre of the 
war, than is generally assumed ; and doubtless many a 
fight occurred, as to which no more special information is 
forthcoming. Thus particularly at the village of CEnoe 
in the valley of the Charander on the road from Argos to 
Mantinea ; where a conflict of some importance must 
have taken place, of which we are without any precise 
account, in which the Argives, in combination with Attic 
auxiliaries, defeated the Lacedaemonians. In the absence 
of individual successes of this description, the bold ad- 
vance observable in the policy of the Argives, and the 
voluntary self-subordination of such a state as Corinth, 
would, moreover, be hardly intelligible.* 

The campaigns in Acarnania and Argolis situation 
had only a quite secondary significance for of s P arta - 
the main progress of the war. Its real decision had long 
ago passed into other quarters ; and the tardiness of the 
Spartans, who in the last years did nothing in order to 
bring about a change in the war by means of an import- 
ant armament, is doubtless connected with their having 
meanwhile entered upon a new course of policy, and 
hoping to be able to confront their enemy by more effective 
and certain means than mere military force. The Sepa- 
rate League itself was not their principal danger, for its 
strength had already been exhausted ; the greatest peril 
of all which had resulted from the years of war was 
rather the rebuilding of the walls of Athens. Hereby 

* For the chronology of the feuds in Acarnania and Argolis we have 
no information besides the sequence of events in Hellen. iv. 6 and 7. 
Andoc iii. 27, ISia kclI narpucri tiprjvrj (ancient Heraclidic treaties). 'Yno<f>epciv 
row? jui^a?, Hellen. iv. 7, 2. — Victory of the Athenians at CEnoe, Pans. i. 15 
1; x. 10, 4; ApopMh. Lac. var. 7; Kirchhoff, Gesch. d. gr. Alph. 202. With this 
event Xenophon concludes the Kara yrjv iroAe/xof. 

268 History of Greece. [Boo* v. 

the entire state of affairs in Greece had been once more 
changed, and all the gains of the Great War had been 
once more forfeited. The old enemy had regained a posi- 
tion of independence ; and, if the friendship between 
Conon and Pharnabazus was maintained, the Attic do- 
minion over the coasts might be imperceptibly revived, 
while Sparta was more incapable than ever before of re- 
sisting such a power as this. Against such perils the 
wild bravery of an Agesilaus could effect nothing. It 
was an occasion for the men of the school of Lysander to 
come to the rescue, in order to create a change in that 
quarter, from which the unfavorable alteration in the 
position of Sparta had originally proceeded. 

Antaicidas Agesilaus had no wish to change Sparta's 
at Sardis. course of action ; for in his eyes any negotia- 
/ 0L o^y L 4 tion with Persia was a denial of his heroic 

(b. c. 392). 

period, and a renunciation of all its fruits. 
But in opposition to him another party came into promi- 
nence, headed by Antaicidas, the son of Leon. To him 
it seemed foolish that Sparta should consume her strength 
in futile petty warfare, without being able to decide the 
main issue ; he urged that the power of the adversary 
should be attacked at its roots, and that the authority of 
Sparta should be re-established after the same fashion in 
which it had been founded by Lysander. Antaicidas 
himself became this new Lysander. He soon gained a 
considerable party, and, already before the capture of 
Lechaeum (p. 200), was sent by the Ephors to Sardis, in 
order at any cost to bring about a reconciliation, and a 
new combination between Persia and Sparta* As Ly- 
Tiribazus san der had found Cyrus, so Antaicidas found 

Tiribazus (formerly the satrap of Armenia, 
and since 392 the successor of Tithraustes), newly ap- 
pointed to the supreme command of the royal troops ; 
and in this instance again, as was so frequently the case, 
the new official was the reverse of satisfied with the policy 

chap, iv.] ^ e Corinthian War. 269 

of his predecessor. For, as a rule, the attitude to be as- 
sumed by the king's lieutenant-governors towards the 
most momentous questions was left to their personal dis» 
cretion ; and Persian policy determined itself, according 
as this satrap had been directly exposed to losses by the 
campaigns of Agesilaus, while that was trained up in the 
ancient traditions of hatred against Athens. Tiribazus 
was from the first well-inclined towards the Spartans, and 
as a loyal servant of his king was, from honest conviction, 
in favor of a combination with them. But hardly had 
he commenced to negotiate in this sense with Antalcidas, 
when from the opposite party too an embassy arrived, led 
by Conon, in order to operate against Antalcidas. It 
consisted of four Athenians, and, at the request of the 
Athenians, also of Boeotian, Corinthian, and Argive en- 
voys. Thus already in the year 392 the satrap's court at 
Sardis became the real arena of conflict between the bel- 

At this point the advantage was decidedly Pro ositiong 
on the side of Sparta ; and Antalcidas was the of Antalcidas. 
right man to make the best use of the favorable situation. 
The successes of his adversaries served him as the best 
handle for his schemes ; and in particular the new rise of 
Athens was made use of for an effective attack upon 
Sparta's most dangerous enemy. He sought to convince 
the satrap that Conon in his capacity as an officer of the 
Great King had kept nothing in view but the interests of 
his own city, and had unwarrantably abused the confi- 
dence reposed in him. For assuredly the moneys had not 
been granted from the treasury for the purpose of re- 
storing Athens as a great power, and of flattering the pride 
of the citizens, whose city had become powerful through 
the defeats of the Persians, and was filled with monu- 
ments of victory defrayed out of Persian spoils. But the 
intention of Antalcidas was not merely to deprive the 
Attic general of the satrap's confidence, which was all the 

270 History of Greece. [Book v. 

more easy to effect, inasmuch as at the same time the po- 
sition of Euagoras at the Persian court had likewise un- 
dergone a change, and had become one of hostility. He 
also contrived to represent to Tiribazus the true interests 
of Persia under a totally new point of view. It was easy 
to explain the defects of the policy which she had hith- 
erto pursued. Tissaphernes had been removed, and yet 
his principles had been recurred to ; for the course of 
action due to Pharnabazus and Tithraustes was in truth 
nothing but that which Alcibiades had of old counselled 
Tissaphernes to pursue; one party among the Greeks was 
supported against the other, in order that neither might 
be allowed to become powerful enough to inflict damage 
upon the empire. This principle implied that Persia 
should be constantly under arms, and should either carry 
on war herself, or cause it to be carried on for her pay ; 
in consequence of which she never enjoyed tranquillity. 
Surely, Antalcidas argued, it was far more correct to pro- 
vide for the non-existence of any Greek power dangerous 
to Persia. The sole cause of all danger for the empire 
lay in the oppression of individual Greek states by others, 
and in the consequent union under these of larger groups 
of cities, whose resources were thus placed at the disposal 
of their oppressors. But these acts of violence were 
equally opposed to the national wishes of the Hellenes 
and to the interests of the Great King ; they constituted 
the germ of endless quarrels, and of continuous agitation 
and interruption of commercial intercourse in the whole 
circle of the JEgean. In order, therefore, to put an end 
to these evils, the absolute independence of the individual 
Greek cities ought, with an intelligent view to the in- 
terests of all the riverain states, to be acknowledged as a 
principle of international law, and to be placed under the 
guardianship of the most powerful among the states. 
Thus alone could a real guarantee be secured for a last- 
ing peace ; and by their unreserved acceptance of this 

chap, iv.] The Corinthian War. 271 

principle the true friends of the King and of peace would 
be tested. 

It is easy to perceive, how cunningly this exposition 
was calculated for the advantage of Sparta. Her position 
in Peloponnesus was not endangered by the principle 
advanced ; for nominally her confederates were to retain 
their independence ; but any extension of power hostile to 
Sparta was thereby designated as illegal, and abolished. 
In the event of the adoption of these views Argos would 
have to let go Corinth (which, it will be remembered, was 
the principal end of the exertions of the Corinthian fugi- 
tives, to whom doubtless an essential share may be 
ascribed in the proposals of Antalcidas) ; and again 
Thebes, the provincial towns of Bceotia ; and Athens, the 
islands still remaining to her, viz. Lemnos, Imbros, and 
Scyros, which at this very moment she was again regard- 
ing as the nucleus of a new Confederacy. And Sparta 
was not only the solitary state, the existing limits of whose 
dominion were not imperilled by the present peace-propo- 
sals, but she could in secret calculate upon having, in 
conjunction with the Great King, to take the second place 
as guardian over their execution, and upon finding therein 
an opportunity of providing for her own dominion, so soon 
as she should have humiliated and materially weakened 
the adverse states. For this reason Sparta unhesitatingly 
assumed the standpoint of Persian interests, so that Hel- 
lenic interests were altogether left out of the question ; for 
this reason too no independence was claimed, as towards 
the Persians, for the Asiatic cities, on whose behalf Sparta 
had quite recently been engaged in war. 

The immediate object was completely gained. Tiribazus 
on the present occasion was not less blind to the real 
designs of the Lacedaemonians, than others had formerly 
been with regard to the intentions of Conon ; the satrap 
was delighted with these proposals, the execution of which 
seemed at last to render possible a settled and advan- 

272 History of Greece. [Book v, 

tageous policy on the part of Persia in the Archipelago. 
When the envoys of the other states uttered their pro- 
tests, he saw in them only the expression of hostile senti- 
e f rnents, and the full confirmation of the repre- 
Couon. sentations of Antalcidas. Conon on the other 

(b^'S. 1 * 4 nan d he treated not as an envoy, but as a 
royal official, bound to answer the charge rest- 
ing upon him of abusing the king's confidence, and caused 
him to be placed under arrest, notwithstanding that he 
had been cautious enough not to dispose of the Persian 
moneys on his own responsibility, but only to spend them 
after arriving at an understanding on the subject with 
Pharnabazus. Antalcidas, on the other hand, now re- 
ceived a supply of money ; and Tiribazus repaired to 
Susa, in order to gain acceptance for his views in the 
quarter where the ultimate decision lay. 

The negotiations, however, progressed less favorably 

than they had begun. The design of Tiribazus, of bring. 

... . ing about a sudden and complete change in 

Opposition to ° * © 

Antalcidas. Persian policy, met with eager opposition. 
The devastating campaigns of Agesilaus were still too 
freshly remembered, and in particular the Great King 
himself was still to the highest degree wroth with the 
Lacedaemonians, who, although they owed their successes 
in Greece to nothing but Persian support, had yet turned 
their offensive force against Persia, in order to retake 
from the empire those very cities of the coast, of which 
the treaties with Sparta were intended to guarantee the 
secure retention. Of this state of feeling at court the op- 
ponents of the new system of policy seem to have availed 
themselves, in order to detain Tiribazus for a considerable 
time from returning to Asia Minor, and in his place to 
establish at Sardis, as commander-in-chief over the mari- 
time provinces, an adherent of Pharnabazus, 

Struthas. « TT 

Struthas by name. He was a warlike and 
energetic man, who made it a point of honor to take ven- 

chap, iv.] pfe Corinthian War. 273 

geance upon the Spartans for the calamities brought by 
them upon the royal dominions. From first to last, he re- 
garded the Athenians as the King's allies ; and it was 
probably he who brought about the liberation of Conon 
from his imprisonment. 

This change amounted to a defeat for An- New under . 
talcidas, who had already deemed himself so ^ iugs by 
near to his goal ; and it is natural that the 01. xcvii. 1 
party adverse to him at Sparta should have 
again taken courage. They demanded that the satrap, 
whose sentiments were hostile to Sparta, should also be 
openly treated as an enemy, and that troops should be 
sent to Ephesus. Inasmuch as the treasures brought 
home by Agesilaus had by this time been spent, the pros- 
pect of new booty was very tempting. Without Persian 
money it was absolutely impossible to do anything effec- 
tive ; if therefore it was not offered in the shape of subsi- 
dies, it must be sought as booty of war. In the begin- 
ning of the year 391 B. c. Thibron was despatched with a 
squadron to Ephesus, in order to recommence a series of 
campaigns in the style of Agesilaus. But he found an 
adversary, such as he had by no means ex- Death of 
pected, in Struthas. During a negligently- Thibron. 
managed foray Thibron was surprised, and cut down with 
a considerable number of troops.* 

Simultaneously the conflict broke out at a wide variety 
of points. The Athenians were intent upon once more 
collecting a body of confederates, and appropriating to 
themselves the fruits of the victory of Cnidus ; while the 
Spartans, on the other hand, desired to take from them 
the positions which they had gained. At the head of the 

' * An talcidas the opponent of Agesilaus : Plut. Ages. 23 ; Apophth. Lac. Ages. 
60 (Herbst, p. 699, denies the existence of political opposition between 
them). First mission, b. c. 392 circ. : Xen. Hellen. iv. 8, 12 ; Kirehner, 35. 
Coins of Tiribazus, Brandis, 353 f. Struthas : Hellen. iv. 8, 17. Some stated 
Conon to have lost his life at court ; " Dinon . . . efFugisse scripsit" (proba- 
bly by the contrivance of Struthas): Nep. Conon, 5. His death at Cyprus: 
cf. Rauchenstein ad Lys. xix. 39. 


274 History of Greece. [Book V. 

Teieutias Spartan forces stood the two brothers, who 
mander 0rn were the leaders of the war-party, Agesilaus 
and Teieutias ; for the latter, the successor of 
the unfortunate Pisander, was from 393 b. c, during a se- 
ries of years, either nauarch, or commander of individual 
squadrons. After a long interval he was the first capa- 
ble man, to whom ships of war could be entrusted, a 
popular leader in war, the favorite of the ships' crews, 
and distinguished by effective eloquence, as well as reso- 
lute in action. It was Teieutias who brought about the 
fall of Lechseum, and who restored the Spartan suprema- 
cy in the Corinthian Gulf (p. 261) ; while another squad- 
ron under Ecdicus, the nauarch of the year 391 b. c. (01. 
xcvii. 1-2), set sail for Rhodes, in order to recover this 
island, with the defection of which the calamitous course 
of events by sea had commenced. 

Position of Thus, in its fourth year, the Bceoto-Corin- 
fieUjw in thian War had become a naval war, against 
which the scene of the conflict on the Isth- 
mus fell into the shade. On both sides vigorous prepara- 
tions were made and great plans pursued, without, how- 
ever, any genuine confidence existing on either. Exter- 
nal influences had kindled the war, external resources had 
made possible the armaments of the League ; but now 
these resources ran dry, and the struggle could only be 
continued by sacrifices brought by the members of the 
League themselves; and for these there was but slack 
readiness, in proportion as the prospect of a safe success 
diminished. In fact, a common object in the prosecution 
of the war was wanting. For when the universal indigna- 
tion against Sparta had come to an outbreak, all had been 
united in their desire to humiliate Sparta, but in nothing 
else ; for in all other respects the several points of view 
greatly differed. The moderate parties at Athens and 
Thebes desired nothing beyond securing the independence 
of their states ; while the war party at Argos and Corinth 

chap, iv.] The Corinthian War. 275 

necessarily looked to an annihilation of the Spartan 
power ; for so long as there yet existed a Sparta possessed 
of any degree of strength, she could not possibly re* 
nounce her hegemony over Peloponnesus. Among the 
members of the League the Argives were, accordingly, 
the most eager in the prosecution of the war ; they de- 
manded that the struggle should be continued, until Spar- 
ta had been forced to accord perfect freedom of movement 
to the states of the peninsula. In Athens there likewise 
existed a party which adhered to the views of the Ar- 
gives, and which opined that the power of Sparta must be 
thoroughly broken, if a new future was to open for 
Athens : but the same city also contained a very con- 
siderable peace-party ; and among the statesmen of the 
latter tendency the most important was Andocides (p. 158). 
He belonged to a house in which this poli- . , . , 

o i Andocides 

tical tendency was a family-tradition. His head of ^ 

J J peace-party 

grandfather Andocides had helped to conclude at Athens - 
the Thirty Years' Peace (vol. ii. p. 451) ; his uncle Epily- 
cus had taken part in an embassy to Persia, probably the 
same of which Callias was the head (vol. ii. p. 454).* 
The younger Andocides likewise actively worked from his 
youth upwards in the spirit of his ancestors. For already 
as a young man under thirty years of age he was a spokes- 
man of the aristocratic circles, and opposed to the popu- 
lar orators, who were endeavoring to overthrow the Peace 
of Nicias immediately after its conclusion, and bringing 
about combinations with the Peloponnesian states (vol. iii. 
p. 333). To this standpoint he adhered, however far he 
was in other respects from being a man of character ; and 
at the present conjuncture he advocated, as he had thirty 
years before, those Athenian interests which demanded a 
secession from the Separate League and an agreement with 
Sparta. The circumstances of the times were in his favor. 
The fighting had continued for four years, without the 

* Epilycus : Hiecke, de pace Oimon. 9 ; Kirchner, 69. 

276 History of Greece. L Bo °* V 

Leaguers having as yet been successful in any set battle. 
At that time Iphicrates had not yet had any opportunity 
of achieving any brilliant stroke. The capture of Le- 
chseum had reopened the Corinthian passes ; the fortifica- 
tion of Athens was still uncompleted ; and the issue of 
the war on the Isthmus was less certain than ever before, 
particularly since Teleutias controlled the waters of the 
Corinthian Gulf. But neither was the advantage to such 
a degree with the Lacedaemonians, that they had reason 
to pitch their demands excessively high. Their prospects 
of Persian aid had been frustrated ; Thibron had fallen ; 
in Rhodes, their plans remained unaccomplished. They 
were accordingly obliged to renounce their ulterior schemes 
of dominion, and in the first instance to look to separat- 
ing the members of the League, in order to arrest the re- 
vulsions which had taken place in Peloponnesus, to humi- 
liate Argos, and to become master again at home. 
Peace- Of this state of affairs the peace-party at 

Elt g ween ions Athens most effectually availed itself. An 
s ^rta 9 and embassy was sent to Sparta, headed by Ando- 
(b X 39i)' 2 c id es ' He succeeded in causing negotiations 
to be once more opened with Athens, as with 
a power of equal rank ; the two states were to set the ex- 
ample by concluding peace, and then to call upon the 
rest to accede to it. Among the several points the inde- 
pendence of the Greek states was again primarily insisted 
upon — a clause of course aimed at Corinth and Boeotian 
Orchomenus — while, in order to anticipate any interpre- 
tation of this point unfavorable to Sparta, the status quo 
of her possessions was expressly acknowledged ; and simi- 
larly that of the Athenian, inclusive of Lemnos, Imbros, 
and Scyros. And in particular the Athenians were to be 
permitted to complete their fortifications, and also to pro- 
vide themselves with as many ships of war as they chose 
to build. 

With this treaty Andocides returned home, in order to 

Chap, iv.] The Corinthian War. 211 

recommend its adoption to the citizens ; it was to be rati- 
fied on the fortieth day. He with reason thought that his 
was a great achievement ; for Sparta had renounced her 
absolute hegemony, Athens was once more a Great Power^ 
and the shame of the last peace was thus expiated. And 
yet Andocides found that he had not satisfied either par- 
ty. The one was wroth that he had not availed himself 
of his powers to conclude peace definitively at Sparta. 
The other was altogether averse from peace of any kind, 
refusing to possess walls and ships by the grace of Sparta, 
and to be restricted to the three islands ; finally, it appre- 
hended danger to the constitution from any and every ap- 
proximation to Sparta. 

Andocides defended his handiwork and his Andocide8 
point of view. He demonstrated to the citi- ? B e c P 39f\ 
zens, how the history of Athens, more impres- Autumn - 
sively than that of any other city, taught the evils of war 
and the blessings of peace. Every successive peace which 
had been concluded (for the unhappy capitulation after 
the defeat at iEgospotami ought not to be regarded as one 
of the number) had been the starting-point of a happy 
period of progress, and of a rapid rise to prosperity and 
power. A rational policy demanded the preservation of 
amicable relations with the strong : but the perversity of 
the Athenians consisted in their tendency to quarrel with 
the great states, and to ally themselves with the small : 
thus Amorges had been preferred as an ally to the Great 
King (vol. iii. p. 347), the Egestseans to the Syracusans, 
and the Argives to the Spartans. The designs of the Ar- 
gives, who wished with the aid of Athens to retain Co- 
rinth, and who were continually urging their allies to the 
prosecution of the war, while they sought in every way to 
cover their own position, could only be realized by means 
of a complete victory over Sparta ; for which purpose 
there were no sufficient resources, while Persia would never 
permit its accomplishment. The full measure of condi* 

278 History of Greece. l BooK v 

tions of peace which Athens could expect at the end of 
a war in which victory remained with the enemy, was now 
offered to it. Let the Athenians be weary of their new 
friends, and remember who it was that after the catas- 
trophe of the city proposed its destruction (vol. iii. p. 570), 
and to whom it had then owed its preservation. The The- 
bans, he said, were likewise now inclined to peace. If, 
then, the Athenians were in any event determined upon 
war, let them earnestly reflect, whether they were willing 
to bear all its sacrifices without deriving any advantage 
from it themselves, in order to enable the Argives to at- 
tain to their selfish ends. 

Andocides was therefore recurring to the principles of 
Cimon, when he desired to see the affairs of Hellas ar- 
ranged by means of a mutual understanding between the 
two great states ; he desired, like Pericles, to see, even as 
towards the Barbarians, relations established by treaty, 
under which the trade in the ^Egean could undisturbedly 
develop itself. And, doubtless, a peace-policy of this de- 
scription was at no time better justified than at the pre- 
sent, when Athens was utterly incapable of asserting her- 
self as a military Power, being without a treasure, with- 
out a navy, without a civic community ready to make sa- 
crifices, and without trustworthy allies. Moreover the 
combinations between Antalcidas and Tiribazus were not 
unknown ; and most assuredly it was in accordance with 
the real interests of Athens, that Andocides should use 
his utmost exertions for preventing a one-sided agreement 
between Sparta and Persia. Athens had providentially 
gained disproportionately much in return for slight con- 
cessions ; there was at present absolutely no prospect of 
her obtaining more ; and it was therefore advisable to se- 
cure as speedily as possible the advantages due to Conon. 
XT .. .. Such was the wish of Andocides. But he 


broken off. failed to convince the citizens. He was not a 

s. c. 391. 

man generally trusted. The fact that he in* 

chap, iv.] The Corinthian War. 279 

clined towards Sparta made him unpopular ; and against 
him there were the Boeotian party and the Democrats 
proper, who regarded hostility against Sparta as a pledge 
of civic liberty. Many may in addition have entertained 
hopes of Persian subsidies ; and it is likewise permissible 
to assume, that ambitious men, such as Thrasybulus and 
Iphicrates, were anxious not to be deprived of the oppor- 
tunity for brilliant feats of arms. And, most especially, 
the question of the Thracian Chersonesus was kept in 
View. The Athenians wished to see their possessions there 
recognized by Sparta ; while Sparta on the other hand 
had no intention of renouncing the Hellespont, of which 
she had in recent years come clearly to perceive the im- 
portance for the supremacy at sea. In short, the treaty 
negotiated by Andocides was not ratified ; and Andocidcs 
himself was charged with having abused his pow r ers, and 
banished. The conflict broke forth again Banishment 
with renewed vehemence. It was at this time of Andocides. 
that there ensued the devastation of the mountainous dis- 
trict in the Corinthian territory (p. 261) ; and that Iphicra- 
tes proved his new style of tactics by annihilating the Lace- 
daemonian mora, a success which induced the Thebans like- 
wise to break off their peace-negotiations with Agesilaus.* 
But the most momentous events took place by sea. 
Teleutias received orders to promote the enterprise at 
Rhodes. Delighted to gain a wider theatre Maritime 
of action, he quitted the Corinthian Gulf, ggjjJ&Suw 
sailed across the Archipelago, seized Samos 01. xcvii. 3 
for Sparta, and captured ten Attic vessels (BC ' 

* Party-pamphlet of Andocides, dating from the years 420-15: Hermes, i. 5. 
The genuineness of Andocides' speech de pace (upon which doubts are 
already cast by Pionysius) is contended for by Boeckh, Publ. Ec. oj Ath., vol. 
i. p. 237 [Eng. Trans.]; Grote, Hist, of Greece, vol. ix. p. 475; Kirchner, de 
Andoc. &c. To the embassy of Andocides, Philochorus testifies in the 
Argument to the Oration. There are errors with reference to earlier 
history (as also in Demosth.), but there is no contradiction against the 
political situation of the year 391 ; not even with respect to the walls, to the 
love of peace prevalent at Thebes, and to the wish of the Corinthians 
definitively to acquire (cAe^) Argos. Cf. Hertzberg, u. s. p. 294. 

280 History of Greece. [ B °o* v. 

which had been sent to the aid of Euagoras. Athens, 
who in consequence of the victory of Cnidus still looked 
upon herself as the mistress of the seas, found herself sud- 
denly scared out of her sense of security. Thrasybulus, 
after having been for some time cast into the shade by 
Conon, was now once more the foremost man in Athens, and 
the leader of the war-party : to him was entrusted the first 
considerable fleet, which Athens after her restoration was 
able to equip, consisting of forty vessels, with which he 
was to oppose the Spartans in the Rhodian Sea. In the 
spring of the year 390 B. c. (01. xcvii. 2) he weighed an- 
chor in the Pineeus. But instead of sailing to Rhodes, 
he took a northward course, into the Thracian waters, 
into those regions the importance of which had come 
under consideration during the last peace-negotiations, 
and had probably been specially insisted upon by Thra- 
sybulus himself, as one of the leading opponents of Ando- 
cides. In this quarter he displayed a great activity lead- 
ing to important results ; entered into advantageous com- 
binations with the Thracian princes as well as with the 
democratic parties in the maritime cities; in this way 
secured Byzantium and Chalcedon ; re-established the 
levy of sound-dues at Chrysopolis (vol. iii. p. 501), and 
farmed them out ; and after this returned to the ^Egean. 
In Lesbos a Spartan Harmost still held sway. Thrasybu- 
lus defeated him, and gained over to the side of Athens 
the island cities, with the exception of Methymna. In 
the following spring he continued his course further south, 
but not even now to Rhodes, although the most urgent 
instructions reached him from Athens, bidding him hasten 
to the assistance of the Rhodians, who were hard pressed. 
He preferred to harry the coasts of Caria, chiefly, as may 
be surmised, because he had himself to provide for the 
maintenance of his troops, and was therefore unable to 
enter into any serious warfare, offering no opportunity for 
booty. The discontent aroused by his self-willed proceed' 

chap, iv.l f} ie Corinthian War. 281 

ings became, however, more intense at Athens from day to 
day; bitter complaints reached the city from men con- 
nected with it as confederates or by relations of hospitality, 
and from Athenian citizens, whom he had subjected to ill- 
treatment : the party adverse to him stimulated the feel- 
ing against him and against his colleague Ergocles; he 
was accused of having, at the instigation of Ergocles, 
conceived the plan of establishing himself with his troops 
at Byzantium, in order by virtue of his position there, in 
combination with his Thracian following, to defy the 
orders of the civic assembly, and to create for himself an 
independent power. Doubtless the main blame rested 
upon Ergocles, who was immediately summoned home, to 
give an account of his proceedings ; while Thrasybulus 
was for the present allowed to retain his command, until 
he should have accomplished his task in Rhodes ; but 
before he reached that island, he met with his Death of 
death on the Eurymedon, in the territory of Thrasybulus. 
the city of Aspendus, whose soldiers slew him in his tent 
on the occasion of a nocturnal surprise. The ships were 
conducted to Rhodes by Agyrrhius.* 

Meanwhile the Spartans had been induced F rthe 

by the naval armaments of Athens, and by naval feuds. 
the exploits of Thrasybulus, to arm in their 01 - XCYii - \ 
turn. They directed their attention to two 
favorably situated points-, in order to employ them 
as military positions against Athens, — viz. Ab . 
Abydus and iEgina. In Abydus, Dercyllidas 
had maintained himself with great skill (p. 255). Anax- 
ibius was put in his place, to break the power which 
Athens had newly obtained there, and to destroy the 
Attic trade. Iphicrates was despatched against him with 

* As to the campaign~of Thrasybulus in 390 b. c. and the following year, 
cf. Frohberger, Philol. xvii. 439. As to the indictment of Ergocles after the 
death of Thrasybulus : Lys. 28 and 29. Sound-dues : Boeckh, P. Ec. of Ath, 
Vol. ii. p. 39 [Er.g. Tr.]. 

282 History of Greece. £Boo* V. 

eight vessels and 1,200 peltasts, and, laying a well-con' 
trived ambush against him near Abydus, slew him to- 
gether with many of his followers. 

and m nna. ^ ar more threatening were the attacks from 

iEgina. For here, to the extreme terror of 
the Athenians, the sea once more proved to be as insecure 
as it had been of old before the Persian Wars. Sparta 
instructed the islanders, whom she had re-established in 
JSgina, to equip privateers for harassing the opposite 
coasts. An Attic besieging force was surrounded before 
iEgina ; nor was it until after several considerable losses, 
that Chabrias, on his way to Cyprus, succeeded in landing 
unexpectedly in the island, killing the Harmost Gorgopas, 
and once more open in the sea to the Athenians. But 
no lasting security was obtained ; the Lacedaemonians sent 
Teleutias to .iEgina, where he animated the seamen with 
new courage, and was able to venture a surprise of the 
Piraeeus ; on which occasion, after his troops had pene- 
trated as far as the magazines of the port, they made 
their way back unhurt, and laden with rich spoils. 

Approxima- Thus fighting went on in the widest variety 
Sparta eUV aud °f localities ; but nowhere was anything deci- 
Persia. g j ve e ff ec ted. On the other hand an essential 

b. c.388. change gradually ensued in the mutual rela- 
tion of the parties. The Athenians had entirely sepa- 
rated themselves from the allies with whom they had 
originally entered into the Bceoto-Corinthian War ; the 
struggle for the passes of the Isthmus had become a naval 
feud, in which Athens, restored by means of Persian sub- 
sidies, was intent upon securing the advantages gained by 
the Persian naval victory. But in the course of this feud 
the Athenians had unintentionally become involved in a 
war against Persia, finding it obligatory upon them, in 
consequence of the benefits received from Euagoras, to 
support that prince in his revolt, and together with him 
Egypt, which had likewise risen. Sparta on the other 

«ap. iv.j The Corinthian War. 283 

hand, which had formerly been allied with Egypt against 
Artaxerxes (p. 253), and which had recently sent Thibron 
and Diphridas to Ephesus, to make war upon Persia, had 
in its political conduct followed an opposite current. For 
while the Spartan land-forces were still fighting against 
the Persians, the naval commanders of Sparta were cap- 
turing the Attic vessels, intended to support the revolt 
in Cyprus ; and finally, in the year 388 b. c. (01. 
xcvii. 4), Sparta created Antalcidas commander-in-chief 
of her naval forces, and thereby made manifest her 
wish to resume negotiations with the court of the Great 

Antalcidas had never renounced his schemes. He per- 
ceived how his designs were favored by the incautious 
proceedings of the Athenians, and took advantage of 
these proceedings for his purposes, just as Conon had six 
years previously turned to account for his ends the ex- 
peditions of Agesilaus. At the same time his patron 
Tiribazus had recovered authority and influence. It was 
no longer possible at Susa to refuse to recognize the fact, 
that the policy proposed by Antalcidas was the most ad- 
vantageous which Persia could adopt. The feeling of 
aversion from Sparta was outweighed by the desire of 
satisfying the demands of the coast-provinces. It was 
necessary for the Persians to be undisturbed by the 
Greeks, if they were to direct their whole strength against 
Cyprus and Egypt; for the combination between these 
two dangerous powers could not but in the highest degree 
claim the attention of the Great King. Accordingly, the 
Spartan admiral was most favorably received at court ; 
all his propositions were approved ; and he was now 
solely intent upon inducing the Athenians also speedily, 
and without entering into further conflicts, to accept the 
peace. And in this he succeeded all the more easily, 
because the Athenians had scattered their slight offensive 
resources, and were continuing the war without energy 

284 History of Greece. t BooK * 

. , . . Antalcidas at once repaired to the Helles- 

Antaloidas x 

commands p 0n t ; relieved Abydus ; took eight vessels 
from Thrasybulus (of Collytus); and then 
collected reinforcements in such numbers from 
the Persian ports and from Sicily, that at the head of a 
fleet of eighty vessels he controlled the sea. Athens, un- 
certain of the command of her own waters in consequence 
of the JEginetan privateers, and now moreover deprived 
of supplies from the Pontus, and incapable of equipping 
a fleet able to defy her enemies, had to look forward to a 
new siege and famine. All the terrors of the year 405 
rose before the eyes of the citizens, while the advantages 
to be expected from the alliance with Cyprus and Egypt 
lay in the remote distance, and the amicable relations 
which had begun to be established with Dionysius had 
likewise again been absolutely reversed. Thus, not one 
of the orators ventured to recommend the continuation 
of the war. Thebes was exhausted as to both public and 
private resources, and incapable of sustaining any longer 
the incessant feud with Orchomenus. Argos and Corinth 
could not alone and unassisted defy the foe. Sparta 
herself, on the other hand, though issuing forth successful 
and victorious out of all the troubles of the war, could 
not possibly think of immediately using her present su- 
periority for the oppression of the other states ; for her 
power was solely based on the support of the Great King, 
and this support had only been accorded to her for the 
purpose of putting an end to the war which hindered 
Persia in her undertakings, and which fed the Cyprian 
revolt. Therefore neither was Sparta for the present in- 
terested in anything beyond taking advantage of the uni- 
versal exhaustion of the belligerent states, so as to bring 
about with all possible speed a peace-congress 

Peace-eon- r x x ° 

cress at an( j a general Hellenic disarmament. The 

Sardis. ° 

... congress was to take place at Sardis, whither 
(b. c. 387). Tiribazus caused the envoys to be summoned 

chap, iv.j The Corinthian War. 285 

Hereby Sparta immediately secured a twofold advantage, 
In the first place, she might assume that the authority of 
the Great King would contribute materially to facilitate 
the consummation of the peace, because every manifesta- 
tion of opposition must now appear in the light of an act 
of hostility against that power, which was most feared on 
account of its fleet and of its pecuniary resources : it was 
the only power, which during the entire course of the war 
had uniformly been successful and victorious. Again, the 
states adverse to Sparta were in the Persian empire not 
looked upon as members of a League, entitled after a war 
carried on in common to offer conditions in common, but 
simply as individual states, bound, not less than Sparta 
herself, to submit to a general regulation of Greek affairs. 
Hereby the position of Sparta became a far more favora- 
ble one. And that Persia was the regulator of the new 
order of things, was to a certain extent justifiable by the 
fact, that a Persian distribution of money had provoked 
the entire land-war, while the main decision by sea, the 
single decisive battle of the whole struggle, had been a 
victory gained by the Persian fleet. 

The conditions of peace were those original- The 
ly drawn up by Antalcidas, from which they 'l^ 1 °® ( j >f » 
only differed in according more favorable 
terms to Athens. At the previous congress, held at Sar- 
dis (p. 256), the most strenuous opposition had been 
offered by Athens ; for Athens was the one state, where 
the principle was still upheld, that it was shameful to sac- 
rifice Hellenes to the barbarians ; the one state, in fine, 
whose troops still stood under arms ; and moreover Cha- 
brias was operating with success in Cyprus, and the revolt 
there might possibly be very useful to the Athenians. 
Their connexion with Euagoras had therefore above all 
to be terminated ; and this was one of the main objects 
of the Persians in the entire transactions concerning the 
peace. For this reason those concessions upon which 

286 History of Greece. [Book v. 

the Athenians had especially insisted at the previous 
meeting of envoys, were now granted to them, — viz., the 
possessions of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros. These islands 
had not been taken from the Persians ; and might be re- 
garded as legitimately acquired, as portions of Attica sit- 
uate on the further side of the sea. Accordingly, the in- 
strument of the peace was drawn up in the following 
terms : — 

' King Artaxerxes deems it just, that the cities in Asia 
should belong to him, and, of the islands, Clazomense and 
Cyprus : the remaining Hellenic states on the other hand, 
both great and small, are to be independent ; only Lem- 
nos, Imbros, and Scyros are, as of old, to belong to the 
Athenians. Whichsoever states shall not accept this 
peace, upon them I shall, in conjunction with those who 
accept it, make war by land and by sea, with ships and 
with money/ 

Con ress ^ e instrument of this peace was a master- 
at Sparta, piece of diplomatic skill. Seemingly clear 
°| B *cvUi. and simple, it yet had a meaning which only 
those who saw deeper could justly appreciate. 
In the first place it was drawn up in such terms, as com- 
pletely to satisfy the Great King : to him, as the victor 
of Cnidus, was awarded the chief gain, in the recognition 
of his absolute dominion over Asia Minor and Cyprus. 
Next, according to the words of the treaty, the interest of 
the members of the League against Sparta was also taken 
into account ; for their struggle had for its object the 
destruction of the despotism of Sparta over Greece, and 
this was abolished by full power of self-government being 
secured to all the Greek states. But in what way this 
stipulation was to be understood, was not made a subject 
of discussion at Sardis. Tiribazus contented himself with 
laying the royal message before the assembled envoys as 
the immutable basis of the peace ; but its execution was 

chap, iv.] The Corinthian War, 287 

left to the Hellenic states ; and for this purpose a second 
congress was convoked at Sparta, and probably held be- 
fore the summer of the year 387 b. c. had come to a 

At Sparta the discussions were more animated than 
they had been in the palace of the satrap ; for it was now 
that the real significance of the second article „ 

o Execution 

of the treaty came to be debated. Sparta at of the treat y- 
this congress appeared in the character of the state en- 
trusted by Persia with the execution of the treaty ; for 
although it had been carefully and prudently avoided 
explicitly to assign to her such a position, yet it was 
tacitly assumed that upon the state which had taken an 
immediate share in the drawing up of the instrument, and 
which enjoyed the full confidence of the Persian Court, 
rested the obligation of watching over the execution of the 
compact; and its last clause contained a sufficiently clear 
promise, that in the event of any opposition Sparta might 
count upon energetic assistance in arms and in money 
from Persia. The Persian message was now translated 
into Lacedaemonian ; and its terms were, that all the re- 
cent attempts on the part of individual states to oppress 
others were opposed to the autonomy of the Greek com- 
munities, as guaranteed by the treaty of peace, and were 
therefore invalid : consequently, Argos was declared 
to be bound to renounce her hold upon Corinth, and 
Thebes her territorial sovereignty over the Thebes 
cities of Boeotia. Scenes of the utmost violence 
ensued. The Thebans desired to be heard as representing 
the entire district of Boeotia ; and their envoys were in- 

* Grote {Hist, of Gr. vol. ix. p. 535) rightly distinguishes between the first 
and the second congress, although such a distinction is nowhere drawn by 
the ancients; but see Hellen. v. 1, 30 ff. The treaty was concluded at Sardes 
under the presidency of Tiribazus, nineteen years after iEgospotami ; Diod. 
xiv. 110, 117. Terms of the treaty; Plut. Art. 21 ; cf. Justin, vi. 6. Xenophon 
is quite satisfied with the treaty, Hellen v. 1, 3G ; Ages. ii. 21. Otherwise 
Plutarch, Artax. 21. 

288 History of Greece. E BooK v - 

structed only to sign the treaty as Boeotians. But an 
immediate armament on the part of the Spartans forced 
them to give way. Orchomenus was recognized as an 
independent state ; and orders were likewise given for the 
restoration of Platsea.* 

Ar og Argos met with the same treatment. The 

Argives could appeal to the fact, that Corinth 
\ had joined them of her own free will ; and it was inexpli- 
cable, why a state should not by virtue of its autonomy 
also enjoy the right of uniting itself with a neighboring 
state. But the Spartans refused to see in this hated 
union anything but an illegal act of violence, which had 
been merely facilitated by a party at Corinth. They im- 
mediately levied an army, for the purpose of invading 
Argos ; the Argives, in their helplessness, were obliged to 
give way, and to withdraw their garrison from Corinth* 
whither the exiles now returned, who, after having during 
a term of six years pursued their ends with admirable 
energy, now brought their intrigue to the happiest of con- 
summations : they were, so it was said at Sparta, received 
with open arms by their fellow-countrymen ; L e., their 
return was viewed in the light of a termination of the 
terrorism exercised by a small party, and as a restoration, 
after a long interval, of the lawful order of things. The 
adverse party had to decamp ; the petty state was restored 
within its ancient boundaries ; and Corinth, united with 
the Lacedaemonians more firmly than ever, once more 
acted in their interest as the gate-keeper of the Peninsula. 
g . nifi _ Thus it is evident, how the tame and harm- 

cance of the J^g articles of the treatv of peace concealed a 

Peace of » * 

Antaicidas. bristling zeal for war; and Agesilaus was 
above all active in giving proof of this spirit. A recon- 
ciliation had taken place between him and the party of 
Antaicidas, when the treaty concluded by the latter proved 
to be not a shield behind which Sparta was fain to crouch, 

* Restoration of the Platseans, Paus. ix. 1, 4. 

chap, iv.] The Corinthian War. 289 

hut a sharp sword against her enemies. Upon the most 
defiant among them a heavy blow had once descended ; 
and there lay a bitter truth in the saying, whereby he 
excused the Spartans for their relations towards the Great 
King — it could not be said, he declared, that Sparta was 
medizing ; rather this was the state of the case, that the 
King of the Medcs was laconizing. So effectually had the 
Great King, without intending it, served the interests of 
Sparta ; just as in the earlier treaty with Conon, he had 
provided for Athens, when desirous only of providing for 

There was however, after all, a great difference between 
the two cases. Conon had entered the Persian service as 
a private individual, and had employed his influence 
patriotically ; whereas now, at the instigation of Sparta, 
Persia was formally acknowledged as the power whom it 
behooved to settle the affairs of Greece. An entirely new 
code of public law had been called into life, a new sys- 
tem of states, of which the centre of gravity lay at Susa. 
Persia was henceforth the Great Power proper, and the 
great states of Greece had become* states of secondary 
rank, standing in a relation of vassalage towards Persia, 
whose will they had to obey, and against whose will they 
were not allowed to alter their relations towards one 
another. The Great King was now the overlord of Hel- 
las. He summoned congresses of the Greek states, whose 
deputies humbly accepted his imperial orders ; in all in- 
ternal disputes which seemed to him <?f sufficient im- 
portance, he might intervene by word and by action, 
while the ultimate appeal lay to his decision ; every viola- 
tion of the peace was an act of revolt against the recog- 
nized lord and master. 

This relation was the necessary result of the policy pur- 
sued by the Greeks. Already at the beginning of the 
Peloponnesian War Sparta had courted the favor of the 

Persians (vol. iii. p. 75), and Athens had followed her 

290 History of Greece. t Bo0K v 

example. On either side it had become more and more 
habitual to allow success to depend upon the attitude of 
the Great King ; and thus Persia, though suffering from 
internal disruption, conquered in every battle which she 
had fought, and driven back from every coast, had by her 
conquerors been placed in her present position, of having 
to give the ultimate decision in the struggle between the 
Greek states. The overthrow of Athens was the work of 
Persia, and equally so was the restoration of Athenian in- 
dependence. Already in these times it was a popular 
proverb in Greece, that " the fate of the Hellenes lies in 
the hands of the King;" and the relation herein ex- 
pressed, which had as a matter of fact long been in ex- 
istence, was now by the Peace of Antalcidas formally 
recognized and legalized. Herewith the glorious age of 
the War of Liberation was virtually at an end, while the 
direct reverse of that which had been gained at Salamis, 
Platan, and Mycale, had come to prevail ; for the Per- 
sians had in the end after all achieved the objects for 
which they had of old sent their hosts into Hellas. What 
had Mardonius demanded beyond the recognition of a 
Persian protectorate in Greece ; and was not European 
Greece now avowedly in a relation of dependence towards 
the Persian coast ? With regard to Asiatic Greece on the 
other hand, the principle, from which Persia had never 
swerved, that to her belonged all the coast-lands of Asia 
Minor, was now solemnly acknowledged by all the Greeks. 
Hellas on the hither, and Hellas on the further, side of 
the sea had once more been torn asunder, and for the first 
time since the battle of Mycale the Great King was abso- 
lute master over Asia Minor ; he had in his hands all the 
ports, and disposed for his purposes over the men and 
ships and pecuniary resources of the cities, which he 
needed at the present moment more than ever, in order to 
restore his power in Cyprus and Egypt. The unfortunate 
cities, after being so often freed, without ever becoming 

Chap. IV.] f^ Q yr i n ^ an War 291 

free, because it had invariably been their fate to serve the 
purposes of whatever state happened to command the sea, 
now fell under a dominion, which was the opposite of the 
gentle and indulgent treatment formerly experienced by 
them at the hands of Mardonius and Cyrus. They were 
made to feel the yoke newly imposed upon them the more 
heavily, in proportion to the length of time during which 
they had been withdrawn from it. Citadels were built in 
the towns, and garrisons placed in them ; those cities 
which had ventured upon attempts at revolt were de- 
stroyed ; and taxes were exacted to as large an amount as 
possible. The Persian fleet controlled the Ionian and 
Carian seas ; and although the territorial domain of Per- 
sia was for the present very closely confined to the main- 
land, so that even the city of Clazomenae, only separated 
from the mainland by a narrow sound, was expressly as- 
signed to the Persians, yet a line of demarcation of this 
kind has at all times proved ineffectual and untenable ; 
nor could any one fail to perceive, that the state in pos- 
session of all the ports and military positions along the 
coast would at the next opportunity likewise annex to its 
territory the islands fronting the coast, Samos, Chios, &c. 
These islands were of themselves defenceless ; and there- 
fore the treaty of peace, by preventing the formation of 
any power capable of serving to protect them, likewise 
sacrificed to the Persians the islands and the entire island- 
sea. But the worst of all was this : that the resources of 
Asia Minor, so soon as they had been renounced by the 
Hellenes, could not but immediately serve to enable the 
Great King to subject other Hellenes, and in particular 
to suppress the most hopeful of all the risings at any time 
undertaken by a Greek population against Persia, — viz., 
to conquer Euagoras.* 

* The Spartans npoaraTau t»js vnb B. Kara7rcfi<p9ei<nj^ elprjinj^, Hellen. v, 1, 36. 
'Ef Bao-iAet TiTuc 'Ekkrjvw: Arist. Phys. ausc. iv. 3; 210 b; Persia is the 
KivririKov. — As to the treatment of the Asiatic cities, Isocr. Pcmeg. 117 , de 
pact 97 et al. 

292 History of Greece. t Bo0K v - 

Th c m Euagoras had been forced to perceive from 
prianWar. ^ ne £ rs ^ ^hat ^he amicable relations estab- 
b. c. 394—385. li sne d between himself and Artaxerxes could 
not long endure. During a short time the one served the 
interests of the other. For the ships of Euagoras consti- 
tuted the greater part of the fleet which restored to the 
Persians the dominion over their coasts and the Archipe- 
lago ; from which preponderance of power it again re. 
suited, that Athens recovered her walls, and was thereby 
enabled to become an independent ally of Euagoras. 
Meanwhile the suspicions entertained by the King against 
Euagoras (p. 220) had never been extinguished ; and a 
hostile feeling between the two ensued immediately after 
the victory of Cnidus. Consideration for his own security 
would have of itself obliged Euagoras to address himself 
to the extension of his power from Salamis over the other 
island-towns. Now, in Cyprus there existed nine or ten 
petty kingdoms, ruled over by Hellenic or Persian houses 
under Persian superiority. This division of power secured 
the dominion of the Great King. He was accordingly 
bound not to permit the spread of the power of Euagoras, 
or to leave unregarded the requests for aid preferred by 
his threatened vassals in Amathus, Citium, and other 
cities. An island of the size of Cyprus (its extent in 
length is equal to the distance between the southernmost 
promontories of Peloponnesus), with such resources in 
metals, timber, corn, &c, and situated so as to be indis- 
pensable to any state desirous of commanding the seas be- 
tween Asia Minor, Phoenicia, and Egypt, could not be 
permitted to fall into a single hand, least of all into that 
of so daring a man, who allowed the popular elements 
most dangerous to the Persians to assert themselves, and 
who, far from confining himself to the island, entered into 
combinations with others, with Syracuse, with Egypt, and 
doubtless also with the Greek cities on the south coasts of 
Asia Minor. These were the relations out of which 

chap. IV.] f] ie Corinthian War. 293 

sprang the Cyprian war, a conflict by land and by sea 
which lasted for ten years, and which, after being first 
waged between Salamis and the lesser cities, grew into an 
offensive war against Persia, and finally closed with a 
siege of Salamis. 

The first stage of the conflict was an island-war, in 
which Persian troops too participated under the command 
of the Carian dynast Hecatomnus and of Autophradates, 
the satrap of Lydia ; but this intervention was ineffective, 
and failed to prevent Euagoras from more firmly estab- 
lishing and extending his dominion. He made Salamis 
the capital of an independent island-realm, and provided 
it with institutions formed after Hellenic models. He 
introduced the Rhodian standard of currency, and issued 
gold coins like the Great King himself. Acoris, who 
ruled over Egypt, which had remained in revolt against 
Persia since the year 411 (01. xcii. 2), was an active ally to 
Euagoras, because it lay in his interest, not to allow 
Cyprus, the outpost of the Nile-country, to fall again into 
Persian hands, and to become a Persian basis of military 
operations against Egypt. The Athenians likewise re- 
mained true to Euagoras, and furnished effective aid. In 
particular, Chabrias succeeded, in the year 388 (01. 
xcviii. 1), in gaining brilliant victories in Cyprus. Al- 
most the whole island was subjected ; so that Euagoras 
was now able to proceed to a war of offence. He turned 
against the cities of Phoenicia, by which the island had 
been so long kept in a state of oppressive dependence; he 
took Tyre by storm, and caused Cilicia to revolt ; the 
fleet which Conon had commanded, was to be the last col- 
lected in the coast-districts of Mount Taurus and Mount 
Lebanon for the Great King. All the malcontent vassals 
of Persia were united in a great coalition ; the most im- 
portant provinces of the Empire were in a state of revolt ; 
and the dominion of the Achaemenidse trembled in the 

294 History of Greece. l BoOK v 

End of the Artaxerxes therefore needed to have his 

Cyprian War. hands free, and to be able to dispose at will 

01. xcviii. 4 over his armies and his treasures ; and he 

(B. c. 385). , , . 

necessarily also desired the pacification of 
Greece, in order to be able to gather mercenaries from all 
parts of it. It was for this reason that Tiribazus so 
eagerly pressed on the conclusion of the peace ; and after 
this had been effected, an armament was immediately set 
on foot both of land and of naval forces, such as had not 
been witnessed since the days of Xerxes. In the cities 
of Ionia a fleet of 300 sail was collected ; Tiribazus con- 
ducted it to Cyprus, and commenced the attack which 
brought the war into its last stage. Even now Euagoras 
did not lose courage. He contrived by means of his 
cruisers to cut off the supplies from the invading army, 
and then with his 200 triremes fought a great naval battle 
against the foe, in which he was at first successful, but 
was afterwards defeated, whereupon he was blockaded in 
Salamis. Abandoned by Athens, and by Egypt too in- 
sufficiently supported, he was finally obliged to enter into 
negotiations ; and after the removal of his bitterest enemy, 
Tiribazus, he contrived to be allowed to retain his ances- 
tral principality in Salamis as a vassal of the Great King 
(01. xcviii. 4 ; b. c. 385). 

The gains Thus ended the Hellenic rising in Cyprus, 
of Persia. the continuation — which came a century too 
late — of the Wars of Liberation in Ionia and Hellas. 
Euagoras was abandoned by the Athenians, although he 
was resuming the work of Cimon and expiating the blood 
of Attic warriors, uselessly shed in the glorious battle by 
land and sea at Salamis. The Greek states were so full 
of mutual jealousy and of selfishness, that they had no 
feeling left for the single national struggle undertaken in 
this age, or for the hero who was conquering for Hellas 
the richest island of the Mediterranean. They allowed it 
once more to sink back under the yoke of the Barbarian 

chap. IV.] The Corinthian War. 295 

monarch, and the instruments which he employed in 
bringing this about were the Greeks of Ionia. This then 
was the chief gain which accrued to the Persians out of 
the Peace of Antalcidas ; and for this reason that peace 
fully amounted to a Persian victory and to an overthrow 
of the Hellenes, who by it betrayed the most glorious 
epoch of their national history, and dishonored the 
memory of their greatest heroes. But this humiliation 
cast a double shame upon the Greeks, inasmuch as they 
had not succumbed in arms to a superior power, but had 
abased themselves before a foe whom they had over- 
thrown everywhere, by land and by sea, and whose in- 
ternal weakness was now more decided and notorious than 
ever. In order mutually to ruin one another, they had 
first individually, and now conjointly, taken upon their 
shoulders the shameful yoke of the foreigner; and al- 
though it was an old sin of theirs to be perpetually 
wooing the favor of the Persian Court, yet the open and 
general confession of so disgraceful a dependence, and 
the formally executed renunciation of the position held 
by the Hellenes in the iEgean since the battle of My- 
cale, constituted an act which could not but blunt the 
last feelings of honor left in the Greek states and un- 
dermine such remnants as still survived of national dig- 

But deep as was the moral overthrow of the Greeks, 
yet its external consequences were less than might have 
been concluded from the arrogant terms of the instrument 
of the Peace. The new overlord of Hellas was after all 
incapable of asserting a real supremacy ; and the internal 
affairs of Greece accordingly remained in the hands of 
the Greek states, and in particular of those two states, 
which in the last treaty too had been recognized as the two 
powers holding the primacy of Greece. For this reason 
it is necessary, in order to understand the development 
which ensued, to review the situation of Athens and Spar- 

296 History of Greece. t BoOK V. 

ta before, and immediately after, the Peace of AntaL 

Athens About the time when Sparta was carrying on 

return of e war in Elis an(i ^sia Minor > Athens had en- 
Conon, joyed several years of comparative tranquilli- 

ty, during which it seems as if her condition had gradual- 
ly again become more prosperous. But the impoverished 
and depopulated city was not permitted to recover her 
strength, nor could her citizens permanently reconcile 
themselves to an economical system of administration. No 
sooner had a few public resources been accumulated, than 
the old financial misrule recommenced. Under the ar- 
chonship of Diophantus in 01. xcvi. 2 (b. c. 395-4), festi- 
val-moneys to the amount of a drachm per head were dis- 
tributed among the people, and about the same time the 
rest of the system of salaries was revived. This was done 
chiefly at the instigation of the demagogue Agyrrhius, 
who in home affairs had supplanted the former leaders of 
the community, Thrasybulus and Archinus, and together 
with them the entire party of the moderate democrats. 
He recklessly pandered to the love of self-indulgence of 
the lower classes, and for their sake re-introduced the pay- 
ment for attendance in the popular assembly, or at all 
events raised it to half a drachm. Hereby the public 
finances were necessarily cast into the utmost confusion ; 
and from the public want of money it again followed, that 
every method was resorted to of obtaining money for the 

* The existence of ten Cyprian principalities is demonstrable from 
cuneiform inscriptions: Rawlinson, Ilerodotus, i. 483. Brandis, Assyrien, in 
Pauly's Realmcyclopadie, i. 1898.— The Cyprian War lasted ten years : Diod. 
xv. 9; Isocr. ix. 64 (Dates: subjection of the principalities, b. c. 394-1; 
Persian war without important events, 391-87 ; Euagoras at the height of 
his power, loss of the fleet, and capitulation, 386-5). Engel, de Euagora 
(1846); de temp, quo divulgatus sit Isocr. Pancg. (1861), Rauchenstein, Isocr. v. 22. 
—State of the currency: Brandis, Miinzwesen. p. 364 sq. Egypt, in a state of 
revolt since the year 411, aids the Spartans (Nephereus: Diod. xiv. 79; 
Justin, vi. 2).— Acoris: Diod. xiv. 98; xv. 2f.; Theopompus, Fr. iii.; Sievers, 

C-AP.IV.] TJie Corinthian War. 297 

exchequer. And the worst of all these methods was the 
ordinary one, viz. an unfair administration of justice. 
How low must the moral feelings swaying the majority of 
the citizens have sunk, when it was deemed quite natural 
that the Council, so soon as it was at a loss how to meet the 
current expenses, allowed indictments for high treason to 
lie, in order to obtain money by the confiscation of lands ; 
when the prosecutors could venture to tell the juries, that 
their salaries would run short, if they refused to give the 
verdict of condemnation demanded ; when Lysias, in de- 
fending the unfortunate children of Aristophanes (p. 299), 
is found openly declaring that his task would be rendered 
very difficult to him by two circumstances, — the one, that 
the property in the case was believed to be very consider- 
able ; and the other, that the public treasury was in ex- 
treme want of an influx of money. And even Lysias 
himself, instead of daring to evoke the consciousness of 
right in the citizens against such proceeding, merely urges 
on the opposite side another consideration in the public 
interest, by attempting to make his hearers understand, 
how the transitory profit of illegal confiscations is out- 
weighed by the greater loss necessarily arising out of the 
mutual hostility thereby provoked among the citizens. It 
is true that other remedies were also tried. Euripides 
(perhaps the younger tragedian of the name) introduced 
a law, according to which 2=} per cent were to be levied on 
all taxable property, in order that thus a sum of 500 ta- 
lents might be accumulated : the entire taxable capital 
must accordingly have been reckoned by him at 20,000 
talents (4,875,000/.). This financial law was warmly wel- 
comed, of course by the multitude not possessed of means ; 
but the object desired and promised was not achieved ; 
and the orator, after earning high praise, soon fell into 
utter disfavor with the citizens. This happened at the 
same time in which Agyrrhius stood at the height of his 

influence, and in which the poet Aristophanes in his Ecclfr 


298 History of Greece. f BooK v - 

siazusce (01. xcvi. 4 ; b. c. 393) lamented the wretched con- 
dition of the city and the bad leaders of the citizens. The 
orators had altogether left off speaking of what was ad- 
vantageous to the common weal, and only discussed the 
momentary profits obtainable for the multitude. To screw 
personal gains out of public offices, and to make a for- 
tune as envoy by Persian gifts, was no longer regarded as 
in any way disreputable ; and even citizens of desert, men 
who had taken part in the liberation of the city and had 
been real benefactors of the people, lost their footing in 
these unhappy and demoralizing times. One of these was 
Epicrates, who even if he did not take money from Timo- 
crates (p. 238) was subsequently condemned as having 
been open to a bribe. 

, A Such was the state of things at Athens 

and after. ( G > 

when the city entered into the war with Sparta. 
Beyond a doubt Athens was less capable than ever of ac- 
complishing anything to her credit by her own strength. 
Then, however, came Conon, whose arrival was a day 
of rejoicing for the city, such as it had not experienced 
since the return of Alcibiades (vol. iii. p. 508). And how 
far purer and more thorough was the joy called forth on 
the present occasion ! The most loyal of the citizens of 
Athens had returned, and had returned with full hands, 
bringing with them unexpected and exuberant good for- 
tune. A new life hereupon began at Athens; and the 
joyous gratitude animating the citizens elevated them, cast 
selfishness into the background, and aroused patriotism in 
its place. Copious hecatombs were offered to the Saviour 
Gods, and noble dedicatory gifts were placed by Conon in 
the citadel, or sent to Delphi. In the Pirseeus, now 
once more connected with Athens, was built a sanctuary 
of Aphrodite, as worshipped at Cnidus, in memory of the 
naval victory gained there; and doubtless at the same 
time the buildings in the port, which the Thirty had de- 
stroyed, were re-erected. Athens had, as by the touch 

chap, iv.] The Corinthian War. 299 

of magic, been transmuted from a poor and impotent 
district-town into a wealthy and powerful city, the ally of 
the Great King as well as of the rich and fortunate prince 
in Cyprus. In the intoxication of this good fortune, 
Conon was honored like a demigod, and a bronze statue 
was erected to him on the terrace above the market-place 
by the side of Harmodius and Aristogiton — an honor 
never before paid to any citizen. 

And now the Athens of old seemed suddenly to rise 
into life again. The sea had been swept clear of all hos- 
tile vessels ; in Cythera an Athenian had been established 
as governor, and all the islands and coast-towns which in 
consequence of the victory had fallen away from Sparta — 
Cos, Teos, Ephesus, Samos, Chios, and the Cyclades — 
seemed hereby already to have become a new possession 
of the Athenians. Moreover, Euboea and the Thracian 
Chalcidians had already joined the Separate League, 
which indeed but for Conon would have never been called 
into existence. But this scheme went still further. On 
his motion, Eunomus and Aristophanes, who together with 
his father Nicophemus was among Conon's most faithful 
adherents, repaired to Syracuse, in order to persuade 
Dionysius to enter into a matrimonial alliance with 
Euagoras and into the league against Sparta ; and by this 
embassy at least so much was gained : that the ships 
which were to be sent to aid Sparta from Syracuse, were 
detained there. 

At the same time the man rarely adapted An Athe _ 
for despoiling the Spartans of their glory in nian lev y- 
the land-war also, was found in Iphicrates. The Athe- 
nians again displayed valor in the field. A tomb in the 
Ceramicus honored those who had fallen before Corinth ; 
and immediately in front of the Dipylum Dexileus was 
buried, who had fallen during the archonship of Eubu- 
lides (01. xcvi. 3 ; b. c. 394-3), in the twenty-first year 
of his age, as one of the " five horsemen," and whose mar- 

300 History of Greece. [ BoOK v - 

ble image has been recovered in a state of good preserva- 
tion. These Five must accordingly have distinguished 
themselves, before the battle of Lechseum had yet been 
fought, by some exploit of arms ; and it is probable that 
the Knights, who were at this period unpopular among 
the multitude, were anxious for an opportunity of re- 
covering their honor. Mantitheus, who had belonged to 
the body of the Knights under the Thirty, himself relates 
in the speech composed for him by Lysias, how he had 
conducted himself at the beginning of the war. " When 
you Athenians," he says, " concluded the league with the 
Boeotians, and were thereupon bound to march to the res- 
cue of Haliartus, I was called out for service in the ca- 
valry by Orthobulus. But inasmuch as I found the opi- 
nion widely spread, that the cavalry would have but a 
small part to play in the fighting which was expected* 
while others who had no right to do so were exchanging 
into the cavalry, I went to Orthobulus and caused my 
name to be struck out of its lists, because I deemed it a 
disgrace to take part in the campaign in personal securi- 
ty, at a time when the majority of my fellow-citizens 
would have dangers to undergo. When hereupon my fel- 
low-demesmen had assembled before the march-out, and 
when I perceived that some among them were worthy and 
brave men, but lacked the necessary means for equipping 
themselves, I proposed that the wealthy should come to the 
aid of the needy, and myself presented to two men thirty 
drachms apiece. When at a later date the expedition to 
Corinth was undertaken, and many a one held back, be- 
cause serious perils would evidently have to be encoun- 
tered, I managed to fight in the front rank ; and although 
our phyle suffered beyond all the rest and lost the majori- 
ty of its men, yet I held my ground longer than Thrasy- 
bulus with his grand air, who loves to upbraid all men 
with cowardice." 

This description offers us a very clear conception of the 

chap, iv.] Tfc Corinthian War. 301 

nature of the proceediugs in connexion with an Attic levy 
of men at the commencement of a war, and shows how on 
such occasions at one time and money and objects belong- 
ing to an equipment, and at another time courage, were 
wanting. Money was brought by Conou, and the want 
of civic courage was supplied by the mercenaries ; nor 
was there any lack of skilful generals. But that which 
was absent during the entire war, from its beginning to its 
close, was definite goal, as well as a man genuinely 
trusted, and able to lead and elevate the community. 
The peace-party, supported by the love of ease prevalent 
among the citizens, the party of Andocides (p. 275), 
operated to hinder vigorous action. But even those ani- 
mated by patriotic and warlike sentiments, were not 
united. Thrasybulus of Stiria was their natural leader, 
but he was personally far from popular, as is shown by 
the sarcasm of Mantitheus. Like Themistocles of old, he 
made the mistake of too loudly and too frequently insist- 
ing upon his own services : he thought that as the libera- 
tor of Athens he might go further than other men ; for 
this reason he became involved in a quarrel with his old 
associate Archinus, and, on the indictment of the latter, 
was on one occasion sentenced for having proposed an 
illegal motion. His assumption of grandeur displeased 
the multitude ; and it is intelligible, how they felt more 
at their ease under the leadership of an Agyrrhius.* 

But hereupon the appearance of Conon Conon and 
suddenly changed everything for the better. Thrasybulus. 
Abundant resources and definite ends again existed ; and 

* Confiscations (S^evo-ei?) : Boeckh, Publ. Ec. of Ath. vol. ii. p. 127 
[Eng. Trans.]. Lysias on indictments for high treason, xviii. 17. Euripi- 
des : Ar. Eccles. 818. Boeckh. tt. s. p. 257. Epicrates : Dem. xix. 277. Nico- 
phemus in Cythera: Hellen. iv. 8,8; Lys. xix. 7. Consequences of the 
victory: Boeckh, u. «. p. 157. Embassy at Syracuse, Lys. xix. 19 (according 
to Sauppe's emendation). Tomb of Dexileus : Rangab6, Eunomia (1863, May 
31st); Gottingez Nachrichten (18G3), 190; Salinas Monumenti sepolcrali scoperti 
in Atene (1863). Mantitheus, Lysias, xvi. Position of Thrasybulus, 
Philol xvii. 445. 

302 History of Greece. £ Bo °* v - 

once more all elements gathered around one man. But 
neither was the influence of Conon enduring. His double 
position as the confidential agent of Persia and as an 
Athenian patriot was untenable. His task could only be 
that of freeing Athens from the ban under which she had 
lain, of restoring to her freedom of movement, obtaining 
for her allies, and as it were opening the portal for a new 
era in her history. The rest depended on the conduct of 
the Athenians themselves : it was imperative that they 
should in a spirit of self-sacrifice recover their manly 
vigor, and by their own exertions continue the construc- 
tion of the edifice on the basis offered to them. But no 
such sustained onward effort ensued. The citizens had 
been spoilt by Conon. Instead of gratefully employing 
what they had received, they were wroth as soon as the 
money-payments became less abundant, and as soon as the 
Persian fleet ceased to keep the seas clear of hostile ships. 
When, therefore, Antalcidas gained influence, the au- 
thority of Conon at once sank ; and then the outbreak of 
the Cyprian War finally ruined his position. The Athe- 
nians were placed in the same difficulty through Euagoras, 
in which the Lacedaemonians had been placed through 
Cyrus. Both were first the authors of friendship with 
Persia, and afterwards the causes of hostile relations with 
Death of ner * Conon vanished from the scene, without 
Conon. leaving a trace behind him, and died in 

B.c.389(circ). Cyprus about the year 389. The fruits of his 
victories were lost, before they had been appropriated by 
Athens ; and of his whole system of policy nothing re- 
mained but the combination with Euagoras, — a combina- 
tion now so full of danger, which the Athenians were un- 
willing to break off, but which on the other hand they 
would not venture energetically to turn to account. 

After the departure of Conon Thrasybulus again came 
into the ascendant ; but we have already seen how unsat- 
isfactory was his position, and how insufficient were the 

Chap - iv -1 The Corinthian War. 303 

resources at his disposal (p. 281). Moreover, feelings of 
suspicion prevailed against the generals abroad, who were 
expected punctually to fulfil their instructions, and were 
yet obliged themselves to provide for the maintenance of 
their enemy. The distrust of Thrasybulus rose to such a 
height that he, the liberator of Athens, was thought to be 
on the road towards seeking Tyrannical power. After his 
death the state of affairs became still worse _. .. . 

y Death of 

when Agyrrhius took the command of the Thrasybulus. 
ships, without being able to accomplish anything. It was 
an aimless struggle to and fro, without any inner cohe- 
rence and without any real prospect of success ; no damage 
could be done to Sparta, and the only fear was, lest she 
should separately bring to pass treaties with Persia. 
Every one at Athens was conscious of the wretched condi- 
tion of his native land, and longed for a change in it, and 
for peace ; and no man comprehended the situation of the 
times in a nobler and more dignified spirit than Lysias, 
who attempted, during the celebration of the g eech f 
Olympic festival (in July 388), to take ad- §j^£' 
vantage of the tone of mind naturally pre- 01 xcviii x 
vailing among the festive assembly, in order (B - c - 388 >- 
to recall to its members their national duties, and to con- 
tribute his utmost to the termination of the unhappy war, 
now approaching its ninth year. " This festival," he said, 
" was founded for the purpose of preserving friendship 
among the Hellenes. Discord has brought us into the 
humiliating position in which we now stand. On the one 
side the Persian King, on the other the Sicilian Tyrant, 
are menacing the liberty of Hellenic cities ; the task is 
accordingly incumbent upon us, of terminating our home 
feud, and of then turning our united forces against our 
common enemies." He reminds the Spartans of their 
duty, as the born leaders of the Hellenes, not to allow 
Hellas to be utterly ruined. This was a genuinely na- 
tional policy, worthy of the best age of Greece. Such 

304 History of Greece. t BooE v 

sentiments, therefore, at this time still animated Athenian 

It was at Athens, therefore, that the policy of Antal- 
cidas also necessarily met with most opposition. For, of 
all the Greeks, the Athenians were least able to adopt it, 
without sinking into the deepest humiliation, if they aban- 
doned the cities, whose protection they had claimed as it 
were as the right of a mother-city, and at the same time 
their greatest benefactor, the noble Euagoras, to whom 
they had quite recently erected a statue in the market- 
place. To him were devoted the best exertions of the 
party of Conon. More than any man Aristophanes, the 
son of Nicophemus, had actively apj>lied himself to ad- 
vocating the requests for aid on the part of his prince 
(p. 299). He had even risked the greater part of his 
property, and had by entreaties and pledges induced his 
acquaintances to advance money to the public treasury. 
The fall of Aristophanes and of his father probably con- 
nects itself with the calamity suffered by the ships on 
Execution their way to Cyprus (p. 283). Both father 
of Aristo- an( j son were indicted for high treason, and 

phanes and ° ' 

Nicophemus. p U t to death, without any regular inquiry, 
(B.&389). according to martial law (b. c. 389). This 
amounted to a victory for the peace party, 
which was strictly opposed to all foreign complications. 
Even now, however, the cause of Euagoras was not aban- 
doned. In the following year Chabrias crossed to Cyprus 
with ten vessels and 800 mercenaries, and great results 
were achieved (p. 293). Prospects of the widest kind 
opened in the event of further victories being gained, and 
of an intimate connexion, based upon identity of interests, 
being kept up with the princes of the two wealthiest coun- 
tries of the ancient world, the resources of which were 
now being placed at the disposal of the Athenians.f 

* Olympian 9peech of Lysias : SchStfer, Phihl xviii. 188. 
I Trial of Aristophanes : Lys. xix. 22 ; Meier de bonis damn. 192. 

chap, iv.] The Corinthian War. 305 

Now, it was precisely at this time that Athens was 
called upon to accede to a treaty of peace, which was to 
be concluded essentially with the view of thwarting the 
princes of Cyprus and of Egypt. Doubtless a considerable 
part of the citizens opposed to the recall of the victorious 
general from Cyprus, and the faithless tearing asunder of 
an alliance, of which the fruits were at this very time 
beginning to mature. But the peace-party prevailed. 
The Spartans were shrewd enough to confine themselves 
for the present to the humiliation of Argos, Corinth, and 
Thebes. To the Athenians concessions were made ; and, 
inasmuch as nothing special had been fixed with reference 
to the Archipelago, they might flatter themselves with the 
hope of gradually recovering their dominion over the 
islands. For the immediate present they were only inter- 
ested in escaping from the pressure brought upon them by 
the privateering of the iEginetans, and by the loss of the 
imports from the Hellespont. Their accession to the 
treaty decided its conclusion, and put an end to the eight 
years' war, which was in every respect most hurtful to 

It was a war, begun by the Persians and Review of 
ended by the Persians, which from its very e ar ' 
commencement lowered the national consciousness, and on 
the other hand contributed little to arouse vigor and 
courage ; the most important gain had fallen into the laps 
of the Athenians without any exertion on their part, the 
most momentous victory had been gained without their 
co-operation. And the petty war which the Greeks had 
carried on among themselves, was chiefly a species of rob- 
bers' feud, tending to uncivilize the people, and bringing 
hopeless devastation upon the districts of the land. Age- 
silaus transferred to Hellas the fashion of making war 
upon barbarians, lit destructive fires wherever he went, 
caused the fruit trees to be pulled up by the roots, and 
Bhamelessly sold as chattels human beings, members like 

306 History of Greece. TBook v. 

himself of the Hellenic nation. Nor was a contest among 
fellow-citizens of a single town ever carried on with more 
unyielding violence of passion, than at Corinth. 

But the most momentous occurrence of the 
armies in ' whole war was the transformation of the mili- 
tary system, which connects itself with the 
campaigns in Asia. For while the states of Greece were 
falling into utter discord with one another, the fame of 
the warlike capabilities of the nation had steadily risen ; 
its superiority was to such a degree acknowledged by all 
the barbarians, that they thought themselves able neither 
to conquer it, nor to conquer without it. Hence, wherever 
wars were carried on, there Hellenic men were in demand. 
Formerly, only such persons had offered themselves for 
mercenary service abroad, as were without any genuine 
native country of their own, i. e. who belonged to no 
regularly organized policy claiming the services which 
they would give, such as the Arcadians, Cretans, Carians, 
Thessalians, and again those who had been expelled from 
their own states, and were homeless and bankrupt in their 
fortunes. But since the system of mercenaries had ac- 
quired a new splendor through Cyrus, the inclination 
towards it became more and more general. For it was no 
longer as of old, when to lack a home had been the great- 
est misfortune which could befall a Greek. Party-feuds and 
civil wars had destroyed men's loyalty to the canton to 
which they belonged, and their attachment to the place where 
they had been born. Instead of these feelings, there pre- 
vailed a craving to go forth into the wide world, and a han- 
kering after adventures. Thus generous natures, as e. g. 
Xenophon, unscrupulously entered the service of a Persian 
prince, if opportunity offered itself for chivalrous deeds. 
Herein, at the same time, the national pride could likewise 
find abundant satisfaction ; and the sentiment asserted itself 
with constantly increasing vivacity, that it was the mission of 
Greek valor and culture, to transform the lands of the East 

chap, iv.j Tlie Corinthian War. 307 

The system of Greek mercenaries in Asia Minor, more- 
over, reacted upon the mother-country. Here it had al- 
ready for some time obtained at sea ; and, on more than 
one occasion, one fleet had sought to weaken the other by 
an increase in the rate of pay (vol. iii. p. 523). But for 
the mainland, the Corinthian War was the beginning, and 
the Isthmus the original home, of the system of mercena- 
ries. Here a certain Polystratus hired troops for the 
moneys brought by Conon ; Iphicrates as- MT 
sumed the command over them, and gave to forms of iphi- 

. crates. 

the mercenary forces the importance which 
belongs to them in Greek history, by introducing a re- 
form into the Athenian military system, well adapted to 
the times. For a soldier to provide himself with a com- 
plete equipment of arms, it was necessary that he should 
be well-to-do ; but the number of citizens in this condi- 
tion had very considerably dwindled, and those who were 
most easily able to furnish the cost were on an average 
most prone to consider their own comfort and most spoiled 
by self-indulgence, and doubtless therefore not the best 
materials for war. But heavy arms were entirely calcu- 
lated for the old style of warfare, for regular battles 
fought in line, in which the skilful use of the ground and 
tactical movements were of less moment. They were in- 
tended to protect the lives of citizens as far as possible ; 
and, the fully-armed warrior being accompanied by a 
servant, who carried his shield and attended to his 
weapons, the army was unnecessarily swelled, and its 
flexibility impeded. 

Furthermore, Iphicrates perceived, how in a war with 
Sparta, who immovably adhered to her ancient military 
system, a reform adapted to its purposes constituted the 
most effective means for securing a superiority over the 
foe. Already Demosthenes had by the employment of 
light-armed troops and by innovations in tactics (vol. iii. 
p. 395) gained important successes ; Iphicrates called into 

308 History of Greece. t Bo0K v. 

life a series of thorough changes. He made the arms of 
defence lighter and easier, by introducing a circular 
shield (Pelte) of smaller size, and replacing the bronze 
greaves by a species of gaiters (Iphicratides) ; on the 
other hand, he made the weapons of offence more effective, 
by lengthening the spear and substituting the rapier for 
the sword. Being thus lightly armed, the soldiers could 
carry a larger quantity of supplies and undertake longer 
marches. Thus Iphicrates created the new infantry of 
the line, the peltasts, who were incomparably better 
adapted for rapid movements in gorges and mountains, 
than were the heavy masses of the civic militias. 

Towards mercenary troops the commander stood in a 
totally different relation, from that which he held towards 
fellow-citizens. Among the former it was possible, and it 
was necessary, to maintain the strictest discipline ; there 
was not the same need of sparing them ; and they were 
attached immediately to the person of the general, from 
whom they derived pay, glory, and booty ; the mercena- 
ries of Iphicrates followed him from Corinth to the Hel- 
lespont. Iphicrates, himself a man of low birth, was in 
his own person rarely adapted for the management of his 
men. He was ruthlessly strict, and yet popular. He 
could venture to cut down on the spot a sentinel whom he 
found asleep at his post ; he knew how to tame the most 
savage, and to turn their passionate vehemence to account 
for the service; he openly declared his preference for 
those who were most eager for money and for enjoyment. 
Everything depended on the spirit of the soldiery ; and, 
besides his great talents for command and for organiza- 
tion, Iphicrates was also gifted with the faculty of having 
the right word at once forthcoming in the right place. 
The newly-created army was in readiness in an incredibly 
short time, and at once gave to the Athenians a decided su- 
periority in the field. The single defeat suffered by the Spar- 
tans in this War, was inflicted upon them by peltasts (p.262). 

chap, iv.j Tfo Corinthian War. 309 

Doubtless Iphicrates entertained plans far Hig polifcical 
outstripping those which he was able to carry schemes - 
into execution. For can any one believe, that he made 
his military reforms only for the purpose of carrying out 
this or that successful surprise ? He was not merely a 
bold condottiere, but also a politician of keen intelligence 
and of far-reaching conceptions. Of all those who sap- 
ported the policy of Conon, and who sought to turn to ac- 
count for Athens the benefits which he had conferred upon 
her, Iphicrates effected far the most. It was he who 
showed, how the portal of the peninsula must be burst 
open, which had hitherto stood in the way, like the inac- 
cessible castle of the Spartan power ; who first occupied 
Acrocorinthus with Attic troops, and first appreciated the 
significance of this fastness for the general relations be- 
tween the states of Greece. He conceived the bold idea 
of securing Corinth for Athens ; for the establishment of 
a garrison there was in point of fact the most radically 
effective expedient for quelling Sparta's hankerings after 
intervention, — a better expedient at all events than the 
bifurcate walls of Lechseum, which had to be guarded 
against a chronic danger of attack, and were, according 
to the successive issue of events, either built up or pulled 
down again. Now, inasmuch as the Corinthians them- 
selves recognized their incapacity, as a petty state, of de- 
fending themselves against the Lacedsemonians, and there-* 
fore resolved to renounce their independence (p. 258), it 
may well have seemed to be the duty of Athens to protect 
Corinth ; and possibly there was at Corinth itself a party 
which desired to join Athens, and not Argos. Certain it 
is, that at Corinth itself a sanguinary quarrel occurred 
between Iphicrates and the Argive party, some of whom 
he put to death ; that, after the union with Argos had 
been effected, the departure of the Attic mercenaries was 
demanded ; and that the whole body of the citizens ot 
Argos marched out to take possession of Corinth. But 

310 History of Greece. [ BoOK v - 

Iphicrates was not the man voluntarily to give up such a 
post as this. He offered to hold Acrocorinthus ; but at 
Athens so bold a policy was declined, and Iphicrates re- 
signed his command, vexed at the timorousness of his fel- 
low-citizens, who refused to employ the weapon which he 
had forged for them. On the other hand, the Athenians 
were afterwards credited with their refusal to enter into 
their general's schemes of annexation, as with a proof of 
magnanimity and wise moderation. 

Effects of ^° ^ ne na PPy reforms in her military sys- 
of e merce- m ^m, tnen > Athens owed that rise in her power 
nanes. which enabled her to humiliate Sparta even 

by land, to terrify Arcadia, and to entertain thoughts of 
establishing an Attic military position in the peninsula. 
But, on the other hand, the disadvantageous consequences 
of the innovation likewise soon manifested themselves. 
The close connexion between the army and the common- 
alty, whereupon was founded the strength of ancient 
states, was dissolved ; and whatever the army was, it was 
through the commander. The citizens more and more 
withdrew from military service ; a military class arose, 
which regarded itself as outside civic life, a restless and 
homeless sort of men, ever on the look-out for an opportu- 
nity of applying their handicraft of arms, and according- 
ly making any disturbance which might anywhere break 
out doubly dangerous. Money now decided everything. 
For money those ready to bear arms enlisted, without 
asking any questions as to the cause for which they were 
to fight ; and by money the band was kept together. 
" The bodies of the Hellenes," says Lysias, " belong to 
those who can pay." Thus the people was severed into 
two halves : the one, which was in constant military prac- 
tice, was estranged from its home ; the other, the civic 
community proper, lost the habit of military service. In- 
stead of the calm valor of the settled citizen, fighting for 
his house and home, the wild courage of homeless adven- 

chap, iv.] ji he Corinthian War. 311 

turers decided the fortunes of the states, — men whose con- 
duct depended on the individuality of their leaders, and 
whose loyalty held out just as long as there was money in 
the military chest.* 

Athens was unfortunate, in experiencing Ath 
rather the evil than the good effects of the after the war. 
system of mercenaries. Athens was the solitary city, 
where the mercenary force had been organized with crea- 
tive genius and in a patriotic spirit, and had without de- 
lay achieved the utmost success ; but this success it was 
not contrived to hold fast, for the courage was wanting to 
allow the commander of the mercenaries to take his own 
course ; and thus it came to pass, that his great deeds re- 
mained without any influence upon the issue of the war. 
And indeed, it was in general the misfortune of Athens, 
to oscillate to and fro without fixity between political 
tendencies of the most diverse kinds during the whole 
period of the war ; such men as Thrasybulus and Archi- 
nus, Agyrrhius, Conon, Andocides and Iphicrates, being 
successively and simultaneously influential. Not one of 
them permanently enjoyed the confidence of the com- 
munity, or became the permanent leader of the city. 
Hence, neither could there be any question of a fixed sys- 
tem of policy ; instead of pursuing with consistent energy 
of will ends chosen by themselves, the Athenians grew ac- 
customed to wait for impulses and decisions from abroad. 
Thus it came to pass that in spite of the various particu- 
lar successes obtained by Athens in this war, she upon the 
whole lost more in it than she gained. At its close, she 
was more thoroughly disintegrated than before : she had 
lost all her allies, had found her best men untrustworthy, 
and had anew recognized the insufficiency of her own re- 
sources ; and was in the end forced under the pressure of 
necessity to conclude a peace, which deeply injured the 

* Polystratus and his successors: Dem. iv. 23. Schemes of Iphicrates; 
Diod. xiv. 92; Aristid. Panalk. 167 ; Rehdantz, Vitai Iphicr., Ch., T. p. 16. 

312 History of Greece. t BooK v. 

honor of the city, and by no means corresponded to the 
original purposes of the war. For this had in truth been 
a rising against Sparta, intended to dispute her right to 
interfere in the affairs of the remaining states. But at 
the close of the war the predominance of Sparta, was 
placed on a new basis, which she employed with the object 
of arrogating to herself, more confidently than ever be- 
fore, the right of intervention in the affairs of all the 
other states of Greece. 

The posi- -^ or Sparta had under the most diverse 
tion of Sparta. f orms persistently adhered to her ancient 
policy. Careless of the national honor, she desired to be 
mistress in Greece ; and whatever support she could find 
for her claims to dominion, was welcome to her. These 
claims she had asserted by force of arms, by treaty, and 
by divine authority. These means had lost their effective- 
ness ; and after already the Peloponnesian War had been 
virtually decided by the Great King, he was now also 
formally set up as the authority, which in the absence of 
any other had to serve for regulating the relations between 
the Greek states in favor of Sparta. In the place of the 
Delphic god, it was the king of the barbarians whom 
Sparta caused to sanction her assumption of primacy in 
Hellas. According to the words of the Treaty, indeed, 
all the states were equal before the Great King ; he alone 
overtopped all the rest, and was the one Great Power, 
from whose throne issued the condition of peace. But 
the carrying-out of these conditions had been committed 
to the hands of Sparta ; for this purpose the Spartans had 
to watch over Hellenic affairs ; to them fell the execution 
upon all who resisted the new order of things. In other 
words, therefore, they laid claim to the beginning in 
Greece by virtue of the royal authority, and this au- 
thority was thoroughly consonant with their own policy. 
Had they not drawn up the terms of the powers in their 
•wn sense, and merely contrived to obtain the royal seal 

chap, iv.] The Corinthian War. 313 

to the demands of their ambition ? As towards the Great 
King, they undertook an obligation identical with what 
had ever been their own desire, viz. to prevent the rise of 
any greater power in Greece, and to keep it split up into 
petty states, weak and defenceless. 

Sparta could not have stood in a more advantageous 
position than that which she now held. She still had her 
adherents, from of old, in all the states, and was still re- 
garded by the majority of the Hellenes as the state upon 
which was incumbent the conduct of national affairs. It 
was only in the year preceding that of the Peace that 
Lysias said : " The Lacedaemonians are accounted the 
leaders of the Hellenes, and justly so, by reason of their 
inborn valor, by reason of their skill in war, and because 
they alone dwell in a state which has never been de- 
vastated, without fortifications, without civil discord, 
unconquered and ever under the same constitution."* 
Sparta had victoriously issued forth from all the dangers 
which had beset her ; all the combinations formed against 
her had remained ineffectual ; no enemy stood in the field j 
nowhere was there a state displaying vigor of action ; the 
craving for peace was universal ; and, although the new 
form of the hegemony offended many, yet in the masses 
the feeling for national honor had been too much blunted, 
for the position of power held by Sparta to have run any 
danger from it. The remaining states, as well as she, had 
humbled themselves before the Great King ; and after all 
she had only contrived better than the rest, to obtain for 
herself the good- will of the mighty ally, and to make cer- 
tain of his support. 

Had Sparta used the Peace with caution j The falsity 
she might have reaped its fruits in full, and Jj ^taicSlS! 
have gradually accustomed the states to 
peaceable subordination. But no such thoughts were en- 
tertained at Sparta. Her lust of dominion was not satis- 

* Lys. xxxiii. 7. 


314 History of Greece. C Bo °* v. 

fied, but kindled anew ; she stood not at the end, but at 
the beginning, of her schemes. Nineteen years after the 
battle of jEgospotami she saw her foes disarmed for the 
second time, and desired nothing short of carrying out 
what she had then begun, with more sagacity and with 
better success. She intended that the Great King should 
only serve as a pledge for her own dominion ; and the 
autonomy guaranteed to the states was to be the net in 
which their liberty should be strangled. At bottom, 
everything about this Peace was false. The independence 
of the Greek states is proclaimed, whereas the object is 
their dependence. From Persia proceed the conditions 
which have been devised at Sparta ; and the Great King 
dictates the peace as the overlord of Hellas, while he is 
more impotent than ever before, and unable to protect 
himself in his own land against flying bands of Hellenic 

* Concerning the Peace of Antalcidas, viewed as thoroughly consistent 
with the ancient policy of Sparta, see in particular Herbst, New Jahrbiichm- 
jur Philol lxxvii. p. 704. 



The next eight years of Greek history are nothing but 
a history of Lacedsemonian policy. All the other states 
are crippled ; Sparta alone acts, by carrying out the Peace 
in her own interest, by re-establishing her omnipotence 
afresh, and by endeavoring to humble in succession one 
after the other of those states in which a power of resistance 
has survived. 

At Sparta itself, indeed, there was an ab- A . olig 
sence of concord. Here, too, there existed a f nd A g esi - 
party of thinking men, who endeavored to 
prevent an abuse of the treaty of peace and of the momen- 
tary preponderance of the Spartan power ; whom morality 
and political insight induced to demand that the rights 
of Hellenic states should be respected ; and who foresaw, 
how a new policy of force would involve the state in new 
perils. The representative of these principles was Agesi- 
polis, who followed his father Pausanias in his conception 
of Greek affairs (p. 56). The youthful king had con- 
ducted himself with respectful modesty towards his col- 
league, who sought to attract him to himself by treating 
him confidentially, as a soldier treats a comrade. Soon, 
however, Agesipolis assumed a very independent position. 
He was animated by magnanimous and national senti- 
ments, worthy of one descended from Leonidas and from 
the noblest members of the house of the Agiadse. He 
possessed an intelligent judgment, together with a tender 
susceptibility for the honor of his native city. It was im- 
possible to him, to conceive of himself in his relations 


316 History of Greece. t BooK v - 

towards the other states as of a mere Spartan ; he regarded 
a Hellenic policy, such as Brasidas and Callicratidas 
(vol. iii. p. 530) had pursued, as the only salutary course 
of action ; he was the leader of the party, which adhered 
to the bonds and to the duties dating from the ancient 
Confederation ; and it was therefore not inherited jealousy 
or perversity, but well-founded conviction, which made 
him the opponent of Agesilaus. From the first, he dis- 
approved of the treaty, by which Sparta had subordinated 
herself to the national enemy, in order to be able to rule 
over fellow-members of the Hellenic race ; but inasmuch 
as this treaty had been once concluded, he desired, to see 
it used as an expedient of protection, against any danger- 
ous extension of the Attic or the Boeotian power, but not 
to have it employed as a pretext for an illegitimate lust 
of dominion. 

Agesilaus, on the other hand, had long ago renounced 
the character of a Hero king at the head of the hosts of 
Hellas, which he had played for a time; during the last 
years of the recent war he had become a partisan of the 
most narrow-minded Laconism ; and his sole intention 
now was, to take full advantage of the peace in this sense. 
He thought that tranquillity could be permanently re- 
stored in Greece only in the event of every rising against 
Sparta being strangled in its birth. Nor was even this 
object pursued openly and honestly with impartial severi- 
ty, as behooved a state conscious of its ruling mission ; 
but attempts were made in a petty spirit to take ven- 
geance for former injuries, and to make defenceless cities 
pay the penalties of their previous conduct. 

For this line of policy Agesilaus was precisely the man. 
It was not the honor of his native land, not even that of 
his native city, which lay nearest to his heart, but his own 
person ; personal vanity, which is wont to be a specially 
marked characteristic of the deformed in body, was the 
motive of his designs ; and after his great plans had suf- 

Chap, v.] Consequences of Peace of AiitaMdas. 317 

fered shipwreck, he knew no other ambition but that of 
making his power felt by those who had treated him 
without consideration. From the scenes in Aulis (p. 224) 
down to those in Arcadia, where he had been forced to 
make his way through the country by night, in order to 
escape the gibes of the Mantineans (p. 263), he had not 
forgotten a single taunt, a single injury; and with savage 
vehemence he sought for opportunities of vengeance. 

Thus the ancient opposition between the two royal 
houses once more prevailed in full measure ; but from the 
first the advantage was decidedly on the side of Agesi- 
laus. He was far superior to his colleague in experience 
and military fame; he contrived to maintain his popu- 
larity ; very skilfully played, as he had always done, the 
part of the representative of the ancient Spartans ; and 
by means of cunning concessions managed to secure the 
good-will of the official authorities. For, whereas the 
kings had formerly attached the greatest importance to a 
careful maintenance of their honorary rights, and to pre- 
serving intact their inherited dignity, Agesilaus, who was 
extremely vain, but not proud, saw no objection against 
recognizing the Ephors as his superior authority, which it 
was his duty unconditionally to obey; in the point of 
form, too, he sacrificed the independence of the royal of- 
fice, by being the first to rise from his royal throne, when 
the Ephor3 passed by. He flattered them in every way, 
in order through them to direct the measures of public 
policy. Furthermore, his intentions were actually second- 
ed by the inclinations of the Lacedaemonians, who sought 
quarrels with the petty states, and who wished to play the 
lords in other cities, in order to obtain booty and money. 
For the hostile spirit by which Agesilaus was animated 
w 7 as spread among all those who had taken part in his 
campaigns; the influence of his ambitious brother (p. 
261) likewise supported him ; and thus it is not wonderful, 
that Agesipolis with his pacific and equitable principles 

318 History of Greece. l Bo °* v - 

should have found little favor, while his adversary in all 
essential points determined the conduct of Sparta.* 

For the rest, Sparta, instead of immediately displaying 
her designs, at first contented herself with having gained 
her object against Argos and Thebes; and hereupon 
waited to observe what impression the Peace had created 
in the surrounding territories. 

Movements Even in the peninsula, the times of an ab- 
iu Peiopon- solute subordination under the mere will of 


Sparta had long passed away. The confede- 
rate cities felt offended, at a peace of so universal an impor- 
tance having been concluded without their participation ; 
and the bolder among them had no intention of allowing 
their future to be settled off-hand. After all, the same 
autonomy, which had in the interest of Sparta been re- 
stored to the Corinthians and Orchornenians and Plata> 
ans, might be claimed as against Sparta ; and there is no 
doubt, that in the peninsula too voices were raised, which 
appealed to the treaty in this sense, and laid claim to full 
autonomy for the states to which they belonged. 

Xenophon, indeed, makes no mention of these move- 
ments of the liberal party, because it is his general habit, 
as a zealous adherent of Agesilaus, to pass over what was 
adverse to the latter; but trustworthy authorities attest, 
that several states really asserted their autonomy with 
really serious intentions, and took advantage of the right 
conceded to them, of governing themselves according to 
their own laws, to call to account the officials who had 
hitherto held sway under the authority of Sparta. Strict 
inquiries were set on foot, which the leaders of the Lace- 
daemonian party evaded by flying from the popular tribu- 
nals, and seeking protection at Sparta.f 

* Agesilaus and Agesipolis: Plutarch, Ages. 20; Xen. Rellen. v. 3, 20; 
Diod. xv. 19. 2,vnfLax<.Kii alpecris, Polyb. ix. 23. Agesilaus and the Ephors : 
Plutarch, Ages., 4; Manso, Sparta, iii. 1, 215. 

f The Peloponnesian cities ano\afiov<Tau t4s avi-ovo/ni'a? Aoyov airgrow 
irapd rOtv iTrearakrjKOTuv inl tjjs AcuceSaifAOKiW rjycfiovias, Diod. XV. 5. 

chap, v.] Consequences of Peace of Antalcldas. 319 

These risings on the part of individual communities 
could not lead to any lasting results ; and the Spartans 
succeeded, without much trouble, in bringing back their 
partisans, and in convincing the confederate cities, by 
force of arms, that they had misunderstood the article 
concerning the autonomy. But these movements they 
employed as an opportune pretext for henceforth watch- 
ing with greater severity over Peloponnesian affairs ; and 
as formerly, after the overthrow of the Messenians, the 
Messenian party had been persecuted throughout the en- 
tire peninsula (vol. i. p. 243), the same was now the case 
with regard to the Argive party. For it had been from 
Argos that the most daring attack upon the supremacy of 
Sparta had proceeded ; Argos had not only concluded 
anew a Separate League, but had also endeavored to 
blend together the revolted confederate cities into a greater 
and more powerful state in the North. This amounted to 
the most dangerous attempt ever made against Sparta ; 
and for this reason those states which had directly or in- 
directly taken part in it, could not but be the next object 
against which the Spartan arms directed themselves. 
Among these states none was more suspected than Man- 

Mantinea was the single citv of Arcadia . 

G J Sparta and 

which had dared to pursue an independent line Mantinea. 
of policy. Not until the Persian Wars the community 
coalesced out of five villages into one fortified city ; this 
being done at the instigation of Argos, which already at 
this early date entertained thoughts of forming for itself 
a confederation in its vicinity. Mantinea had endeavored 
to increase its city and territory by conquest, and after 
the Peace of Nicias had openly opposed Sparta (vol. iii. 
p. 290). After the unfortunate termination of the first 
war waged by a Separate League, Mantinea had indeed 
again subordinated itself to Sparta (vol. iii. p. 312), but 
it had remained a democracy, and the ancient aversion 

320 History of Greece. f BooK v - 

from Sparta continued. No secret was made of the satis- 
faction caused by the victory of Iphicrates ; and, had not 
the city found itself fettered by a treaty, concluded with 
Sparta in the year B. c. 418 for a term of thirty years, it 
would doubtless have taken advantage of the favorable 
conjuncture of the last war, and have resumed its ancient 
line of policy. It can hardly be doubted, that at Argos 
the accession to the league of the bold and warlike city 
of Mantinea was calculated upon ; and how dangerous a 
turn might not the Corinthian War have taken for Spar- 
ta, had the three contiguous territories of Argos, Man- 
tinea, and Corinth been blended into a single hostile 
state ! Here, then, were reasons enough for hating Man- 
tinea worse than any other Peloponnesian state, and for 
letting it be the first to suffer chastisement. In the second 
year after the peace operations were commenced accord- 
ingly. The thirty years' treaty had expired ; and the 
Spartans now desired no new settlement of their relations 
with Mantinea by treaty, but the unconditional submis- 
sion of the city, which as a focus of democracy disturbed 
the happy peace, and the desired subordination of the 
government of the Arcadian cantons. Clearly, this ano- 
maly must be removed ; and therefore the matter was 
taken in hand without much ceremony. The messengers 
of Sparta brought a series of complaints to Mantinea ; 
the citizens, it was declared, had under empty pretexts 
evaded sending their contingent ; they had displayed bad 
feeling (this referred to the march-through of Agesilaus) ; 
they had assisted the Argives by furnishing them with 
supplies. These complaints were accompanied by the de- 
mand, that the city should pull down its walls ; and as 
the citizens, who were still led by the Argive party, al- 
though they could not expect aid from any quarter, were 
courageous enough to reject this proposition, the Ephors 
without further delay decreed war against them. 

Agesilaus evaded the conduct of this war, putting for- 

Chap, v.] Consequences of Peace of Antahidas. 321 

ward as a pretext the amicable relations, War wifch 
which had subsisted between his father Archi- MantlDea - 
damus and the Mantineans. In reality, he , 0lx J G J.\ ii - 3A 

J ' (b. c. 38o). 

may have expected little honor from this 
campaign ; for the confederates were averse from it, and the 
conduct of sieges was not his strong point. But probably 
his chief reason was this : that he wished to avail himself 
of this opportunity for insulting and damaging his colleague 
in office. For it may be conceived, how unwillingly Age- 
sipolis entered upon this task, — unwillingly, not only by 
reason of his political principles, but also because some 
of the present leaders at Mantinea were on friendly terms 
with him through his father. No opposition was, how- 
ever, offered by Agesipolis, who carried the expedition to 
a more speedy and successful issue than his unfriendly 
colleague had hoped for. After establishing a blockade 
over the enemy in the city, he very cleverly availed him- 
self of the conditions of the ground, in order to force the 
besieged, without loss of life, to capitulate. He caused 
the stream Ophis, which traversed the city and which at 
this season (the late part of the year) was swollen, to be 
dammed off below the city, so that there being no means 
of efflux for its waters, they inundated the streets, and 
rose high alongside of the walls. These walls, having 
been built of unbaked clay, were softened from below, 
until rifts made their appearance in them, and it was a 
useless labor to prop them up by beams and boards. 
Thus Mantinea was disarmed without a struggle ; no 
citadel existed into which the citizens might have re- 
treated ; and all further resistance was out of the question. 

When, hereupon, negotiations commenced, Fa]] f „ 
the father of Agesipolis, who lived in exile at tinea - 
Tegea, contrived to assert his influence. Per- , 0I - xcviii. 4 

& ' , (b. c. 385). 

haps even the damming-off of the stream 

should be attributed to him ; for as he had for some time 

been familiar with the district, he could not have failed to 


322 History of Greece. L BooK v 

be aware, that in the border-feuds between the Mantineans 
and the Tegeatse this Ophis-stream had already more 
than once been called into action for the purposes of war- 
fare. And it was obviously his interest, that his son 
should gain a rapid victory, and that this victory should 
be attended by as little bloodshed as possible on either 
side. After the fall of the walls, he accordingly used his 
good offices with his son, and obtained permission for six 
hundred citizens belonging to the Argive party, and al- 
ready designated by their enemies inside and outside the 
city as victims for slaughter, freely to depart. It was an 
instance of magnanimous generosity, offering a very 
marked contrast to the ways of his colleague, when Age- 
sipolis drew up his warriors, arms in hand, before the 
gates at either side of the high-road, to protect these men 
during their departure against the vengeance of their own 
fellow-citizens. By order of the Ephors the city was now 
broken up ; the citizens had to pull down their own dwell- 
ing-houses, and to disperse once more into the ancient vil- 
lages. Each of these henceforth formed a separate com- 
munity, furnished its own contingent, and willingly obeyed 
every command issued by Sparta. Such was the promised 
independence of the Greek communities ! And this act 
of oppression was, forsooth, to be regarded as a benefac- 
tion, as a liberation from the sufferings of city-life, as 
a restoration of the patriarchal happiness of peasant- 
life! Xenophon, in point of fact, assures us that the 
Mantineans, however vexed they had been at first 
when their town-houses were pulled down, soon grew 
wiser, and gratefully appreciated the convenient proximity 
of their lands and the tranquillity of rural life, interrupt- 
ed by no popular orators. Doubtless the aristocrats were 
glad to have recovered possession of the communal offices, 
and cannot have failed to send to Sparta the most favora- 
ble reports concerning the success of this re-settlement.* 

* Diodorua dates the outbreak of the feud with Mantinea, 01. xcviii. 3 

chap, v.] Consequences of Peace of Antalcidas. 323 

By the expedition against Mantinea the policy of Age- 
silaus had openly asserted itself. This was no other than 
the old Lysandrian policy, only of a still more ruthless 
and unabashed character. It was no longer thought in 
the least necessary to deduce a semblance of justification 
from the Peace ; force and arbitrary violence were unscru- 
pulously employed, in order definitively to establish the 
absolute influence of Sparta ; and for this purpose the ser- 
vices of the troops of the confederates were demanded, as 
if a matter of Hellenic interest were in question. The 
Mantinean campaign was the logical continuation of the 
war with Elis ; the end aimed at was the unconditional 
furnishing of contingents for any object Sparta might 
choose to propose ; the Peloponnesian was to become a 
Lacedaemonian army. 

The success achieved by the Lacedaemonian party in 
Mantinea occasioned immediate attempts by the same 
party in other quarters, directed towards a similar estab- 
lishment of their influence. The first instance was that 
of Phlius. 

The city of Phlius in the upper valley of g t nd 
the Asopus was one of those Greek communi- p ™ iU9 - 
ties which, in a small territory surrounded by neighbor- 
states of preponderant power, preserved their indepen- 
dence and characteristic individuality from the earliest 
times. The Phliasians lived in their fair mountain- valley, 
withdrawn from the great struggles agitating the world, 
in happy prosperity. But they were at the same time 
brave and prepared for warfare ; they possessed an efli- 

(b. c. 386-5), and its progress, 01. xcviii. 4 (b. c. 385-4). Xenophon, Hellen. v. 
2, 2, places its commencement in the year in which the treaty expired. 
According to Thuc. v. 81, the treaty was concluded as early as 418. It is 
therefore necessary either, notwithstanding Xenophon, to assume an 
interval of two years to have occurred between the expiration of the treaty 
and the outbreak of hostilities, or, notwithstanding Thucydides, to date 
the conclusion of the treaty a few years later than the battle of 418. Cf. 
Hertzberg, p. 313 f. Concerning the Ophis-stream, see Curtius, P*h- 
ponne808, i. 239. 

524 History of Greece. t Boox v 

cient force of horsemen ; proved themselves patriotic Hel- 
lenes in the Persian wars ; and afterwards adhered to 
Sparta as faithful members of the Confederacy. They 
were governed by families which encouraged this attitude ; 
and inasmuch as the city, lying away from the sea, sup- 
ported itself by husbandry and the culture of the vine, 
this state of things endured for a long time without 
change. In the end political movements made their ap- 
pearance even here. A democratic party formed itself, 
and the former leaders of the community were expelled. 
This had occurred when the Corinthian war scared the 
quiet valley of the Asopus out of its wonted tranquillity, 
and when the bands of Iphicrates from their head-quar- 
ters on the Isthmus devastated the surrounding district. 
Phlius was utterly isolated. Its citizens were still too 
much attached to their ancient traditions to join the Se- 
parate League, and yet they had at the same time severed 
themselves from Sparta. They intended to support them- 
selves by their own strength ; but Iphicrates inflicted great 
damage upon them ; whereupon they found themselves af- 
ter all obliged to invoke the protection of Sparta, and to 
admit Spartan troops among them. The Spartaus behaved 
with prudent moderation ; and instead of their demand- 
ing, as it had been feared they would, the recall of the 
exiles, these men, disappointed in their expectations, had 
to wait for other times. 

Restoration After the fall of Mantinea, the Phliasian 
sfan h exiies ia " ex ^ es conceived new hopes. Observing how 
(b'c X 383) 1 ^ ie state * n P ossess i° n 0I> the primacy was now 
with thorough strictness reviewing all the Con- 
federate cities in succession, with reference to their loyal- 
ty as members of the Confederation, they now denounced 
their native city as a community which had been guilty 
of revolt (01. xcix. 1 ; b. c. 384). So long as they had 
been its leaders, it had, they declared, been among the 
most loyal ; but since the victory of the popular leaders, 

chap. v.] Conseque?ices of Peace of Antalcidas. 325 

it had, like Mantinea, become negligent as to its duty of 
furnishing its contingent, recalcitrant, and hostile. In 
Sparta the importance of Phlius for the control of the 
Isthmian districts could not be mistaken. If, so long as 
the Separate League remained under arms, it had been 
thought necessary to treat Phlius tenderly, in order not to 
drive it over to the enemy, there now seemed no reason to 
reject this opportunity of strengthening the power of the 
state holding the primacy. The complaints of the exiled 
Phliasians found a ready ear ; the reasons for their expul- 
sion were declared unsatisfactory ; and their recall was 
demanded. When these orders arrived at Phlius, the ex- 
isting government perceived its inability to defy them ; 
the state of feeling among the citizens was not to be 
trusted, for the fugitive party-men still had numerous ad- 
herents in the city. It was accordingly resolved to re-ad- 
mit them, and to re-instate them in their lands ; those who 
had in the interval acquired the lands in question, were to 
be compensated out of the public resources, and all even- 
tual disputes were to be judicially decided. That the 
matter was not hereby settled, could easily be perceived. 
Sparta, however, had completely gained her immediate 
object ; and already she had in view other and wider 
aims, for which she intended to claim military aid, ac- 
cording to the newly regulated system of the contin- 

In the spring of the year 383, an embassy Embassy 
arrived at Sparta, which suddenly directed the JjJJonia 
attention of the Ephors to the distant north of ?'• xc o i x - l 

r (b. c. 383). 

the jEgean. It was composed of envoys sent by 
the Chalcidian cities of Apollonia and Acanthus, headed 
by the Acanthian Cligenes, and supported by the Mace- 
donian king. They demanded assistance against the 
powerful city of Olynthus, which, as they declared, was 

* Sparta and Phlius : Hellen. iv. 4, 15. Xenophon lauds Sparta's abstention 
from restoring the exiles as an act of special generosity on her part. 

326 History of Greece. [ BooK v 

•without restraint extending its frontier, subjecting a num- 
ber of independent communities, and forming on the 
Thracian Sea a dominion, the existence of which utterly 
contradicted the conditions of the Peace. 

On the question of this unexpected demand, again, the 
two parties at Sparta were directly opposed to one an- 
other. Agesipolis was an opponent of all undertakings 
directed against Hellenic States ; he foresaw how they 
must lead to new acts of injustice, and in the end, prove 
hurtful to Sparta. The Ephors, together with Agesilaus 
and his adherents, on the other hand, were resolved not to 
reject the overtures of the envoys ; they regarded the pro- 
position as a welcome opportunity for re-establishing, un- 
der the most favorable circumstances, the power of the 
city in districts of incomparable importance for the con- 
trol of the Archipelago ; and considered a great war as 
the best means for accustoming the Hellenic contingents to 
the leadership of Sparta. They, accordingly, produced 
the envoys before the popular assembly and the deputies 
of the confederates, who must at this point of time have 
been present at Sparta for the purpose of discussing and 
regulating the affairs of the confederacy. 
s ech of ^ n *^ s occasion Cligenes made a speech, in 

ciigenes. which he expounded the situation of matters. 
" Great and important transactions," he said, " are taking 
place in Hellas, of which you, as it seems to me, have no 
knowledge. Of Olynthus, indeed, you have all heard, — 
the greatest of all the cities in the Thracian peninsula. 
This city began with attracting to itself several of the 
lesser communities, in order together with these to form a 
common state ; hereupon, it conquered a few of the larger 
cities in the vicinity, then caused a series of places to re- 
nounce their allegiance to the Macedonian King, even 
Pella, the greatest of his cities ; and it appears as if 
Amyntas were being gradually forced to surrender his 
whole territory to the advances of the Olynthians. Re- 

Chap, v.] Consequences of Peace of Antalcidas. 327 

cently they have further proceeded to send messages to 
our cities, and have intimated to us, that we should unite 
our military forces with theirs, — otherwise they would 
make war upon us. Now, our sole desire is, to live ac- 
cording to our laws, and to remain free citizens ; but with- 
out external aid this is out of our power ; for Olynthus 
has at her disposal 8,000 heavy-armed, and a still larger 
number of light-armed, troops ; and her cavalry, should 
we give in our adherence, will amount to more than a 
thousand men. But you ought to know, that the Olyn- 
thians are pursuing plans of a yet far wider scope. We 
have seen among them envoys from Thebes and Athens ; 
and we were told, that they were, for their part also about 
to send envoys to these cities, in order to conclude an al- 
liance with them. But should such an alliance be brought 
about, it behooves you to reflect, how it will be possible for 
you to withstand it. Many other cities share our views, 
and hate the Olynthians as we hate them ; but they have 
not dared to take part in our embassy. If, then, you are 
troubled, even concerning Bceotia, and are unwilling to 
allow it to contract itself into a single whole, — consider 
that in the present case an incomparably more dangerous 
power, one which is a land- and a sea-power at the same 
time, is forming itself. For the Olynthians are in posses- 
sion of everything needed for the purpose, of forests for 
building ships, of abundant revenues from harbors and 
mercantile places, and of a population numerous on ac- 
count of the fertility of the soil. Moreover, they have for 
neighbors the free Thracian tribes, which even now are 
ready to do them service, and which, as soon as they shall 
have been completely subjected, will constitute a very con- 
siderable accession to their power, especially since they are 
in that event likely to become proprietors of the gold- 
mines. All these are matters, which are not the product 
of our invention, but the subject of daily discussion among 
the Olynthians. Such is the situation of affairs ; and it 

328 History of Greece. [ B <">* v. 

now rests with you to decide, whether it be worthy of your 
attention. Up to the present moment the power, which 
we have described to you, is one not difficult to meet ; for 
those who have against their own will joined the new 
union of states, will also fall away from it again, so soon 
as they shall see a power asserting itself in opposition to 
it. But when, as is their intention, they shall, by a mu- 
tual grant of the civic franchise, have become more and 
more blended together, and when they find it to their own 
advantage to adhere to those who are mightier than them- 
selves (as is the case with the Arcadians with regard to 
Sparta), it may be doubted whether the league of states 
will any longer so easily admit of dissolution." 
Results of This speech had, with the assent of the 

the embassy. Ephors, been sagaciously calculated for the 
purpose of impressing the Thracian campaign upon the 
Spartans as a political necessity ; the policy of interven- 
tion was, so to speak, represented as a policy of preven- 
tion, and offensive as defensive war. Again, the dangerous 
side presented by the speech of the envoys, was cleverly 
evaded. For it was dangerous to allow a relation of sub- 
ordination, such as was being carried out more strictly 
than ever in Peloponnesus, to be represented as intolerable 
on the Thracian coast, and to demand from the Pclopon- 
nesians a defence of Acanthus and Apollonia against the 
domineering ambition of Olynthus, while in the peninsula 
every attempt at independence was chastised as an act of 
revolt. The Spartans would in this matter draw no dis- 
tinction but one of time. In their eyes, the establishment 
of a new league of states, damaging the independence of 
Greek cities, amounted to an illegal and revolutionary 
proceeding ; but not less was such the case with the disso- 
lution of a dominion over neighbor-states, consecrated by 
the course of centuries ; and, indeed, a very explicit refer- 
ence is made to this distinction in the speech as given by 
Xenophon. It is conceded, that in the event of the Olyn- 

Chap, v.] Consequences of Peace of Antalcidas. 329 

thians being allowed to realize their cravings after a hege- 
mony, a really fixed and historically coherent whole might 
be the result, in which case the Acanthians too might be 
satisfied, — just as at this very time the Arcadian commu- 
nities were placed in an uncommonly favorable situation 
by virtue of similar relations, so that they enjoyed the 
comfort of canton-life, and at the same time participated 
in the advantages which only a great power could offer to 
its constituent members. 

And yet it was nothing but fear of Sparta, Arm 
which made the confederates willing to co- reforms - 
operate ; for after such a judgment as Man tinea had suf- 
fered for having neglected duly to furnish her contingent, 
they were all thoroughly frightened and ready to do ser- 
vice. Of this state of affairs, then, the fullest advantage 
was taken by the envoys, as well as by the authorities of 
the city ; and the praise of great energy cannot be denied 
to the war-party which controlled affairs at Sparta. The 
ancient sluggishness of movement had been shaken off, 
and all the restraints of timidity had been overcome. Af- 
ter such marches as those which Agesilaus had underta- 
ken, distances had lost their importance ; no thought was 
taken of the possibility of serious resistance on the road 
from the Isthmus to Thrace, although the feeling of dis- 
affection in Bceotia was well understood ; and Agesilaus, 
who was the soul of the war-party, gloried in demonstrat- 
ing the advance which Sparta had made since the days of 
Brasidas, when Thraco-Macedonian applications for aid 
had for the first time reached Sparta (vol. iii. p. 178). A 
levy of 10,000 men was resolved upon, and the armaments 
were carried on with the utmost ardor. In arrangement 
of the federal matricula on this occasion, a new principle 
was for the first time, so far as we know, acted upon. For 
it was resolved to leave to the confederates the choice of 
sending money instead of men ; and for this purpose a 
calculation was made of three ^Eginetan obols (i. e. 4J 

330 History of Greece. t B °°* v - 

Attic obols tire.) per diem for each fully-armed warrior, 
and of the quadruple of this, equivalent to a stater (2s. 2d. 
circ.) f for each horseman. Two peltasts were reckoned to 
each hoplite ; and it may with certainty be assumed, that 
Agesilaus attentively took advantage for his native city of 
the recent important innovations with regard to light in- 
fantry and its tactical application. Finally, it was fixed, 
that in case of any city not fulfilling its obligation, Sparta 
should have the right of levying a fine of a stater daily on 
account of every one man missing. 

These ordinances, by which the system of the Confede- 
rate army was regulated, were the results of a sagacious 
combination of strictness and indulgence. For while care 
was taken that no man should be missing in the field, the 
duty of bearing arms was lightened by means of an equi- 
valent money payment being permitted in lieu of personal 
service, which was intentionally not fixed at a higher rate 
than that to which the pay and the expense of mainte- 
nance in war amounted. Thus it was in the power of the 
wealthier communities, to evade personal service in arms ; 
and Sparta gained this advantage : that the Peloponne- 
sians, who preferred the money-payment, grew unaccus- 
tomed to military service, and became un warlike in pro- 
portion as Sparta increased in military strength of her 
own. Sparta, therefore, hereby fully adopted the policy 
of the Athenians, who had established their absolute ma- 
ritime hegemony by permitting to the lesser island com- 
munities the payment of an equivalent for personal service 
in money, and by thus gradually disarming them. And 
Sparta could drill and dispose of troops enlisted by her- 
self after a quite different fashion from that which had 
been possible in the case of the men furnished by the con- 
federate states ; so that the entire reform served essential- 
ly to raise the military strength of Sparta. And advan- 
tage was taken of the first war conducted on a greater 
scale and resolved upon in common, in order to call into 

Chap, v.] Consequences of Peace of Antalcldas. 331 

life these new institutions ; so soon as they had been car- 
ried out in Peloponnesus, it would be possible to adopt 
them as regulations for the armies in the remainder of 
Greece ; for that such were the ultimate intentions of the 
party of Agesilaus, there can be no doubt.* 

When the spring of the year 383 arrived, Ex edition 
the entire peninsula fell into a condition of ° f Eudami- 

* das and 

warlike agitation; and the Lacedaemonian Pncebidas. 
captains passed through all the cantons, in or- 01 - xcix - 2 

(B. C. 3o3). 

der to collect men or moneys. But action was 
not delayed till the armaments should have been com- 
pleted ; for the envoys most justifiably insisted upon a ra- 
pid advance ; everything, according to their view, de- 
pended upon the Peloponncsian troops being at their post, 
before the still wavering or unwilling cities had been 
forced by Olynthus to give in their adhesion. It was ac- 
cordingly resolved in the first instance to form a brigade 
of 2,000 men under the brothers Eudamidas and Phcebi- 
das. With one division of this Eudamidas immediately 
set out, advancing in forced marches up towards Thrace ; 
the other followed about the middle of the summer. 

Phoebidas was a passionate adherent of the Phoebd 
war-party. He was completely mastered by ^°™ 
the feverish excitement which prevailed in 

v'li X('1X. A 

part of the civic community, and which delu- (b. c. 383). 
sively pictured to them the ultimate goal of Spartan am- 
bition as easily attainable ; he burnt with desire, for his 
part too, to contribute some notable service, in order to 
extend the dominion of his native city over Greece as ra- 
pidly as possible. Thus he came to Boeotia, and pitched 
his camp before the walls of Thebes, where the two par- 
ties stood sharply opposed to one another ; the democratic 
party had carried the election of their leader, Ismenias, 
and the opposite party that of Leontiades, on the Board 

* Cligenes : Hellen. iv. 4, 15. Army-reforms : ib. 14 ; Grote, Hitt. of Greece 
vol. x. p. 77 ; Boeckh, Publ. Ec. of Ath., vol. i. p. 3G0. 

332 History of Greece. [ BooK v. 

of Generals. As yet the two parties held the balance to 
one another ; bnt the oligarchs felt that their power was 
on the decline, and that they needed support from with- 
out, if they were to maintain themselves. For this pur- 
pose no better opportunity could be found than the pre- 
sent. While, therefore, Ismenias held proudly back, and 
never showed himself in the camp, his opponent entered 
unobserved into an understanding with the Spartan gene- 
ral, and proposed to him the occupation of the citadel of 
Thebes, which he undertook to deliver into his hands with- 
out fighting or danger. 

Let the situation of affairs be considered. In spite of 
an outwardly peaceful relation, a feeling of bitter indig- 
nation prevailed at Sparta against Thebes, as the chief 
focus of the last war. It was known, how unwillingly she 
had submitted to the execution of the peace ordered by 
Sparta ; and the present relations between the two states 
had fallen into a condition of doubtfulness, in which they 
could not long remain. Against Mantinea Thebes had 
still furnished her contingent ; but now, under the in- 
fluence of Ismenias, it had been publicly proclaimed, that 
no citizen was to join the Thracian expedition. For any 
Spartan undertaking extending beyond the Isthmus was 
the worst of abominations in the eyes' of the states of 
Central Greece, who well knew what must be the result 
of such attempts. On hearing the reports of the envoys, 
the Spartans could entertain no doubt as to the fact, that 
a league was in progress between the states of Central and 
those of Northern Greece, which alone at the present time 
retained capabilities of resistance, and which, if united, 
would form an extremely dangerous power. Sparta was 
without a fleet. The success of the Thracian campaigns, 
accordingly, essentially depended upon a secure command 
being obtained over the land-route ; but, as matters stood 
at present, it was to be apprehended that, upon the first 
mischance which might befall the Spartan arms, the The- 

Chai\ v.] Consequences of Peace of Antalcidas. 333 

bans would openly declare themselves against Sparta, and 
prepare the greatest difficulties for the troops sent to re- 
inforce their predecessors. For the security of the line 
of march the decisive position was the Cadmea. 

How, then, could an ambitious general such as Pboebi- 
das was, have under these circumstances hesitated long, 
when the occupation of the Cadmea was offered to him, 
and when by boldly striking a sudden, unscrupulous blow 
it was in his power to secure without bloodshed, what 
sooner or later must in any case be secured, if Sparta was 
to carry through her system of policy, — and what, more- 
over, would then presumably have to be obtained in a 
sanguinary and perilous war ? 

Leontiades had chosen day and hour with seizure of 

i.i i x • tm t*u i~ I. j the Cadmea. 

the utmost cunning. Hie lnebans had a great 
festival, of which the centre was the temple of (t'^Sj. 
Demeter, a sanctuary of primitive antiquity, UTnmer - 
on the Cadmea. This festival was celebrated by the wo- 
men apart ; they secluded themselves on the citadel, where 
the gates were closed upon them ; and the key for this day 
was in the hands of Leontiades. The Council was assem- 
bled in a hall in the market-place ; the way from the 
Southern gate of the city to the citadel was very short, 
and touched none of the open places within the walls ; 
and moreover the citizens were in the most unsuspecting 
frame of mind, in harmony with the festive character of 
the day. No one was thinking of the Spartans, who were 
known to have received orders about noon to break up 
their camp and march for the north. No sooner, then, 
had Leontiades convinced himself, that the noontide heat 
had driven every human being from the streets, than he 
mounted his horse, as if about to honor the departing 
general by convoying him along the first part of his 
march ; and thus the citadel, together with the women, 
was in the hands of the Spartans, before either Council or 
citizens had any suspicion of the danger. Leontiades him- 

334 History of Greece. f BoOK v - 

self was the first man to announce to the Council what 
had occurred, and to declare any resistance to be impossi- 
ble. His adherents immediately surrounded him ; and, 
since the opposite party had been completely taken by 
surprise, the oligarchs carried everything, in particular 
the arrest of Ismenias, and the appointment to his post 
of a member of their own party ; while the leaders of the 
democrats took flight to Athens. The treasonable design 
had been successfully consummated in a few hours ; and 
all that remained for Leontiades to do, was to hasten to 
Sparta, in order there also to be the first to announce the 
great event.* 

That an event, all the details of which fit into one an- 
other so precisely, should have been brought about quite 
by chance and incidentally, by means of an understand i 
ing arrived at within a short time, is doubtless extremely 
improbable. Nor is it conceivable, that the leader of the 
Laconian party at Thebes, who must in any case have 
prepared his plan long beforehand, should not have pre- 
viously informed himself, whether, and to what extent, he 
might look for co-operation on the part of the Spartans. 
We shall therefore be justified in assuming as very pro- 
bable, that Phcebidas had received instructions at home 
to pitch his camp on the appointed day near Thebes, to 
establish communications with Leontiades inside its walls, 
and generally to see what was to be done. But these in- 
structions must have been of a non-official character, and 
have been given to him in the closest confidence ; for only 
thus is the impression to be explained, which the arrival 

* Eudamidas requests the Ephors to allow his brother Phcebidas to 
follow him with the remainder of the troops, who were not yet quite ready 
for taking the field : Hellen. v. 2, 24. Diod. xv. 20, is inaccurate, — Capture 
of the Cadmea, nvfliW ovriav according to Aristid. i. 419, Dindorf (accord- 
ingly Clinton fixes the date in 01. xcix. 3); Xenophon, Hellen. v. 2, 29, is 
more precise : Std. to ta? ywalicas iv rrj Ka6>ei'a #ea-/xo</>opid£€U'. The Thes- 
mophoria in the month of Damatrius are conjecturally placed by Boeckh 
(Mondcyklen, 83) after the middle of September. Others have thought of 
other festivals of Demeter, Sievers, p. 159 of the Thalysia (Thiluthiua — 
Thargelion — May). 

chap, v.] Consequences of Peace of Antaleidas. 335 

of Leontiades and the tidings of the seizure of the Cad- 
mea created at Sparta. 

Here, Agesipolis and those who shared his Phoebidas 
opinions were of course filled with the most J ud gf d on . 

x , Spartan pnn- 

serious anger by the violation of the Peace ; cipies. 
and demanded the punishment of the general, and the re- 
storation of the Cadmea. The excitement however was 
too great, to admit of its being ascribed to moral indigna- 
tion at the dishonorable and illegal character of the deed. 
Other reasons must have existed, why many Spartans, not 
belonging to the party of Agesipolis, disapproved of the 
transaction ; and doubtless one of the main reasons of the 
feeling of displeasure lay in the circumstance, that a se- 
cret understanding between Agesilaus and Phcebidas had 
to be assumed as a matter of course, and that this was 
regarded as an unconstitutional interference with the 
rights of the authorities. For the personal hatred of king 
Agesilaus against Thebes was notorious, and it was known 
how he had from the first looked upon the Peace as an 
instrument for the chastisement of Thebes ; he, therefore, 
was regarded as the real author of this act of violence, 
upon which, without having such a support as this in the 
background, Phoebidas would never have ventured. The 
excitement was accordingly directed against Agesilaus, 
who was now standing at the height of his influence, and 
who, swayed by his ambition, was intent upon carrying on 
a personal government at Sparta, and upon controlling 
the policy of the state. 

Agesilaus was accordingly in his turn obliged to use 
his whole influence, in order to protect Phcebidas ; and 
the way in which he succeeded in effecting this, offers a 
sure test of the state of feeling at this time prevailing at 
Sparta. The large majority of the citizens were quite 
content with the thing itself which had been done ; but it 
was not permissible to approve of its execution, lest a 
dangerous precedent should be established for the future. 

336 History of Greece. [Book v. 

Phcebidas was accordingly called to account for his un- 
authorized proceeding ; he was removed from his com- 
mand over the army, and sentenced to a fine. This satis- 
fied the injured dignity of the Ephors, while at the same 
time it involved a humiliation for Agesilaus. But as to 
the main point he completely, and without difficulty, se- 
cured his object. For his open declaration, that every 
act on the part of a Lacedaemonian commander ought to 
be judged according as it either redounded to the advan- 
tage of the state or not, and that this alone must be the 
standard, was at bottom so ancient a principle of Spartan 
policy, that only very few could on this head seriously 
contradict him ; and, inasmuch as the occupation of 
Thebes was regarded as the greatest advantage gained by 
Sparta since the battle of JEgospotami, while under exist- 
ing circumstances nothing could have been so dangerous 
to her as a withdrawal from the Cadmea, there could re- 
main no doubt as to the course to be pursued by the gov- 
ernment. The troops received orders to hold the place ; 
and three harmosts were despatched thither, to assume 
the supreme command. 

The act of sudden violence perpetrated by Phcebidas 
has both in ancient and in modern times given excep- 
tionally great offence ; but this impression is only in so far 
justified, that the deed was one of an exceptionally sur- 
prising and daring character, and befell one of the most 
considerable cities of Greece : in other respects it accords 
so thoroughly with the general character of Lacedaemo- 
nian policy, that it is impossible to find in it anything ex- 

For it should be remembered, how Sparta on principle 
would never consent to recognize the other states as enjoy- 
ing an equality of rights with herself, or to bind herself 
by such general rules of law as prevailed between states 
co-ordinate with one another. Moreover, there existed in 
all the cities a party which shared the standpoint of Spar- 

Chap, v.] Consequences of Peace of Antalcidas. 337 

ta ; and those who held these opinions, were not regarded 
as one party on a level with the rest, but as the men who 
were alone justified in asserting themselves as the loyal 
patriots; while their opponents, the democrats, were 
looked upon as the revolutionary faction, which sinned, 
not only against Sparta, but also against the common 
country. From this point of view Sparta was able to look 
upon intervention on behalf of her adherents as a kind 
of duty incumbent upon her as the state holding the pri- 
macy ; and, in order in a still higher degree to surround 
the violent interference in the affairs of other communi- 
ties with an equitable semblance, it was customary to 
conceive of the condition of those states which were gov- 
erned as democracies, as if a revolutionary reign of ter- 
ror were prevailing in them, under which their citizens 
were oppressed by a band of turbulent agitators ; so that 
it seemed all the more incumbent upon Sparta, to apply 
to them a wholesome disciplinary force, and to restore the 
legal state of things. And in Thebes the proceedings of 
Sparta manifestly admitted of something more of justifi- 
cation than elsewhere ; for with the Thebans democracy 
was an innovation of the last few years. It was one of 
the two highest public officers who here of his own accord 
handed to the Spartans the keys of the citadel entrusted 
to him by the community. Furthermore, Thebes had now 
refused to furnish her contingent, although bound to fur- 
nish it according to the Spartan view and according to 
what Thebes had herself in recent years acknowledged as 
her duty ; and this refusal, which had been made in an 
extremely offensive form, could not but be regarded as a 
proof of her being already in secret league with Olynthus 
against Sparta. Thus Thebes was already de facto at war 
with Sparta ; and it is quite obvious, what importance at- 
tached to the Cadmea during a war against Olynthus. 
Finally, appeal could be made to the fact, that the The- 
bans had themselves proceeded with far greater harshness 

338 History of Greece. [ Bo °* v - 

against Platsese, and this again simply under the pretext, 
that the democracy there constituted a breach of usage 
and an insufferable revolt. 

With regard to the chief objection to the conduct of Spar- 
ta, viz. her violation of the very treaty which she had re- 
cently herself proclaimed, she had already made it suffici- 
ently clear, that she refused to recognize any autonomy but 
such as consisted in the voluntary self-subordination of all 
the states to her leadership, as to that of the primary state* 
Execution of ^ ne Spartans further showed their extreme 
ismenias. anxiety to invest the occupation of the Cad- 
mea with the semblance of an act performed in the name 
and in the interest of the whole nation, by the legal pro- 
ceedings which were set on foot against Ismenias, who had 
been delivered up to them. They instituted a kind of 
Amphictyonic tribunal, to which they summoned assessors 
from all the confederate cities. The accused was charged 
with having occasioned the Corinthian War, and having 
entered into secret communications with the Persian 
King. He contrived to defend himself well with refer- 
ence to these special points. But how could he deny, that 
he was devoted to popular government, and had actively 
opposed the claims of Sparta ? And this sufficed for his 
condemnation. By putting him to death the Spartans 
obtained not only the satisfaction of their craving for ven- 
geance upon the person of the most hated of their adver- 
saries, but also the declaration on the part of a Hellenic 
judicial tribunal, that democratic opinions and hostility 
against Sparta amounted to high treason ; so that her en- 
tire proceedings at Thebes were hereby simultaneously re- 
cognized as lawful.* 

Fresh distur- ^ sti11 clearer ^g nt falls U P 0n tneSe trans " 

bances at actions from the occurrences which soon after- 

Phhus. _ - 

01. xcix. 3 W ards ensued at Phlius. Since the enforced 

(b. c. 381). 

* Ismenias, judicially sentenced as neya\64>ptov koX Kaxoirpdyfiuv at 
Thebes, according to Xenophon ; at Sparta, according to Plutarch, Pel. 5. 

Chap, v.i Consequences of Peace of Antaleidas. 339 

re-admission of the exiles (p. 325) Phlius had conduct- 
ed itself with consistent loyalty towards Sparta. Age- 
sipolis, invariably anxious to remove every occasion for 
further acts of oppression, had doubtless done his best to 
gain the hearts of the Phliasians by kindness ; and it 
was a special satisfaction to him, that notwithstanding the 
difficult condition of their home affairs they readily ful- 
filled their obligations as confederates, aud even afforded 
him an opportunity of publicly commending them on ac- 
count of the promptitude and the abundance of their mo- 
ney-contributions. This occurred when Agesipolis was 
following with the main army on the expedition against 
Olynthus ; so that the Phliasians must have been among 
those confederates, who took advantage of the new army- 
regulations (p. 330) to pay a money equivalent exempting 
them, entirely or in part, from personal military service ; 
— which was doubtless done by many of the wealthiei 
confederate cities in the case of an expedition directed to 
so remote a point abroad. Very probably, moreover, 
where there existed in a city two parties on very unfriend- 
ly terms with one another, neither of the two may have 
desired to weaken itself by sending out men. 

But when, since the spring of the year 381, Agesipolis 
was on the march, and when his conciliatory influence 
could no longer assert itself, new quarrels broke out at 
Phlius. No advance could be made with the discussions 
concerning the settlement of landed properties ; and no 
agreement could be arrived at as to a decision of the 
questions of possession in dispute, which should be equit- 
able for both parties. The democrats refused to acknow- 
ledge any court of appeal beyond that of their native ju- 
dicial tribunals ; but these were composed of citizens who, 
like the large majority of the town population, were at- 
tached to the popular form of government. The late 
exiles, who had still not completely recovered possession 
of their lands, hereupon openly accused the tribunals of 

340 History of Greece. t BooK v - 

partiality ; declined to commit to them the decision of le- 
gal questions which were of an essentially political char- 
acter ; and demanded that these should be brought before 
another, and a foreign, court. This demand was so tho- 
roughly in accord with the policy of Agesilaus, that we 
are probably justified in assuming it to have been made 
at his instigation ; for he was not less active in exciting 
the evil spirit of discord, than his noble colleague was 
everywhere desirous of allaying it. 

When, then, the exiles turned to Sparta, and brought 
forward their complaints as to the denial of impartial pro- 
ceedings-at-law, a fine was imposed upon them by the 
civic community at Phlius, because of course an inde- 
pendent city could not permit any of its individual citi- 
zens to carry their grievances before foreign states. The 
Ephors, on the other hand, had no intention to allow this 
opportunity for a fresh intervention to escape them. Thus 
they acted quite in the sense of the policy of Agesilaus, 
who wished democracy to be treated as an excess involv- 
ing a common danger, and therefore advocated the bring- 
ing of all questions connected with it before a Hellenic 
commission, — in other words, before the arbitrating au- 
thority of the state which held the primacy. On this oc- 
casion, again, the oligarchs, who at home were accounted 
traitors and had been legally sentenced, were regarded as 
the true patriots and as the actual civic body, which it 
was necessary to protect against the injustice of a small 
party ; although the contradiction between this pretence 
and the real state of things was in the present instance 
incomparably more gross and palpable than in the case of 
Thebes. But in order that the conduct of the Phliasians 
might appear in an additionally invidious light, the case 
was represented, as if they had merely waited for the de- 
parture of Agesipolis, before defiantly confronting Sparta, 
in the belief that the other king would hardly quit the 
city, and that they were thus secured against any armed 

chap, v.] Consequences of Peace of Antahidas. 341 

intervention. But we can hardly allow ourselves to sup- 
pose the Phliasians to have judged the state of affairs with 
so little intelligence. 

The further course of events was in its de- „ 


velopinent thoroughly consistent with this |?^ nst 
opening. Agesilaus, personally connected with 01. xcix. 4 
the leaders of the fugitives, Podanemus and (B ' c * 381) ' 
others, urged their cause with extreme energy. He pro- 
nounced their demands to be completely justified, and the 
imposition of a fine upon them to be invalid ; and imme- 
diately marched out at the head of an army. The Phlia- 
sians wished to anticipate him, and promised to submit to 
the resolutions of Sparta ; but for this it was now too late. 
The city, it was said, had shown itself too untrustworthy ; 
nothing short of garrisoning its citadel would serve as a 
sufficient pledge of its fidelity. On receiving this answer, 
the citizens determined manfully to defend their liberty, 
although they had not had time to prepare for a war, 
and were without any hope, except such as might possi- 
bly accrue from their being clearly in the right, from the 
strong situation of their city, and from the ill-will created 
among the confederates by the unjust proceedings of 

The city of Phlius rose on a series of three g . of 
terraces between the streams flowing directly phlius - 
from the springs of the Asopus. On the lowest ( ^ 1 ; c x ^5j 4 
of these terraces lay the market-place with the 
buildings surrounding it, on the middle one the temple of 
Asclepius, on the uppermost the citadel. The plateau of 
the citadel had a very strong situation, and was roomy 
enough to contain groves and corn-fields ; which circum- 
stance perhaps contributed to make a protracted resist- 
ance possible. The popular leader Delphion conducted 
it, — with a fearlessness and endurance forcing admiration 
even from the enemy. He was surrounded by 300 young 
men, the kernel of the defensive force of the citizens ; 

342 History of Greece. t BoOK v - 

and with these he at the right moment protected every 
point threatened, and also annoyed the besiegers by means 
of sallies. Among the besiegers there was much unwilling- 
ness ; the Peloponnesians showed how little they were in- 
clined to serve as executioners to the Spartans, so as to 
help them to chastise any town against which they might 
chance to entertain a grudge ; the siege protracted itself 
for an entire year ; the service was of an extremely heavy 
description ; and the injustice of the entire proceeding be- 
came very palpable to the confederates, when they viewed 
the little band of the exiles, whose restoration they were 
to effect by force of arms. The king, indeed, on this oc- 
casion too sought to spread the notion, that the democrats 
were carrying on a reign of terror within the walls, and 
that Delphion was a Tyrant, who by his body-guard re- 
pressed the real sentiments of the citizens ; but Delphion 
replied by causing the citizens to assemble on an open ter- 
race, visible to a great distance, so that the besiegers might 
convince themselves with their own eyes, how the city was 
so far from being terrorized, that a civic community of 
5,000 men was of one mind against the traitors in the 
Lacedaemonian camp. 

Agesilaus refused to be prevented from continuing to 
play his game of a hypocritical policy. In the end the 
want of supplies could not but make itself felt in Phlius, 
after the city had held out twice as long as the exiles had 
declared to be possible. The less trustworthy citizens be- 
gan to escape from the walls ; and hereupon Agesilaus gave 
orders, that the exiles should use all the connexions at their 
command in order to tempt their fellow-citizens to their side. 
Those who came were received with open arms, and pro- 
vided with food and weapons ; and thus, by the employment 
of all kinds of artifices, the band of the Phliasians in the 
camp was after all swollen to more than a thousand, to 
whom Agesilaus would point as the kernel of the civic com- 
munity, which ought to be restored to possession of its rights. 

Chap. V.J Consequences of Peace of Antahidas. 343 

At last the brave city's power of resistance f^|^f? ion 
declined. Phlius demanded free transit for 
an embassy, to be sent to the authorities at Sparta ; but 
the king, deeply offended at being thus passed over, 
induced the Ephors to commit the decision absolutely 
into his hands. With this answer the envoys returned ; 
and now nothing remained for the unfortunate city, but 
to surrender unconditionally to its bitterest foe. Enraged 
by the long endurance of the siege, which had lasted for 
more than a year and a half, and finally in addition by 
the escape of Delphion, he ordered the utmost rigor to 
prevail. He instituted a commission of a hundred men, 
composed half of exiles, and half of citizens acceptable 
to them. These were to decide " who in the city was to 
remain alive, and who had deserved death." The same 
commission was furthermore, under the protection of the 
Spartan arms, to draw up a new constitution. 

About the same time the tidings arrived of . , 

° and of 

the capitulation of Olynthus. After several olynthus. 
alternations of success and defeat, in which , 01 - c - L 

7 (b. c. 380-79). 

the brave Teleutias, the general sent out after 
Eudamidas, had fallen before the enemy's walls, and 
subsequently Agesipolis too had been carried away by a fe- 
ver in the prime of life, Polybiades had finally by estab- 
lishing a complete blockade overcome the proud city, and 
thereby put an end to its much-feared league of towns.* 
This was the summit of the supremacy The ower 
of Sparta in Greece, based on the Peace ^ f esiiaus and 
of Antalcidas. Boeotia was now a vassal- 
state ; and in the peninsula everything had been arranged 
as the Spartans wished. The revolutionary tendencies 
which had manifested themselves there since the Peace of 

* Phlius besieged for a terra of twenty months : Rellen. v. 3, 25 ; Plutarch, 
Ages. 24. Nature of the locality : Curtius, Pelopownesos, ii. 471 ff. Agesipolis 
died before Olynthus b. c. 380 — #caT4 fle'pov? aK^u, Hellen. v. 3, 19 — after reign- 
ing fourteen years, in the third year of the Olynthian War. The 
capitulation of Phlius falls in the latter part of the summer of b. c. 379 ; ct 
Sievers, p. 390. 

344 History of Greece. [ B <> * v. 

Nicias, had been suppressed ; the northern post, the most 
dangerous on account of its remoteness from Sparta 
and of its inclination towards a Separate League, was 
now held firmly in hand ; on the frontiers of Argos a 
chain of secure posts had been gained in Mantinea, 
Phlius, and Corinth ; oligarchical Corinth for the sake 
of its own security had to act as the guardian of the 
Isthmus for Sparta. Thus Argos was surrounded ; while 
the single state which besides Argos was still under a 
democratic government, viz., Athens, had been exhausted 
by the Corinthian War, and was moreover utterly isolated, 
and menaced in the rear by the garrison of the Cadmea. 
The most dangerous of all possible combinations, that 
between Thebes, Athens and Olynthus, had been nipped 
in the bud. The most powerful of the cities to the north 
of the Sea followed the leadership of Sparta. The sys- 
tem of the confederate contingents had been newly and 
suitably organized. Sparta might hope to render her 
army more and more the sole controlling military force, 
and to transform her hegemony into an absolute domin- 
ion. A variety of Amphictyonic traditions had been 
successfully resuscitated, in order thereby to invest the 
new-Spartan supremacy with a semblance of legality. 
The ancient contest against the Tyrants had, by a trans- 
mutation in accordance with the times, become a persecu- 
tion of popular government ; and the success with which 
individual foci of democracy had been annihilated, 
seemed to justify the hope, that it would be possible en- 
tirely to overcome and extirpate this tendency in the 
Hellenic nation. Sparta was the single state in Greece 
which pursued a fixed system of policy ; she was clearly 
conscious of her aim, and equally reckless in her choice 
of means. Hence her rigor of action, such as she had 
never displayed in former times. The ancient discord 
between Kingship and Ephors had come to an end. Ages- 
ilaus by his cunning complaisance had gained over the 

CHi-p. v.] Comequences of Peace of Antalcidas. 345 

authorities, had freed himself from the obstacles placed 
in his way by the influence of his fellow-king, and now 
ruled as independently, as hardly a Heraclide had ruled 
before him. Hereby the conduct of public affairs came 
to be characterized by unity and effectiveness ; both 
friends and foes knew what they had to expect from Spar- 
ta. This was a kind of government such as Lysander 
had had in view ; his system of party-policy was renewed, 
and his institutions were imitated, by Agesilaus ; but the 
latter possessed the advantage of a fixed position in his 
own state, which Lysander had lacked, who contended 
against the revolution, and yet was himself a revolution- 
ary politician ; while Agesilaus, without giving offence, 
as the universally acknowledged representative of Spar- 
tan feeling attained to personal rule in his native city. 
In this, too, Agesilaus was more sagacious than his 
political tutor : that in the first instance he confined him- 
self to the mainland, and applied the peculiar resources 
which still existed at Sparta to the establishment of a 
secure continental supremacy, and to its maintenance by 
means of a well-contrived network of garrisons. 
It should be remembered in addition: that r^ ,. 

lne climax 

the supremacy of Sparta rested not only on of the Spartan 

x J L J supremacy. 

the force of arms, but also on a body of adhe- 
rents spread through all the cities ; that beyond the limits 
of Hellas she kept up advantageous and important con- 
nexions, above all with the Great King, who, rejoicing in 
the tranquil possession of his coasts, was at all times ready 
to give his support for the maintenance of the Peace of 
Antalcidas in the sense in which Sparta interpreted it, 
furthermore with the Tyrant of Syracuse and with the 
kings of Macedonia ; that, lastly, she victoriously asserted 
her arms even in Epirus, and bade the Illyrians desist 
from a further advance, who are said to have cast a long- 
ing glance towards the treasures of Delphi (01. xcviii. 4 ; 
b. c. 384). And thus we may understand, with what 


346 History of Greece. [ BooK v - 

satisfaction Agesilaus and his friends looked upon their 
handiwork, and how securely founded it seemed to them : 
for although it was not yet completed, why, upon a favor* 
able opportunity presenting itself, should not the occupa- 
tion of the remaining places which still preserved an in- 
dependent power, in particular of the Acropolis of Athens, 
which had been abandoned in an hour of weakness, be as 
successfully accomplished, as the occupation of the Cadinea? 
And yet this very deed, intended as the corner-stone on 
which the supremacy of Sparta was to rest, became the 
stumbling-block on which that supremacy was to shiver 
into fragments. However splendid the power of Sparta 
might seem, yet its footing was feeble, because she ignored 
and contemned the moral forces and the spirit of freedom, 
still existing in the Greek communities. The resistance 
was thought to be at an end, of which the activity had 
only been temporarily suppressed ; and an arrogant self- 
delusion opined that a single act of sudden violence had 
accomplished all. Sparta, herself devoid of intellectual 
life, was likewise without the remotest conception of moral 
forces, and was incapable of truly uniting and leading 
Greece ; she could only take — she had nothing to give ; 
she merely knew how to oppress free communities by bru- 
tal force, and to introduce oligarchical party-governments. 
This system of treatment produced the force of resistance ; 
and the deed of Phoebidas, when judged from the very 
stand-point of sheer expediency, adopted by the policy of 
Agesilaus, proved to have been an act of utter perversity. 
For it provoked agitation in a population whose resources 
had as yet been the least exhausted ; and the new rising 
against the overbearing arrogance of Sparta was all the 
more dangerous because it proceeded, not from a league, 
whose members maintained little cohesion among one 
another, but from a single city, which accepted the con- 
test against Sparta, first on behalf of its own liberty, and 
then for the supremacy in Hellas. 


* m » 


Fboh Ol. c. 2, (b. c. 379) to Ol. civ. 3 (b. c. 362). 

Note. — The chief source for the period of the hegemony of Thebes was 
Ephorus, whose JEolic patriotism (cf. Book VII. chap, ii.) likewise extended 
to Boeotia ; whoever read his books, was seized with admiration for Epami- 
nondas : cf. Plut. de garrul. 22. He is blamed for his ignorance of military 
matters by Polybius, xii. 35. He furnished materials to Diodorus, who for 
many facts is the sole authority, but who also makes quite erroneous 
statements, e.g. xv. 82. Xenophon is of use byway of controlling Diodorus 
(who takes no account of him), but, by reason of his partiality, is otherwise 
wholly untrustworthy. He misrepresents history ; with him every piece 
of good fortune happening to Thebes is an accident, and every success on 
the part of Agesilaus merit; nor is justice done by him to Epaminondas 
until the closing compaign. His Hellenics narrow themselves more and 
more into an account of Peloponnesian history. The genuineness of his 
Agesilaus is doubtful. Plutarch's Agesilaus has good authorities (avaypa<f>al 
AaKcopiKai, c. 19). In his Pelopidas, and in the Dialogue on the Dozmonion of Socra* 
tes, he has excellent materials derived from native tradition. Some details 
from his Life of Epaminondas may be preserved in the Apophthegmata. The 
Hellenics of the Olynthian Callisthenes (beginning from the Peace of Antal- 
cidas) were used by Diodorus (cf. Wesseling ad xv. 54). Pausanias, in his 
ninth Book, has very valuable information, in particular c. 14. Nepos, too. 
is the solitary authority for certain credible facts. Occasional information 
is to be found in the orators, Isocrates (Plataic. 12, unjust against Thebes), 
Demosthenes, JSschines, Dinarchus. The Boeotian historians, Anaxis, and 
Dionysodorus, whose works extended to the accession of Philip (Diod. xv. 
95), were used by Diodorus and Plutarch, without there being any possibili- 
ty of demonstrating what was extracted from them. Chronology is in this 
period, too, very uncertain, especially up to the battle of Mantinea. Fixed 
points are furnished by the Olympic games, civ. 1 (b. c. 3G4), and by the 
eclipse of the sun on July 13th, b. c. 364, which immediately preceded the 
last expedition of Pelopidas. 




Bceotia was one of the most fortunate of Bceotia. 
the districts of Greece. It lay in the heart of Hellas, well 
protected on the outside by natural frontiers and at the 
same time washed by three seas (if the two divisions of 
the Eubcean channel, separated from one another by tho 
straits, are regarded, as they were by the ancients, as two 
distinct seas) : a country presenting a rare combination 
of the advantages of coast-land aud of interior. For it 
touched the main routes of Greek maritime intercourse, 
and at the same time contained in its inland parts a wealth 
of resources. Fat pastures spread along the rivers and 
lakes ; corn and wine flourished abundantly ; and its hor- 
ticulture and breeding of horses gave to Bceotia a pre- 
eminence before all the neighboring lands. It was densely 
peopled by a healthy race of inhabitants : the men of Bce- 
otia were famed for their bodily vigor, and the women of 
Thebes for their beauty. Manifold immigrations from the 
interior as well as from the sea had carried into Bceotia 
the geims of a higher civilization. The land was filled 
with those systems of divine worship, which everywhere 
among the Greeks gave an impulse to culture and to ar- 
tistic life, in particular with the worship of Apollo and 
that of Dionysus ; it was richer in highly-famed seats of 
oracles than any other country. Seven-gated Thebes we 
remember as the point among all the cities of the Greek 
mainland, where we first meet with a higher civilization ; 
still clearer testimony remains as to the glory and wealth 


350 History of Greece. [Bookvi. 

of Minyan Orchoinenus ; nor is anything more profoundly 
astonishing to the traveller, than to behold on the ruin 
of the morass, so gloomy and desolate at the present day, 
in the centre of the district, the ruins of the cities of prim- 
itive antiquity, which once upon a time encircled as with 
a thick wreath the basin of the valley. 

That the Boeotia of history should never have attained 
to a significance corresponding to the natural advantages 
of the locality and to the prosperity of the district in the 
pre-Homeric age, is due above all to one principal cause. 
The immigration of the Thessalian Boeotians, from which 
the country derived its name and the beginnings of its 
connected history, destroyed the earlier civilization of the 
land, without succeeding in establishing a new civilization 
capable of conducting the entire district to a prosperous 
and harmonious development. 

Condition of ^ cannot be sa ^ tnat tne anc i ent germs of 
Boeotia in the culture were suppressed, or that barbarous 

historic times. rr ' 

times supervened. The ancient seats of the 
gods and oracles continued to be honored, and the ancient 
festivals of the Muses on Mount Helicon, and of the Cha- 
rites at Orchomenus, to be celebrated. In Boeotia too 
the beneficent influence of Delphi was at work, and the 
poetic school of Hesiod, connected as it was with Delphi, 
long maintained itself here (vol. ii. p. 95). And a yet 
stronger inclination was displayed by the iEolian immi- 
grants towards music and lyric poetry. The cultivation 
of the music of the flute was encouraged by the excellent 
reeds of the Copaic morasses. This was the genuinely na- 
tional species of music in Boeotia. Flute-playing and 
sinking were practised in public competition contests ; and 
although the lofty art of Pindar attached itself in some 
tespects to foreign schools, yet it was rooted in its native 
soil. The existence of poetesses such as Myrtis and Co- 
rinna, who would venture to compete with Pindar, attests 
the spread among the people of a love of art, and shows 

chap. I.] Xhe Uprising of Thebes. 351 

how the Boeotian ^Eolians herein proved themselves the 
born equals of their kinsmen in Lesbos. 

And yet the Boeotians lacked the capacity The 
for attracting to themselves the earlier ele- ar?s°tocrac 
ments of population in such a way as to bring 
about a happy amalgamation. In the southern part of 
the country Old-Ionic population maintained itself (vol. i. 
p. 120) ; and we know, how inflexible was its attitude 
towards the iEolians, how different were the courses 
pursued by Thebes and by Plataese respectively. In the 
west the ancient traditions of the Minyse attached them- 
selves to the rocky fastness of Orchomenus, where an 
indelible aversion from the new lords of the land handed 
itself down from generation to generation. Nor were the 
political institutions adapted for promoting a peaceful 
union ; for the knightly families which had conquered the 
country kept themselves apart, and retained all the rights 
of government. Although several attempts were made 
to regulate by law the order of things which had been 
established by force, as is proved by the laws of the 
Bacchiade Philolaus at Thebes (vol. i. p. 294), yet these 
ordinances were solely intended to support the power, 
founded by force of arms, of the nobility holding the 
land. The common interest of the ruling families, 
distributed through the cities of the country, was the 
single bond of cohesion among the different territories, 
while the people itself was kept away from political 
affairs and oppressed. But the worst evil of all was, that 
the aristocracy of the country did nothing to render 
itself worthy of its position. The Boeotian lords were 
not much preferable to the Thessalian ; nor was there any 
region far or near, inhabited by Greek tribes, which 
presented a harsher contrast in culture or manners, than 
the district where the road led from the Attic side of 
Mount Parnes across to the Boeotian. But this inferiority 
by no means excited emulation; on the contrary, the 

352 History of Greece. lbookv* 

jEolians in Boeotia secluded themselves with a kind of 
defiance from all intellectual movement, in proportion as 
beyond the hills the Ionic race developed an active 
vitality ; they became more and more stolid and indolent ; 
as against the over-refinement of the Athenians they were 
rather proud of their own rustic roughness and rudeness • 
and for the higher enjoyments of life, which were denied 
to them, they sought compensation in sensual indulgence. 
Luxurious banquets were the most important matters in 
their social life ; to justice and law they paid no respect 
either among themselves or as towards others, and their 
quarrels they preferred to decide by blows. 

Under these circumstances, there could be no question 
of a prosperous development. The natural resources of 
the country were only very partially turned to account ; 
trade and navigation were neglected, and the harbors lay 
unused. All free intellectual culture was left aside, and 
the gymnastic art was allowed to degenerate into the 
pursuit of athletics, since instead of a general develop- 
ment of physical vigor and agility the aim was merely 
the highest possible degree of muscular strength. The 
dialect of the Boeotians likewise stood still at a very 
primitive stage, and was in particular distinguished from 
the other more advanced branches of the Hellenic lan- 
guage by its predilection for hollow vowels. Pindar 
wrote in a dialect different from that spoken by the 
people (vol. ii. p. 99). He endeavored by means of his 
art to obtain for his fellow-countrymen a better name 
among the Hellenes ; but there was no district of Greece 
in which he met with so little response as in Boeotia ; nor 
was he after all by origin a genuine Boeotian (vol. ii. p. 
288) ; he had acquired a culture far surpassing that of 
his native land, and was animated by a national senti- 
ment contradictory to the tendency prevailing there. 
For the ruling families had attached themselves to the 
national enemy ; and the people, without any will of its 

chap. I.] The Uprising of Thebes. 353 

own, was forced to pour out its blood at Platan on behalf 
of the foreign invaders. Thus the most glorious age of 
Hellas became a time of the deepest shame for Boeotia ; 
and, while the other Hellenes enjoyed the beneficent 
results of the War of Liberatiou, Thebes was driven into 
a more and more unworthy policy. Full of venomous 
jealousy of Athens during the growth of her prosperity, 
but too weak to damage her hated neighbor by her own 
strength, Thebes stood under cover of Sparta, and was 
unceasingly busy in goading on the enemies of the Athe- 
nians. The outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, and the 
scenes of horror enacted at Platsese, were a triumph of 
this system of policy. 

No sooner had Athens been humbled, than Revulsion 
Sparta and Thebes began to pursue divergent at Thebes - 
courses. At Thebes the democratic party, which had 
already existed for a considerable period, and which had 
even already temporarily attained to the conduct of affairs 
(vol. ii. p. 448), acquired lasting influence. The first sign 
of this revulsion was the resolution passed by the Thebans, 
that every house and every town in the country should 
open their gates to the banished Athenians. Sparta did 
what was in her power, to estrange from herself, and to 
drive over to the side of Athens, all the friends of legality. 
The ancient hostility between the two neighbor-states be- 
gan to vanish ; and in Boeotia a considerable party formed 
itself, which aroused a higher political consciousness in the 
people, fostered the hatred against Sparta, spread love of 
liberty and Hellenic feeling, and enthusiastically cherished 
the idea, that the time had now at last come, to expiate 
ancient shame, and to give to Thebes an honorable place 
among the Greek states. A new history was to be com- 
menced, and all the shortcomings due to the long misgov- 
ernment of selfish oligarchs were to be made good. For 
this purpose it was necessary, not only morally to regene- 
rate the people of the capital, but also to gain over the en- 

354 History of Greece. t BooK VL 

tire country to the new ideas, and to blend all its towns 
into a united and free Boeotia, newly aroused and re-invig- 
orated by the liberty of communal life. 

Such was the policy of the Theban patriots, the Young- 
Boeotian party, to which the nobler part of the younger 
generation of the land adhered. For in a country where 
the people had been oppressed for centuries, it was very 
natural, that the starting-point of this regeneration was not 
the people, but the well-born circles of the population. 
The movement was accordingly supported by members of 
ancient houses who gloried in opening for the Boeotian 
people the way to a new and honorable history ; and here 
again we find houses belonging, like that of Pindar, not to 
the Boeotian country-nobility, but to the most ancient no- 
bility, which had been settled in Thebes already before the 
Boeotian immigration, and from whose trunk fresh branches 
were even at so late a time yet springing forth. 

One of these houses, in which the regenera- 
house of ^ion of Thebes was prepared, was that of Po- 

Polymnis. . . 

lymnis. It carried its pedigree back as far as 
the times of Cadmus, but it had long ago forfeited its 
former splendor. The family accordingly lived in modest 
retirement, without participation in the lawless life of the 
wealthy Boeotians, and in perfect tranquillity fostered the 
germs of higher culture, which had never quite died out 
at Thebes, and which now received a new impulse by be- 
neficent influences from abroad. 

In Lower Italy the persecution of the Pythagoreans had 
been several times renewed (vol. iii. p. 267). It was in- 
tended to destroy the schools, whose influence annoyed the 
multitude ; but, as has invariably been the case with perse- 
cutions directed against schools possessed of vitality and 
moral vigor, this persecution also inevitably served to 
Pythagorean s P rea d * ne doctrines against which it was di- 
Pn^oiaus 9 ' rected. Fugitive Pythagoreans found their 
way to Thebes among other places, in particu- 

chap, i.] The Uprising of Thebes. 355 

lar Philolaus, who first put the Pythagorean wisdom into 
writing, and who was a contemporary of Socrates. He 
found eager listeners, and the names of two men in par- 
ticular clearly prove, that the spirit of scientific inquiry 
was at that time vigorously asserting itself at Thebes, viz. 
those of Simmias and Cebes. Both these men, simmias 
who had derived their first impulse towards and Cebes - 
philosophic meditation from Philolaus, afterwards went to 
Athens. Here Cebes was among the followers of Socrates 
accounted the most unwearying inquirer, and Simmias is 
praised by Plato, as having left no peace to himself or 
others, constantly suggested new problems, and pursued 
everything to its ultimate consequences. These men ac- 
cordingly made philosophy one more bond between Athens 
and Thebes ; in their energy and endurance the JEolic 
temperament displays itself from its best side ; both men 
belonged to the higher spheres of society. Of Cebes it 
was related that he purchased the freedom of the Elean 
Phsedo, in order to secure him for philosophy ; and Sim- 
mias, after having undertaken long and distant journeys, 
made his house a meeting-place of philosophical friends. 

Upon Philolaus, who had first made Thebes L . 
a seat of Pythagorean wisdom, followed the 
Tarentine Lysis. He too arrived as a fugitive, and met 
with a hospitable reception in the house of Polymnis, who 
treated him entirely as a member of his family. This 
generous hospitality bore rich fruit, in the first instance 
for the sons of the house, Epaminondas and Caphisias, of 
whom the former, and elder (born about the year 418), 
proved specially open to the philosopher's influence, and 
together with a personal veneration for him imbibed a deep 
love of scientific study.* 

* Connexion between Thebes and Magna Grsecia : Boeckh, Philolaos, 10. 
—Simmias and Cebes: Xen. M&mor. i. 2, 48; iii. 11, 7; Plat. Phced. 85 ; C Zel- 
ler, ii. a, 171. Lysias must have 2ived down to 01. xciii., if Epaminondas 
was born in 01. xcii. : Plut. de Gen. Socr. 3 ; Nepos, ii. 2. Epaminondas waa 
forty years of age at the time of the Liberation : Plut. de occ. viv. c. 4. 

356 History of Greece. [BookVI 

The train- -^ n education such as that which the youth- 
Epaminon- ^ Epaminondas received, had not as yet fallen 
das * to the lot of any Theban. His ardent spirit 

found a guide and teacher capable of offering him a wealth 
of treasures, and who devoted himself to him in daily in- 
tercourse, as to a son of his own. Thus a mental horizon 
stretched before his eyes, passing far beyond the limits 
hitherto open to a Boeotian. The wealthy world of the 
colonies in the distant West, the glorious Greek cities on 
the coasts of Italy and Sicily, became as familiar to him 
as another home. The wisdom of Ionia and Athens had 
likewise already found its way to Thebes. How must he, 
while thus looking around upon the chief seats of Greek 
culture, have become conscious of the lofty mission of the 
Hellenes, and with what humiliation must he have turned 
to gaze upon his own native city ! Moreover, there acted 
upon him the special influence of the Pythagorean dogma. 
It was of its nature reforming ; instead of only occupying 
the head, it laid claim to the entire man ; it was an ideal 
Hellenism, striving after realization in actual life, and 
irresistibly urging him who had comprehended it to spread 
it further. Thus the house of Polymnis became the focus 
of a higher life, whence light and warmth radiated ; and 
Epaminondas was, by means of his personal individuality, 
the best witness to the ennobling force of philosophy. Its 
demands had become a second nature to him. A contempt 
for w r ealth and for sensual indulgence, a rigorous conti- 
nence and self-denial, humility and power of secrecy, self- 
sacrificing love of country and friends, a firm and equable 
earnestness which suppressed every movement of passion, 
and invariably kept the loftiest ends in view, — these Py- 
thagorean virtues were at the same time the characteristics 
of this young Theban ; while he by no means held him- 
self, like a philosophical eccentric, at a distance from social 
intercourse and the arts customary to his country ; he was 
taught by the best flute players of Thebes, and he also de- 

Chap. I.] 7^ Uprising of Thebes. 357 

voted himself to the cither and to song. He zealously 
attended the palsestrse ; but even here he had a different 
end in his view from that pursued by his fellow-country- 
men: for his object in exercising his body, was to render 
it a willing and agile organ of the mind, and efficient for 
the service of his native land. The art of oratory he like- 
wise cultivated with the utmost ardor; for while little 
desirous of shining as an elegant speaker, he at the same 
time esteemed it an essential task of Hellenic training, that 
a man should understand how to come forward at the right 
time, and how both to point out the right and to castigate 
the wrong in brief words, and to expound his conviction 
in fuller flow of speech. Thus his eloquence was likewise 
rooted in the moral foundation upon which his entire in- 
dividuality rested ; he regarded it as a patriotic work to 
obtain an honorable recognition for the art of speech in 
Boeotia, among a population so indolent in both thought 
and speech. 

He was a Theban and a Hellene, the one Th end 
and the other from his verv heart ; and the aimed at 

J by Epami- 

purpose of his efforts was the elevation of his nondas. 
native city, whereby a service would be simultaneously 
rendered to the common fatherland. For the welfare of 
Hellas depended upon the endeavor of its individual 
towns to make true Hellenism a living reality ; nor was 
any other precedence justified in his eyes, than that rest- 
ing upon Hellenic virtue and culture. Athens had 
conceived this mission in a grander spirit than any other 
city, but she had lost her position by departing from the 
principles of Pericles. The primacy of Sparta was a 
shameful oppression by force. If Sparta continued in 
the way she was pursuing, and with soldierly arrogance 
misused the Hellenes, enslaved their cities or dissolved 
them into villages, encouraged treason and punished 
patriotism by illegal executions, — then the best pos- 
sessions of the Hellenic nation were in danger. To rise 

358 History of Greece. [BookVL 

against such a tyranny was a national duty, and such a 
rising was primarily called for in the case of the city 
which had suffered the most severely of all. In a just 
resistance against criminal excess all the nobler forces 
would be set in motion ; and it was therefore thus that 
Thebes would also soonest attain to a place among those 
states, whose destiny it was to exercise a supreme influ- 
ence over the common affairs of Greece. The opportu- 
nity had arrived for a courageous endeavor to ennoble 
the material strength existing in Bceotia by assigning to 
it a lofty task, and to awaken the people out of its 

Not all the points of view which we observe gradually 
presenting themselves, were taken at once. The imme- 
diate object of Epaminondas was the moral and political 
elevation of the citizens, in order that they might become 
capable of recovering, and of worthily maintaining, their 
liberty. That Epaminondas labored towards this end for 
years, is beyond doubt. Otherwise he could not have 
been found with his resolutions so thoroughly matured, 
or so well-prepared, when the hour of the crisis arrived. 

Epaminondas had no thoughts of pursuing his objects 
of reformation by founding a philosophic order, such as 
it had been attempted to form in Magna Graecia. He 
rejected whatever estranged him from the people, and on 
the other hand sought to take full advantage of the best 
forces contained in it for the commonwealth, above all of 
the power of friendship. He brought about a combina- 
tion between himself and other Thebans sharing his 
sentiments, and united them with one another. In this 
he was aided by the circumstances of the times ; for a 
salutary ferment had perceptibly made its appearance 
among the Boeotians, and there existed a young genera- 
tion, displaying a higher capacity for culture, and able to 
take vigorous resolutions for the advance of their native 
city. They were ready to attach themselves to Epami- 

chap, l] y/ie Uprising of Thebes, 359 

nondas, and under his guidance to labor for the 
regeneration of Thebes. One of the most important of 
the men sharing this tendency was Pelopidas. 

Pelopidas, the son of Hippocles, belonged p e i pidas 
like Epaminondas to a family of ancient a . nd th t 

* J oligarchs. 

nobility ; but he was at the same time a man 
of large property, and belonged to one of the most 
highly-considered families at Thebes. Moreover, he had 
very largely increased his paternal inheritance by means 
of a marriage. It accordingly shows liberality of mind, 
that he is found at so early an age and so decisively 
renouncing his connexion with a party, which counted 
him among its members, and which held out to him the 
prospect of a full share in its privileges and advantages. 
His was a generous nature, brave even to foolhardiness, 
and capable of self-sacrifice ; and although he had no 
inclination towards philosophical studies, but found the 
principal pleasure of his life in the chase and in military 
exercises, yet he had many fine natural gifts, — knowledge 
of the world, versatility, receptivity towards all intel- 
lectual impulses, and a ready appreciativeness of moral 
greatness ; he was elevated above love of money and 
sensual indulgence, munificent towards his friends, mod- 
erate and simple as to himself, a declared foe of injustice, 
and an enthusiast for all the higher blessings of life. To 
a man of such sentiments the attitude of the Boeotian 
aristocracy and the position of his native city could not 
but be intolerable : he therefore attached himself heart 
and soul to the Young-Boeotian party, of which by means 
**of his external resources, as well as of his chivalrous 
individuality, he soon became one of the principal 

After the Peace of Antalcidas this party had, instead 
of diminishing, increased. For its power rose with every 
new act of violence of which Sparta became guilty ; and 
in the end the Laconian party had seen no other method 

360 History of Greece. [Bookvi. 

of self-preservation but that of throwing itself entirely 
into the arras of Sparta, and hereupon thought to have as- 
sured its victory. Its policy however was not less short- 
sighted than criminal ; for since the betrayal of the city 
no mere political party standpoints were any longer at is- 
sue, but such opposite principles, as were clearly and in- 
corruptibly judged by all Hellenes in- and outside Thebes, 
in so far as they were not blind partisans of Sparta: what 
was now in question was the liberty or enslavement of a 
Greek city ; what had formerly been a domestic affair of 
Thebes had now become a national matter. The oligarchs, 
indeed, acted like the Spartans of those days, who merely 
took into account visible forces, and derided public opin- 
ion. The most notable among the oligarchs, Leontiades, 
Archias, Philippus, and others, in turn filled the public 
offices, and put dependents of their own into the govern- 
ment places, down to that of jailer. They carried on a 
pure party-rule, as Critias and his fellows had in their 
time done at Athens. Those whom they disliked were 
placed under arrest ; neither property nor honor was safe 
against the government. The supreme power lay with 
the commanders of the Peloponnesian troops. Sparta 
lorded it over the whole of Bceotia as over a dependent 
territory ; nor, doubtless, was it without a political 
intention that Agesilaus caused the tomb of Alcmene, 
the original ancestress of the Heraclidse, at Haliartus to 
be opened, and the contents to be transported to Sparta. 
For the transfer of such relics, according to Greek belief, 
constituted a sanction of supreme lordship (vol. iii. p. 289). 
But however secure the Spartans, and the oligarchs under 
the protection of the Spartan troops, might feel, yet the 
opposite party was neither destroyed nor disarmed, and 
the fugitive Thebans became a real power by the fact that 
all patriots in Greece unanimously stood on their side, 
and with them longingly awaited the hour of vengeance.* 

* "H nepl *Ap\iap t* rbv noXenapxpvvra koX ») wept Qiktnirov rvpavvis EeUen. 

Chap - l J The Uprising of Thebes. 361 

The number of the Thebans who found a „,, „, 

The The- 

refuge at Athens was three or four hundred, ^ans at 

° Athens. 

Here the services, rendered by Thebes to 
the Attic patriots twenty years before, were gratefully 
remembered, and the indignation against Sparta was at 
this point of time so universal, that the fugitives met with 
kindness even in the aristocratic circles, which were as a 
rule pervaded by friendly sentiments towards the Lacc- 
da3monians. All the demands and suggestions of Sparta 
were rejected with generous firmness ; the fugitives were 
not only supplied with shelter and provisions, but were 
also officially accorded an honorable position under the 
protection of the state in the community, like the home- 
less Platssans of old. And Sparta, even under Agesilaus 
was without sufficient energy to carry through her de- 
mands by force ; she hesitated to drive the Athenians 
to extreme measures. 

Thus, without any outward rupture of the Preparatory 
peace having taken place, Athens and Thebes Thebes! 
lay face to face like two hostile camps, vigi- 
lantly observing one another. The Theban government 
had its spies at Athens, who closely followed the steps of 
the conspirators. With the aid of these spies Androcli- 
das, who after the death of Ismenias had become the 
leader of the party, was successfully made away with by 
assassination, and thus the immediate schemes of his fel- 
low-partisans were frustrated. On the other hand the 
fugitives had a number of trustworthy friends at Thebes, 
who after their fashion prepared the liberation of their 
native city. Some of them joined the Tyrants, but only 
as a pretence, and gained their confidence, so that they 
obtained influential posts, in which they were able to be 

V. 4, 2. 'Epyw n-ev rvpavvoi, Adyw Sk 7ro\efiap\ot, Plut. Ages. 24. Oi wept 'Ap\iav 
kcCi 'Yndr-nv, Hellen. vii. 3, 7. Character of the government: Du Mesnil in 
BybcVs Histor. Zeitschrift, ix. 294.— Relics of Alcmene : Plut. de Genio, 5f.; 
Boeckh, Sovnenkreise, p. 145. 


362 History of Greece. [BookVL 

of the greatest use to their party. Thus in particular 
Phyllidas was by the polemarchs Archias and Philippus 
appointed their private secretary, and employed upon the 
most confidential missions. Others were secretly busied 
with preparing the youth of Thebes in mind and body for 
the critical day ; among these above all Epaminondas, 
who hitherto, although he had already attained to the 
maturity of manhood, had refrained from taking part in 
public life, and had displayed no trace of ambition. The 
Tyrants accordingly regarded the poor philosopher in his 
retirement as the reverse of dangerous, and allowed him 
calmly to go his way, although he, and no other, was the 
very centre of the endeavors towards liberty. A thorough 
understanding in all main points prevailed between him 
and those who had fled to Athens. With the most active 
of their number, Pelopidas, he had entered into a bro- 
therly union of intimate friendship ; he had served with 
him in the Arcadian campaign (p. 325), and had saved 
the life of his wounded at the risk of his own. He was 
incessantly active in evoking patriotism, vigor of action, 
and moral earnestness ; he made use of the competitive 
games carried on between the Thebans and the Spartans 
as a preliminary to serious contests, and weaned his fel- 
low-citizens from their servile fear of their oppressors. 
The circumstance too, that just about this time he lost 
Lysis, his paternal friend, contributed to his henceforth 
devoting himself all the more resolutely to his fellow- 
citizens. With him men of mark co-operated, such as 
more especially Gorgidas, who acquainted the exiles with 
all affairs belonging to the public business of the city, 
and Pammenes, a man of considerable influence, who, 
without taking any active part himself in the work of 
liberation, encouraged the efforts of Epaminondas, and 
added to his authority. 

Although the same end was pursued from sides so 
various, yet one year after the other passed, without that 

chap, i.j f£fe Uprising of Thebes. 363 

end being reached. It was a heavy trial of patience for 
the fiery souls of the heroes of liberty, and yet it was a 
time full of blessings. For in it the younger population 
of the Thebans grew strong in the midst of oppression, 
and ripened for the day of liberty. The moral invigora- 
tion, proceeding from Epaminondas, spread and proved 
itself. In the same way the protracted sojourn of the 
exiles at Athens was a season of refinement and strength- 
ening ; they showed by their endurance that they were not 
moved by the impulse of a passing enthusiasm ; they 
learnt at Athens, what demands were made upon a state 
desirous of placing itself at the head of the national 
movement. Finally, the feeling of security on the part 
of the Tyrants became deeper and deeper ; they relaxed 
their measures of precaution, and deceived themselves so 
utterly, that they regarded the philosophical tendencies 
of the Thebans as a desirable diversion from political as- 
pirations. Thus Archias and Leontiades themselves oc- 
casionally took part in the discussions in the house of the 
traveled Simmias, although it was a meeting-place of the 
men who had conspired against tl 3 Tyrannis.* 

During four long years the exiles waited for The regolu . 
the day of vengeance. For a time they may tion taken - 
have indulged the hope, that Athens would begin the ri- 
sing against Sparta and open a path home for them ; but 
the Athenian civic community was too faint-hearted, and 
the Boeotian (p. 238) was unable to prevail. The exiles 
had accordingly to depend upon themselves ; it was neces- 
sary for them to take the first step, in order to draw the 

* 300 fugitives (Diod. xv. 20), 400 (Androtion Schol. Aristid. iii. 278, Din- 
dorf. Tpt<uc6«Ttoi ap. C. Miiller, Fr. H. Gr. iv. 046). In Xen. Hellen. v. 2, 31, the 
reading is uncertain.— Androclidas (cf. p. 222): Hellen. iii. 5, 1; Plut. deGenio, 
29.— Epaminondas and Pelopidas at Mantinea: Plut. Pelop. 4; Paus. ix. 13 
(doubts of Palmer and Kriiger ap. Clinton ad arm. 385).— The Thebans forced 
to send their military contingent: Vater, Leben des Pelopidas (Jahii's Jahrb. 
Suppl. viii.), p. 238 (likewise in the case of the expedition against Olynthus, 
Hellen. v. 2, 37).— Gorgidas and Pammenes : Sievers, 197 f.— Archias z visitor 
to Simmias : Plut. de Genio Socr. 

364 History of Greece. [Boo*vi. 

Athenians after them, and doubtless their political friends, 
Cephalus and other popular orators of note, said to them : 
" Only begin ! Athens neither can nor will leave you 
in the lurch." Pelopidas, although one of the younger of 
their number, had assumed the lead among the exiles, after 
by the assassination of Androclidas they had been de- 
prived of their leader and had thus for a time been awed 
into inaction : next to him Melon was the chief personage. 
There was no time for further delay. It was in the fifth 
year, about the beginning of the winter. Olynthus and 
Phlius had fallen ; the power of the Spartans grew from 
week to week. There could be no thought of an open 
campaign ; opportunities must be found for a secret re- 
turn. The bad time of the year, in which little intercourse 
took place, seemed to favor the enterprise ; in the winter 
the Spartans could least of all be expected to move with 
rapidity to the spot ; moreover, the date of the shortest 
day coincided with the turn of the year among the Boeo- 
tians, and with the festival of the Heraclea, during which 
it was hoped to find the city in a corresponding state of 
carelessness. Lastly, one of these most zealous democrats, 
Amphitheus, had been recently placed under arrest ; and 
it was hoped that by bold action he might still be saved. 
Departure Thus, then, day and hour were fixed in ac- 
of the eon- corc | ance with the friends at Thebes. Proba- 


fr"™ bly the secret had not been revealed even to 

Athens. J 

pi. cix 2 a n the exiles. The majority of them remained 

(b. c. 379). J J 

December, quietly at Athens ; for the departure of consid- 
erable numbers would have betrayed every- 
thing. A hundred quitted the city, and assembled under 
Pherenicus in the Thriasian plain, in order to advance 
upon the frontier from the direction of Eleusis; while 
twelve who had volunteered for the first and most perilous 
enterprise — with Pelopidas, Melon, Damoclidas, and Theo- 
pompus among them, — furnished as for the chase, and 
accompanied by dogs, marched by the straight road across 

chap, i.} T/ ie Uprising of Thebes. ?So 

Mount Parnes, and in small detachments quietly made 
their "way into Thebes. The wind and snowdrift which 
prevailed allowed them, without exciting suspicion, to draw 
their cloaks over their heads ; the gates and streets were 
deserted. Thus they succeeded in reaching, by different 
paths, the house of Charon, where they united The con 
with six-and-thirty conspirators dwelling at y? ir ^ tors at 
Thebes. The most useful service of all was 
rendered to them by Phyllidas, the secretary. He had 
bidden the polemarchs to a banquet on the same evening ; 
the close of the official year was to be brilliantly cele- 
brated, and, in order to heighten the giddy excitement, the 
host had promised the arrival of some handsome women 
after the banquet. But this was also the reason why 
Archias, who wished to be sure of perfectly confidential 
company, had requested that Leontiades might not be in- 
vited ; thus the scheme of uniting all the heads of the 
government at one spot failed. 

The conspirators were preparing in solemn 

1 l * ° Assassina- 

calm for the deed of blood — they were stand- ti oii g ar f chs he 
ing, crowned with wreaths, by the altar of the 
house, and the soothsayer was watching the flame — when 
a knock was heard at the door, and voices outside vehe- 
mently demanded admission. They belonged to mes- 
sengers from the polemarch, who summoned Charon to 
Archias. It was impossible not to suppose that every- 
thing had been betrayed. And, in point of fact, rumors 
of what was in progress had reached the ears of Archias ; 
but the tranquillity and presence of mind of Charon, who 
made his appearance without delay, and the representa- 
tions of Phyllidas, succeeded in removing the suspicion, 
which was a very unwelcome interruption of his pleasure 
to the polemarch. Indeed, he was now so thoroughly re- 
solved not to allow anything further to interfere with the 
festive enjoyment of the day, that he placed a letter from 
Athens, which arrived immediately after the departure of 

366 History of Greece. fBoo^vi 

Charon and revealed the entire plot, unopened under the 
cushion. " No business till to-morrow," he cried in 
drunken audacity, bade the banquet progress with re- 
newed spirit, and in lustful impatience called for the 
promised courtesans. 

At last they are declared to have arrived. Steps are 
heard ; the servants are dismissed ; the doors of the ban- 
queting-room fly open ; the robes of veiled women become 
visible, and are welcomed with clapping of hands, their 
heads being shaded by thick wreaths. These were the 
conspirators, Charon, Melon, Caphisias (p. 357), and 
others, in disguise. They pause for a moment on the 
threshold, in order to take a clear view of their victims. 
Then they cast off their coverings, and grasp their dag- 
gers ; Melon slays the drunken Archias, Charon slays 
Philippus ; and most of the remaining guests it was like- 
wise found necessary to put to death, because in their 
vinous excitement it was impossible by words either to 
gain them over or to calm them. 

The more difficult part of the task had been under- 
taken by Pelopidas with Caphisodorus, and a few others. 
They directed their steps to the house of Leontiades, an- 
nouncing themselves at the door as messengers from Cal- 
listratus at Athens. No sooner had they been admitted, 
than Leontiades became sensible of his danger. He re- 
ceived them in his sleeping-apartment with his sword 
drawn, and cut down Caphisodorus, who had entered first; 
nor was it till after a desperate struggle that Pelopidas 
succeeded in overcoming Leontiades, and in avenging his 
friend, who dying stretched forth his hand to him in 
grateful acknowledgment. The last victim was Hypates> 
who was overtaken while endeavoring to effect his escape. 

Thus within a few hours of the night a terrible judg- 
ment had been held upon those who had betrayed their 
native city, who with the help of the arms of the stranger 
had kept their fellow-citizens under the yoke, and had 

chap. L] The Uprising of Thebes. 367 

therefore according to the Greek view thoroughly de- 
served the name and the doom of Tyrants. Before the 
night was out, the prison was opened ; Amphitheus and 
many other martyrs of the good cause in joyous surprise 
grasped the hands of their friends. The trumpets held in 
readiness for the festival of the Heraclea, proclaimed to 
the citizens that a far more glorious festival had corn, 
menced for the city ; while the Spartan garrison, number- 
ing 1,500 men, who by a timely intervention might have 
given a very dangerous turn to the affair, were so com_ 
pletely taken by surprise by the outbreak of the revolu- 
tion, that they timorously remained within the walls of 
the citadel, where the small body of adherents to the 
government sought their protection. Thus the bonfires 
blazed with impunity all around the Cadmea, and next 
morning the Tyrannicides were able unhindered to make 
their appearance in the market-place, and to render an 
account to the assembled citizens of the deed done in the 

This was the day of the regeneration of Thebes, the day 
on which she rose anew out of the heavy oppression under 
which she had lain. Now all the rest of the ,„, - . 

The first 

exiles arrived ; the Theban warriors, whom popular 

' ' assembly at 

Epaminondas and Gorgidas had been quietly Thebes. 
training, publicly appeared in their military array ; a new 
civic community seemed on this morning of liberty to 
have assembled in the market-place ; the two parties which 
had been naturally working for one another, now joined 
hands. Epaminondas had been unable to reconcile with 
his principles a personal participation in the assassination 
of the oligarchs ; for the slaying of a citizen without a 

* Melon was, according to Xenophon, the chief author of the Liberation; 
hence ij toO MeAtovo? em. rows irepi AeovTid.Sr)v eVavaarao-i?. Hellen. v. 4, 19. 
The close of the Boeotian year about the time of the winter solstice : Plut. 
Pelop. 24. Election of Boeotarchs for the last days of the year: Plut. 13; 
Sievers, 186 ; Vater, n. s., 342. 

368 History of Greece. [BookVL 

judicial sentence was a proceeding, which his conscience 
would have refused to justify. He was, however, unwilling 
to set up his own sentiments as the standard for the judg- 
ment of others. He could not but acknowledge the act of 
the conspirators to have been one demanded by the cir- 
cumstances and free from selfish motives. He therefore 
himself introduced the Tyrannicides, when they presented 
themselves before the community as suppliants on account 
of the civic blood shed by them. The citizens jubilantly 
hailed them as their preservers and benefactors ; the priests 
accorded them expiation ; and three of them who had acted 
the most prominent parts, Pelopidas, Melon, and Charon, 
were immediately called to the head of the commonwealth 
as Boeotarchs. All this took place under the very eyes of 
the Lacedaemonian troops, whose commanders were for the 
present unable to contrive anything beyond the despatch 
of Hying messengers to Sparta and to the garrisons of 
PlataBse and Thespise asking for speedy aid. The Thebans 
on the other hand rested their hopes upon Athens ; nor 
were they deceived. 

In Athens the Boeotian party had been uncommonly 
active. Information had quickly come of the events im- 
minent at Thebes, and troops had been sent to the frontier. 

a Cephalus had proposed, that the state should 

of the take part in the liberation of the neighbor-city. 


This motion had not passed the popular as- 
sembly; yet not only did individual volunteers hasten 
across to Thebes, but two Attic generals, who had been 
sent to the frontier simply for the purpose of observing 
events, allowed themselves to be induced by the Thekui 
appeal for aid, to intervene actively on their own respon- 
sibility. Chabrias occupied the pass of Eleutherse, so as 
to close the road to Thebes against the Spartans ; and De- 
mophon entered Boeotia, being convinced that he was 
simply acting in the interests of Athens, when aiding 
the Thebans to free their citadel. 

chap, i.] y/ie Uprising of Thebes. 369 

At Thebes he found everything in full mili- C apituia- 
tary activity. The Spartan force attempting fj^ a tlie 
to come to the rescue from Platsese had been ol «•* 

(B. c. 379). 

beaten back, and under the directions of Pe- December. 
]opidas the Cadmea had been completely block- 
aded. The expectation of a Lacedaemonian army in- 
creased the zeal of both sides. Day and night assaults 
were made upon the walls of the citadel ; the garrison was 
not left in peace for a single hour, in order that it might 
be tired out as soon as possible ; prizes were proposed, to 
promote emulation ; the danger of being attacked in the 
rear by a second army increased with every hour. And 
doubtless the besieged would have been able to hold the 
strongly walled fortress, had they had time to provide them- 
selves with sufficient supplies. As it was, the numbers of 
the troops, still further swelled by the Thebans who had 
taken refuge in the citadel, were disadvantageous to them. 
The troops consisted in the main of confederates, who were 
by no means inclined to sacrifice themselves for the pur- 
pose of preserving the fortress to Sparta ; and thus the 
harmosts found themselves forced to surrender the citadel, 
on condition of being allowed a free departure. The troops 
on their way from Thebes came already at Megara upon a 
Spartan army, which would have arrived in time to relieve 
the citadel only one or two days after the capitulation. 
Circumstances had proved fortunate beyond all expecta- 
tion for the Thebans. Within a term of a few days the 
Tyrants had been slain, the Spartans had been overcome, 
and by means of emulation in the midst of concord the 
foundation-stone had been laid for a new history of the 

* Spokesman of the Boeotian party (oi /SoiwTi^oiTes ; cf. the $iAo0»?j3aioi 
of Antiphanes), Thrasybulus of Collytus, Leodamas, Aristophon, Cephalus, 
Thrason (proxenus of the Thebans), Archedemus, Pyrrhander, Phormisius, 
Eleus : Dinarch. i. 38. As to the participation of Athens, Xenophon attests, 
as against the confused account of Diodorus, that nothing was done by the 
state as such : Grote, Hist, of Greece, vol. x. p. 122 ; Schfcfer. Demoath. i. 16, 


370 History of Greece. t BoOK V£ « 

imm diate -^ ew e P ocns °f Greek history began so sud- 
effects of the denly as that of the liberation of Thebes. The 

liberation of * 

Thebes. city itself was surprised by the secret deeds of 
the night ; at Athens only a few were privy to them. 
Far greater of course was the surprise of the more distant 
cities. The first impression was nearly everywhere the 
same ; the whole nation was pervaded by joyous sym- 
pathy with a deed of freshness and boldness such as had 
not been experienced for a long time. It recalled the 
deeds of the prehistoric age, the Heroes who entered the 
paternal house arms in hand, in order to liberate it. 
Even in Sparta it was impossible to repress a certain de 
gree of appreciation and interest, although in the sense of 
the ruling party the heroes of liberty could not but be 
regarded as rebels. It was moreover necessarily an event 
leading to many momentous consequences. A power 
which laid a heavy hand of oppression upon the whole of 
Greece, but which at the same time seemed more absolute- 
ly unassailable than at any previous time, had been sud- 
denly shaken ; it had been humiliated in a way in which 
no Hellene could fail to recognize the just punishment of 
haughty arrogance ; and the state through which this hu- 
miliation had been accomplished, had thereby stepped 
forth from its subordinate position. If it succeeded in 
maintaining its new position, the entire system of the re- 
lations between the states in Greece must inevitably 
change. All men therefore anxiously awaited the de- 
velopment of affairs, which could not but be close at 

The tasks ^e nrs * ste P ^ad ^ een a splendid success 

of Thebes. n the part of the Thebans ; but with it the 

The occupation of the passes of Mount Cithaeron by Chabrias probably only 
served to maintain the neutrality of Athens. But the trial of the generals 
(Hellen. v. 4, 19) proves that not merely individual volunteers took part. 
Whether Demophon was one of the condemned, remains doubtful ; Chab- 
rias certainly was not. Diodorus probably confounds two quite dis- 
tinct events, the struggle for the Cadmea and the summer-campaign : 
Bchafer, u. *. p. 18. 

chap, i.i yAe Uprising of Thebes. 371 

far more serious task had merely begun. For obstacles 
presented themselves on all sides against a permanent 
rise on the part of the Theban power. Thebes was 
nothing more than a single district town; its supremacy 
over Boeotia, which it had with inflexible persistency 
again and again sought to secure, had been completely 
overthrown by the Peace of Antalcidas ; Platsese had 
been rebuilt ; Orchomenus was independent ; all the 
neighboring cities jealously watched over their indepen- 
dence. It was therefore necessary, as against the enemy 
outside, to begin from the beginning the hard task of 
uniting the country ; for not Thebes, but only Boeotia as 
a whole, was capable of defying the superior strength of 
that enemy with any prospect of success : the city, there- 
fore, which had so boldly opened the contest, required 
first to secure to itself the basis of a sufficient power. Nor 
was it possible, that Thebes should content herself with 
certain rights of primacy and claims upon the furnishing 
of contingents, but the whole country of Boeotia must be 
blended into a single whole, into a state-territory with a 
centralized government. 

Of course preliminary steps had already The unifi , 
been taken in this direction. The Young- fj^j^* 
Boeotian party at Thebes numbered adherents 
in the other towns as well, where there was no lack of 
opposition against the ruling families, which were at the 
same time the real representatives of the desire for inde- 
pendence on the part of the several cities. The distinctness 
and fixity with which the Theban patriots had settled their 
scheme of action already before the Liberation, are most 
clearly manifest from the circumstance, that on the very 
day following upon that event not polemarchs, but Boeo. 
tarchs were elected ; for the polemarchs were city officials, 
while the Bceotarchs were officers of the entire country, 
generals of the confederation. In other words, the an- 
cient confederation of the Boeotian towns (vol. i. p. 121) 

372 History of Greece. t BooK VL 

was immediately renewed, but from points of view quite 
different from those pursued at any previous time, because 
the necessity of a fixed union was vividly felt by the 
democratic party. Its adherents were accordingly ac- 
tively at work throughout the country, to overcome the 
inborn feelings of aversion entertained by the several 
cities towards one another and towards Thebes ; they 
everywhere called upon their fellow-countrymen to neglect 
all separate interests for the sake of the common cause ; 
they offered to all the same advantages which they had 
achieved for Thebes, freedom from Sparta and from op- 
pression by an oligarchy cherishing Spartan sentiments, 
equality before the law, and equal rights of election and 
suffrage. A desire for liberty moreover prevailed outside 
as well as in Thebes ; and the prevalence of greater fer- 
vor among the people facilitated the blending of elements 
at other times so hard to reconcile. Thebes had by its 
heroic daring acquired a new position in the land, and the 
first Boeotarchs were men who were hailed with joyous 
confidence by the leading party throughout Bceotia. Thus, 
then, the very first dangers of war caused volunteers ready 
for service to gather from the several districts of the coun- 
try ; and there was reason to hope, that the regeneration 
of Thebes would be followed by that of all Bceotia. It 
was desired that Thebes should not only become the first 
and leading city of the country, but that all Bceotia, 
blended into a single whole, should find itself represented 
in Thebes, as Attica was in Athens ; for which reason, 
too, the citizens of Thebes in their public transactions no 
longer called themselves Thebans, but "Boeotians in 

But for the attainment of such an end as 
elements. 115 *hi s > a successful rise of public spirit, which 
filled men's minds with enthusiasm, which 
caused the better tendencies to prevail, and which re- 
pressed jealousies and quarrels, could not permanently 

chap, i.j r he u pr i s i ng j Thebes. 373 

suffice. The old brutality of feeling again and again 
asserted itself. Already the first victory had been dese- 
crated by the ill-treatment both of living and dead, when, 
on the departure of the garrison, the populace lay in wait 
for those of its fellow-citizens who had sought the protec« 
tion of the Spartan soldiery. Some of them were saved 
by the Athenians. Others fell as victims to a popular 
fury which refused to spare even the children of the un- 
fortunate men. Even among the members of the patriotic 
party there was no lack of conflicting elements ; for to- 
gether with democracy its evils immediately made their 
appearance. Ambitious men who had co-operated in the 
Liberation, deemed themselves treated with insufficient 
respect, and for this reason became bitter opponents of 
Pelopidas and Epaminondas, — as e. g. Meneclides. Others 
wished to take advantage of the sudden change in public 
affairs, so as to commit violence upon the noble families 
by shameful outrages, and to carry through a bloody 
revolution, — as e. g. Eumolpidas and Samidas. 

Under such circumstances, inner difficulties ~, „ 

1 The Sacred 

of infinite magnitude beset the new popular Band - 
leaders, who recognized in the moral and intellectual 
elevation of the people the condition indispensable in the 
case of an attempt on the part of Bceotia to assume an 
honorable position among the Greek states. Inasmuch, 
then, as it was impossible of a sudden to animate with 
a right spirit the mass of the population which had been 
so long utterly neglected, and which under a selfish oligar- 
chical government had been excluded from any par- 
ticipation whatever in public affairs, those men who were 
establishing the work of the regeneration of their country* 
sought to spread and domesticate civic virtues, without 
which a lasting advance was impossible, in the first in- 
stance in smaller circles ; and it was thus that they formed 
a body of elect, who were to be the model of the rest, the 
kernel of the people of the new Bceotia. 

374 History of Greece. [BookVi. 

This was an institution, connecting itself with earlier 
usages of the land. For already in the battle of Delium 
(vol. iii. p. 174) a band of the Three Hundred is men- 
tioned, who fought, like the heroes of the Homeric age 
associated in pairs, from their chariots in front of the 
main body of the soldiery. This doubtless very ancient 
institution was now revived and carried out in a new 
spirit under the guidance of Epaminondas and Gorgidas. 
They had quietly assembled around them a circle of 
youths, with whom they had presented themselves before 
the community on the day of the Liberation, so that they 
were regarded as the founders of the Sacred Band of 
Thebes. It was now no longer a privilege of the nobility 
to belong to the Three Hundred ; but those among the 
youth of the land who were in feeling the noblest and 
most high-minded, and who already under the oppression 
of the Tyrants had been preparing themselves for the 
struggle for freedom, were henceforth the elect and the 
champions. It was their duty to stimulate the rest 
eagerly to follow their example of bravery and discipline ; 
they were associated with one another by the bonds of 
friendship and by identity of feelings for the struggle on 
behalf of the lofty aims of their native land. This Sacred 
Band was a most beneficent institution, in which a soldier- 
like spirit was happily blended with ethical and political 
points of view, and ancient national usage with the ideas 
of the present and with Pythagorean principles ; and it 
constitutes an honorable monument of the wisdom of 

* Meneclides: Plut. Pelop. 25. — Samidas and Eumolpidas: Plut. de Gen 
Socr. 3 — The Three Hundred (elsewhere also the normal number of a select 
band, as in Cyrene, Sparta ; cf. vol. ii., Note XIV. Appendix) at Delium : 
Diod. xii. 70: oi nap' iiceivoa jjvioxoi Kal napafidrai Ka\ovfx.ei>ot., just as in the 
Homeric age the warriors in chariots fought in the van of the foot-soldiers, 
and were at the same time associated two and two. The use of the war- 
chariot must have long maintained itself in Boeotia; hence the appellation 
remained in use even as late as the Peloponnesian War : Grote, Eist. of 
Greece, vol. vi. p. 530. Plut. Pelop. 18: i « *6Aews \6\os. According to 

<^hap. i.] 27^ Uprising of TJiebes. 375 

But how little confidence could be derived The dangers 
from this small band in the struggle now im- of the War - 
minent ! For although there existed a party in Sparta, 
which had seriously disapproved of the deed of violence 
committed by Phcebidas, and which was consequently not 
displeased to observe its evil results, yet it could not be 
anticipated that the Spartan government would give way. 
The Thebans on the other hand were anything but pre- 
pared for the war ; their situation was far less favorable 
than when they had commenced the struggle seventeen 
years before. At that time they had possessed Persian 
subsidies and Greek allies, while the power of the enemy 
had been divided. At present, the Thebans stood quit© 
alone; for, although Athens had very effectively sup- 
ported them on the occasion of the recovery of the Cad- 
mea, yet she had not done this as a state. When, 
therefore, the Spartans demanded an explanation at 
Athens, the civic assembly was not courageous enough to 
sanction the proceedings of its generals ; the anti-Theban 
party took advantage of the timidity of the citizens ; the 
generals were indicted, and were both sentenced to death 
for having overstepped their powers. Sparta had her whole 
military force at her disposal against Thebes, and her 
army was better drilled and organized than at any pre- 
vious time ; while Thebes, unaccustomed to carrying on 
war by herself, felt uncertain of the districts of her own 
country, or was at open feud with them. The approaches 
towards Thebes were open on all sides ; the coasts were 
defenceless ; and Platsese, Thespise, and Orchomenus served 
as military positions to the enemy in the midst of the 
Boeotian territory. Probably, therefore, no state ever 
began war in a more disadvantageous situation as against 

Plutarch and Polyaenus, the Sacred Band was a creation of Gorgidas ; ac- 
cording to Athen. 602, of Epaminondas. According to Thirlwa/1, vol. v. p. 
48, its original purpose was the occupation of the citadel. Plut. de Gen. Socr. 
6: 6t KpeiTTous Keyofievot. The subsequent development of the Sacred 
Band was a service rendered by Pelopidas. 

376 History of Greece. £ BooK Vl 

Sparta. Thebes had in her favor nothing but the spirit 
of her great leaders, who were able to infuse into a part 
of the population courage and patriotic enthusiasm ; but 
the preparatory measures which they had taken for ren- 
dering Bceotia capable of resistance were as yet far from 
complete ; nor was any man less desirous than Epami 
nondas of meeting the Spartans with defiant self-confi- 
dence and challenging them to a decisive contest. To 
him no bloodshed among Hellenes could on principle be 
anything but an abomination, or appear justified on any 
occasion, except when the cause was the defence of the 
most sacred possessions of a free commonwealth against 
Thebes and deeds °f violence. It is therefore perfectly 
Sparta. credible, that with his co-operation (for it 

. 01, «;J was with him that the leading ideas of The- 

(B. c. 378). § ° 

ban policy doubtless originated, although he 
had no seat at the board of the generals of the confedera- 
tion) an embassy went to Sparta with proposals of peace, 
in which even certain rights of hegemony were conceded 
to Sparta, and the fulfilment of the earlier treaties was 

These negotiations, however, remained without result. 
At Sparta the military governors who had abandoned the 
Cadmea without waiting for relief, were condemned ; 
while it was resolutely intended to chastise Thebes at 
once. The supremacy of Sparta depended upon force ; it 
was doomed, so soon as expulsions of Lacedsemonian gar- 
risons were left unpunished, or actually recognized as 
justified popular risings. The authority of the city was 
at stake ; nor was it allowable to wait, until the new 
enemy, who had suddenly sprung from the soil like the 
dragon-brood of Cadmus, should gain strength and unite 

In other words, the policy of Agesilaus now as before 
prevailed at Sparta ; and both in and outside the city it 
was assumed as a certainty, that he would undertake the 

chap, i.j The XJprising of Thebes. 377 

command of the expedition against Thebes. However, 
he declined it, appealing to the fact, that, after doing 
military service for more than forty years, a king was not 
less than any other citizen freed from serving beyond the 
frontiers. But this was not the real reason, which rather 
lay in the circumstance, that by his proceedings at Phlius, 
and probably also by his connection with Phoebidas, Age- 
silaus had become very unpopular in a wide variety of 
circles, so that, if he took a personal part in an undertak- 
ing, the worst fears were entertained in Greece. Now, in 
Sparta there were at this time Theban fugitives, who had 
saved themselves with the garrison of the Cadmea ; and 
on this, as on many other occasions, the Ephors allowed 
the exiles of another state to determine their measures. 
These Thebans represented to them, that the appearance 
of Agesilaus in Boeotia would only increase the vehe- 
mence of its resistance, because from him men were in- 
variably accustomed to expect the most terrible method 
of carrying on war, the hopeless devastation of the land, 
the sale of the inhabitants into slavery, executions, and 
the establishment of despotic governors. The Ephors 
gave way ; Agesilaus retired in vexation of spirit, and 
declined to have anything more to do with the whole 
affair. In his stead the youthful Cleombrotus assumed 
the command of the army, the brother and successor of 
the noble Agesipolis, and like him a man of Hellenic 
patriotism and of kindly sentiments towards the con- 
federates. He would doubtless have willingly accepted 
the peace offered by the Thebans. In obedi- cieombrotua 
ence to the Ephors he entered Bceotia already in Bceotia - 
in the month of January 378 ; advanced with 3 ^). c * 2 (B * c " 
his army as far as the neighborhood of January. 
Thebes ; pitched his camp by the heights of 
Cynoscephalse ; and remained here for sixteen days. Then 
he returned home again without having inflicted any kind 
of damage. The entire campaign was purely a demon- 

378 History of Greece. [BookVI. 

stration, so that, when the Peloponnesian troops returned 
home, they were quite ignorant why they had marched 
out. The whole party of Agesilaus could not but be in 
the highest degree indignant ; the best time for the attack 
had been wasted ; and the whole proceeding appeared in 
no other light than that of an extremely dangerous dis- 
play of good-will towards the rebels. The war-party was 
not, however, strong enough to overthrow Cleombrotus ; 
and the peace-party being equally unable to gain the 
upper hand, there could amid these oscillations be no 
question of a policy leading to satisfactory results.* 

g , , . Yet the short winter-campaign was not to 

in Thespiae. remain without consequences of importance. 
For Cleombrotus had left a considerable part of his 
troops behind him in Boeotia, — at Thespiae, which, situate 
at a distance of three hours' march from the capital, seemed 
admirably adapted for the purpose of a dangerous mili- 
tary position. The supreme command he gave to Spho- 
drias, who was at the same time furnished with moneys 
for the levying of fresh troops. 

Thus, in spite of the harmless campaign of Cleombro- 
tus, the Thebans were placed in a very perilous position. 
Before their gates lay a Peloponnesian army, which per- 
ceptibly reinforced itself out of the cities of Boeotia hostile 
to them, and which at the same time served to overawe 
the Athenians, who for their part did everything to satis- 
fy Sparta. They recognized the change which had taken 
place in their position, since the passes of the Isthmus 
were again in the hands of the Spartans ; for to the north 
of the Isthmus there were so many inlets into Central 
Greece, that the stopping of this or that pass was in the 
main absolutely useless. 

sphodrias' Under these circumstances it is not wonder- 
su^rise e of ful tnat tne Thebans should have resorted to 
the Pirseeus. a stratagem, in order to bring about the re- 

* Embassy to Sparta : Isocr. xiv. 29. Vexation of Agesilaus : Helle*. v. 4, 
13 : ela avTovs fiovkeveaOai bitolov Tt /3ovAoipto. 

chap, i.] Th e Uprising of Thebes. 379 

suit which was now necessarily of primary §}j ) c,2 * B,a 
importance to them, viz. a rupture between 
Athens and Sparta, and the triumph of the Theban party 
at Athens. Sphodrias, the harmost of Thespise, was 
known as a man of passionate temper ; and it might be 
calculated upon as a certainty, that he would not be 
averse from perpetrating a sudden act of violence after 
the manner of Phoebidas, if an opportunity should be 
offered to him. A secret communication was accordingly 
made to him, — it is said, at the instigation of Pelopidas 
and Melon, — by a Boeotian, who introduced himself to the 
harmost as a faithful partisan of Sparta, to the effect that 
the circumvallation of the Pirseeus was still incomplete. 
It would accordingly, he was told, be an easy matter to 
penetrate from Thespise through the Eleusinian plain and 
the coast-districts of Attica into the port-town, before 
any suspicion of the movement had reached the Upper 
City. Sphodrias fell into the trap. The Lacedaemonians, 
barren of devices of their own, were all the more accessi- 
ble to suggestions from other quarters ; nor can we be 
surprised to find an ambitious Spartan carried away by 
the idea, that it was in his power by means of a single 
night's march to obtain possession of the Attic port-cita- 
del, docks, and fleet, and thus to render a service to his 
own native city, which would so to speak form a consum- 
mation to all previous enterprises of the same kind. The 
policy of ruthlessly pursuing the interests of the individ- 
ual state had come so thoroughly to pervade the public 
life of Sparta, that Sphodrias could not entertain any 
doubts but that his surprise, if successful, would meet with 
an ex-post-facto approval. Moreover, the feeling prevail- 
ing at Athens was well known, and it might be assumed 
that the Athenians were only waiting for the first mishap 
which might befall Sparta, in order to put themselves for- 
ward again : thus a series of dangerous struggles could be 
nipped in the bud by means of a bold deed swiftly carried 

380 History of Greece. [Booivi. 

out, and perhaps only a few days remained during which 
it was possible to accomplish it. 

Sphodrias, therefore, commenced operations without 
delay ; but in the execution of them he showed himself 
uncertain and irrational. He was frightened by the 
torches burning around the sanctuaries of Eleusis, because 
he believed them to be fiery signals lit by the Athenians. 
And, again, he had not even properly calculated the 
length of the road ; at daybreak he had only reached the 
boundary between the plains of Eleusis and Athens : his 
plan of a nocturnal surprise was therefore frustrated. 
Nothing remained for him but to retrace his steps. But 
even now he acted with strange perversity : for, instead of 
taking his departure as quietly as possible, he pillaged 
several villages, and then marched away across Mount 
Cithaeron, while the citizens of Athens were sallying forth 
to avenge his shameful violation of the peace. 

Acquittal of ^ ne on ° ence was doubly criminal, inasmuch 
Sphodrias at as a t this very time the Spartan envoys were 
still sojourning at Athens, who had demanded 
and received satisfaction for the breach of neutralitv com- 
mitted during the Theban rising. The Athenians were, 
as a matter of course, only to be appeased by the im- 
mediate punishment of Sphodrias. The Ephors dismissed 
niin from office, and summoned him before the judicial 
tribunal, the Council of the Old (vol. i. p. 210). No one 
doubted that he would be sentenced to death, since none 
of the considerations which had saved the life of Phcebidas, 
could be urged in his behalf. Sphodrias himself had not 
dared to appear. And yet he was acquitted ; and the tale 
went, that a tender relation of friendship subsisting between 
the sons of Sphodrias and of Agesilaus had contributed to 
this result. The king unexpectedly pleaded for the accused, 
giving as his reason, that Sparta could not spare such men. 

uencesof ^e act °^ Sphodrias has been variously 

his acquittal, judged in both ancient and modern times. 

chap. L] The Uprising of Thebes. 381 

He was known as an adherent of Cleombrotus, whom 
it was accordingly sought to hold accountable as the 
real originator of the attempt ; but it is too strikingly 
contradictory to the policy of the young king and of his 
family. Again, the entire well-attested story as to the 
Theban stratagem has been rejected as improbable, but 
without sufficient reasons. The Thebans might with a 
good prospect of success try this way of bringing about a 
quarrel between Athens and Sparta ; for in the worst 
event (and one according to their estimation extremely 
improbable, viz. of the Munychia having been success- 
fully surprised), the Athenians would have been driven 
immediately to conclude an alliance with Thebes, in order 
to recover the citadel. The acquittal of Sphodrias could 
certainly not be anticipated with confidence by the The- 
bans ; but even without this the attempt itself could n^>t 
but advance their end, and heighten the feeling of ill-will 
against Sparta. The relation between Sphodrias and the 
two kings remains the obscurest point in the whole matter. 
Both are said to have been on his side against the Ephors : 
the one, as it seems, from motives of old friendship ; while 
the other can hardly be presumed to have opposed public 
opinion and rendered a service to his adversaries, simply 
from motives of weakly parental affection. He must 
have approved of the attempt on principle ; and in the 
present case we may suppose that it was a triumph to him 
to see the friend of Cleombrotus a convert to his policy 
and a votary of the view, that every resource ought to be 
employed in order to increase the power of the state. 
Men holding such sentiments ought not to be sacrificed to 
the enemy, even though they happened to have failed in a 
particular design. Thus the one king thought it his duty 
to protect an old, and the other a newly-gained, member 
of their respective parties.* 

* Grote's reasons against the story of Sphodrias, Hist, of Greece, vol. x. p. 
135; "the origin of the story due to Spartan invention," Schllfer, i. 16. But 
why should th* Spartans have set this story afoot ? What gain resulted to 

382 History of Greece. [Booivi 

The acquittal of Sphodrias converted his expedition, so 
devoid of importance in itself, into an event of far-reach- 
ing consequences. In Sparta the authority of Agesilaus 
sank : for he was made accountable for the unjust judi- 
cial decision, which all the more offended the feelings of 
the better among the citizens, because he was believed to 
have weakened the supremacy of the law on purely per- 
sonal considerations. But not only his unconscientious- 
ness was made clearly manifest, but also the entire absence 
of political sagacity, which could surely least of all be 
spared in the case of such a policy as that of Agesilaus, 
In Athens the Lacedsemonian envoys had not been 
allowed to depart, until they had given the assurance that 
Sphodrias would be condemned to death on account of 
his act of self-will. His acquittal amounted to the trans- 
fer of his guilt to the state, while the promised satisfaction 
was not accorded. This suddenly changed everything. 
The Athenians, who had only quite recently proved so 
tame and yielding, and had thereby essentially facilitated 
the subjection of Thebes, now rapidly and resolutely re- 
nounced their connexion with Sparta. The Theban 
party, recently exposed to penalties in person and in purse^ 
took the helm of the state into their hands with the gene- 
ral consent of the people. A spirit of warlike ardor arose ; 
the circumvallation of the Piraeeus was completed, and 
the scheme for the restoration of the maritime power of 
. Athens was seriously urged on; the othei 

Alliance be- <* ° ' 

tween Athens states were summoned to combine for a com- 

and Thebes. 

mon struggle against Lacedsemonian despot- 
ism ; and, above all, an offensive and defensive alliance 
was concluded with Thebes. 

Thus the situation of affairs was considera- 


in Boeotia. \y\j l ess favorable for Sparta, when in the next 

(b L cTst8). summer she armed for a second campaign ; for 

the question was no longer the chastisement of 

them or to Sphodrias, from his being represented as a man who allowed a 
Boeotian commercial traveller to talk him over into a breach of the peace ? 

chap, i.j 2^, jj^^g f Thebes. 383 

a single city, but the two chief cities of Central Greece 
stood united to resist any intervention on the part of 
Sparta ; Thebes was encouraged by this alliance, saw her 
frontiers covered, and could rely upon timely support in 
any decisive contest. The Thebans, however, had no in- 
tention of risking their good fortune in open battles, and 
in the first instance arranged everything for an effective 
defence. For this purpose they converted the precincts of 
their city into a vast entrenched camp. All the more con- 
venient inlets were stopped up with fosses and palisadings, 
the work being facilitated by the heights, lakes, and rivers 
in the neighborhood : and doubtless it was the military 
insight of Epaminondas which directed its execution ac- 
cording to a fixed plan. The troops were at the same 
time exercised by an incessant drill ; and reliance was 
above all placed upon the cavalry for obstructing, by 
means of its swift movements, an entrance within the lines 
of the fortifications. Chabrias, who had already stopped 
the march of Cleombrotus into Boeotia on a former occa- 
sion, commanded the Attic auxiliaries, and was thoroughly 
trusted ; he had gained great glory and gathered ample 
military experience up to the time of the Peace of Antal- 
cidas at Cyprus, and afterwards in the service of King 
Acoris (p. 293). He was present with 5,000 foot-soldiers 
and 200 horse. Thus the approach of the enemy was 
calmly awaited. This time Agesilaus came in person, at 
the head of a force of 18,000, and of 1,500 cavalry. Taken 
by surprise by the excellent preparations of the Thebans, 
he found himself unable to make use of his superior num- 
bers. Like a beast of prey outside the walls of a well- 
guarded farm, he passed up and down in front of the en- 
trenchment ; wherever he sought to enter, he was met by 
troops ready for action ; and when he marched off* without 
having accomplished anything, his rear-guard had to suffer 
sensible losses at the hands of the flying squadrons, who 
contrived to turn every local opportunity to advantage. 

384 History of Gh-eece. [BookVL 

Finally he succeeded in effecting an entrance, but even 
then only accomplished a devastation of the city territory. 
For the enemy, instead of abandoning the field, so cour- 
ageously in happily-chosen positions withstood the attacks 
of Agesilaus, that he for his part discontinued the contest 
and called off his troops, which were already advancing 
to the assault. This was equivalent to a defeat. Agesi- 
laus, finding himself disarmed by the calm bravery of his 
adversaries, contented himself with fortifying Thespise 
anew and establishing Phocbidas there as military gov- 
ernor, and then took his departure home with his troops. 

Boeotian Thereupon the allies issued forth from their 
c. a 3?7 > -6 i f n8tB ' cam P wn ^ n increased confidence; attacked 
Thespise ; defeated and killed the hated Phce- 
bidas ; and daily increased the numbers of their adher- 
ents in Boeotia, till nothing remained for the Spartans, 
but to levy their forces afresh with the commencement of 
the next spring. But now the Peloponnesian confederates 
likewise became every year less easily manageable. The 
Theban war was extremely unpopular ; instances of open 
resistance occurred ; and although the king gained iso- 
lated advantages here and there by means of successful 
forced marches and other tactical devices, learnt by him 
in Asia, yet in the main no progress was made. While 
the courage of the allies was constantly on the increase, 
the authority of Agesilaus sank in the eyes of both friend 
and foe ; and the ambitious king had for the second time 
to quit Boeotia, without having in reality accomplished 
anything beyond causing fruit-trees to be cut down by the 
roots, farms to be burnt to the ground, and corn-fields to 
be mown bare. During his return he met with an acci- 
dent at Megara, and was carried home sick to Sparta ; he 
could not but perceive that a curse rested upon this war, 
which he himself had originally occasioned. When in 
the following year (b. c. 376) Cleombrotus made one more 
expedition against Thebes, he never even crossed Mount 

chap. L] The Uprising of Thebes. 385 

Cithseron ; but, finding the passes occupied by the allies, 
marched away again after an unsuccessful skirmish.* 

But during the last campaigns a new war had already 
broken out, which threatened the power of The r of 
Sparta from another quarter. Athens, scared ^ausinicua. 
out of her irresolute attitude by the criminal 01 - c - 3 ( B - c - 

J 378-7). 

attempt of Sphodrias, had entered upon a 
totally new system of policy. It was now clear, what 
was to be expected from Sparta ; the necessity was palpa- 
ble of being prepared against so insidious an enemy ; 
and thus for the first time there was re-awakened in 
the Attic community a clear consciousness of its politi- 
cal task, a unanimous and resolute rise to action. In- 
stead, therefore, of contenting themselves with supporting 
Thebes, and in conjunction with her rejecting the claims 
of Sparta to supremacy over Central Greece, the Athe- 
nians vigorously addressed themselves to the restoration 
of their own power, and the recovery of their ancient 
position. In this respect the year of the archonship of 
Nausinicus, 01. c. 3 (b. c. 378-7), constitutes a decisive 
epoch ; it was the year in which the most considerable 
statesmen of Athens united to establish a new political 
position for their native city; and although their pro- 
posals imposed new sacrifices, they were accepted by the 
citizens without reluctance. A new financial AT 

New system 

census was held of the inhabitants ; the whole of taxation. 
of the property existing in Attica, inclusive of the public 
property and of that held for wards, being accurately re- 
gistered ; while, instead of the capitalists being individu- 
ally called upon from time to time to bear the burdens of 
the state, associations of tax-payers were formed, in which 
the poorer as well as the richer members contributed ac- 
cording to the standard of their property ; and thus a 

* Expedition of Agesilaus before the harvest: Hellen. 38. Military 
dispositions of Chabrias : Diod. xv. 32 ; Dem. xx. 76; Nepos, Chabr. 1, 2; 
Rehdantz, 53. 


386 History of Greece. t BooK VL 

broader and safer basis was obtained for the system of 
public burdens. The citizens subject to taxation, from 
which only those devoid of property ( i. e. probably those 
whose possessions were estimated below 25 minse = 93/. 
tire, in value) remained exempted, were divided into 
twenty associations, every one of which represented an 
equal paying power. These associations as a body guar- 
anteed the payments claimed by the state. The highest- 
taxed in the several associations, three hundred in number, 
provided for the actual payment of the contributions, 
pledged themselves for it to the state, and, if necessary, 
undertook to make advances. Hereby immediate inter- 
vention on the part of the magistrates was avoided, and 
the wealthiest of the citizens acquired, as a compensation 
for the considerable sacrifices expected from them, a cor- 
responding degree of influence. 

The new Hereupon the Pirseeus became full of life, 
naval con- as f j j m j^ e d avs f Themistocles ; one hun- 

federation. J 

dred triremes were immediately constructed, 
the ship-sheds put in order, and the sailors drilled. The 
Athenians had no lack of efficient commanders. They 
had at their disposal the inventive genius of Iphicrates, 
the proved capacity of Chadrias, and the noble and gener- 
ous spirit of Timotheus, Conon's son, whose mission it pre- 
eminently was to resume the work of which his father had 
laid the foundations by the construction of the Walls. 
These men were one and all born generals ; while in Cal- 
listratus of Aphidnse Athens possessed a statesman, whose 
eloquence, experience, and knowledge of the world ad- 
mirably adapted him for promoting the new development 
of her power : for everything depended upon a wise regard 
being paid to the circumstances of the times. But for 
the success of their new efforts the Athenians were chiefly 
indebted to the Spartans. By their abuse of their supre- 
macy of position since the destruction of the Attic fleet, 
the Spartans had provoked so much wrath not only on 

chap, i.] y&e Uprising of Thebes. 387 

the mainland, but also in all the island and coast-towns, 
and even now these were treated by them with so defiant 
an arrogance, that the Athenians had on their side the 
inestimable advantage of being able to appear before the 
Greek seaports, which had all more or less tasted the rule 
of Spartan harmosts, in the character of preservers and 
liberators, — just as the Spartans themselves had once 
upon a time summoned the same places to freedom from 
the yoke of the Athenians. But now it was of primary 
importance to convince the maritime states of the fact, 
that they were not about to be deceived once more, and 
that it was not their destiny to be perpetually exchanging 
one yoke for the other. Definite pledges were therefore 
required, to show that the Athenians were now pursuing 
a policy with regard to their confederates essentially dif- 
ferent from their former policy of maritime dominion. 
They showed that they had learnt the lesson of the past, 
and set forth as the first principle of the new association 
a conscientious respect for all the existing forms of state- 
government ; there was no desire to rule in the confederate 
towns by means of parties ; Athens was then to be, not 
the ruling capital, but only the directing city in possession 
of the primacy (der leitende Vorort), the seat of the Federal 
Council, in which all communities, both great and small, 
were to be represented. Callistratus was in a sense the 
Aristides of the new confederation, and doubtless did 
much to bring about an agreement ; it was likewise his 
work that in the place of the " tributes " of odious memory 
the payments necessary to the existence of the confedera- 
tion were introduced under the gentler name of " contri- 
butions^ which term expressed the voluntary character 
of the offerings. Furthermore, Athens solemnly renounced 
the possession of any landed property in the island-states ; 
she relinquished all claims on former state-domains there ; 
while at the same time it was settled, that in future neither 
should any Attic citizen be allowed to acquire landed 

388 History of Greece. IBookVL 

property abroad, — a provision which freed the islanders 
from the fear of the ancient cleruchies (vol. ii. p. 533) being 
renewed. At the same time care was taken not to irritate 
Persia, lest she should be perchance again impelled to take 
the side of Sparta. The Peace of Antalcidas was tacitly 
retained as the basis of the new system of relations be- 
tween the states; it being merely intended to make a 
reality of that clause of the Treaty, which Sparta had so 
vilely abused and in the end so shamefully broken, — in 
this sense, however, that it was not to exclude a voluntary 
association of allies enjoying equal rights. These states 
were then conjointly to constitute a Hellenic power, for re- 
sistance against any act of injustice on the part of Sparta.* 
Never was a policy more in accordance with its age and 
more happy in its conception put forward by Athens than 
on the present occasion. It met with sympathy and joyful 
assent far and near. The foreign connexions, which had 
secretly continued to be maintained even during the time 
of the absolute supremacy of Sparta, were now publicly 
renewed, — among them that with Chios, the ancient faith- 
ful ally of the Athenians, which had undergone evil ex- 
periences during the maritime dominion of Sparta (vol. 
iii. p. 546), and those with Mitylene, which Thrasybulus 
bad freed from Spartan harmosts (p. 280), and with Byzan- 
tium. Amicable relations were resumed with the Cyclades, 
Rhodes, and Perinthus ; in other words, the ancient union 
of navies was at once renewed upon a large scale and in a 
wide extent. Even such states joined it, as had hitherto 
never stood in confederate relations with Athens, above all 
Thebes, which drew the immediate advantage from this 
resurrection of the Attic naval power. For the energy of 
the Athenians, which had again revived in full measure, 

* As to the naval confederation in the year of Nausinicus, see Diod. xv. 
28f. and the documentary instrument of the confederation, discovered in 
1851, and edited hy Eustratiades, Rangab6, M. H. E. Meier, and Schiifer. 
Cf. Sch&fer, Demosth. i. 25. Svirafis in lieu of <f>6pos. 

Chap, i.] The Uprising of Thebes. 389 

actually enabled them to appear in the JEgean with squad- 
rons of war vessels already during the last two Boeotian cam- 
paigns. Chabrias, Timotheus, and Callistratus were the 
first commanders of the new confederate fleet. The Spar- 
tans indeed at first pretended not to take these p roce ed- 
important movements into account at all. But jpgs of 

1 Sparta and 

their confederates at the next meeting protested her conitd - 

° r erates. 

very loudly against the exclusively mainland 
policy pursued by the Spartans in the conduct of the war, 
which uselessly wasted the Peloponnesian resources ; it was 
simply a repetition of the ancient system of warfare pursued 
by Archidamus (vol. iii. p. 57). The Corinthians were doubt- 
less pre-eminently active in insisting upon a naval arma- 
ment. The new naval power, it was urged, ought not to 
be allowed to attain to maturity ; Athens ought to be cut 
off by sea, and starved out. This, it was urged, was the 
single proper mode of attack ; by sea it would likewise be 
easier to reach the Thebans. The Spartan government was 
obliged to give way ; and thus it came to pass, that the 
expedition to Boeotia was postponed for the present, while 
maritime affairs absorbed all attention. 

Within a short time Pollis, the Lacedaemonian admiral, 
was able to weigh anchor with sixty vessels, and made his 
appearance so unexpectedly in the waters of Ceos and 
Andros, that a whole fleet laden with corn, which was on 
its voyage from the Hellespont, only with difficulty escaped 
him. The ships made their way into the harbor of Gerces- 
tus in Eubcea, but were unable to continue their voyage. 
The Pirseeus remained blockaded, and a new famine was 

Hereupon the citizens rose to the occasion, and at once 
equipped so large a number of ships-of-war, that they were 
able to break the blockade and bring in the supplies. Cha- 
brias commanded the fleet. Instead of resting satisfied 
with the success already achieved, he sailed to Naxos, in 
order to lay siege to the island-city. Pollis followed ; and 

390 History of Greece. lbookVL 

„ , , in the broad sound between Naxos and Paros 

Battle of , 

Naxos. the fleets met ; the Attic being superior in num- 

fceLSTO). hers by twenty vessels. It was about the mid- 
september. dle of the month Boedroniion, the month of 

victory with the Athenians (vol. ii. pp. 291, 324, 339, and 
Note xxvii. Appendix) ; and the day of the month chosen 
by Chabrias for the battle was the sixteenth (September 
9th, 376 b. c.) ; it was the first of the days of the Eleu- 
sinian festival, which was opened with the cry : "To the 
sea, ye Initiated ! " Pollis successfully attacked the 
left wing of the Athenians, until Chabrias came up with 
the kernel of his fleet, and, most efficiently supported by 
the youthful Phocion, who commanded under him, sank 
more than half of the enemy's vessels, captured eight, and 
gained so brilliant a victory, that he might have destroyed 
the insignificant fleet of the foe, had he not been rendered 
cautious in the use of his good fortune by the remembrance 
of the fate of the generals at the Arginusse (vol. iii. p. 538). 
He returned home with 3,000 prisoners, and brought to the 
city spoils to the value of 110 talents (26,800/. circ.). 

This was the first victory which Athens again owed to 
herself, — a genuine citizens' victory, the just punishment 
for the breach of the peace committed by Sphodrias, the 
full justification of the claims with which Athens once 
more came forward among the maritime states of Greece. 
How soon had the entire relations between the states 
changed in the course of a few years ! Sparta, after quite 
recently in unmeasured arrogance indulging in the belief 
that she had reduced all Greece to servitude, had now 
been humiliated by land and by sea. Though she had 
called into play all the auxiliary resources at her disposal 
in repeated campaigns, she had proved incapable of 
breaking the resistance of a single city which had cast off 
her yoke ; and had then at the hands of a second power, 
which had arisen with equal suddenness, suffered a defeat, 
whereby she was forced to abandon the entire maritime 

chap, i.] The Uprising of T/tebes. 391 

region of the Archipelago, and to hide timidly with her 
vessels behind Cape Malea.* 

To Thebes the successes of Athens were of inestimable 
value. During these years Thebes was able to Theban 

devote herself undisturbed to her most im- P olic y- 
mediate tasks, and firmly to establish her posi- 37 J )1 - ci - (B - c - 
tion in Bceotia. In this she proceeded with a 
sagacious moderation, doubtless based upon a system of 
policy introduced by Epaminondas. All violent means 
were eschewed, in order that the work of union might not 
be desecrated by bloody party-struggles. Confidence was 
placed in the growth, increasing from year to year, of the 
national party, in the progress towards maturity of a 
young generation of patriots, and in the impression created 
by the defeats of Sparta, which could not but discourage 
her adherents. And in truth the difficulties in which the 
oligarchical governments were involved steadily increased. 
In Thespian matters had come to such a pass, that the 
oligarchs for the sake of self-preservation conceived the 
desperate scheme of falling upon their adversaries in the 
town with the assistance of Lacedaemonian soldiery, and 
massacring them in a body. It was therefore one of the 
very last acts of Agesilaus in Bceotia, to prevent the out- 
break of civil warfare at Thespiae. 

But the more faithfully the Lacedaemonian party held 
out under unfavorable circumstances in Tanagra, in Thes- 
piae, in Orchomenus, the more was it entitled to a vigorous 
support. Immediately, therefore, after the battle of Naxos 
a new military expedition was resolved upon; Sparta, 

* Battle of Naxos : Hellen. v 4, 60 ; Diod. xv. 34 ; Plut. Phoc. 6 ; Dem. xx. 77. 
nepi Tt)v nava-eX-qvov : Boeckh, Mondcyclen, 4. "*AAa5e nvarai." : Mommsen, 
Heortologie, 24G. Boeckh dated immediately before the battle the decree of 
Cephalus in honor of Phanocritus of Parium, who receives a reward for 
having brought information concerning the movement of a hostile squadron 
(Corp. Inscr. Or. 84; cf. a similar decree with regard to Philiscus, Gotlinger 
Nachr. 1867, p. 2G1). However, this combination, which already Grote called 
into question, cannot be maintained, as is shown by Kirchhoff, Abhandl. <L 
Berlin. Akad., 1861, p. 605. 

392 History of Greece. [B«mVi 

after having abandoned the iEgean to the Athenians, 
hoped to be left at peace by them, and turned anew to 
operations against Thebes. The Thebans on the other 
hand sought to escape the imminent danger by means of 
skilful negotiations, and in particular once more set in 
Timotheus m °ti° n their friends at Athens. These insisted 
Sea the Ionie u P on tne necessity of not leaving the work 
half-finished, and the victories which had been 

B. c. 375. i ' 

gained unused. The maritime dominion of 

Summer. ° 

Athens ought to be restored in its full extent, 
if she was to maintain a secure hold over what she had 
already recovered. It was known that the maritime states 
in the Western Sea desired to join the new confederacy ; 
and thus, to the terror of the Spartans, a fleet of fifty 
vessels was in the spring of the year 375 sent out under 
Timotheus. It first landed forces upon the coast of La- 
conia, which was devastated by them, and then steered 
round Peloponnesus into the Ionic Sea, in order here to 
test the fortunes of the recovered maritime dominion of 
Athens. The results were uncommonly favorable. The 
community of the Paleans in Cephallenia was the first to 
give in its adherence ; Corcyra followed. The magnani- 
mous conduct of the Attic commander gained him all 
hearts ; for everywhere he respected the existing constitu- 
tions, and conscientiously abstained from any abuse of his 
power. An Attic confederacy rapidly formed itself in the 
Ionic Sea, and was joined by the princes of Epirus. The 
consequence was that the same terror which had of old 
contributed most to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian 
War, viz., of the Peloponnesus being surrounded on all 
sides and so to speak throttled by the maritime power of 
Athens, once more befell the Spartans and their confede- 
rates : the states which had remained true to Sparta, in 
particular Leucas and Ambracia, urgently demanded sup- 
port. The intended campaign by land was therefore, quite 
in accordance with the desire of the Thebans, once more 

C » AP - l 3 The Uprising of Thebes. 393 

postponed, while a fleet of fifty-five vessels was sent out 
under Nicolochus, to maintain the Peloponnesian su- 
premacy in the Ionic Sea. In the month of June the 
fleets met off the coast of Acarnania, opposite the island 
of Leucas, near Alyzia. Timotheus pursued the same 
course which Chabrias had followed before the battle of 
Naxos, in remembering the festival which was celebrated 
at Athens on the day of the battle, and sailing to meet the 
foe with ships wreathed with myrtles. He employed a 
small squadron for the purpose of tiring out the enemy by 
rapid manoeuvres; and not till then did he advance to 
battle with his remaining ships. Though the victory 
gained by him was not so decisive as that of the preceding 
year, yet the superiority of the Athenians was undoubted ; 
and Timotheus, reinforced by the Corcyrsean auxiliaries, 
remained in undisputed possession of the sea. In a short 
time, and with small resources, successes had been achieved, 
such as had of old cost extreme exertions lasting many 
years ; and this time they had not been purchased by 
means of bloody revolutions ; the victor's hands were pure, 
his glory was without a stain, and the moral dignity of the 
Athenians stood higher than ever before.* 

But Athens herself was not what she had been of old. 
The citizens were no longer joyously ready to make all 
necessary sacrifices, no longer energetically determined to 
stake everything upon the restoration of their power. 
The most splendid successes of Timotheus failed to call 
forth any lasting ardor for war ; the joy inspired by his 

* Agesilaus at Thespise : Hellcn. v. 4, 58; Plut. Ages. 27 (the king falls sick 
at Megara; his illness and weakness continue for a long period, till after 
the battle of Leuctra). Ua\atrj<; and KeptcvpaCwv 6 fiij/i-os: instrument of the 
confederation (Schafer, Comm. de Sodis Ath. 11). Battle of 'AAu^t'a, Xen. j 
"n-epl AevKafia" Diod. ; Polyaen. iii. 10, 4 (f/v eopTr) 2/ct'pa). The Scira (in the 
latter part of the autumn) are easily confounded with the Scirophoria; 
Schomann, Griech. AUerth. ii 2 . 4G6. On account of the season of the year, 
such a confusion has with much probability been assumed to have oc- 
curred in this instance also ; if so, the battle would fall on the 12th 
Sciroph.=June 27th. Cf. Schafer, Demosih. i. 48. 


394 History of Greece. [BookVi. 

reports of his victories was embittered, and turned into 
vexation, by the demands for money made at the same 
time. And indeed there existed no treasure whence the 
needs of the war could have been defrayed ; the con- 
tributions flowed in scantily ; the money for the fleet had to 
be collected by means of a property-tax, sensible to every 
individual. Finally, the grievous impression prevailed, 
that these heavy sacrifices chiefly redounded to the advan- 
tage of the Thebans. They alone derived a certain and un- 
doubted profit from the expenditure, while the permanence 
of the Attic successes was open to reasonable doubts. 

At Athens men thought that more than enough had 
been done to restore the honor of the state ; and since 
Sparta had likewise very considerably toned down her de- 
mands, since she was sick of the naval war into which she 

Peace ne- ^ad ^ een forced against her will, and desirous 
gotiations. f having her hands left free for more import- 
? 7 ! - ci ' 2 ( B - c - ant purposes, it was possible for the peace 
negotiations to be opened with the best pros- 
pect of success. And indeed the two chief powers soon 
came to an understanding, — on the basis of the Peace 
of Antalcidas, — to this effect : that all garrisons should be 
removed from the territory not belonging to their state, 
and that Sparta and Athens should be mutually recog- 
nized by one another ; the former as holding the primacy 
among the Peloponnesian states, the latter as the pri- 
mary state of her naval confederacy. The treaty, after 
being negotiated at Sparta, was at Athens submitted to 
the deputies of the naval confederacy for ratification. Not 
one of the states, with the exception of Thebes, had any 
interest in the continuation of the war. Athens was com- 

Peace with P^ety satisfied by the concessions of Sparta ; 

Sparta. an( j ^he remaining states were well contented 

JJ- <**' 2 (*• c - to have shaken off the tyranny of the Spartans 

iIX . . bv means of such slender exertions. The 

Attitude of J 

Thebes. Thebans could not assert their separate inter- 

chap, i.j The Uprising of Thebes. 395 

ests, which were opposed to the general desire for peace ; 
but they had instructed their deputy not to sign otherwise 
than in the name of Boeotia. The deputy in question was 
Epaminondas. It created astonishment when the Theban 
envoy pleaded his cause in a manner which placed him on 
a full equality with his opponent Callistratus, the greatest 
orator of Athens. Epaminondas attested by his personal 
bearing as well as by his speech, that a new era had in 
truth opened for Thebes, and that she was well capable of 
assuming another position than that which she had hereto- 
fore held. In no quarter however was there any inclina- 
tion to postpone the desired peace again on account of 
Thebes : this point would have necessitated fresh negotia- 
tions with Sparta, who, it was well known, would refuse to 
give way on this head ; on which Athens was at bottom 
thoroughly at one with her. For the Athenians regarded 
with increasing disfavor the endeavor of the Thebans to 
force themselves in among the great powers of Greece ; no 
sooner had the despotic supremacy of Sparta been 
broken, than the feeling of fraternity, which had formed 
itself between Athens and Thebes in the struggle against 
that supremacy, vanished, and the old aversion re-ap- 
peared, intensified by suspicious fears, such as might with 
reason suggest themselves to a jealous neighbor-city on the 
occasion of the presence of a man like Epaminondas. 
Callistratus upheld the treaty agreed upon at Sparta, and 
in the whole diet Epaminondas was not supported by a 
single vote. He stood absolutely alone ; and, as he obeyed 
his instructions, Thebes was excluded from participation in 
the treaty. On his return home, the question was once 
more taken into consideration ; the state of affairs was not 
held to be ripe as yet for venturing on the decisive step ; 
conciliatory overtures were therefore made, and a second 
embassy signed the treaty in the form demanded by the 
other states.* 

* Peace : Hellen. vi. 2, 1. Manso, Vtfhmel, and others deny the Peace of 

396 History of Greece. [Book vl 

This act of self-control, to which the Thebans once more 
consented, was a step of wise moderation productive of the 
best results. For, instead of the general indignation turn- 
ing against them, as the solitary disturbers of the peace, 
and furnishing Sparta with an opportunity for undertaking 
a new expedition of vengeance, the cause of strife had 
now been evaded. On the other hand, the understanding 
between the two great powers at once showed itself to rest 
on very unsafe foundations. For, precisely as in former 
times of war, so now again the commanders could not after 
the publication of the conclusion of peace abstain from 
seeking to secure small advantages for which a fitting op- 
portunity offered itself. Timotheus, feeling himself after 
all for the moment master of the Western Sea, before 
quitting it, landed a body of Zacynthians in their island, 
and supported them in their endeavors to seize the govern- 
New naval meu ^ This breach of the peace aroused the 
cyra° ff Cor " wrath of the Spartans ; and since they received 
01 . 2 no satisfaction for it at Athens, they immedi- 
(b. c. 374). ately despatched a fleet to Zacynthus, and at 
the same time took advantage of the invitation of a party 
favorable to them in Corcyra, and attacked this island, 
which they were least of all willing to leave under Attic 
influence, because it was of too great importance for them 
with a view to their relations with Sicily. In this attempt 
they met with the most vigorous support from the maritime 
states of Peloponnesus ; and, as Timotheus had meanwhile 
quitted these parts, they, after in the first instance trying, 
but failing in, a surprise, besieged the city of the Corcyrse- 
ans most vigorously from the landside as well as from the 
sea, with sixty ships and 1,500 men. But the Athenians 

374; Sievers (220) says "it was never executed." Rehdantz (71) gives the 
correct view. Callias concluded peace twice (387 and 374 b. a): HelUn. vi. 3, 
4. Sacrifice on the occasion of the peace : Isocr. xv. 110; Nepos, Timoth. 2. 
Diodorus clearly distinguishes between two series of peace-negotiations 
(xv. 31 and 50). The former probably at Athens : Rehdantz, 73. 'Ef aywyet^ 
" praesidiorum deductores," #>. 72. 

Cha >- *J The Uprising of TJiebes. 397 

were at hand without delay ; they sent an auxiliary force 
by land to Epirus, whence, with the aid of the friendly 
government, it was transported to Corcyra, and arrived at 
the right moment for averting immediate danger ; while 
at the same time they equipped sixty vessels-of-war, to fol- 
low under Timotheus. 

Thus, after a sham peace of a few weeks, the war had 
burst forth afresh ; and it was now the task of the Thebans 
to employ this new term, which an unexpected good-for- 
tune offered them, with the utmost energy, so as at last to 
regulate the affairs of their own land as they wished, and 
to prepare themselves for the inevitable day of the crisis. 

A peaceful blending of the territories of the several 
towns of Boeotia, such as Epaminondas and his friends had 
hoped for, would not admit of realization, though it was 
manifest enough that the entire future of the country de- 
pended upon its union around a single centre. The 
Orchomenians still found the idea intolerable, that their 
city of ancient fame was to become an insignificant hamlet 
in the country which had its seat of government at Thebes ; 
the lower classes were too little advanced to appreciate the 
blessings promised them by the political regeneration of 
the land; and the ruling families refused to give way, 
although they could not but recognize that their position 
was becoming daily more untenable. And, as to the Pla- 
tseans, who could blame them for having allowed an in- 
vincible hatred against the authors of their terrible 
calamities to take root among them ? The excellent men 
who were at present directing the policy of Thebes had to 
suffer for the former conduct of their native city. 
It was therefore necessary to proceed by _, 

force of arms ; and there was the less reason ^ ina posses- 
sion of 

for entertaining any scruples on this head, Boeotia. 
since the obstacles against the union of the , 01. ei 2 

& . (b. c. 374). 

country were foreign garrisons. For the new 

Thebes adopted this principle from the old : that every 


98 History of Greece. [Booivi 

combination on the part of a Boeotian town with a foreign 
power amounted to a criminal act of disloyalty and of 
treason against the common country, — the same principle 
which the Thebans had urged upon the Spartans in refer- 
ence to Platsese, and which the Spartans held to have been 
abolished by the Peace of Antalcidas. Pelopidas first 
took the field for Thebes. After several fruitless attacks 
upon Orchomenus, he made use of the moment when the 
Lacedemonian force which guarded the citadel there had 
marched out to Locris. At the head of the Sacred Band 
and a squadron of cavalry he appeared before the city ; 
but here other troops had unexpectedly arrived, — a sign 
of the anxiety with which the Spartans endeavored to 
maintain their positions in Boeotia, even though they were 
for the present occupied with other matters. Pelopidas 
retreated along the road to Tegyra, which lay on the 
further side of the valley of Lake Copais, opposite Orcho- 
menus, in the direction towards Locris. Here he suddenly 
came upon the Lacedaemonians on their return thence. 
There was no question of evading the conflict. He, there- 
fore, in spite of their numbers being double his own, 
attacked them with his cavalry, and then with the Three 
Hundred broke through the enemy's line. The Lacedse- 
monian leaders fell, and the ranks opened for Pelopidas to 
pass through. But he, now no longer satisfied with this 
success, once more attacked the troops, and drove them into 
flight ; so that it was only under cover of the night that 
they were able to make good their escape into Orchomenus. 
Thus the menace of danger was changed into a brilliant 
victory ; and this day of honor for the Sacred Band created 
a great impression throughout Boeotia. Probably the Boeo- 
tian towns simultaneously gave in their adherence, without 
a single one of them being destroyed. About the same 
time, immediately after the outbreak of new hostilities be- 
tween Athens and Sparta, communications were likewise 
already opened with Iason, the Tyrant of Pherse, and 

chap, i.j The Uprising of Thebes. 399 

attempts made to bring about a combination between Pho- 
cis and Boeotia. These were the first endeavors towards 
founding a confederation in the mainland of Central 

While thus the policy of Thebes already ventured be- 
yond the confines of Boeotia, the last decisive events within 
these were also already occurring. With a new war in 
certain prospect, it was inadmissible to leave any fortified 
places standing, which Sparta might immediately use as 
military positions. Above all, Platsese had Destruc . 
long been an object of vexation to the Thebans. * io " ^ f 
Information now reached them, that this city 0] xci 4 
was intending to place itself under the pro- (B - c - 37: ^- 
tection of the Athenians: it was, therefore, in spite of 
the Peace (p. 395), rapidly taken by means of a cavalry 
attack, and laid level with the ground, after the population 
had been permitted to depart unhurt, on condition, how- 
ever, of never again entering Bceotia. Very soon after- 
wards Tanagra and Thespise were likewise utterly reduced, 
and doubtless deprived of their walls. At last matters 
had been thoroughly set to rights at home ; the goal of 
many years' endeavors had been reached. Thebes was the 
first and the only city of Bceotia.* 

Meanwhile the naval war had been continued with vary- 
ing results. The Corcyrseans with painful anxiety awaited 
the promised fleet. There was at Athens no lack of good- 
will. But the want of money had already made itself felt 
before the departure of the fleet, and crippled all proceed- 
ings. Timotheus did what lay in his power to do. Per- 
sonally, he made the greatest efforts. The trierarchs added 

* Zacynthus: Hellen. vi. 2, 2. Tegyra: Plut. Pelop. xvi. 17; Diod. xv. 37. 
The straight road between Orchomenus and Tegyra was impassible : 
Ulrichs, Beisen, i. 202. Destruction of Platseae: according to Pausan. ix. 1, 3, 
under the archonship of 'Aoreios, 373-2 b. c. ; according to Diod. xv. 16, 
under that of Socratides, 374-3 ; according to Clinton-Kriiger in the sum- 
mer of 374, i. e. before the peace. Contra, Isocr. xiv. 10 (avvOrjKai), 14 (tlprjvr^ 
ouotj?), and 44. This is not to be understood as referring to the Peace of 
Antalcidas : H. Weissenborn, Zetiachr. f. Alt., 1847, 921. 

400 History of Greece. lbookVL 

advances of their own for the maintenance of the crews ; 
and thus in April 373 the fleet weighed anchor; but 
instead of making for Corcyra, where the situation of the 
besieged daily grew more unbearable, Timotheus sailed to 
the north, to the coasts of Thessaly and Macedonia. He 
evidently had in view a long and decisive war, and accord- 
ingly deemed it above all incumbent upon him to open 
new resources and to gain new allies. Men are generally 
prone to attach the highest importance to that for which 
they personally feel the highest capacity ; and thus Timo- 
theus did not scruple to keep the Corcyrseans waiting, 
while by the charms of his manner he succeeded in in- 
ducing the Prince of Pherse, Iason, and a series of island and 
coast-states, to join the Attic confederacy. While he cruised 
about in the ^Egean as a peaceful victor, successfully 
adding new members to the naval confederacy, the summer 
passed away. The brilliancy of his return, with a fleet 
increased by thirty confederate vessels, and with a large 
number of envoys, instructed to sign the instrument of the 
confederation, once more reconciled the Athenians, who 
had already begun to murmur, with their general, so that 
they conferred on him anew the command of the fleet. 

But neither was its second departure followed by any 
results. Wherein lay its use, if the means were wanting 
for its maintenance? Timotheus was full of ambition to 
do great deeds and of patriotic readiness to make personal 
sacrifices. He pledged his own lands to the trierarchs for 
the advances which they made to the state, but these efforts 
merely served as a momentary stop-gap ; it was impossible 
under such circumstances to open a regular campaign, and 
far away from home to defy a well-trained fleet. He could 
therefore do nothing for the present but cruise to and fro 
in the ^Egean, in order to supplement his resources in men 
and money ; whereupon he again lay for a time inactive in 
the roads of Calauria. Doubtless there was no man to 
whom this inactivity was more painful, than it was to the 

chap, i.j T/ ie (Jprismg of Thebes. 401 

general himself. And yet upon him the blame was cast 
of a useless protraction of the war and of the loss of valua- 
ble time. He was more popular at a distance from Athens 
than at home among his fellow-citizens. His most danger- 
ous adversaries were Iphicrates and Callistratus, who, 
otherwise not on friendly terms with one another, had com- 
bined to attack him. Iphicrates had returned from 
Egypt, where he had commanded Greek mercenary troops 
under Pharnabazus, and desired a new theatre for glorious 
enterprises; Callistratus was one of those who felt them- 
selves injured and cast into the shade by the pride of Timo- 
theus. The general was accordingly indicted as having 
deceived the civic community (vol. ii. p. 257) and betrayed 
the state; and was dismissed from the supreme command. 
Iphicrates became his successor, — as it would seem, with 
extraordinary powers ; inasmuch as he was left at liberty to 
choose his colleagues in office. He must at that time have 
contrived to make himself very highly trusted. Probably 
this is also the period of his endeavors to open new sources 
of income for the Athenians; for he was the author of a 
law which commanded the removal of such projecting parts 
of houses as interrupted the traffic in the streets, or which 
placed a special tax upon them; hereby a not inconsidera- 
ble profit was derived by the public treasury from the 
well-to-do citizens, who were anxious to preserve the ar- 
rangement of their dwellings intact.* 

In his office as general Iphicrates displayed uncommon 
energy. As a born commander of mercenaries, he was 
accustomed to go straight to the point; he rigorously in. 
sisted upon the citizens paying their contributions for the 
fleet, and within a short time collected seventy vessels. 

♦Indictment of Timotheus: Sch'afer, iii. B. 138.— Financial law of 
Iphicrates: Polyeen. iii. 9, 2; Boeckh, P. Ec of Ath.,\o\.l. p. 88 [E. 3V.J ; 
Rendantz, 92 f.— Attack of Sparta upon Corcyra : 373 b. c. spring. Mnasippus 
sent out: autumn. Timotheus deposed in the month Mtemacterion (No- 
vember). Expedition of Iphicrates: 372, spring (or just before the close 
of the year 373), Weissenborn, 924. 

402 History of Greece. [Book vi 

He was sagacious enough to choose for his colleagues the 
men who might do him the greatest harm, viz. Callistratus, 
and by his side Chabrias. This aroused confidence; for 
he who asked for such men as these, thereby made it clear, 
that he shrank from no control in his conduct of the war. 
He left behind him at Athens the mainsails, thereby indi- 
cating, that his ships were not destined for promenades in 
the Archipelago, but that they were from first to last meant 
to be instruments of war. Already the rapid voyages 
which he made round Peloponnesus were designed as a 
schooling for war ; he contrived in the midst of the greatest 
exertions to keep his men fresh and ready for work, to stir 
a spirit of emulation among them, and to arouse their am- 
bition. General admiration was excited by the spirit, the 
discipline, and the warlike training which prevailed on 
board his fleet. 

Already at his arrival on the scene of war, he found that 
an essential change had taken place in the condition of 
affairs. The citizens of Corcyra had by means of a des- 
perate sally freed themselves, unaided, from the worst pres- 
sure ; on this occasion they had slain the Spartan general 
Mnasippus, and had so greatly discouraged the besieging 
army, that, when the news came of the approach of an 
Athenian fleet, the siege was entirely abandoned. Thus 
the fortunate Iphicrates was victorious before his arrival ; 
and he hereupon surprised an auxiliary squadron from 
Syracuse, which the Spartans, departing in timorous haste, 
had neglected to await. Of ten Sicilian triremes, which 
were moreover laden with dedicatory gifts of the costliest 
kind for Delphi and Olympia, nine fell into the hands of 
the Athenians. The sums paid in ransom for the captured 
Syracusans, and obtained by the sale of the dedicatory 
gifts, which Iphicrates, empowered thereto by a sufficiently 
clear expression of the will of the civic community, turned 
into money at once, for a time supplied the means neces- 
sary for the fleet. Simultaneously he carried on a lucra* 

chap, l] The Uprising of Thebes. 403 

tive freebooter's war by means of the ninety ships of the 
united fleet of Athens and Corcyra, laying contributions 
upon the coasts of Peloponnesus and Central Greece, and 
also collecting voluntary payments from the confederates.* 
So wildly desultory a system of conducting the war 
could not be long continued. Iphicrates himself perceived 
this, and could not but agree with Callistratus on this head. 
Callistratus was accordingly requested by Iphicrates to go 
to Athens, in order to obtain either the means for a regular 
war, — or peace. Callistratus had only the latter alterna- 
tive in view. His was the clearest insight into the whole 
situation of affairs ; he could entertain no doubt, but that 
Sparta would now, even more readily than three years ago, 
recognize the naval dominion of Athens ; while the Athe- 
nians themselves were without ulterior objects, for the sake 
of which they ought to carry on the war. Moreover, 
Antalcidas had again been sent to Susa ; and it was in the 
interest of Athens, to prevent a new intervention on the 
part of Persia. But the reason which above all could not 
but incline both states to peace, lay in the affairs of 
Boeotia. The unexpected destruction of Platsese had pro- 
voked great indignation among the Athenians ; and the 
expelled Platseans, who had met with a hospitable recep- 
tion at Athens, stimulated the ancient aversion to Thebes, 
depicting in the most glaring colors the arrogance of the 
new capital, which would soon find even the limits of 
Boeotia too narrow for its ambition. Though at the same 
time there was no lack of men who were able to justify the 
proceedings of the Thebans, and who represented them in 
the light of a political necessity, yet the majority of the 
citizens decidedly took the side of the Platseans, on whose 
behalf Isocrates also composed his Platsean Oration. Ac* 

* Iphicrates chooses Callistratus : ov fxdka emT^Setov ovra, Hcllen. vi. 2, 39 
(not to be altered, as proposed by Boeckh, P. Ec. of Ath. vol. ii. p. 163 
U57. TV.); according to Thirlwall, vol. v. p. 81, "proof of magnanimous self- 
confidence."— Dedicatory gifts : Diod. xvi. 57. 

404 History of Greece. [Bookvj 

eordingly the proposals of Callistratus found ready listen, 
ers, and a peace-embassy to Sparta was decreed ; while at 
the same time the confederates, and Thebes in particular, 
were summoned to take part in the negotiations. 

Congress at -^ t was a mem °rable day for Greece, when in 
Sp of ck 1 (b ** uue ^ ^ e con g ress met a t Sparta. A 
c ' /Jie desire was generally felt, to be freed from the 

obscurity and uncertainty of the existing state 
of tilings ; and a consciousness prevailed, that the decision 
of great questions was at issue. Besides the Greek states, 
Macedonia and Persia likewise had their representatives 
at Sparta. The Persians deemed it their interest, to pro- 
mote the termination of the Greek quarrels ; for, taught 
by long experience, they could not but favor by preference 
a condition of things, in which the two chief states held 
the balance of power to one another ; moreover, they could 
more easily obtain mercenary troops for their own pur- 
poses, as soon as the internal quarrels of the Greeks should 
have ceased. The negotiations were conducted on the 
part of Sparta by Agesilaus. Athens was represented by 
several men of mark. Among them was Callias, Hipponi- 
cus' son (vol. iii. p. 2), who had saved but little of his in- 
herited wealth, but clung all the more determinedly to the 
ancestral fame of his house, and whom it had been im- 
possible to pass over, both on account of the ancient rela- 
tions of that house to Persia, and of his holding the posi- 
tion ofproxenus of the Lacedaemonians ; further, the popu- 
lar orator Autocles, Strombich ides' son, Melanopus, and 
others. But the real soul of the embassy was Callistratus. 
Thebes was represented by Epaminondas, this time fur- 
nished with very definite instructions. 

The deliberations began in the presence of the committee 
of the Laconic civic community, and were opened by the 
Athenians as the movers. Callias, the diplomatist for show, 
gave a very circumstantial account of his ancestor Trip- 
tolemus, who, he stated, had communicated the mysteries 

Chap, i.] rp ne Uprising of Thebes. 405 

of Demeter to Heracles, the ancestor of the kings of La- 
conia ; wherefore it was assuredly most unbecoming, that 
the descendants of Heroes associated in so close a friendship 
should live in strife with one another, and that the Pelopon- 
nesians should design to cut off the supplies from those who 
had first conferred upon them the boon of corn. Upon 
these feeble phrases followed the speech of Autocles, which 
came straight upon the Spartans like a keen blast of wind. 
With unsparing openness he exposed before them the policy 
which they had pursued in Greece since the end of the great 
war between the states. " Ye Spartans," he said, " have 
ever asserted the independence of the individual commu- 
nities to be the principle upon which our national affairs 
ought to be regulated ; and yet no state has more rudely 
violated this principle, than yourselves ; for in the first place 
you demand from the Peloponnesians unconditionally the 
furnishing of contingents, without inquiring whether they 
approve of the war or not ; and again, which is much worse, 
you establish governments beyond the limits of the penin- 
sula, commissioned to keep the communities in subjection 
by all possible means of force. You are wroth with the 
Thebans for desiring to bring the Boeotian towns under their 
dominion ; and meanwhile you occupy the citadels of towns 
which are not your own yourselves. How is a restoration 
of tranquillity throughout Greece possible, if you employ 
the provisions of the Peace of Antalcidas as a means of en- 
chaining others, while you thereby open an unlimited sphere 
of action to your own lust of dominion ? " 

The Lacedaemonians were forced to listen to these re- 
proaches without contradiction ; and it was a great satisfac- 
tion to many of the injured states that the Spartans should 
once in a way have the truth thus openly told them in their 
own city, before a large assembly. The peace g eech 
oration proper it was reserved for Callistratus °/ c»Hi- 

A x stratus. 

to make. He was the conciliating statesman, 

who mitigated the severity of his predecessor's oration by 

406 History of Greece. [BookVI, 

readily conceding that mistakes had been committed on 
both sides. The question was not, he observed, that of cast- 
ing up the account between these mistakes, but that of 
making such a use of the lessons and chastisements received 
on either side, as should redound to the advantage of the 
whole nation. The Spartans would by this time probably 
have learnt to understand what had been the result of the 
treatment hitherto accorded by them to the Peace of An- 
talcidas. Thebes, which was to have been humbled, was at 
the present time more powerful than ever before. They 
would therefore probably be found inclined to pursue a 
moderate policy. " The Athenians," he said, " are ani- 
mated by a real love of peace ; nor have they been induced 
to make their present overtures, as some think, by the em- 
bassy which you have sent to Susa ; for what should they 
have to fear from the Persian King, inasmuch as their ob- 
jects are identical with his ? Nor are we involved in any 
kind of difficulty, from which we might be seeking to ex- 
tricate ourselves by means of a rapid pacification. It is 
rather considerations for the general condition of Greece, 
and the community of interests, winch make a close union 
between the two states advisable. For so long as they 
stand in arms against one another, the feeling of hostility 
between the Attic and the Lacedaemonian party must con- 
tinue in all the communities. This ancient evil is only to 
be cured by means of a sincere understanding between the 
two states, which cannot but cause those elements of party- 
hatred to lose their importance ; and thus a real establish- 
ment of peace is possible in the Greek world without any 
foreign intervention. Again, the conduct of certain of our 
confederates, which is as little pleasing to us as it is to you, 
is an inducement to us to unite our interests with yours. 
Inasmuch as your power by land has been well preserved, 
and our power by sea has been restored, the only reasonable 
policy which both of us can pursue, is to secure ourselves 
by means of a frank alliance against every danger by land 

chap, i.j The Uprising of Thebes. 407 

and by water, either state resting satisfied with the favorable 
position which it has obtained, instead of acting after the 
manner of a passionate gambler, who, after he has made 
a lucky throw, doubles his stakes, in order to win all ; for 
usually such a proceeding leads to all being — lost." 

It was according to the principles developed The treat 
in this speech that the treaty of peace was ° f Peace of 
executed. It amounted in the main to a re- 371 )- 
newal of the Peace of Antalcidas, only with this differ- 
ence, that Sparta was not, as on the former occasion, 
charged with the execution of the treaty. This power, 
which she had so cruelly abused, it was not wished again 
to commit to her hands. The most natural course would 
have been for the two great states to have jointly under- 
taken the responsibility of maintaining the treaty ; for, inas- 
much as its purpose was the general pacification of Greece, 
it was in point of fact indispensable to make provision for 
the event of a breach of the peace occurring from any side 
whatever. But in the first place a scruple was felt against 
absolutely excluding Persia, which, as has been seen, was 
also represented at Sparta, and which had been the guaran- 
tor of the earlier treaty ; and, again, Athens could not 
bring herself to undertake definite obligations of this de- 
scription. For every one foresaw an event close at hand, 
which would give occasion for an execution of the conditions 
of peace by forcible means : and with reference to this event 
Athens was not in the least inclined to fetter herself by an- 
ticipation. Inasmuch, then, as it was after all necessary to 
arrive at some kind of settlement, the guarantees for the 
due observance of the treaty contained in the third clause 
of the instrument of b. c. 387 were this time simply abol- 
ished ; and it was expressly provided, that it was not incum- 
bent upon any individual state or upon any association of 
states to watch over the maintenance of the treaty, but that 
every state should be at liberty according to its own choice 
to come to the aid of a community injured in its rights. 

408 History of Greece. [Bookvl 

By means of this clause the peace, which was most 
solemnly established at Sparta for the whole of Greece, be- 
came in point of fact a sham peace, an empty delusion. 
For all the particular provisions inserted in the treaty — 
viz. that Sparta should withdraw her governors and garri- 
sons from places abroad, and put an end to all threatening 
movements, military or naval — now lost their significance : 
because there was no one to watch over the fulfilment of 
the articles of peace. It was therefore, certainly, a bitter 
humiliation for Sparta to have to hear the truth told her 
in open assembly, to have to recognize Athens as a great 
power like herself, and to accept without reservation the 
conditions of peace proposed ; her entire conduct had been 
plainly condemned by the public voice, and her arrogance 
had beon unsparingly chastised. The Spartans were to all 
appearance forced to adopt a new course of action, and to 
abandon the policy of Agesilaus. But in point of fact 
they had after all obtained what they chiefly desired. 
They were not bound to attack the states withstanding the 
treaty, but they had the right to do so ; they had ac- 
quired freedom of action against Thebes, and this under 
the most favorable conditions, if Thebes could be repre- 
sented to be the disturber of the general peace. And the 
most important clause of the treaty for the Spartans was 
that which apparently was of all the emptiest of meaning : 
viz. the provision, that by virtue of the universal autonomy 
no state should be obliged to furnish aid in arms against 
another. Hereby all the previous associations for the pur- 
pose of securing the regular furnishing of military contin- 
gents, the Peloponnesian among them, seemed to be dis- 
solved ; and Sparta no longer possessed as hitherto the 
right of calling the cities of the peninsula to arms in sup- 
port of her policy. But in point of fact everything re- 
mained as before; and while the cities confederate with 
Athens were regarded as independent members of the con- 
gress, Sparta maintained her position as head of the Pelo- 

chap, i.] The Uprising of Thebes. 409 

ponnesian confederacy unchallenged, and in so far success- 
fully issued forth from this crisis also as the ancient and 
single great power of Greece. 

The most important and questionable point, viz. the 
relation of Thebes to the districts surrounding it, had not 
been brought under discussion at all in the meetings of the 
congress. It was intentionally evaded by either side. 
Epaminondas had spoken with vigor in the sense of Auto- 
cles against the Spartan policy ; it was a satisfaction to 
him, to see that policy meet with so open a disapproval ; 
nor was there any reason for his objecting to the articles 
of the treaty, so far as their words went : the only question 
was, in what way they were to be applied to Thebes ; and 
this only became manifest towards the close of the congress. 
On the 14th of Scirophorion (June 16th) the treaty was 
signed and sworn to by the representatives of _. p 
the greater states, Persia, Sparta, Athens, signed. 
Thebes : hereupon the confederates of Athens pi. eiL i 

... (B'C. 371). 

also signed, each in his own name. On the June wth. 
next day, we are told, the Thebans appeared Demand of 

• ill ^ ^ i • • ill E P am in° n - 

witn the demand, that their signature should das. 
be altered, and that the word " Boeotians " should be sub- 
stituted for "Thebans." This demand must have been 
occasioned by something special which had occurred in 
the interval ; probably, the protocol of the treaty was kept 
open for signatures still absent, and, in secret connivance 
with the two great powers, deputies of Boeotian communi- 
ties presented themselves, to acquire by signing on their 
own account a documentary claim to independence. 
Epaminondas was this time resolved not to give way. 
His signature, he declared, had validity for the whole of 
Bceotia ; he had not signed as an official of the city of 
Thebes, but as Bceotarch ; there existed no Bceotia besides 
Thebes ; and he therefore demanded an alteration of the 
signature, so as once for all to cut off any independent par- 
ticipation of Boeotian towns or villages in the conclusion 

410 History of Greece. [BookVi 

of the Treaty. Why should Bceotia alone renounce the 
right of forming a union of its districts within its natural 
boundaries ? If the Peace of Antalcidas was to be carried 
out in the sense of the Spartan policy, a dissolution of all 
the states of Greece might be demanded. Lacedaemon 
itself consisted of a group of villages, which had by sheer 
force been united into a single whole, and the peace just 
negotiated nowhere recognized as legally existing a rela- 
tion involving the obligation of furnishing military con- 
tingents. Thebes accordingly firmly insisted upon her 
good right, and was resolved to defend it against all the 
cavils of foreign powers.* 

Thus the declaration of directly opposite standpoints, 

which had been long in preparation, had at last been 

openly made ; nor was anything to be gained in this mat- 

D 1 rat' ^ er ky negotiations. Agesilaus accordingly 

of war propounded to his adversary the decisive 

against - 1 x J 

Thebes. question, whether he would consent on the 

basis of the renewed Peace of Antalcidas to acknowledge 
the autonomy of the Boeotian towns. " Only," replied 
Epaminondas, " in case you Spartans yourselves recognize 
your own provincial towns as free communities." The 
proud assurance of the Theban heightened the fury of the 
king ; in utter wrath he sprang from the seat which he 
occupied as president of the congress, and signified his 
final declaration by cancelling the name of the Thebans in 
the document of the treaty. Hereby war had been de- 
clared against Thebes ; and the end of the peace congress 
was the outbreak of a conflict which was to determine the 
entire system of relations between the states of Greece. 
_ u . . It hardly admits of doubt, that the turn 

The objects J 

of the war. taken by affairs was foreseen and brought 

* Epaminondas m Sparta: Plat. Ages. 28; Paus. ix. 13: Nep. Epam. 6. 
Xenophon's (Hellen. vi. 3, 3f.) account is decidedly unfavorable to Epami- 
nondas. Hertzberg, p. 347; Herbst, Neue Jahrbilch. f. Philol lxxvii. 701 ; W. 
Vischer in the N. Schiceiz. Museum, 1861, 23. 

Chap, i.] tj w Jjprisifig of Thebes. 411 

about by the leading statesmen. Agesilaus had borne 
with humiliation after humiliation, so as in the end to 
throw the whole blame of the frustration of the hopes of 
peace upon Thebes, utterly to isolate her, and thus at last 
to be able to execute the expedition of vengeance, so long 
delayed, under the most favorable circumstances. After 
the negotiations at Athens (p. 390) it might be considered 
certain, that Thebes would assert herself as the capital of 
Boeotia ; Callistratus and Agesilaus were from the outset 
agreed upon not permitting this ; and since Athens as 
well as Sparta insisted upon regarding the Theban claims 
as contradictory to the fundamental provisions of the 
treaty of peace, the remaining states never thought of 
protesting against the proceedings of Agesilaus and their 
indisputably arbitrary character. 

The rapid transition from peace to war likewise shows 
how everything had been prepared and calculated with a 
view to the event which had actually taken place. For 
if there had been any serious intention of executing the 
conditions of the peace, a beginning would have had to 
be made with a complete disarmament, the withdrawal of 
all the garrisons, and the dissolution of all the military 
bodies, in order then, if it were desired, to arm for a new 
war, and to obtain for it the consent of the confederates. 
And such were actually the views of the party of the 
Moderates at Sparta ; and when Cleombrotus, who was 
still in Phocis with a Spartan army, with the view of pro- 
tecting this country against the attack of Thebes (p. 392) 
inquired of the Ephors, what line of conduct he was to 
pursue, Prothous indeed came forward at Sparta and de- 
manded, that the provisions of the peace recently sworn 
to should be observed, and the army dismissed at once ; 
but he remained entirely without support, and was de» 
rided, as if he had been a fool, for his sentimental policy ; 
and it was unanimously determined to make full use of 
the advantage in hand, to reinforce Cleombrotus as largely 

412 History of Greece. [BookVL 

as possible, and to order him to invade Boeotia without 
delay, so as to force Thebes, which had defiantly dared to 
question the supremacy of Sparta in her own land, to 
give way. The whole of Greece expected, that the power 
of Thebes would be inevitably broken in the briefest 
period of time, and that the vengeance of Sparta would 
be accomplished. For this time, instead of disputed 
points admitting of settlement, nothing less was at issue 
than the existence of the city which desired to force itself 
into a place among the great powers, and to overthrow 
the existing order of things in Hellas. The war there- 
fore had for its object nothing short of the destruction of 
the city ; deprived of its walls, dissolved into hamlets, 
sentenced to the payment of tithes to the gods, it was to 
serve as a terrible example of the consequences of an 
arrogant revolt against Sparta. Meanwhile the Thebans 
for their part had likewise done their utmost to prepare 
themselves for the critical hour. They were now to prove 
that the proud words spoken at Sparta were backed by a 
people possessed of courage and vigor sufficient to make 
these words a living reality ; the leaders of the movement 
had constantly pointed to the fact that young Boeotia had 
yet to undergo a severe baptism of blood, and they were 
themselves firmly resolved rather to fall in the struggle, 
than to go into exile for a second time. Epaminondas 
stood at the height of his influence, which he had slowly, 
but surely, acquired. He had always regarded the de- 
velopment of the military forces of the state as the most 
important branch of his activity as a statesman ; he had 
incessantly urged the blending of the several contingents 
into a Boeotian popular army, and had at the same time 
reflected on means whereby victory might be wrested even 
from superior numbers. 

The tactics ^e art °^ war as P ursue d by the Spartans, 

non^Sa" 1 " * n s P* te °^ i so ^ ate( i reforms (p. 331), continued 

to be based on the ancient tactics for fighting 

chap, i.] The Uprising of Thebes. 413 

in line ; they still retained their phalanx, the order of bat- 
tle drawn up at equal depth, in which they advanced 
against the foe. In their eyes a battle was still a kind of 
duel, both armies seeking a spacious ground on which to 
measure their strength against one another. By means of 
firm cohesion in the ranks, and of the presence everywhere 
of equal valor, they thought that victory might be made 
a certainty in any given battle. Nothing could accord- 
ingly be more advantageous for the adversaries of Sparta, 
than a successful introduction of such innovations as 
might find the Spartans unprepared, and render them 
unable to carry on the fight after the fashion to which 
they were accustomed. 

It was on this that Epaminondas had long reflected ; 
he had attentively followed every progress in the military 
art: he had convinced himself of the gains obtainable 
under difficult conditions by grouping the masses, by 
heightening the mobility of the several divisions of a force, 
by adopting a skilful order of march, and by taking ad- 
vantage of the peculiarities of locality. The conduct of 
troops, emancipated from the ban of ancient tradition, 
had become an art, and the organization of the military 
system a subject of serious study. Iphicrates and Cha- 
brias had shown what could be effected against the old 
school of Lacedaemonian tactics by ingenious innovations. 
Following such precedents, Epaminondas, whose philo- 
sophical mind could not rest satisfied with isolated changes 
and inventions, now sought to develop a new system of 
tactics, the introduction of which should determine the 
course of the war and, implicitly, the mutual relations be- 
tween the Greek states. 

The fundamental principle was a very simple one. 
The ancient system of tactics was based upon the practice 
of beginning the fight simultaneously and with equal vigor 
along the whole line; Epaminondas forsook this, by no 
longer drawing up his troops in a line of battle of equaJ 

414 Histmy of Greece. [Bookvi. 

depth, but giving special strength to the right or left end 
of the line. Thus was formed a column of attack behind 
the front, designed to direct itself like a wedge against 
some particular point in the enemy's line, so as to break it 
by one ponderous onslaught, and to create confusion in his 
whole order of battle. This system brought with it the 
advantage of obliging those who employed it to assume 
the offensive in every open battle; while at the same time 
it w r as specially favorable in this respect, that in the attack 
the particular point in the enemy's line could be chosen 
at will, and that at this point the enemy's strength was 
necessarily far inferior to that of the assailant; so that in 
other words success was in the first instance almost certain. 
And to these tactics a decisive significance attached with 
reference to the whole of the enemy's line in the case of a 
Lacedaemonian army, where everything depended upon the 
cohesion of the different parts being maintained undis- 
turbed; while a more agile army, and one better practised 
in the opening and closing of the ranks, would have been 
well able to evade such shocks, and to escape their dangers. 
The Boeotians were naturally adapted for a mode of 
Pre ara- attack consisting in a rapid advance, and were 
battfe f ° r the also nab i tuatecl to it (pp. 243, 246) ; and in- 
asmuch as during recent years they had been 
schooled by constant practice in such manoeuvres of thrust- 
ing forward an attacking column, and of breaking through 
the enemy's line, it may truly be said that in his so-called 
slanting or oblique order of battle Epaminondas had as it 
were furnished them with a new weapon for the defence 
of their land against the Lacedaemonians. In order to 
secure his ends, he of course also availed himself of other 
means, such as were offered to him by the experiences of 
the most recent times of war. Above all, he contrived to 
turn to account the special strength of Boeotia, her cavalry ; 
it served him admirably for occupying the enemy by bold 
attacks, and for diverting his attention from the decisive 

Chap, lj The Uprising of Thebes. 415 

point, and it was all the more effective, because the enemy's 
cavalry was in the worst possible condition. The wealthy 
citizens of Sparta maintained the horses, on which, when 
the day for marching out arrived, were mounted the most 
inefficient men. In the same way Epaminondas managed 
to secure great advantages by means of light-armed sol- 
diery, as well as by combining different species of troops.* 

Thus prepared, he at the head of about The field f 
6,000 men awaited the approach of the enemy, Leuctra. 
in the direction from the valley of the Cephisus, where the 
broad and easy road descended from Phocis : for this time 
it was no longer the defence of the capital, but that of all 
Bceotia, which was in question. He therefore took up his 
position on the southern shore of Lake Copals, near Coro- 
nea, which was probably not chosen by him without inten- 
tion, as being the locality of the Boeotian festivals and 
festive games. Cleombrotus, however, preferred another 
route ; he turned into the southern part of Phocis, march- 
ing by irksome mountain-paths from Ambrysus along the 
south side of Mount Helicon past Thisbe and Creusis, and 
thus reached the more open hilly country which extends 
between the advanced heights of Mounts Cithseron and 
Helicon. He probably underwent the difficulties of this 
circuitous route, in order to unite with his army the aux- 
iliary troops sent after him from Peloponnesus, and thus 
to meet the enemy with his full forces. Spartan troops 
continued to occupy the passes of Mount Cithseron, and 
till shortly before the battle joined the king's army, 
which now probably doubled the Theban in numbers. 

Thus the low-lying land between the two mountain- 
ranges became the field of contest. Cleombrotus pitched 
his camp by the southern heights forming the extreme 
portion of Mount Cithseron, to the west of Platan : the 

* As to the Aof rj $d\ay£, see Diod. xv. 54. — Spartan horseman : Hellen. vi 
4, 11. — Combination of light troops (a/uumroi kol ireATaarat) with cavalry: 
HeOen. vii. 5, 24 and 25. 

416 History of Greece. [Book vi. 

Thebans pitched theirs opposite, at the rim of the plain, 
near the little town of Leuctra, in the territory of Thespise, 
and distant an hour and a half's march from Platseaj. 
Between the two ridges of heights stretches from east to 
west a plain rather more than a mile (Eng.) in breadth, 
the soil of which in the winter is marshy, while in the 
summer it is rent by rifts in the ground. 

It was the first time that the Thebans met the Spartans 
in the open field. They had not yet overcome their 
ancient fear of the Lacedaemonian phalanx ; moreover, 
the enemy was superior in numbers, and the nature of the 
locality admitted of a free unfolding of them. No won- 
der, therefore, that before the battle Epaminondas should 
have had to undergo arduous struggles ; that, like Mil- 
tiades at Marathon, he should have in the first instance 
had to conquer the irresoluteness and timidity of his own 
colleagues. Fortunately, the fiery Pelopidas stood by his 
side. Both were agreed in the conviction, that the pre- 
sent was not the time for betraying fear or withdrawing 
behind entrenchments. Not a foot of Boeotian ground 
ought to be sacrificed, or the Boeotian towns would rise 
anew, and the Spartans be encouraged. Thus they suc- 
ceeded in gaining the majority of the votes of the seven 
generals. Next, it was necessary to inspire the troops 
with that moral spirit, upon which, for such a comman- 
der as Epaminondas, everything depended. The present 
w T as to be a holy struggle for the independence of their 
native land, and this struggle was to be a voluntary one ; 
he therefore publicly called upon all those who were re- 
luctant at heart, to leave the ranks. The high-mindedness 
implied in this summons did not fail of its object. Again, 
he contrived to invalidate the discouraging omens, which 
were busily bruited about by those who wished to avoid 
fighting on the present spot ; like Themistocles before the 
battle of Salamis, he made use of the oracles and priestly 
bodies, inducing them to assert their influence so as to 

chap, i.j y/^ Uprising of Thebes. 417 

elevate the minds of the soldiers. A divine saying 
averred that the Spartans would suffer a defeat at " the 
tomb of the virgins ; " and this saying was interpreted to 
refer to the resting-place of two daughters of the land who 
had been ill-used by the Spartans, and who lay buried in 
the vicinity. Here a sacrifice was offered, and ven- 
geance was vowed to the virgins' shades. Then the ti- 
dings arrived from Thebes, that the gates of the temples 
had suddenly opened, and that the armor of Heracles had 
vanished from the temple of the Hero of the land. He 
had, then, personally taken arms, to hasten to the rescue, 
and to bear his part in the fray, as the ^Eacidae had done 
at Salamis. 

Thus the main point was already gained. _. battle 
Full of courage, the troops ranged themselves of Leuctra. 
in order of battle according to the dispositions ( B .'c."7i). 
of their commander. On the left wing he uy6 * 
formed, unobserved by the enemy, the columns of attack, 
fifty men deep ; their extreme end being composed of the 
Sacred Band under the command of Pelopidas. It was to 
reserve itself for the final decision. 

In the hostile army there was far more disorder and 
tumult. Here were wanting a directing intelligence and a 
resolute will. This time again Cleombrotus was indisposed 
to give battle ; he was without confidence either in himself 
or in his cause. But those who surrounded him urged him 
on, and demanded that he should lead the army into battle. 
He must now, they said, refute the suspicion that he was 
not in earnest about fighting the Boeotians ; he would be 
accounted a traitor, if he allowed the enemy's army to 
escape from the spot. After breakfast the final council of 
war was held, which lasted till noon. Heated by wine, the 
Spartans led their troops in front of the camp at the de- 
clivity of the heights. They drew up their infantry in a 
long line, twelve men deep, with the wings advanced on 
cither side ; doubtless their plan was, to outflank the much 


418 History of Greece. [BookVI. 

shorter line of battle of the enemy, and to surround it. 
Thus they advanced into the plain ; and with so much 
violence and haste, that in their blind ardor they drove 
back part of the baggage attendants, who (as the Thes- 
piseans had already before done) were about to separate 
from the Theban army, so that these men had against their 
will to re-occupy their former position. Then the real 
battle began. Epaminondas sent forward his cavalry, 
which hurled back the enemy's horse upon the infantry. 
Hereby the Spartans were hindered from advancing in a 
level line ; and the opportunity had now arrived for Epa- 
minondas to execute his main attack. He ordered his left 
wing to advance at a quick step straight upon the right 
wing of the enemy, where Cleombrotus stood. The column 
wedged itself with the whole impetus of its weight into the 
enemy. At first the ranks of the Spartans maintained their 
cohesion ; and even now an intention remained of outflank- 
ing the Thebans. But no sooner had Pelopidas observed 
this movement, than he suddenly broke forth with his 
picked body of men from the rear guard, and by a vehe- 
ment onset forced Cleombrotus to abandon his design. The 
king hereupon wished to call back those of his troops which 
were in advance of the rest. But at the same time Epa- 
minondas, who now saw himself covered on the left, with 
increased confidence charged the core of the enemy's forces. 
The front ranks fought man against man ; the rear ranks 
following closely, pushing forward step by step, and rapidly 
filling up every gap that had arisen in front of them. The 
battle was at a dead-lock ; it seemed as if a stone wall 
opposed itself to the Thebans. " Give me one step more," 
exclaimed Epaminondas to his men, " and the victory is 
ours." And once more the charging column advanced, 
the Spartan line wavered, gave way, and broke. As into a 
breach poured in the Thebans, themselves in indissoluble 
cohesion. On the right of them and on the left of them fell 
the Spartans, after their ranks had been broken. The king 

chap. L] The Uprising of Thebes. 419 

was wounded to death ; and the bloodiest of hand-to-hand 
fights arose around his body. Sphodrias and a number of 
the best commanders lay on the ground ; all order and 
discipline were at an end. In full flight the broken masses 
effected their escape up to the height where the camp had 
been pitched. After the right wing had abandoned the 
field, the left was likewise involved in the retreat, so that 
the army could not be drawn up again in line of battle till 
it had found shelter behind the fosse of the camp. Even 
now the Peloponnesians were superior in numbers ; their 
left wing was virtually intact. They might have recovered 
themselves and renewed the battle, in order at least to hold 
the field and to bury their dead. But the confederates 
were not inclined to redeem the defeat of the Spartans at 
the risk of their own lives ; Epaminondas had by his entire 
method of attack shown clearly enough that it was not 
against them that he was fighting : and again, it was not 
till now that the Spartans realized their enormous losses. 
Of 700 citizens 400 had fallen, besides at least 1,000 Lace- 
daemonians ; and their cavalry was broken and dispersed. 
Under these circumstances even the most defiant lost cour- 
age. The defeat had to be openly confessed, and a herald 
to be sent into the enemy's camp, to ask for a truce for the 
burying of the dead. Epaminondas granted it, provided 
that first the confederates, and then the Spartans, should 
take up their dead bodies. The former sought, but found 
at most a few stray corpses ; all the dead were citizens and 
subjects of Sparta. This proved palpably against whom 
the battle had been directed, and how the Nemesis had 
overtaken those whose guilt had provoked the entire w r ar. 
Epaminondas likewise retained the shields of hostile com- 
manders, in order to hang them up at Thebes in remem- 
brance of the victory, while a trophy was erected on the 
spot itself in honor of the gods of the land, who had 
averted so heavy a calamity from Bceotia.* 

* Leuctra: Hellen. vi. 4, 2; Diod. xv. 51 ; Plut. Pelop. 20.— Date: Plut. Age*. 

420 History of Greece. [BookVl 

„ .. - Such was the battle of Leuctra, which was 

Results of ^ ^ ' 

the battle. fought in the beginning of July, not quite 
three weeks after the congress at Sparta. So rapidly fol- 
lowed the answer of Epaminondas to the defiant decision 
of Agesilaus, and the proof by facts, that his native city 
was not less justified in regarding the Boeotian land as 
her territory, than was Sparta in thus regarding the 
Lacedaemonian. It was the most important of all the 
battles ever fought between Greeks. On this day Thebes 
became an independent power in Greece, and a return of 
Spartan despotism was henceforth impossible for all 
times. For this reason the day of Leuctra could not but 
be a day of joy, not to Thebes only, but to the whole of 
Greece. For had Cleombrotus been victorious, the peace 
recently confirmed by oath would doubtless have been 
broken, Boeotia would have again been filled with Lace- 
daemonian garrisons, and thus Athens too would have 
been menaced at the first opportunity. So long as Sparta 
had the power of committing acts of injustice, no other 
policy could ever be expected from her ; there was 
accordingly no other method of obtaining a real peace 
and a lasting security for the Hellenes, than that of once 
for all making Sparta incapable of seizing positions by 
main force beyond her own boundaries. The Thebans 
therefore thought themselves justified in regarding their 
struggle not as the rupture of the national peace, which 

28, Cam. 19; Marm. Par. Helcatomb. 5, according to Ideler: July 8th; after the 
octaeteris, July 7th. Cf. Ascherson, Archozol. Ztg., 1850, p. 264.— Orderly 
retreat into the camp according to Xenophon, iravTekri<; rpoirr\ according to 
Diodorus. Leuctra lay at the southern height over the precipitous declivity 
of Parapungia: Ulriehs, Beisen und Unlers. ii. 102 f.; Vischer, Erinnerungen, 
551. — AevKTpiSe?, the daughters of Scedasus : Plut. Pelop. 19 ; de Malign. 
Herod. 11 ; Ulriehs, u. «. 107.— Tpo<f><*via, Diod. xv. 53.— The Tropseum of the 
Thebans Ulriehs thought to have discovered in 1839. Vischer, Erinnerungen, 
652, assented. Keil, Sylloge Inscr. Boeot. 90, thinks the ruin more probably a 
sepulchral monument. — With reference to the statement, p. 416, that the 
Thebans here for the first time met the Spartans in the open field, it 
should be remarked that at Coronea they were chiefly opposed by confed- 
erates and mercenaries. 

Chap - *•] The Uprising of Thebes. 421 

it seemed to Agesilaus, but as its confirmation ; and in 
this sense they also immediately sent a herald to Athens, 
in order to announce there what had taken place, and to 
establish anew the friendly and neighborly relation, which 
had so happily proved itself on the occasion of the down- 
fall of the Thirty, as well as on that of the recapture of 
the Cadmea. But the message failed to meet with the 
joyous response which had been expected. The annoy- 
ance at the brilliant advance made by Thebes out- 
weighed the feeling of satisfaction at the humiliation of 
Sparta. The Athenians were vexed to think that the 
Thebans had succeeded in what Athens had never even 
attempted, viz. in hurling back a Spartan army from the 
frontier of the land by a battle fought in the open field. 
They were vexed to have contributed to all this advance 
on the part of Thebes and to the confirmation of her 
power, and were little inclined to recognize this state, 
which they were still wont to regard with a certain con- 
tempt, as their natural equal. The policy of Callistratus 
prevailed at Athens, and the citizens were not ashamed to 
allow their dissatisfaction to be perceived. Instead of 
joyous sympathy and congratulations the messenger of the 
victory found an offensive coldness awaiting him : and 
even the most ordinary forms and considerations were 
omitted. The herald of the Theban state was not even 
invited to share the hospitality of the council, and re- 
ceived no answer whatever to his proposals. 

On the field of Leuctra the battle had been followed by 
a calm which endured for weeks ; it seemed as if the 
Thebans, taken by surprise by their own good fortune, 
needed time, in order to come to a clear determination as 
to the ulterior measures to be pursued by them. This 
pause was not however due to any want of resolution ; 
rather, it was the tranquil and clear spirit of Epaminon- 
das, which was causing his fellow-countrymen to refrain 
from all premature steps. Far removed from any over* 

422 History of Greece. [BookVL 

estimation of himself, and fully content with what he had 
already achieved, he had no intention of pursuing his 
victory by further expenditure of blood. After the The- 
bans had secured the glory of having alone and unassisted, 
like the Athenians of old at Marathon, been found equal 
to the struggle against the foe of Hellenic freedom, this 
deed was to be acknowledged as a national deed, redound- 
ing to the advantage of all Hellenes ; and the results of 
the victory were to be assured by means of a combination 
of states sharing the same sentiments. For if at the pre- 
sent conjuncture the states of the northern mainland 
joiued hands, in order to withstand every renewal of 
Spartan despotism, it was to be expected that Sparta 
would be forced to give way, and that unnecessary blood- 
shed would be avoided. 

iason of Hence the embassies, which went from the 

LeucS-if field of Dattle to Athens and to Thessaly, 
where Iason of Pherse had at that time first 
united the entire country under his rule. Iason had long 
attentively followed the course of events ; and to him 
every opportunity was welcome, which offered itself for 
an intervention on his part in Greek affairs. He there- 
fore hailed with lively pleasure the message which Athens 
had received so coldly ; declared himself ready at once to 
enter into the proposed alliance ; and appeared in the 
briefest time possible with an army on the battle-field, 
with the intent of there asserting his voice as mediator, 
before the Spartans had yet taken their departure. 

The Spartans were blockaded in their camp ; part of 
their confederates, to whom Epaminondas conceded a free 
departure, had deserted them. In their anxious position 

Conduct of ^ ne y were very glad to accept the mediation 

tne batt£ er °^ I ason > anc * Epaminondas was at one with 

the latter, as to its being undesirable to attack 

the fortified camp, and to drive the enemy to the extreme 

efforts of despair. Magnanimously to permit the con- 

chap, l] The Uprising of Thebes. 423 

quered foe to withdraw, seemed more humiliating for the 
authority of Sparta, and more honorable for Thebes, 
than a renewal of the contest. The troops were too much 
discouraged, to be willing in their present position to await 
reinforcements from home ; and the commanders had no 
scruple as to accepting the proffered salvation, however 
deeply they thereby offended against their native laws of 
war. Deeply aware of their dishonor, and not without 
suspicions as to the promises made to them, they took 
their departure from the camp by night-time, and, instead 
of following the straight road across Mount Cithseron, 
retreated by the same side-route, by which Cleombrotus 
had entered the country, to Megara. Here they came 
upon the troops which had left home under Archidamus, 
the son of Agesilaus, in order to relieve the Spartan 

Sparta had, on the arrival of the terrible news, shown 
that she had not yet completely forfeited her ancient 
greatness. It was the last day of the Gymnopsedia (vol. 
i. p. 237), the day on which the city was filled with festive 
choral dances, and on which the flower of its male youth 
presented themselves to the gods. At such a moment 
arrived the messenger from Leuctra. The Ephors would 
not permit the festival to be interrupted. The women 
received strict commands to refrain from public lamenta^ 
tions. On the next morning those whose relatives had 
fallen on the field of battle were seen to appear with joy- 
ous countenances, while the others were sad and ashamed, 
because they had to confess to themselves, that their kins- 
men had only avoided death by flight. Hereupon the 

* The herald at Athens : Hellen. vi. 4, 19. Retreat of the Lacedaemonians 
to jEgosthena, ib. 26. There is a conflict of statements between Diodorus, 
xv. 54, and Xenophon. The former makes Cleombrotus unite with 
Archidamus before the battle, and begin the fighting by a breach of the 
truce (as Wesseling conjectures, following Callisthenes). Cf. Niebuhr, 
lectures on Anc. Hist. vol. ii. p. 235 [E. Tr.], and Grote, Hist, of Greece, vol. 
x. p. 261. 

424 Historij of Greece. [BookVl 

authorities issued orders for a geueral levy ; all the men 
of an age fit for bearing arms marched out of the city 
under the son of king Agesilaus. The king himself lay 
on a sick-bed, and thus had to witness all the disastrous 
consequences of his policy, without being able himself to 
lend a helping hand. The army of Archidamus was not 
intended for any serious undertaking ; and it dispersed, as 
soon as the remainder of the troops returning home from 
Bceotia were in safety. 

Herein, again, the Spartans under this heavy blow dis- 
played a becoming attitude, that they refused to give way 
to the ill-will prevailing against Agesilaus ; and in spite 
of the superstitious fancy asserting itself among the peo- 
ple, to the effect that all the disasters of the state were due 
to the interruption of the legitimate succession to the 
throne, and to the " lame king " (p. 213), against whom 
the oracle had uttered a not meaningless warning, con- 
tinued to repose confidence in Agesilaus, and confided to 
his hands the decision of a very painful question, which 
now had necessarily to be discussed. For according to 
Spartan law the returning citizens were subject to a heavy 
penalty. In order to save their lives, they had abandoned 
the field of battle ; they had, therefore, according to the 
strict letter of the law, placed themselves among the 
Tpiaa^Teq, the deserters, who had forfeited their civic 
rights, and who for the rest of their lives had to bear 
upon them the marks of polluted honor. The rigorous 
execution of this fundamental law was however at the 
present moment virtually impossible ; it would have 
amounted to a kind of suicide, committed by the state 
upon itself; moreover, such a proceeding would have 
been accompanied by the most dangerous movements. 
The king, well conscious of his own guilt, could not but 
be peculiarly unwilling to vote for unconditional severity; 
but, in order not to set a dangerous example by the aboli- 
tion of ancient laws of the state, he declared that the laws 

Chap - l 1 The Uprising of Thebes. 425 

should on this occasion be allowed to slumber. Herewith 
this question was settled.* 

But the worst difficulties were not those of the present 
moment, but those which only gradually made themselves 
manifest, the more that the situation of affairs was 
realized. For there was in truth no state to which lost 
battles were so dangerous as they were to Sparta. Her 
diminished number of citizens could not support such 
losses ; in all probability the total of those who after 
the battle constituted the kernel of the old civic body 
amounted to not more than 2,000. The power of Sparta 
had long been far more considerable in appearance than 
in reality, and the claims put forward by her were quite 
out of proportion to her actual resources ; her chief power 
consisted in the traditional authority enjoyed by the state, 
and in its reputation for military efficiency. If these 
foundations were shaken, what remained, now that the 
ancient devotion of the Hellenes had been converted into 
a just feeling of wrath ? To this difficulty were added 
the discord prevailing within the state, and the loathing 
with which the subject classes of the population bore the 
sway of the wealthy and privileged full-citizens. Under 
these circumstances, Sparta could only be preserved by 
means of a thorough-going political reform. It was time 
to enlarge the narrow sphere of the oligarchy, and to 
form a new civic body ; to admit into the state with equal 
rights the impoverished families of citizens and the free 
subjects, and to give voluntarily what had already been 
sought by means of a revolt (p. 216). Had this been 
done, Sparta might have recovered herself for a new ad- 
vance. But to such ideas the narrow-minded and short- 
sighted aristocracy of Sparta could not rise. Sparta did 
nothing, beyond allowing the " laws to slumber," in order 

* As to the remorse of the Lacedaemonians, on rbv aprCwoSm. e*/3aAdvT€s 
cIAovto x«Arfv, and the proceeding with reference to the Tpeaavres, see 
Plut, Aget. 30. 

426 History of Greece. [Book vl 

to preserve to herself the remnant of citizens capable of 
bearing arms ; and by her conduct she openly avowed her 
inability to avenge the defeat of Leuctra, and her equal 
inability to prevent the further calamities which were ap- 
proaching. While Sparta in irresolute inaction lost the 
most precious time, an unwearying activity prevailed in 
the camp of her adversaries, and pursued its ends with 
the clearest consciousness.* 

Proceedings After the departure of the vanquished 
after thebatfie 9 arm y> Thespise and Orchomenus were over- 
come without offering any resistance. Epa- 
minondas prevented any outbreak of ill-will against those 
Boeotians who had up to the last moment adhered to the 
enemy of the land ; in his view, everything depended 
upon preserving the glory of the victory free from stain. 
His second care was to secure its gains, and to obtain for 
his native city the position to which she had established a 
claim by her struggle and by her victory. This was ac- 
complished in the same way in which Sparta and Athens 
had acquired their supreme positions, i. e. by treaties of 
confederation with the neighboring states with regard to a 
common military system. 

The envoys of Thebes went to Phocis, Locris, iEtolia, and 
Acarnania. Everywhere they found the Laconian party 
discouraged, and the opposite party powerful ; for this 
reason they found willing listeners, when they pointed to 
the common task of preventing by means of firm cohesion 
any intervention of the Peloponnesians in the affairs of 
Central Greece; and nowhere were the victors of Leuctra 
denied the right of being the directors and leaders of the 
new league-in-arms. It was likewise joined by Euboea, 
which regarded itself as a portion of the mainland of 
Central Greece, by the (Etaean tribes, the Malians, and 
even by the citizens of Heraclea, Sparta's daughter-city 

* Number of citizens at Sparta: Clinton-Kriiger, p. 415. "Corruerunt 
opes Laced." : Cic. de Off. i. 84 ; Isocr. v. 47. 

chap. I.] The Uprising f Thebes. 427 

(vol. iii. p. 143) — so universal was the hatred of Sparta, 
so opportune and necessary seemed a vigorous union 
among the states of the mainland, for the purpose of once 
for all rendering impossible a return of Peloponnesian 
acts of oppression. The moderation and dignity observed 
by the Thebans, who under the direction of Epaminondas 
seemed as it were transmuted, secured them respect and 
confidence; and thus was formed in the shortest time, 
without resort to force or party-struggles, a new Am- 
phictyony, a firmly cohering group of states naturally be- 
longing together, with Delphi as their centre. 

It cannot be doubted, that with Delphi, too, Thebe3 
relations of greater intimacy were established, and Delphi. 
such as were in accordance with tradition. It could not 
but agree with the interests of the state now newly hold- 
ing the primacy, to revive the repute of the ancient centre 
of the Greek world, and to take advantage for its own 
purposes of the power of Delphi. Accordingly, Thebes 
out of the spoils of her victory founded a treasury of her 
own at Delphi, and proved her newly-gained influence 
among the Amphictyonic states, by renewing the functions 
of the Federal Council as the supreme court of appeal in 
affairs common to all Hellas, and by indicting Sparta be- 
fore this tribunal as a violator of the national peace. And 
the crime of Phoebidas was all the more amenable to the 
tribunal of Sacred Law, inasmuch as it had been com- 
mitted during a festive season. Sparta was sentenced by 
the Amphictyons to a fine of 500 talents ; which fine was 
after a short lapse of time doubled. Of course Epaminon- 
das might foresee, that even the repetition of the sentence 
would not avail against its remaining disregarded, because 
Sparta would never recognize the obsolete rights of the 
Federal Diet. But he attached importance to the con- 
nexion with Delphi, because it gave prominence to the 
national significance of the struggle into which Thebes 
had entered, and involved a public recognition of the fact, 

428 History of Greece. [ Bo °* vt 

that Sparta's crime remained unexpiated. The authority 
of the Delphic Institution had been obscured, but not 
abolished. A moral effect was therefore produced by the 
exclusion of Sparta from the Pythian games, while Thebes 
strengthened her newly-acquired authority by connecting 
herself with a sacred institution of the highest antiquity, 
and by having on her side the majority of the Arnphic- 
tyonic votes, and being able to execute her further under- 
takings against Sparta, so to speak, under the sanction of 

Yet even now Epaminondas would not allow himself to 
be carried away to hasty proceedings ; on the contrary, he 
once more gave proof of his conciliatory sentiments and 
of his aversion to domestic war. Proposals for a settle- 
ment were made to the Spartans ; the Achaean towns, 
which had abstained from coming into contact with the 
political troubles of the times, and which on account of 
their neutral position seemed naturally fitted to give judg- 
ment as arbiters, were to decide the question in dispute. 
But this attempt at a settlement likewise came to naught ; 
the reason doubtless being a refusal on the part of Sparta, 
who showed vigor and resolution in nothing except in the 
obstinacy of her pride.* 

After Epaminondas had exhausted all peaceable means 
towards the establishment of a new legal order of things 
in Hellas, he passed from the defence of Boeotia to an 
attack upon Sparta in the position which she held in Pelo- 

* With regard to the citizens of Heraclea, it should be noted that this 
city, captured by Sparta in the year 399 (p. 358), was again lost in the 
Corinthian War (p. 359; Diod. xiv. 82). The Heracleotes of the present 
period were therefore Trachinians. — Thebes and Delphi: Diod. xvi. 23 f. ; 
Justin, viii. 1 ; Grote, Hist, of Gr. vol. x. p. 276 ; commencement of a new 
importance of Delphi — an importance fatal to Greece. Dedicatory gifts at 
Delphi: Paus. x. 11,4. Achaia: Pol. ii. 39; Str. 384. Grote has doubts on 
the subject. 



The Spartans had no suspicion of the plans Thebes and 
with which their great adversary was occu- 
pied. For while they thought him solely intent upon his 
own native city, he had the whole of Greece in view. In 
his eyes the war was a struggle for liberty which he had 
undertaken not in the separate interests of Bceotia, but as 
a Hellene, — a national rising against the oppression exer- 
cised by Sparta. After, therefore, the crime perpetrated 
against Thebes had been expiated and her independence 
secured, reparation was likewise to be made for the wrongs 
wreaked by Sparta upon other Hellenes and in earlier 
times, — just as in the great War of Liberation first the 
territories at home had been defended, and then the coasts 
opposite freed. Was not the fairest of all the countries 
of Peloponnesus, Messenia, the earliest victim of Spartan 
greed of dominion, still lying desolate, despoiled of its 
cities, in spite of its excellent harbors devoid of commerce 
and traffic, with its soil tilled by slaves, while the rightful 
owners of the soil dwelt in foreign lands, or fled homeless 
from one exile into the other! 

As Epaminondas possessed an accurate acquaintance 
with Magna Grsecia, for which he was indebted to his 
Pythagorean friends, he had heard of the many Greeks 
of Messenian descent, who dwelt on the further side of the 
sea. The best of this tribe had of old migrated across in 
three expeditions ; and from the descendants of the heroes 


430 History of Greece. [BookVL 

of Eira and Ithome had sprung on the shores of the Sici- 
lian Sea a flourishing race, which constituted the core of 
the civic communities of Rhegium and Messana (vol. i. 
p. 242). For this reason, too, after the fall of Athens the 
Naupactians had from the Corinthian Gulf likewise crossed 
to Rhegium; and the majority of them had gone still fur- 
ther, to the Great Syrtis, where on the western rim of the 
territory of Cyrene lay the city of Hesperides (vol. i. p. 
488), the daughter-city of the Cyrenaeans, which at that 
period was hard-pressed by the neighboring tribes of the 
desert, and demanded a fresh accession of Hellenic men. 
The Naupactians obeyed the summons ; and the same man 
who had commanded them during the fighting at Sphac- 
teria (vol. iii. p. 164), Comon, conducted them across to 
the Libyan coast. 

Notwithstanding their wide dispersion by land and sea, 
the Messenians had preserved their love for their home, 
their hatred against Sparta, their ancient rites of worship, 
and their native dialect ; it was therefore at once a grandly 
conceived and a politic idea on the part of Epaminondas, 
not only to turn the resources of the Messenian people to 
account against Sparta at isolated points, or to excite 
risings in desolate Messenia itself, as the Athenians had 
formerly done (vol. ii. p. 442: vol. iii. p. 153), but also to 
re-unite the scattered bands, in order thus to restore to the 
mother-country an abundance of generous popular blood, 
which it had forfeited through the fault of the Spartans, 
and to establish by Mount Taygetus a state, the restora- 
tion of which must necessarily drive back Sparta into the 
position held by her before the commencement of her 
policy of conquest. For this purpose envoys went forth 
from Thebes, to summon the Messenians in Italy, in Sicily, 
and in Africa, to return home. 

Such was the course of action adopted by the victor 
of Leuctra. How utterly therefore were those deceived, 
who regarded his self-restraint after the battle as weak- 

chap, ii.] The Offensive Wars of Thebes. 431 

ness! He it was, who commanded his times, as the one 
man who pursued great aims and directed the destinies of 
the Hellenes. By his calm vigor he had made his deeply 
humbled native city the state holding the primacy in 
Central Greece; and, responding to his summons, the Mes- 
senians gathered from the remotest corners of the Hellenic 
world, to demand their country back from Sparta, and 
thereby to transform the entire Peloponnesus.* 

But before this transformation had yet been ^ . . 

J Troubles 

accomplished, other movements, which had not in P el °po n - 

1 ' 7 nesus. 

originated at Thebes, broke out in the penin- 
sula. For however much its inhabitants had become ac- 
customed to the old order of things, so that they could 
hardly conceive of the Peloponnesus without Spartan 
headship, yet even here the principle, again and again 
solemnly re-proclaimed, of the independence of all Greek 
communities, had met with a response ; nor could the Pe- 
loponnesians fail to be filled with vexation, when they 
had to hear it constantly repeated to them, that for them 
this principle had no significance, and that with them 
everything must remain as it was. After, therefore, 
already the Peace of Antalcidas had produced manifold 
agitation (p. 318), the bold rising of Thebes aroused the 
utmost sympathy. What indeed could have more deeply 
impressed the vassal-states of Sparta, than to see the re- 
volt of Thebes remain unpunished for years, and the 
chastisement of that city ultimately abandoned? This 
amounted to a defeat of Sparta, which by a long time pre- 
ceded the loss of the battle. Accordingly, at this period 
again attempts occurred at open rebellion against Sparta 
and the Spartan party, whence arose sanguinary conflicts 
which shook the system of the Peloponnesian states, 
before influences from abroad had yet asserted themselves. 

* The special interest taken by the Thebans in Messenia already mani- 
fests itself in the circumstance, that before the battle of Leuctra the shield 
of Aristomenes was brought out, and a trophy decorated with it under the 
eyes of the enemies ; Paus. iv. 32, i. — Comon : Paus. iv. 26. 

432 History of Greece. [Bookvx 

One instance was that of Phigalea, the 
ancient mountain-city on the southern border 
of Arcadia. It had of old been implicated in the Mes- 
senian wars ; had after the fall of Eira been conquered by- 
Sparta like a hostile city (vol. i. p. 244); nor was it until 
after an arduous struggle that its citizens had recovered 
possession of it. An ancient feeling of bitterness, and a 
strong Anti-Spartan party, had therefore maintained 
themselves here. This party now took arms, and ex- 
pelled the ruling families, which adhered to Sparta. The 
exiles established themselves at Hcrsea ; and starting 
thence suddenly fell upon their native city, when it was 
celebrating a festival of Dionysus. They instituted a ter- 
rible massacre among their fellow-citizens, from pure lust 
of vengeance. For they had become aware that they 
were incapable of maintaining themselves in power ; and 
accordingly, after satisfying their vengeance, retreated to 

Corinth Similar scenes were enacted at various 

and Phiius. places, but mostly with the opposite results. 
For in the majority of towns the party of movement was 
weaker ; its adherents having been driven out in recent 
years, and the power of their opponents having been con- 
firmed. For this reason in Corinth, and also in Phlius, 
the endeavors of the democrats to recover possession of 
their native cities were frustrated, — in both places after 
much bloodshed. 

scytaiism ^ ne head-quarters of the Peloponnesian 
of cifs'fB c democracy were at Argos. This city was 
37o) circ. their place of retreat, and the starting-point 
of their undertakings. But Argos itself was the scene 
of the most vehement civic quarrels ; for although here no 
party supporting itself by Spartan influence had yet 
come into power, incessant irritation prevailed between 
the popular leaders and the members of the government^ 
who were principally chosen from the higher classes. 

chap, ii.j ^Ae Offensive Wars of Thebes. 433 

Ultimately, the men in power, sick of the intolerable an- 
noyances inflicted upon them, formed a scheme for 
ridding themselves of their adversaries. The scheme was 
discovered ; and thirty of the most considerable citizens 
had to pay the penalty of their lives. But this was only 
the beginning. For the affair had produced the most ter- 
rible excitement throughout the civic body, and of this 
the popular orators availed themselves, in order to de- 
mand that the city should be thoroughly purged of all 
anti-popular elements. The multitude, set free from all 
restraint, armed itself with cudgels, and fell upon all 
those who seemed from any cause to deserve to be sus- 
pected. Twelve hundred citizens became the victims of 
brutal violence; and when the popular leaders, them- 
selves terrified at the excess of the horrors due to their own 
instigation, wished to stay them, they were themselves 
seized and put to death, so that tranquillity was not re- 
stored until the multitude had fully exhausted itself with 
bloodshed. This was the rebellion at Argos known under 
the name of the Scytalism (cudgelling) : an event hitherto 
unparalleled in Greek history, — so unprecedented, that 
even abroad it was looked upon as an awful sign of the 
times, and that the Athenians instituted a purification of 
their city, being of opinion, that the whole Hellenic people 
was polluted by these horrors. 

This event was about contemporaneous with N . 
the battle of Leuctra ; the sanguinary con- phenomena, 
flicts in the other cities are stated to have occurred in the 
years preceding it, and are possibly connected with the 
negotiations of the year 374 (p. 394 ); just as already the 
first conclusion of a peace on the basis of general auto- 
nomy was seen to have produced similar party-movements 
(p. 318). Everywhere the ancient systems of communal 
life and of state-confederations were shaken at the base. 
In the physical world, too, phenomena occurred at this 
period, which, like those preceding the Persian wars, 

434 History of Greece. [BookVL 

were regarded as threatening signs. Thus the Hellenic 
world was, in the year of the archonship of Asteus (b. c. 
374-3), terrified by a comet of unheard-of size and bright- 
ness, the so-called fire-beam ; and in the same year took 
place the most fatal earthquakes, which have at any time 
visited Peloponnesus, the ancient " dwelling-house of the 
earth-shaker Posidon." The Achaean town of Bura van- 
ished through a rift of the earth ; and Helice was, with 
the soil on which it stood, swallowed up in the sea, in the 
depths of which it was thought that the remains of the 
ancient Ionic city were still discoverable.* 

When, hereupon, the tidings of the battle of Leuctra 
spread through the cities of the peninsula, the party which 
had for years been working for the transformation of the 
state of things in Peloponnesus, naturally gained new con- 
fidence. The fear which had crippled its action was at an 
end. Exhausted Sparta, unable to spare a single man, 
withdrew her governors from the places, where hitherto a 
special superintendence had been held necessary. To 
outward appearance this was done, in order to fulfil the 
obligations of the last treaty ; but no one supposed that 
Sparta would have taken this step, had Cleombrotus been 
victorious at Leuctra. 

It now seemed to be an easy task to make the promised 
liberty of the several communities a reality in Peloponesus 
also ; the ban had been broken, and the movement was 
set free. It was, however, uncommonly difficult to pass 
out of the familiar tracks of the ancient state of things 

* Phigalea, Corinth, Phlius : Diod. xv. 40. As to Heraea, E. Curtius, 
Peloponnesos, i. 346 ; Th. Wise, Excursion in the Pelop. i. 73. Diodorus dates 
these movements after b. c. 374. Grote's reasons to the contrary are not 
convincing. — Scytalism (according to Diod. xv. fi2), 01. cii. 3; b. c. 370. The 
Argives were probably accustomed to assemble with cudgels in their 
hands; the Spartans had at an early period laid aside this custom. Plut. 
Lye. 11. — "Fire-beam": nvpivri Sokos, Diod. xv. 50; Warm. Par. $83; Corp. Insor. 
Gr. ii. p. 322. That this means the tail of a comet is attested by Aristotle, 
op. Senec. Qtmst. Nat. vii. 5. As to Bura and Helice: Curtius, Peloponnesos, i. 
469. — The Peloponnesus oiKwnpiov tou noereiSwi/o?, Diod. xv. 49. 

Chap, ii.] The Offensive Wars of Thebes. 435 

into new paths of progress. Such was the force of habit, 
that even after the battle the levy announced by Sparta 
met almost everywhere with an obedient response, al- 
though the whole war against Thebes had from the first 
been unpopular. The entire peninsula was in a condition 
of ferment ; but what was absolutely wanting to the move- 
ment was a centre as well as a common goal. Sparta had 
isolated all the states, and none ventured to take the first 

This position of affairs was not unobserved The Pelo _ 
by the Athenians. Already during the nego- P oIicv S of n 
tiations at the last congress Athens had beyond Athens. 
a doubt had in view the termination of the B - c - 37 °- 
dependent relation of the Peloponnesian states towards 
Sparta, but she had not gained her end, and had after all 
completely recognized Sparta's primacy. It was now in- 
tended to redeem this failure. At the present moment 
the primacy in Peloponnesus seemed virtually vacant ; 
what therefore was alone requisite, was not to allow a 
third state to fill up the gap. Accordingly, soon after the 
day of Leuctra a summons was despatched to the Pelo- 
ponnesian states to send deputies to Athens, where the 
conditions of the last treaty of peace should be anew con- 
firmed by oath. Hereby Athens took into her hands the 
right of watching over the peace ; and this right received 
a yet higher significance, by the provision being this time 
established, that all the concluding parties should be 
bound to repel by joint exertions any attack upon the in- 
dependence of individual states which had adhered to the 
peace. It amounted to starting in a thoroughly new and 
bold line of policy, when Athens took steps to gather 
around her the communities of the peninsula, which 
lacked any other leader. And if, as towards Sparta, it 
certainly seemed an insidious offence against the loyal 
sentiments which ought to obtain between confederates, 
that the Athenians should immediately turn to account in 

436 History of Greece. [BookVL 

their own interest the defeat of the Spartans, that the 
power of the latter should be as it were declared to be 
extinguished, and that the Athenians should show them- 
selves ready to enter upon the vacant inheritance, — there 
was only this excuse to be made for such a proceeding : 
that it was intended thereby to oppose any intervention 
on the part of Thebes. It soon, however, became mani- 
fest, that the Athenians were incapable of taking the 
direction of Peloponnesian affairs into their hands. 

Popular Here the movements soon assumed a very 

Arcadia^ ln ser i° us an d decided character, in particular in 
Arcadia. For this country had, of all the 
divisions of the peninsula, been most hindered in its de- 
velopment by the overbearing power of Sparta. Arcadia 
consisted of a group of town and rural communities, 
which were from ancient times united by common rites of 
worship, such as those of Zeus Lycseus and of Artemis 
Hymnia. The summit of Mount Lycseum was the sacred 
mountain, the Olympus of all the Arcadians. A hardy 
population of mountaineers inhabited the Arcadian can- 
tons, and the numerous mercenaries, who issued forth from 
these regions, to gain glory and wealth in Sicily, in Asia, 
and in Egypt, are a proof of the superabundance of vigor 
and enterprise existing in this people. It had, therefore, 
always been one of the chief objects of Spartan policy to 
employ the resources of this population, and to make them 
serviceable for Spartan purposes. Since, then, the sub- 
jection of Arcadia had been frustrated by the resistance 
of the Tegeatse and their allies (vol. i. p. 246), Sparta was 
incessantly intent upon hindering the formation of any 
independent power in Arcadia. She exercised the most 
absolute control over the peasant-communities, which 
dwelt in the valleys of the Alpheus and of its tributary 
streams, and which in consequence of the looseness of 
their tribal union had no thought of pursuing a policy of 
their own. Of the towns of Arcadia, Tegea was bound 

chap, ii.j ^} ie Offensive Wars of Thebes. 437 

to Sparta by ancient treaties, and on account of its im- 
portance was always treated with special prudence and 
caution. Over Mantinea, on the other hand, the dis- 
ciplinary power of Sparta had held judgment with the 
utmost severity; dispersed into rural communities, the 
citizens, as men assured one another at Sparta, lived in 
perfect content (p. 322). No sooner, however, had the 
Mantineans acquired liberty of action, than they re- 
nounced this condition, recalled the expelled R . .... 
popular leaders, and, after they had lived dis- of Mantinea - 
persed during fourteen years, rebuilt their city. c giL*? 1 ' 3 (B 
Made wise by the damage inflicted upon them 
in the siege by Agesipolis (p. 321), they now dammed off 
the Ophis-stream, and furnished the wall round the city 
with a stone socle, securing it against damage from water. 
The restoration of the city of Mantinea was an open act 
of revolt against Sparta, and the first armed rising of a 
decided kind against her on the part of any of her con- 
federates. It was therefore regarded as a matter common 
to all Peloponnesus. The neighboring towns helped in 
the building of the city, and the Eleans sent money con- 
tributions in order to hasten the construction, before it was 
hindered by the Spartans. But the latter were so utterly 
discouraged, that they never thought of seriously en- 
deavoring to prevent it. They were merely anxious to 
avert the open insult to their honor and authority. Ac- 
cordingly, Agesilaus, who had friendly connexions at Man- 
tinea, had to seek by means of personal efforts to effect at 
least a postponement of the building of the walls. Let 
the Mantineans, merely for form's sake, ask for the consent 
of Sparta ; he pledged himself that this consent should be 
given ; indeed the Spartans would themselves assist in the 
work. His mission was in itself of a very disagreeable 
character; but still more humiliating was the fact, that 
the authorities of New-Mantinea seized the occasion thor- 
oughly to impress upon the king of Sparta the change 

438 History of Greece. t B& - K VL 

which has taken place in the state of affairs. He was 
coldly refused, because, so the answer ran, no alteration 
could be made in the decree of the civic body ; — and even 
to this humiliation Sparta was obliged quietly to submit. 
She was therefore in Peloponnesus, as she had been in 
Central Greece, first punished at the point where she had 
most grievously offended ; and devastated Mantinea be- 
came the starting-point of the general rising of the Arca- 
dian people. 

Arcadia was, as a mountain country, created by nature 
for freedom ; it supported a numerous population, which 
was healthy and moderate in its wants, fond of armed 
exercises, and enterprising, — a people of peasants, hunts- 
men, and shepherds, which deemed itself the real primi- 
tive race of the peninsula. At the time of the Persian 
Wars the entire military strength of Arcadia amounted to 
about 25,000 men, of whom one-third belonged to the 
three larger towns, Tegea, Mantinea, and Orchomenus, the 
rest to the smaller towns and district-unions. For Arca- 
dia was, it will be remembered, a model chart of republics. 
In its different cantons the constitutional forms of the most 
various epochs existed side by side, from the most modern 
city-settlements, such as the democratic New-Mantinea, to 
the simplest and most primitive of all constitutions, such 
as obtained in the peasant-cantons of the valley of the 
Alpheus, among the Parrhasians, Cynurians, &c, who, 
settled in scattered hamlets, had nothing in common ex- 
cept the sacred places of their race. Sparta had in every 
possible way favored this minute subdivision, because in 
it lay the weakness of the country. In this condition 
Arcadia was incapable of withstanding the Spartan influ- 
ence ; it was the open route for the march of the Lacedae- 
monian armies ; its inhabitants furnished material, always 
ready for service, for the plans of war devised at Sparta ; 
and the votes of the numerous small communities assured 
her a majority in all the deliberations of the confederates. 

Chap, ii.] y^ Offensive Wars of Thebes. 439 

This unworthy servitude had long provoked The 
a deep discontent, which came to an outbreak national 

r 7 party in 

when the power of Sparta decayed. After the Arcadia. 
battle of Leuctra the party which desired to 
emancipate Arcadia openly asserted itself. A national 
consciousness was awakened. Men felt how shameful it 
was, that the most ancient people, and at the same time 
the strongest and the most numerous, of the peninsula, 
should have remained so bound down and weak, as to be 
constantly misemployed for the purposes of another state ; 
they felt, that this people was naturally called upon to 
assume quite another position in the Greek world. Thebes 
acted as a bright example, pointing the way. In conse- 
quence of the victory of the popular party, she had within 
a few years risen from vassalship to Sparta to the position 
of a great power. The same idea was now likewise kindled 
in Arcadia ; a desire prevailed to put an end to the con- 
temptible conditions of political life besetting a mere body 
of separate petty states ; a free, united, and strong Ar- 
cadia was to be established ; and thus arose movements 
passing far beyond the districts of Mantinea, and extend- 
ing over the whole of Arcadia.* 

The task was infinitely more difficult here The .. f 
than in Bceotia. Arcadia contained no cifrv, the . ne , w 

J ' capital. 

such as Thebes, capable of becoming the cen- 
tre of the country ; it was necessary to create a new centre, 
to found a new capital, and to do this in that part of the 
country, where as yet no town existed, in the midst of the 
districts which lay nearest to Sparta and were most 
thoroughly dependent upon her. 

The democratic party must have been long at work in 
secret; for immediately after the battle of Leuctra an 
agreement was arrived at among the several communities 

* Peloponnesian diet at Athens : Hdlen. vi 5, 1 (ou7ro>, not ovtw, notwith- 
standing Grote, vol. x. p. 274). — Arcadia: Curtius, Peloponnesos, i. 1G5. Zeus 
Lycaeus and Artemis Hymnia: Pinder u. Friedl., Beitrage zur alt. Miinzkunde, 
i. 85 f. — Mantinea : Curtius, Peloponnesos, i. 240. 

440 History of Greece. f BooK It 

with reference to the most important measures, and we 
find the most decisive decrees in course of execution. 
The locality of the new capital had been chosen — in the 
most fertile plain of Southern Arcadia, on the banks of 
the river Helisson, a tributary of the Alpheus, at rather 
more than two miles' distance from the latter. This place 
was not chosen with a view to strength of situation ; for it 
lies in a trough-shaped fall of the ground, without a height 
for a citadel, and without natural defences. On the other 
hand, the fertility of the region around was extremely 
favorable to the prospect of a considerable city flourish- 
ing here, where a combination of country and town-life 
was possible, such as well accorded with the tastes of the 
Arcadians, who were accustomed to rural pursuits; but 
what was of primary importance, was the circumstance 
that two of the principal tribes of Southern Arcadia here 
came into contact, viz. the Msenalians and the Parrhasians. 
The Helisson flows down from the Msenalus-range, and 
the southern half of the new city was called Orestea, after 
a Maenalian hamlet. The opposite bank belonged to the 
Parrhasians, who occupied Mount Lycaeum, the wooded 
heights of which overtop the valley of the Alpheus in the 
west ; for which reason a branch-institution of the worship 
of the Lycaean Zeus, the primitive centre of the entire 
country around, was established in the heart of the new 
city. Its situation constituted it a meeting-point of the 
principal high-roads connecting Arcadia, Messenia, and 
Laconia ; it was to become a fixed gathering-place for the 
village communities of the neighborhood, whose territory 
had hitherto lain perfectly open to the Spartans. Thus, 
not only were the Arcadian communities hereby summoned 
to establish for themselves an independent existence, 
but the tribes akin to them, whose lands had for centuries 
been incorporated in Laconia (vol. i. p. 245), the inhabi- 
tants of the upper valley of the Eurotas and of the valley 
of the CEnus, were likewise set in motion, so soon as they 

chap, ii.] tj 16 Offensive Wars of Thebes. 441 

perceived the possibility of joining a new-born and power- 
ful Arcadia, while at the same time the territorial posses- 
sions of Sparta herself were endangered. 

The swift and happy choice of the locality Foundation 
for the new city, as well as the energetic exe- of Mantinea. 
cution of its foundation, would be hard to 9}'^% 
understand, had the Arcadians, who were so 
ill prepared for joint undertakings, and who had among 
them no city leading them by virtue of a position of pri- 
macy, entirely depended upon themselves. Some ex- 
ternal influence was indisputably at work, and indeed 
Epaminondas is expressly named as the founder of the 
new capital. We may therefore assume that it w T as from 
him that the leading ideas were derived ; he brought about 
the formation of a magistrature, which, being chosen out 
of the several towns and districts of the country, and pro- 
vided with the necessary powers, caused the joint work to 
be carried out. This magistrature was composed of ten 
men, two from Mantinea, from Tegea and Clitor, from the 
Msenalians and the Parrhasians respectively. Under their 
superintendence the building of the city proceeded, — and 
proceeded in a grand style. For it was to be no mere 
military position for the defence of the frontier, no mere 
circle of walls for the reception of villagers in times of war ; 
but as a handsome and thoroughly-furnished settlement, 
as a regularly-built modern city of indisputable magni- 
tude and dignity, it was suddenly to arise, as if by magic, 
in the midst of a region inhabited by peasants and herds- 
men, and to transform the entire country. An oval circle 
of walls, 50 stadia in circumference, included the streets 
and public places, which spread on either side of the river. 
It was called the " Great City " (fieydXr) icoXtg) ; and it was 
zealously sought to prove by the splendid constructions of 
the theatre, the market-place, the bridge, &c, that the 
Arcadians lacked neither means nor culture. Rich indi- 
viduals adorned the city with gorgeous edifices, which were 


442 History of Greece. lbook vi 

named after their munificent builders — e. g. the Thersi* 
Hum, the edifice intended for the assemblies of the General 
Council of New- Arcadia. 

Pammenes, the Theban general (p. 362), was instructed 
to keep guard over the design and execution of the whole 
plan. But no dangers of war presented themselves. In 
the same consciousness of security, which shows itself in 
the choice of the locality and in the proud appellation 
given to the city, the building of this standing defiance to 
Sparta on the frontiers of Laconia was carried on, precisely 
as if there had no longer been any Sparta in the world ; 
in truth, she was so crippled, that she submitted to every 
humiliation, and no longer dared to send her soldiers be- 
yond her own frontiers. 

As yet, however, Megalopolis remained a city without 
a state. It was the fruit of a rapid national advance, the 
symbol of a unity, the realization of which was a still 
unsolved problem. The establishment of a constitution 
for Arcadia had indeed been contemplated simultaneously 
with the building of the city. Megalopolis was to be a 
centre not merely for those cantons which had hitherto 
been without a town, but also for the whole of Arcadia ; 
it was to be the seat of the Arcadian central authorities, 
and of a communal assembly representing the entire 
country. Such a body were the so-called Ten Thousand for 
whom the Thersilium had been erected : a committee of all 
the civic communities of Arcadia, which was to hold its 
sittings here at fixed periods and to elect the magis- 
trates, who again were to reside in the capital and to 
have at their disposal a standing army of 5,000 men, the 

* Epaminondas o'lKurn^ of Megalopolis: Paus. viii. 27, 2. Site: Curtius, 
Peloponnesot, i. 281. Thersilium : ib. p. 285. Pammenes : Paus. viii. 27, 2. 
Mvpioi with the e£ovcna irepl tou irokifiov koX eiprjvrjs fiovkevecrQai, Diod. XV. 
59.— Intention of forming a united state : Viseher on Freeman's Hut. of Fed. 
Govt, in Neues Schweiz. Mus. 1864, p. 25. 'EirapiTai ('EirapoijTOi) oi irapd. *Ap*ca<n 
$TjM0<ncH <pvAaKe?, Hesych. 

chap, il] f^ Offensive Wars of Thebes. 443 

It was easy to draw up the scheme of the ogition 
constitution, but its execution met with insu- *° tne efforts 

' for unity. 

perable obstacles. For the obstinacy in ad- 
hering to local distinctions, which was a peculiar charac- 
teristic of the Hellenes, was nowhere stronger than in 
Arcadia, where every community had a clearly marked 
separate life of its own. The blending of the several can- 
tons into one common country was first frustrated by 
those states which now as before adhered to Sparta, and 
which were therefore from the outset hostile to the entire 
anti-Spartan and democratic movement. One of these 
was Orchomenus, an ancient town-canton with ~ . 


a lofty height crowned by a citadel. It lay 
to the north of Mantinea, and, in addition to the territory 
of the city proper, had subjected, and governed as baili- 
wicks, a few hamlets (Methydrium, Thisoa, Teuthis). 
Here a government by families was rigorously kept up, 
and in consequence a firm devotion to Sparta prevailed. 
This feeling was heightened by jealousy of the neighbor- 
ing Mantinea ; and inasmuch as the hamlets dependent 
upon Orchomenus had been summoned to take part in 
the creation of the capital as independent communities, 
Orchomenus itself was naturally very hostile to these in- 
novations. A similar position was that of Tr 
Hersea, the town holding the primacy over 
nine districts, scattered along the right bank of the 
Alpheus, and the banks of the Ladon and the Eryman- 
thus, where the narrow mountain-country opens towards 

These two states withstood like strong bulwarks the 
democratic current of the times ; and while in the other 
towns there indeed remained fragments of the population 
friendly to Sparta, on account of ancient family-tradi- 
tions, in these two no democratic party had ever been 
able to rear its head. Although, therefore, Sparta was 
incapable of opposing the Arcadian movement as a whole, 

444 History of Greece. [Book vi 

yet she could not neglect such allies as these. And in 
fact provision was made to cover Orchomenus by meana 
of a garrison of 1,000 Lacedaemonians, to which was 
further added a band of 500 Boeotian and Argive refu- 
gees, whom the Orchomenians took into their pay, under 
the command of Polytropus. And about the same time 
Heraea was enlarged and fortified ; it became for the first 
time a real town ; and this new Heraea was now, in oppo- 
sition to the democratic capital, to be a basis of military 
operations and a centre for the conservative party. 

other com- ^ ne e fi° r ^ s towards unity met with a second 
munities. obstacle in the resistance of the petty com- 
munities in South- Western Arcadia. It was principally 
in their interest that the new foundation had been made ; 
moreover, the deputies of these communities had declared 
their readiness to contribute inhabitants to the new city. 
But when the Parrhasians were actually to descend from 
their wooded heights, and to settle within the walls, the 
ancient love of home awoke in full strength ; and four 
communities in particular decisively refused to abandon 
their habitations. Thus it came to pass, that an under- 
taking which had had its origin absolutely in the freest 
national will, and which seemed to be nothing but the ful- 
filment of desires long cherished by the people, had to be 
carried through by force. Lycoa and Tricoloni were 
forced to obey. The Trapezuntians emigrated, in order 
to escape a similar fate ; while Lycosura at the foot of 
Mount Lycseum, according to mythology the earliest city 
on which the Greek sun ever shone, was spared the appli- 
cation of forcible measures. Its inhabitants remained, 
while the other communities of the valleys of the Alpheus 
and of its tributaries renounced their independence and 
migrated, entirely or in part, into the capital. 

Even harder, however, was the case of those towns 
which had from ancient times been independent, and 
which possessed a history of their own. Here party-con* 

chap, n.j y/ie Offensive Wars of Thebes. 44 

flicts were inevitable, inasmuch as the national party de- 
manded that the towns should renounce their indepen- 
dence in favor of a united Arcadia, which to the other 
party seemed equivalent to a treason against hearth and 
home; they refused to make a sacrifice of themselves. 
For this reason, in addition to the aristocrats proper, who 
abominated the reforms on account of their democratic 
character, many citizens of a more moderate tendency 
were opposed to the demands of the national party, and 
the civic bodies were severed into mutually hostile halves. 
Such was especially the case at Tegea. 

The Tegeatse had for centuries been faith- „ . 

o Party-con-. 

ful allies of Sparta. In the families, which flict at tegea. 
directed public affairs in this sense, there pre- %' Q cii ' 3 *■*• 
vailed a worthy spirit, such as show r s itself in 
Stasippus, at that time the leader of the conservative 
party, a man of honor, who is stated to have angrily re- 
jected all demands urging him to rid himself of his ad- 
versaries by unlawful means. The leaders of the opposite 
party were Callibius and Proxenus, the latter one of the 
commissioners who had conducted the foundation of the 
new capital. As a state, therefore, Tegea had promoted 
this foundation, had made a pecuniary grant towards the 
capital, and had probably also sent thither a part of its 
population. But the national party desired to go further; 
and when the government of the city declined to listen to 
proposals for a renunciation of its independence, resort 
was had to measures of force. The nationalists take 
arms ; Proxenus falls in a street-fight ; and his band of 
followers is driven to the end of the city in the direction 
of Mantinea. Here, in the building containing the 
portal, they make good their footing, and, while Stasippus 
is delayed by negotiations which have been commenced, 
and thereby prevented from completely suppressing the 
revolt, contrive secretly to receive a reinforcement from 
Mantinea, the chief focus of the Arcadian democracy. 

446 History of Greece. [Book vi 

At this point fortune turns. The party of Stasippus have 
to abandon the city, and retire into a suburban sanctuary 
of Artemis. But the sanctity of the spot affords no pro- 
tection to these unfortunate men. They are driven out, 
disarmed, fettered, and transported on a wagon into the 
city. Here a tribunal awaits them, formed quite irregu- 
larly, as it includes the Mantineans. By this tribunal 
they are sentenced, and thereupon they are executed. 
This proceeding was a revolutionary terrorism, which re- 
garded all resistance against the interests of the united 
state in the light of high treason, and which desired to 
root out the elements opposed to itself. 

Eight hundred escaped to Sparta, where they de- 
manded the protection of their interests. The Ephors 
thought it necessary to do something, in order in conso- 
nance with the sworn treaties to avenge the breach of the 
peace ; and Agesilaus was sent out with an army, which 
was joined by auxiliaries from Hersea and Lepreum. 
The Arcadians stood at Asea with their united forces, 
with the exception of the Mantineans, who had meanwhile 
marched out against Orchomenus. 

Agesilaus Agesilaus advanced into the territory of the 

in Arcadia. Msenalians, where he occupied the hamlet of 
°37o?' 3 (B ' °* Eutaea, which belonged to the district former- 
ly subjected by the Mantineans (p. 319). 
The inhabitants, it would seem, had not yet emigrated to 
Megalopolis ; they were treated with great gentleness, and 
were even aided in the restoration of their walls ; they 
were to recognize, how little Sparta desired to impair 
their independence. Hereupon Agesilaus passed on to 
Mantinea, followed by the Arcadians ; but neither side 
was inclined for a battle. The pride of Agesilaus had 
fallen so low, that he deemed it glorious merely to have 
shown his face with an army outside the boundaries of 
Laconia, to have devastated a few fields, and to have 
offered to give battle. The season had already become 

Chap, ii.] j>] ie Offensive Wars of Thebes. 447 

inclement. But the main reason of his retreat lay in the 
prospect of a Theban army. For in their consciousness 
of their own weakness and insecurity the Arcadians had 
looked round for aid from abroad. They had applied to 
Athens, because after the most recent negotiations (p. 
435) they were entitled to expect support in this quarter. 
Athens had refused them ; but Thebes they found as 
ready as Athens had been unwilling.* 

Thebes had gained a strong position in Cen- The bes 
tral and in Northern Greece. She now needed ?, al , led into 


another theatre of action and another task, in sus * 
order to prove herself worthy of her new power, to 
strengthen the warlike spirit which had arisen, and in 
joint undertakings to confirm the combinations which she 
had brought about in Bceotia and in the countries sur- 
rounding it. She was carrying on the War of Indepen- 
dence on behalf of all the Hellenes (p. 429) ; she was 
standing forth as the protector and ally of those tribes of 
the peninsula which were struggling to secure autonomy. 
The union of Bceotia as a single state served as a model 
to the Arcadians ; Hersea and Orchomenus had to be 
overcome by force, like Platsese, Thespise, and the Boeo- 
tian Orchomenus, to the end that the one united state 
might be called into life. The difference was, that in 
Arcadia there existed no state with historic claims to the 
primacy, no federal capital, whose pretensions it sufficed 
to revive. On the contrary, there was here an entirely 
new capital, an artificially created central power ; and the 
federalists of Arcadia were according to the whole na- 
ture and history of the country incomparably more in the 
right as against the party of union, than was the case in 
Bceotia. Epaminondas himself certainly had no intention 

* Synoecism of Hersea: Str. 337; Curtius, Peloponnesos, i. 394.— Poly tro pus : 
Hellen. vi. 5, 12. — Lycosura: Peloponnesos, i. 295. — Conflicts at Tegea: Hell-en. 
vi. 5, 6 f. (opxoi, the old treaties ; though Thirlwall refers the expression to 
the recent congresses). 

448 History of Greece. [Bookvi. 

of forcing upon the Arcadians any particular form of 
state-union ; but it was his duty to insist, with all the 
power at his command, upon Arcadia not being hindered 
in her transformation by Sparta, and to do his best to 
make Arcadia permanently capable of resisting new at- 
tacks on the part of the enemy. Hereby he at the same 
time offered a proof of the unselfishly national character 
of the policy of Thebes, which was desirous, not of ruling 
over weakened states, but of allying itself with newly- 
strengthened states for the protection of the independence 
of the Greek tribes. He was therefore very glad to re- 
ceive the application for aid from the Arcadians, who 
were joined by Argos and Elis ; in order that Thebes, 
after having already asserted its influence in the affairs 
of the Messenians and Arcadians, might now also appear 
arms in hand as the Hellenic Power in the peninsula. 

The Peloponnesus was still accounted the securely 
guarded innermost citadel of Hellas. It seemed to be by 
nature so carefully barred off by means of the mountains 
of the Isthmus, that the idea of breaking through these 
barriers appeared foolhardy. Iphicrates had broken 
through them, but not one of the combinations effected 
between Central Greece and individual states of the penin- 
sula had firmly endured. A change now ensued. The 
fear of Sparta had vanished, and herewith the Isthmian 
passes had likewise lost their significance. Epaminondas, 
Pelopidas, and the other generals of the confederation, led 
the army across the Isthmus before the end of the year 
370, and effected a junction with the Arcadians, Argives, 
and Eleans near Mantinea, where an army of 70,000 men 
assembled, of whom more than half were heavy-armed 

So far as the protection of the Mantineans was con- 
cerned, the arrival of the army was useless ; for the mere 
rumor of the approach of the Thebans had sufficed to in- 
duce Agesilaus to take his departure. Were the Thebans 

chap. II.] fhe Offensive Wars of Thebes. 449 

now likewise to return at once ? This was the prevailing 
opinion in the council of generals ; and it seemed the more 
reasonable, inasmuch as the official tenure of the Boeo- 
tarchs was about to come to an end very speedily, at the 
time of the winter-solstice, while no powers had been given 
for further undertakings. But Epaminondas had as- 
suredly from the first had other intentions ; he was unwill- 
ing to return home without having achieved anything. 
He was aware that the Arcadian movement had extended 
to the countries on the borders of the Spartan territory, 
and that the frontier-places were ill-guarded, as the Spar- 
tans expected no attack at this season of the year. The 
Peloponuesian confederates urged him to take advantage 
of the present opportunity ; and he might hope to put a 
speedy and glorious end to the whole war against the des- 
potic supremacy of Sparta. 

He therefore made himself, together with E ami _ 
Pelopidas, responsible for the remainder of the nondas 
campaign ; the other generals withdrew from Eurotas. 
its direction, and what ensued was in reality Writer?'* 
a personal achievement of the two friends. 
They led the troops in four divisions through the moun- 
tain-passes of Laconia ; effected a junction of these di- 
visions in the valley of the (Enus at Sellasia ; marched from 
the north of the (Enus down to the left bank of the Euro- 
tas, and without having met with any resistance, stood be- 
fore Sparta, separated by nothing but the bridge over the 
Eurotas from the market-place of the city, the wide extent 
of which was guarded by no walls or outworks. 

When it is remembered, how secure the Spartans had 
hitherto deemed themselves within their valley environed 
by lofty mountains, and how since the expedition of the 
Heraclidse no hostile army had made its appearance in 
the valley of the Eurotas, it is easy to understand the un- 
heard-of terror which seized upon the population. The 
men capable of bearing arms were weak in numbers and 

450 History of Greece. t BoOK VI - 

faint in spirit, while the women, who had never beheld 
the smoke of an enemy's camp-fire, heightened the confu- 
sion by their incessant lamentations. The villages of the 
Periceci regarded the army of the allies as their liberators, 
and rose against their masters ; it was necessary to sum- 
mon the Helots to the defence of the city ; but even these 
were not to be relied upon, nor was it certain whether 
there was more to be feared or to be hoped from their 
newly-formed bands, which in numbers amounted to as 
many as 6,000. But worst of all was the discontent 
among the citizens themselves, among whom there was no 
lack of traitors who believed that Sparta's last hour had 
arrived, and that no time should be lost in offering nom- 
age to the conqueror. For we know how abundant were 
the materials of agitation and of revolutionary cravings 
existing in the city. 

a esiiaus ^° *^ s crisis Agesilaus was found equal. 

saves Sparta. He, who could not but confess to himself, 
that it was through his policy that the state had fallen 
into its present situation, now did what was in his power 
to atone for all his earlier errors, and to save his native 
city. His activity exceeds belief. He contrived to 
gather around him by a safe road the reinforcements 
arriving from a few states ; he preserved order in the city, 
while it resounded with lamentations ; he stayed the furi- 
ous eagerness for battle on the part of those men who 
would only have succeeded in delivering Sparta into the 
hands of the foe, if they had risked an open battle ; he 
distributed the troops on the heights ; with admirable 
presence of mind suppressed the treasonable intrigues in 
progress, and with a severity hardly justified by the laws 
carried out summary sentences of death upon the muti- 
neers. The site of Sparta was in his favor. For such 
was the natural character of the locality, that by means 
of the river and the morasses along its banks on the one 
hand, and its various groups of hills on the other, it ad«- 

chap, ii.] jij^ Offensive Wars of Thebes. 451 

mitted of being defended even without artificial fortifica- 
tions. The first intention of Epaminondas was to advance 
straight across the bridge over the Eurotas into the heart 
of the city ; but on arriving at the bridge, he saw the 
troops so skilfully drawn up by the sanctuary of Athene 
Alea, that he refrained from venturing to force his way 
across, and cutting himself a passage through the narrow 
lane which led to the market-place close at hand. He 
therefore marched lower down the Eurotas, which with its 
highly-swollen waters acted as the best ally of Sparta, 
along the base of the Menela'ium, which, like the Janicu- 
lus at Rome, overtops the shore opposite to the city. 
About two miles and a half lower down he with some 
difficulty effected a crossing ; and, establishing himself at 
Amyclse, from this position flooded with his horsemen the 
entire southern vicinity of the city, and made a second 
attempt to penetrate into it. But during their advance 
his troops were, in the low-lying land by the Eurotas, fallen 
upon out of an ambush, and driven back by a simulta- 
neous onset of horsemen. The Thebans were but little 
prepared for conflicts of this description, while their con- 
federates were still less efficient and trustworthy. Of the 
Peloponnesians the majority were not intent upon anything 
beyond deriving profit from pillaging expeditions ; and 
after they had succeeded in this to their hearts* content, in 
a country well cultivated and free from enemies, they 
began to seize the first opportunity of returning home, 
especially as the Laconian winter caused itself to be felt in 
its full severity. 

Epaminondas, having undertaken this campaign at his 
own risk, was obliged to be most carefully on his guard 
against any serious disaster. He therefore abandoned 
further attempts upon Sparta, passed down the valley of 
the Eurotas, and avenged the many plunderings formerly 
inflicted upon his native land, by thoroughly devastating 
the country as far down as the coast of Helos. The un« 

452 History of Greece. [BookVI 

fortified towns were fired; Gytheuin with its docks and 
arsenals was besieged for three days, and taken ; indeed, a 
Theban garrison was placed in it, so that it might serve as 
a basis for the continuance of petty warfare. It was a 
Decelea on Laconian soil, of double importance, because 
the population of the surrounding districts hated the Spar- 
tans, and had in great numbers joined the allies. This 
population it was necessary to protect against the ven- 
geance of Sparta. It is said, that Epaminondas was 
already on the point of quitting Laconia, when Agesilaus 
caused ten talents to be offered to him through the Spar- 
tiate Phrixus, as an inducement to him to depart. In any 
case he acted in accordance with his own resolutions, by 
taking advantage of his Lacedaemonian campaign, to 
combine with it the execution of his favorite plan, which 
he had been maturing for years, viz. the restoration of 

He found Messenia in a condition of de- 


das in Mes- clared revolt. The peasants, who had been 

senia. < x 

01 cii 3 degraded into Helots, rose against the lords of 
(b. c. 3oy). t^ so j}. an( j the gulf, after lying desolate for 
centuries, was filled with numerous vessels, on which the 
Messenians were hurrying in from Italy, Sicily, and Africa, 
to recover their native habitations (p. 429). The personal 
presence of Epaminondas was needed, to stay the confu- 
sion inevitable in this sudden restoration of Messenia; 
above all, the new state required a fixed centre. As to 
the choice of this there could hardly be any doubt. For, 
like a horn of Messenia, the range of Ithome rises with 
its double wooded summit between the two principal plains 
of the country, — the fastness of Aristodemus, to which 
attached the most glorious traditions of the past. On the 
terraces of Ithome the Messenians had of old been most 
successful in their struggle against Sparta (vol. i. p. 230) ; 

* Theopompus ap. Plut. Ages. 32 (fiurQbt ttjs avaxtoprjo-euis). A sarcasm, 
according to Bauch, Epam. 49. 

chap, it] The Offensive Wars of Thebes. 453 

eighty-six years ago the same mountain had once more, 
though only temporarily, been the refuge of liberty. 

At the present time an enduring creation Foundation 
was to be accomplished ; the foundation-stone of Messene. 
was to be laid of a state vigorous with vitality ; and it was 
doubtless one of the happiest days in the life of Epami- 
nondas, when it was permitted to him, in the midst of a 
population gratefully hailing his restoration of their free- 
dom and of their native land, and recognizing the justice 
of the gods in the expiation of an ancient wrong, to com- 
mence with solemn sacrifices and prayers the building of 
the city of Messene. It was the first city which had ever 
borne this name. It spread at the foot of the lofty summit 
of Ithome in a hollow valley abounding in woods and 
water, with a declivity towards the south, where there is 
an open view of the gulf. The construction of the city 
w r as carried on with copious resources, and in full accord- 
ance with the rules of art. The walls encircling it were 
built so as to follow the rim of the valley, and to include 
the crest of Ithome and its ancient temple of Zeus; be- 
low, along the course of a spring-fed stream, spread the 
public squares and edifices. The principal gate of the 
city was the northern, the well-preserved remains of which 
to this day attest the solid magnificence of the entire de- 
sign and the efficiency of the architects ; it was the gate 
leading to Megalopolis. The two cities were newly built 
with the same purpose under the same influence, as the 
twin bulwarks of Peloponnesian freedom against Spartan 
lust of dominion. The Arcadians brought down from 
their mountains the sacrificial victims for the hecatombs 
at the Messenian foundation-festival ; while the Messenians 
regarded Arcadia as a second native land of their own. 
This was an ancient tradition dating from the times of 
Aristomenes (vol. i. p. 242), which was now in full mea- 
sure renewed. Argos likewise took part in this found- 
ation, and, next to Epaminondas, the Argive general Epi- 

454 History of Greece. |Boo*vi. 

teles was the most active promoter of the building of Mes- 

oth But it was not merely within the walls of 

new cities ^he capital that Messenia rose again ; other 
Messenia. places of ancient fame were at this period one 
after the other restored ; — among them Nestorian Pylus, 
Eira, and the ancient seaport of Methone. Of these 
foundations no other evidence exists besides the remains 
of the walls, still surviving in the Messenian land and re- 
cognizable as works of this date. 

Divine Special attention was at the same time de- 

rites of voted to the ancient forms of divine worship. 

Messenia. * 

Their suppression had been Sparta's chief 
crime; their restoration was therefore the first task of 
those who desired an expiation of the past. The most 
sacred worship of the country was that of the " Great 
Goddesses" Demeter and Persephone, which had been 
celebrated with venerable dedicatory rites in the grove 
near Andania, the most ancient Messenian capital. They 
had been extinguished at the close of the Second Mes- 
senian War ; and it was an arduous task to resume the 
thread of the obsolete tradition. It is related, that the 
gods themselves helped to solve this difficulty ; for that the 
Hero Caucon, the founder of these rites, appeared to Epi- 
teles in a dream, and revealed to him the spot where Aris- 
tomenes had hidden the sacred writings in the earth, when 
forced to abandon his native land to the foe. A roll of 
tin was discovered, on which the whole ritual of the dedi- 
cations was written ; and since descendants of the Mes- 
senian priestly families had likewise returned to Messenia* 
these resumed their ancient functions and rights ; and 
after an interval of three hundred years the annual solem- 
nities recommenced in the cypress-grove of Carnasium, 
and became once more so popular, that they were consid- 
ered inferior in significance only to the Attic Eleusinia. 
We have here a re-assembling of the people after a long 

chap, ii.] ^ Offensive Wars of Thebes. 455 

dispersion, and a restoration of its religious rites, resem- 
bling that which took place in the people of Israel after 
the Captivity. 

Of course the claims of descent could not be closely ex- 
amined in the case of the new settlers. Moreover of the 
very kernel of the Messenian people a large proportion 
remained abroad, where its members held positions of the 
highest consideration, — so especially in Rhegium and Mes- 
sana. On the other hand, a multitude of adventurers 
presented themselves, with the view of acquiring pieces of 
land, large quantities of which had come to be without 
owners in consequence of the expulsion of the Spartans. 
Hereby a really popular renovation of the country and 
the permanent foundation of a new development for it 
were from the first considerably hindered. Colonies, too, 
were introduced from abroad ; thus the seaport of Corone 
arose, under the direction of Epimelides of Coronea, as a 
Boeotian colony on the Messenian Gulf. As to the degree 
of speed with which ail these institutions were accom- 
plished, and as to their order of sequence, we have no evi- 
dence ; but it is worthy of high admiration, that the 
difficult task should have progressed so rapidly and with 
such freedom from obstacles. The one explanation of this 
success, and of the similar success in the case of Mega- 
lopolis, lies in the extraordinary skill which distinguished 
the Greeks in the settlement and organization of the cities ; 
while the chief merit should doubtless be ascribed to Epa- 
minondas, who controlled the whole work as its directing 
spirit, guided the multitudes, and contrived to secure the 
most suitable personages, such as Epiteles, for the promo- 
tion of the undertaking, and to commend the regeneration 
of Messenia to the neighboring tribes as a matter of gen- 
eral Peloponnesian interest. 

Hereupon Epaminondas began his march back, doubt- 
less also encouraging the building of the city at Mega- 
lopolis by his personal presence. He had every reason for 

456 History of Greece. L BooK Vi 

hastening his homeward march. For mean* 
nondas while the Spartans had applied for aid at 

returns x x x 

home. Athens ; and the Athenians were to such a de- 

s B pnng 6 . 9,) gree frightened by the development of the 
power of Thebes in the Peloponnesus, that they with- 
out delay called out their entire military force, in or- 
der to preserve Sparta from annihilation, and to place a 
restraint upon the arrogance of her enemies. No sooner, 
however, was it known that the city of Sparta itself was 
safe, than this ardor cooled ; and Iphicrates, who was in 
command of the expedition, made, indeed, a pretence of 
an intention to bar in the Thebans in Peloponnesus, by 
occupying the passes, so familiar to him, near Corinth ; 
but the road by the coast, leading along the eastern rim 
of the Isthmus by the way of Cenchrese, he left open, or 
at all events defended it so slackly, that Epaminondas was 
able to return home safe. 

At the close of this campaign Epaminondas is stated to 
have come into still more direct contact with the Atheni- 
nians ; and it is not improbable that, after he had safely 
placed the Isthmus in his rear, he availed himself of the 
opportunity to let the Athenians likewise feel his power, 
after by this sudden commencement of hostilities they had 
caused him extreme peril. He had now just cause for 
regarding Attica as a hostile country, and accordingly 
unhesitatingly marched through Attic territory, allowing 
his flying detachments to approach the city itself. The 
Athenians never dared to issue forth from their walls, in 
obedience, it is said, to the express orders given for this 
event by Iphicrates.* 

* Building of Messene : Paus. iv. 26 f. ; Diod. xv. 66 ; Peloponnesos, ii. 138 
(Commencement of the building, 01. cii. 3, b. c. 370-69 ; continuation, 01. cii. 
4: Paus. vi. 2.) Epiteles : Paus. xxvi. 4. Renovation of the dedicatory 
solemnities by Methapus: Sauppe, " Inschrift von Andania," in the Abhandl. d. 
Getting. Get d. Wissensch., 1860, p. 220. Corone, a Theban colony: Peloponnesos, 
ii. 166.— Epaminondas in Attica: Paus. ix. 14; Thirlwall, vol. v. p. 107. 
Erroneous criticism in Grote, vol. x. p. 327. 

chap, ii.] pfe Off em [ VG Wars of Thebes. 457 

Thus Epaminondas returned home, four months after 
the legal expiration of his term of office as general. Now 
at the time of the establishment of the demo- rp, „ .. 

Ine results 

cracy rigorous laws had been passed against of the . 

J ~ r ° campaign. 

every kind of abuse of official authority ; nor 
were envious men wanting who lay in wait for every op- 
portunity of damaging those who were at present the heroe3 
of the day. The cavils proceeded from the party of 
Meneclides (p. 372), who was the most prominent speaker 
in the market-place, and who sought to compensate him- 
self as the champion of popular rights for the failure of his 
ambitious schemes. In the present instance an open 
breach of the constitution had been committed, and an 
arbitrary prolongation of the supreme command had taken 
place, which could easily be represented in the light of a 
beginning of Tyrannical efforts. It cannot be doubted 
that preliminary steps were taken towards a judicial pro- 
cedure ; but when in rendering an account of his tenure 
of office, in which all illegalities necessarily came under 
discussion, Epaminondas simply stated the gist of what 
had been done in the four months, this produced so power- 
ful an effect, that all invidious intrigues fell to the ground. 
For during his short campaign, and without losses, results 
had been achieved, which transformed the entire system 
of the relations between the states of Greece, and first 
fully established Thebes in the position of the foremost 
power there. The rocky portal of Peloponnesus had been 
burst asunder ; inaccessible Laconia had seen the troops 
of her enemies pass from one end of her territory to the 
other, and the impotence of Sparta had been demonstrated 
at her own hearth ; the internal cohesion of her state had 
been dissolved by means of the defection of the Perioeci ; 
her seaport was in the hands of Thebes ; half of her terri- 
tory had been torn away from the rest and established as 
New-Messenia ; Arcadia, Argos, and Elis were in arms 
under the guidance of Thebes against Sparta ; and, finally, 

458 History of Greece. C Boo,t VL 

the newly-built cities served as pledges of a lasting success, 
since they venerated Thebes as their mother-city, and con- 
stituted enduring monuments of her glory, which, together 
with Mantinea and Argos, formed a belt around Sparta, a 
line of hostile positions, which for all times prevented free- 
dom of motion on her part, and placed a wall in the way 
of all future cravings for supremacy which she might en- 
tertain. The jealousy of Athens had likewise only been 
made to serve to increase the glory of the Thebans ; for 
her greatest commander had not ventured openly to meet 
Epaminondas in the field. In short, the first campaign 
abroad undertaken by the Thebans was so rich in honors 
and in achievements, that it was impossible to pass sentence 
upon the author of this good fortune in war for the viola- 
tion of legal ordinances ; and it is accordingly stated, that 
no actual judicial proceedings took place. 
n ,. Moreover, the condition of affairs was cer- 

Continuance ' 

in pXponne- Mainly such, that the foreign relations into 
£US - which Thebes had entered, could not be fully 

surveyed and directed by any man but Epaminondas. It 
was he personally, in whom confidence was placed in 
Arcadia and Messenia ; and it was therefore, so to speak* 
a matter of course, that he could not be dismissed in the 
midst of his work. Accordingly, the ordinances of the 
constitution had only in so far been neglected, that he had 
not appeared at Thebes in person, in order to become a 
candidate at the beginning of the new official year, in the 
month of Bucatius, for the renewal of the dignity of 

But notwithstanding all the magnificence of the results 
of the first campaign, they had merely occasioned a revo- 
lution in the existing state of affairs, but by no means es- 

* Accusation against Epaminondas (Nepos, 8; Appian, Syr. 41); against 
Epaminondas and Pelopidas : Plut. Pelop. 25. No i//i)<£os : Paus. ix. 14. Sie- 
vers, 274, maintains, without cause, that Epaminondas and Pelopidas were 
not chosen Bceotarchs for the year 369. Appian compares Epaminondas 
with Scipio Africanus, ap. Liv. xxxviii. 51. 

Chap, il] The Offensive Wars of Thebes. 459 

tablished a new order of things. Argos and Arcadia con- 
tinued the war, in order to remove the remaining props 
of the Spartan supremacy. The Arcadians took Pellene 
(vol. i. p. 213), and hereby tore away from Sparta the 
upper valley of the Eurotas ; while the Argives attacked 
Phlius, doubtless with the connivance of the Thebans, to 
whom it was necessarily of importance to have a secure 
hold over a few positions on the Corinthian Gulf, so as to 
be able from it freely to enter the peninsula. This was all 
the more important, inasmuch as the Athenians now con- 
tinued to consider it their duty — so strangely had circum- 
stances changed — to guard the passes of the Isthmus 
towards the north, and at present proceeded with much 
greater energy. This time it was Chabrias to whom the 
watch over the frontier was entrusted. He collected at 
Corinth an army of 10,000 men, — Athenians, Megareans, 
and Achseans from Pellene who adhered with special 
fidelity to Sparta. Besides this there was a second army 
of equal strength, composed of Lacedaemonians and other 
Peloponnesians, in part fugitive partisans from Arcadia, 
in part belonging to those states which were thoroughly 
averse from the new changes, such as Lepreum, and the 
cities of Argolis : Hermione, Epidaurus, Trcezen, &c. 
Corinth was likewise now thoroughly on the side of 
Sparta ; for on the one hand she saw her maritime power 
endangered by Thebes, which sought to secure possession 
of the Corinthian Gulf; and again, she was by no means 
willing to allow the passes of her territory to be at all 
times open for the Thebans to march through. Finally, 
the Spartans had also entered into communications with 
Dionysius of Syracuse, for the purpose of obtaining aux- 
iliary troops for the defence of the Isthmus. Thus every 
exertion was made to secure the control of these passes, 
and to break the connexion between Thebes and her Pelo- 
ponnesian confederates. Were this accomplished, it was 
deemed certain that these confederates would by them* 

460 History of Greece. rBooiVL 

selves be unable to achieve anything effective or endur- 
ing; their policy would come to ruin, like all earlier 
schemes of a Separate League. 

Under these circumstances the Thebans were obliged 
again to march out in the same year. This time they 

Second cam- f° un d tne Onean range with the three ways of 
mmondaf pa " access to **! tne two passes by the shore at 

01. cii. 4(b. Cenchrese and Lechseum, and the middle 
c.3f>9). wa y through the gorge of Corinth, carefully 

Summer. guarded by an army, which in addition to the 
most favorable position had the advantage of a threefold 
superiority in numbers. Epaminondas had before him 
what resembled a closed fortress ; and he was obliged to 
try to take the inlets by storm, since the enemy was by 
no means willing to descend into the open for a battle. 
He selected the westernmost of the three passes, through 
which lay the shortest road to his goal. Here were drawn 
up the Lacedsemonians with the Achaeans from Pellene, 
completely separated, as the nature of the locality implies, 
from the other divisions of the army. After Epami- 
nondas had throughout the night kept his enemies along his 
whole line on a constant stretch of expectation, he suc- 
ceeded on the following morning in driving them back at 
the first onslaught, and in so utterly discouraging them, 
that they requested a truce, and permitted him to pass 
freely through. Hereupon the Thebans effected a junc- 
tion with their confederates, who had taken up a position 
at Nemea, and with them advanced before Sicyon, which, 
being simultaneously attacked by Pammenes from the sea, 
went over to the allies. 

The subsequent undertakings were not so successful. It 
proved impossible to take Pellene, the Achsean neighbor 
of the Sicyonians, which had a strong site and was inhabi- 
ted by brave citizens. An expedition to Epidaurus re- 
mained without any real result ; an attack upon Corinth 
even led to an unfortunate encounter ; and the situation 

chap, ii.] The Off em i ve Jf ar8 f Thebes. 461 

of the Thebans was rendered still worse by the contem- 
poraneous arrival of the auxiliaries of Dionysius at 
Corinth. The consequence was, that Epaminondas re- 
turned home. 

But the campaign had not been made in vain. For in 
the first place it had succeeded in diverting attention 
from the south, and in thus affording full leisure to the 
Messenians and the Megalopolitans, for continuing the 
construction of their walls. Secondly, the taking by 
storm of the Corinthian pass was a brilliant feat of arms, 
and its reward was the possession of Sicyon. Now, a pri- 
mitive connexion existed between the Sicyonian territory 
and the Boeotian shores opposite to it ; and to renew this 
connexion at the present time, was of the highest import- 
ance for the military undertakings of Thebes. She was 
now assured of a convenient landing-place, and had ac- 
quired open access through the valley of the Asopus into 
the interior of the peninsula, which the Lacedaemonian 
party was now virtually rendered incapable of closing. 
In spite of this triple result, the campaign was a failure in 
the eyes of the Thebans, who expected nothing short of 
extraordinary achievements from Epaminondas (as the 
Athenians had formerly from Alcibiades), and regarded 
every failure as a want of will. He was Epaminon- 
specifically charged with having after the fight ffJ^SftcT' 1 
at Lechseum treated the Spartans with unwar- 
rantable tenderness, and the result was that he was dis- 
missed from his office of general.* 

In the meantime, the war had not remained confined to 
Peloponnesus ; Thebes had simultaneously found another 
very important field of political activity in the north, par- 
ticularly in Thessaly. 

Thessaly had long been to Hellas a land Thebesan( j 
over the border. With its families of dynasts, Thessaly. 

* Sicyon and Thebes : Pelopommos, ii. 484 ; Archceol Z., 1853, p. 69. 

462 History of Greece. [BookVI. 

who held their court in the cities, and the mass of unfree 
population which cultivated the soil, it formed a world by 
itself, which only occasionally came into contact with the 
Greek states, when a special movement took place, of a na- 
ture to agitate the condition of affairs in Thessaly itself, 
and to excite the attention of the Greeks. These move- 
ments proceeded in part from individual chiefs, ambitious 
for a larger measure of power, in part from the peasants, 
who rose against the lords of the soil. Of the former de- 
scription was the conflict, which after the battle of G^no- 
phyta occasioned an Athenian intervention. At that time 
Orestes, the son of Echecrates, a powerful dynast at Phar- 
salus, had applied for aid to the Athenians ; and it was a 
grand moment in the brief continental supremacy of 
Athens, when her troops in conjunction with the Boeotians 
and Phocians appeared before Pharsalus, in order to as- 
sert her position of arbitress and to extend her influence 
as far as Mount Olympus. Of a democratic tendency 
were the movements in Thessaly during the Pelopon- 
nesian War ; and of these again advantage was taken by 
Athens for the purpose of acquiring influence (vol. iii. p. 
576). But these relations were as devoid of results as the 
earlier enterprise. Nor was it in the interest of the Athe- 
nians, unconditionally to promote the democracy in Thes- 
saly, since they had from ancient times been connected 
with the dynasts by treaties for the supply of mercenaries. 
The dynastic families themselves were also at discord with 
one another, and we find individual members of them at 
the head of the popular party, which rose against the 
power of the nobility (vol. iii. p. 180), — e. g. Polymedes 
and Aristonus, who at the beginning of the Peloponnesian 
War came to the aid of the Athenians. Both these men 
belonged to the party which was adverse to the existing 
government. These conditions of division and party-con- 
flict continued during the entire period of the Peloponne- 
sian War ; and we see individual party-chiefs, who sue- 

chap, ii.] j/^ Off ens ive Wars of Thebes. 463 

cumbed at home, seeking for aid abroad, and thus draw- 
ing foreign states into the sphere of the domestic affairs of 
Thessaly. Thus Hellenocrates, the Larissean, applies to 
the Macedonian king Archelaus, and again Aristippus to 
Cyrus, who sends him money, to enable him to hire troops 
and maintain himself at Larisa, 

By this time the ancient relations with Athens had of 
course come to an end. On the other hand Sparta re- 
sumed her endeavors to acquire power in Thessaly with 
fresh ardor after the overthrow of Athens. The Spartans 
recovered possession of the city of Heraclea, originally 
founded by them as a position against the Athenians on 
the southern border of Thessaly (vol. iii. p. 143), placed a 
garrison in Pharsalus, and established for themselves a 
supremacy over the tribes of Southern Thessaly. These 
proceedings again are doubtless connected with internal 

For about the close of the Peloponnesian T . 

J- Lycophron 

War new movements had broken out in Thes- of Pherue. 
saly, which led to far more important results than those 
which had preceded them. Their starting-point was 
Pherse, the ancient city in the south-western part of the 
great inland plain of Thessaly, four miles distant from the 
sea, where it possessed the seaport of Pagasse, of ancient 
fame. Here arose a prince, who conceived the idea of 
making his city the centre of all Thessaly, Lycophron by 
name. The object of his policy was the overthrow of the 
families of the old nobility, the Aleuadae and Scopadsa 
at Larisa, Pharsalus, and Crannon ; his power w T as based 
on the population, which had up to that time remained in 
a condition of dependence ; and for this reason his rule 
was termed a Tyrannis. In September, 404, he gained a 

* Orestes: Thuc. i. 111. Polymedes arid Aristonus: 16. ii. 22; Buttmann, 
Mythologu8, ii. 285 ; Meineke, Monalsberichte, 1851, p. 587. Hellenocrates : 
Aristot. Polit. 219, 24. Aristippus : Xen. Anab. i. 1, 10. — Spartans in Thessaly 
and Heraclea : Diod. xiv. 38; Polyan. ii. 21 (01. xcv. 2, b. c. 399). Pharsalus 
had a Lacedsemonian garrison in the year 391 : Diod. xiv. 82. 

464 History of Greece. [BookVL 

great victory over the Larisseans ; it was he who subse- 
quently besieged the above-mentioned Aristippus, of the 
house of the Aleuadse, in Larisa itself; and doubtless he 
was supported in his attacks upon the Thessalian towns by 
Sparta. This explains why the states leagued together 
against Sparta in the Corinthian War also took the side of 
the adversaries of the Tyrant, and sent mercenaries to aid 
Medius, the dynast of Larisa. At that time Pharsalus 
and Heraclea were successfully taken away again from the 
Spartans, whose entire influence in Thessaly came to an 
end with the defeat at Iialiartus (p. 244). 

But Lycophron contrived to maintain himself even 
without foreign support; and now succeeded in placing 
Pharsalus on his side. The mercenaries of Medius were 
there fallen upon and massacred ; all Greece was horrified 
by the abominations committed on this occasion ; for the 
corpses of the foreign mercenaries were left in heaps on 
the open field, so that the story ran, how all the ravens 
from Attica and Peloponnesus assembled at Pharsalus.* 
, f The schemes of Lycophron were carried 

lason of J r 

Pheraj. ou f, by lason, his successor in the government, 

* Nothing is established with certainty concerning the history of 
Lycophron, beyond his victory over the Larisreans : Hellen. ii. 3, 4; eclipse 
of the sun on September 3d, 404. Probably the commencement of his 
Tyrannis (a different view is taken by Hamming, de Iasone). Aristippus 
(Trie£6fxei>os vnb tuv avTia-Tao-icoiw) supported by Cyrus on condition of his 
not making peace without Cyrus' consent (a proof of the intention of that 
prince to obtain influence in the affairs of Greece): Anab. i. 1, 10. After the 
departure of the auxiliaries under Meno the power of Lycophron is again 
extended with the aid of Sparta (Pharsalus probably conquered by both in 
common), up to the intervention of the Thebans and Argives, who con- 
jointly with the Aleuade Medius expel the Lacedaemonians from Pharsalus 
(Diod. xiv. 82), 01. xcvi. 2, b. c. 395. Medius caused the Pharsalians to be 
sold into slavery (he therefore regarded the citizens as his enemies). New 
supremacy of the Aleuadae; on the return of Agesilaus, Thessaly was 
hostile to him (Hellen. iv. 3, 3). Hereupon again ensued an extension of the 
power of the Tyrant of Pherae, and the great massacre of the mercenaries 
of Medius (Aristot. Hist. Anion, ix. 31), which is without reason referred by 
Schneider ad Xen. and by Du Mesnil, de Rebus Phars. to the capture of the 
city in the Corinthian War. Cf. Liebinger, de Rebus Pheroeis, and Pahle, Zur 
Geschichte der pherdisctten Tyrannis, Neue Jahrb.fiir Philol., 1866, p. 530. 

chap, ii.j 2'he Offensive Wars of Thebes. 465 

and probably his son-in-law, a man of uncommon mental 
power, thoroughly adapted by his accurate acquaintance 
with the times, and by his unwearied energy in obtaining 
and turning to account new resources, for converting a 
small into a great state. He was a man in the style of 
Themistocles, and at the same time, notwithstanding his 
intellectual superiority and princely birth, charmed all 
men by his courtesy and freedom from haughty pride in 
his nobility. He was in a high degree gifted with the 
cunning, which it was the custom to regard as a Thessalian 
characteristic, and for which the endless party-intrigues 
formed a good school. Nor was he over-conscientious in 
his choice of means ; but he knew how to moderate his 
ambition ; he was free from tyrannical whims, a man of 
chivalrous sentiments, controlling himself, and just to 
others. Of his duty in life he had a worthy conception, 
and regarded true intellectual culture as its primary con- 
dition. He was familiar with the best circles of Attic 
society ; a friend of Timotheus and Isocrates, and an ad- 
miring pupil of Gorgias. 

Iason was animated by no ordinary ambition ; for he 
recognized that the condition of the times made a claim 
upon himself and his people ; which claim he desired to 
satisfy. Hellas needed a state wielding a primary power, 
if it was not to exhaust its strength in internal conflicts, 
and to sink into absolute dependence upon Persia. And 
it seemed as if such a position of prominence properly 
belonged above all to the northern tribes, whose strength 
was still unwasted. The Macedonians and Epirotes were 
too much strangers to the Greeks and at too low a stage 
of civilization. Thessaly, on the other hand, was in point 
of fact the home of the noblest branches of the Greek 
people, the most ancient seat of its common religious and 
political systems. Abounding in resources of every de- 
scription, all that was necessary, if the greatest future was 

to be secured to the Thessalian people, was to regulate its 


466 History of Greece. [BooeV* 

political system anew, to remove the ancient rule of the 
nobility, the mainspring of incessant disputes, and to unite 
the whole strength of the population under a princely 
house trained in Greek culture. For the states of the 
second rank, which asserted themselves against Sparta, 
could not possibly successfully compete with a united 
Thessaly. Who therefore was to dispute with Iason the 
leadership of the Hellenes ? But in order to incline the 
individual states to resign a complete independence for the 
sake of unity, and to overcome their aversion to a mo- 
narchical supremacy, it was necessary to be able to offer a 
prospect of national glory and spoils of victory. This 
Iason thought to obtain by leading the Hellenes once more 
against Persia. The union of Thessaly, a single undivided 
Hellas from Mount Olympus to Crete, and a Persian war 
under Thessalian leadership, — these, then, were the ends 
of the bold prince of Pherse ; and from the same shores, 
whence of old European Greeks had launched their first 
ships into the sea (vol. i. p. 98), from the ancestral home 
of the Minyae, the beginning of a new order of things in 
Hellas seemed now to proceed. 

Iason In Thessaly there existed several kinds of 

master of subject tribes. Some were subject to individual 

Ihessaly. J J 

01 ci 3 city-communities; others paid tribute to the 
(b. c. 374). whole body of the ruling cities; and again 
others only apparently and temporarily recognized those 
cities as supreme. These various groups of tribes Iason, 
following in the course already commenced by Lycophron, 
contrived to attach to himself; the Dolopes and other 
mountain peoples did homage to him. Hereby he gradu- 
ally undermined the power of the cities, so that even these, 
one after another, were forced to join him ; nor did he ever 
neglect to make the conditions of adherence to him as ac- 
ceptable as possible, since he was not anxious to destroy, 
but only to unite. In the year 374 he was no longer defied 
by any city but Pharsalus on the Enipeus. Here he met 

chap, ii.] The Offensive Wars of Thebes. 467 

with resolute resistance. The most eminent among the 
leaders of the party of the old nobility, Polydamas, had 
been chosen chief-justice of the city here; and Pharsalus 
was the last stronghold of the ancient Thessalian system 
of government. Polydamas placed his hopes upon Sparta, 
which state had in the meantime changed its Thessalian 
policy, and now deemed it its duty to oppose the power of 
the Pheraean prince. But all action on the part of Sparta 
was prevented by Thebes. Iason attached the greatest 
importance to a specific settlement. He wished to hold 
sway only according to lawful forms, to which the country 
was accustomed; he therefore sought the dignity of the 
captain-generalship, the rayeia ; and the innovation desired 
by him simply consisted in this : that this dignity should 
not be for all eternity a hereditary possession of the 
Adeuadse and Scopadse, but accessible to that house which 
by the personal eminence of its members and by its general 
position of power was naturally marked out for the leader- 
ship. A term was granted to Polydamas, for awaiting 
Spartan support. When this failed to make its appear- 
ance, he surrendered the citadel ; Iason was now recognized 
as general-in-chief throughout Thessaly ; and it amounted 
to a triumph for his policy, that this had been accomplished 
without the application of force, and that no devastations 
or expulsions had been necessary, which would have led to 
the intervention of foreign states. 

Iason proved himself worthy of the confi- Hig licy 
dence bestowed upon him. The ancient insti- in Thessaly 
tutions of the country were not abolished, but only regu- 
lated afresh. Thus in particular the taxation of the free 
peasants and of the tributary serfs or Penestse (vol. iii. p. 
576). On this head much confusion and arbitrary imposi- 
tion had occurred, which provoked a just discontent and 
kept Thessaly in an uninterrupted state of agitation. Iason 
recurred to the legal provisions, issued by one of the Sco- 
padse as the head of the confederation. But what was 

468 History of Greece. [Bookvi 

of primary importance in his eyes, was to regulate and 
raise the military strength of the land, which had hitherto 
exhausted itself in foreign mercenary service and internal 
party-conflicts. Notwithstanding the full measure of liberty 
which Thessaly left to the individual cities, it was to be a 
single whole in its military constitution ; it was by means 
of a common army, placed at the disposal of the leader of 
the land, more and more to coalesce in all its parts, and to 
learn to understand its own strength. Iason himself kept 
up a well-disciplined army of mercenaries; to which were 
added the contingents levied in the Thessalian towns. He 
was unwearied in developing the organization of his troops, 
and within a short time was able to assemble under him 
20,000 men in full panoply, besides a large number of 
light-armed soldiers and 8,000 picked horsemen. At the 
head of such a force, always ready for battle, he could 
already look upon himself as the master of Greece, which 
could not, with its civic militias and isolated bands of mer- 
cenaries, be equal to a contest with an army like this. 
Nor was the danger unperceived by the more far-sighted 
of the Greeks. They beheld with anxious expectation the 
cloud gathering in the north and slowly drawing nearer, 
which threatened their liberty. 

nd in Hei- Iason, however, proceeded with caution. 

las - In the first instance he sought to strengthen 

himself by combinations with foreign powers, and amoug 
these no ally was more important for him than Alcetas of 
Epirus, in conjunction with whom he was assured of the 
whole mountain-country in the rear of the Greek states. 
In order to be also able to take the latter in the flank, and 
to be master of the most important routes by sea, he 
needed the island of Eubcea. Here he established in 
several cities despots who did homage to him, — e. g., the 
Tyrant Neogenes at Histisea, on the north coast of the 
island. It was far more difficult to bring about the right 
state of relations with Central Greece, where the new im- 

chap, ii.] fphe Offensive Wars of Thebes. 469 

portance acquired by Thebes was a very considerable ob- 
stacle in the way. He perceived more clearly than any 
of his contemporaries how this importance rested upon 
Epaminondas, whose strict sense of right he is said re- 
peatedly to have attempted to shake, so as to involve him 
in his own schemes of personal ambition. But after fail- 
ing in this, he could not hesitate about joining Epaminon- 
das as an ally; for it was in perfect accordance with 
his own interests, that Sparta should be crippled, and the 
Peloponnesian confederacy broken up. He therefore 
united himself with the Thebans, in so confidential a 
fashion, that he gave to his daughter the name of Thebe, 
and appeared without delay on the battle-field of Leuctra, 
in order to congratulate the victorious allies and take 
counsel with them as to ulterior measures. His advice to 
them, to abstain from an attack upon the Spartan camp, 
was, although right in itself, yet hardly given without 
secondary motives of a selfish character ; for he could not 
desire a complete rout of Sparta, inasmuch as the continu- 
ance of the war between the Hellenic states promoted his 
personal ends. 

The Thebans, in their turn, could not but begin to en- 
tertain doubts as to the honest intentions of their ally. 
For instead of contenting himself with having on this oc- 
casion for the first time showed himself with his splendid 
army in Central Greece, he employed his homeward 
march for his selfish purposes in an extremely palpable 
way. For he passed up from the plain of the Cephisus 
through the little valley of the Assus, and on his march 
fell upon the city of Hyampolis, which at this point shut 
off the access from the north into Phocis and Bceotia ; he 
then possessed himself of Heraclea (vol. iii. p. 143), which 
fell into his hands by treason, and destroyed its fortifica- 
tions, while he distributed its country territory among the 
CEtseans and Malians, and thereby made friends of these 
tribes. He thus became master of Thermopylae. la 

470 History of Greece. [BookVI 

other words, he only departed in order to return, and he 
destroyed the gates which might have been shut in his 

After his return home he redoubled his activity. The 
highland tribes of Northern Thessaly, in particular the 
Perrhaebians, were incorporated in his military organiza- 
tion, partly by amicable agreement, partly by force ; the 
armaments and manoeuvres were continued without inter- 
ruption : Thessaly had become one vast military camp ; 
while on the sea too, in the ancient roads of the Argonauts, 
the construction of ships-of-war began. Pherae was the 
centre and focus of the entire country ; the ancient families 
of the grandees had been gained over, or made safe by 
means of hostages, who lived at the court of Pherae; a 
single will ruled from Thermopylae to the pass of Tempe. 
No doubt existed, but that Iason would soon make his real 
intentions manifest ; and Epaminondas, too, naturally felt 
himself very unpleasantly hindered in his undertakings. 

The feeling of anxious expectation increased, when in 

iason at tne s P rm o °f tne vear 370 the tidings spread, 
Delphi. that Iason would make his appearance at Del- 

tB.'c C1 370). phi for the approaching festival of the Pythia, 
in the character of supreme military chief, 
clothed in the full splendor of his power. Incredible ru- 
mors flew about. A contribution towards the sacrificial 

* Iason makes his appearance in Thessalian history in a way hitherto 
unexplained. That he succeeded to the Tyrannis by hereditary right, is 
already made probable by the name of his son Lycophron. Now Lycophron 
and his brothers (Tisiphonus and Pitholaus) were stepsons of Iason, and 
only o/u.o/u.r/Tpioi of Thebe (Photius, Bibl. p. 142). It is therefore very proba- 
ble that the lady who was Iason's second wife was a daughter (and the only 
child) of the elder Lycophron, as has been shown by Pahle, u. s. He conjec- 
tures Iason to be identical with the party-leader Prometheus (vol. iii. p. 
543), and to have exerted himself in conjunction with Critias on behalf of 
Lycophron already in the year 406, when he was about twenty-four years of 
age. The identity of the two personages was already suspected by Wytten- 
bach, because the story of the assassin, who involuntarily performs a 
successful operation (Val. Max. i. 8, ext. 6; Plut. Mor. 890), is referred to 
both. — Alcetas: Hellen. vi. 1, 7. Neogenes: Diod. xv. 30. Polydamas « 
mo-i$io9 apxw- Sievers, 323.— Hyampolis and Heraclea: Hdkn. vi. 4, 27. 

chap, ii.] T he Qff em { ve yr ars f Thebes. 471 

expedition had been imposed upon all the cities of Thessaly 
according to the standard of their prosperity ; and which- 
ever furnished the finest bull as leader of the procession, 
was to receive the prize of a golden wreath. Thus 1,000 
bulls were collected, and more than tenfold the number of 
other beasts of sacrifice, sheep, goats, and swine. In this 
monster hecatomb the wealth of the country was to present 
itself to the god, while a selection of the troops attested 
the vigor of Thessaly, regenerate for a new life. Iason's 
design was to make an exhibition at Delphi of his regal 
power. But he intended something beyond this. 

Delphi was the link by which Thessaly had remained 
connected with Hellas through the course of all the cen- 
turies ; and the institutions of the Amphictyonic League 
furnished the clearest evidence of an age, when the Thes- 
salian tribes had formed a great popular whole with those 
who had emigrated southwards. In recalling this con- 
nexion, Iason therefore, by means of the grand homage 
paid by him to the Delphic god, not merely intended to 
attest himself as the new territorial sovereign of Thessaly, 
and to cause himself to be after a certain fashion recog- 
nized as such, (and indeed it was an ancient Thessalian 
usage for the chief of the country to be designated by the 
Oracle,) but also to revive the relations with Delphi, which 
had become an empty form, in a manner suitable to the 
times. And since of the twelve votes in the Amphictyonic 
Council seven belonged to the tribes of Thessaly, which 
were united under his supremacy, he designed to found a 
claim on this circumstance, for obtaining a position corres- 
ponding to his power in the system of the Greek states, to 
assert his honorary right to the protection of the Oracle 
and to the direction of the festival, and to lay the founda- 
tion for a new union of the tribe and states. Doubtless 
the sagacious prince had already long since entered into 
combinations at Delphi itself; and assuredly among the 
influential personages there many anticipated a new period 

472 History of Greece. t BoOK vi 

of splendor for Delphi, and were not disinclined to support 
the claims of Iason. They likewise calmed the apprehen- 
sions of the population, which not without reason suspected 
Iason to have also the treasures of Delphi in view, by 
causing the god to declare, that he might be left to himself 
to take the care of his treasures. 

Assassi- ^he Py tn i an festival was at hand ; the great 

Son 11 ° f sacrificial processions had set themselves in 
01. cii. 3 motion, and the king was holding his final re- 

view of the cavalry, with which he intended 
to make his entry at Delphi. In all the vigor of his youth 
he stood on the threshold of the great future, with his self- 
consciousness strengthened by manifold, almost miraculous, 
tests and brilliant success, and full of confidence in his 
good fortune. The review was over. He sat on his throne 
under the open sky, in order to receive personal petitions. 
It was then that a group of seven youths approached him, 
in order to prefer a joint request ; but no sooner had they 
surrounded him, than they fell upon and murdered him. 
One of the conspirators, who had been impelled to the 
deed by the infliction of a punishment injurious to their 
honor, was during the execution of the murder slain by 
the body-guard ; a second was overtaken in his flight. The 
rest effected their escape on the horses which had been 
held in readiness, and were at divers places honored as 
men who had rendered a service to the liberty of the Hel- 
lenes, — a clear sign of the view which had been taken of 
the most recent proceedings of Iason. 

With him the whole future of Thessaly was 

The sue- J 

cessors of carried to the grave. The sons whom he left 

Iason. ° 

behind him were under age. The supremo 
military command was therefore conferred upon his bro- 
thers, Polydorus and Polyphron. The latter ruled for a 
year, after making away with his brother, and was then 
himself murdered by Alexander, a kinsman of the house, 
who pretended to be the avenger of Polyphron, but who, 

Chap. II.] The Offensive Wars of Thebes. 473 

instead of according to his promise overthrowing the Ty- 
rannis, possessed himself of it. It is only when we contem- 
plate the state of things which ensued after Iason's death, 
that we fully realize his greatness. For although Alexan- 
der married the daughter of Iason, and prepared to carry 
on the work of his predecessor, yet the contrary of all that 
Iason had sought to bring about actually came to pass : 
instead of a lawful government, savage despotism ; instead 
of union of the land, division and discord ; instead of a 
power reaching beyond the boundaries of Thessaly, weak- 
ness, intervention from abroad, and dependence upon 
foreign powers.* 

The acts of government ascribed to Alexander are mere 
outbreaks of passionate fury against individual adversaries, 
against entire communities, and above all against the 
ancient enemies of his house, the members of the Thessa- 
lian aristocracy. Already Polyphron had caused the 
Pharsalian Poly da mas, whom Iason had wisely spared, to 
be assassinated. Alexander once more provoked agitation 
among the Aleudse, who had already learnt to sub- 
mit to the new order of things, by his prosecution of 
them, so that they applied for aid to Macedonia. The re- 
sult was that Amyntas, the son of Alexander, invaded 
Thessaly, where, as he found no army ready to ward him 
off, he occupied the cities of Larisa and Crannon. But 
his auxiliary expedition was manifestly nothing but an 
attempt at extending his own power ; he began to establish 
himself in the valley of the Peneus as in a Macedonian 
province, and the Thessalians, disappointed in their hopes, 
now asked succor from Thebes. 

The amicable relations between Thebes and Pherae had 
been already disturbed in the last year of Iason's life by 

* Iason and Delphi: Corp. Inscr. Gr., i. p. 811. His schemes against Persia ' 
Isocr. v. 119. Assassination iitiovroiv HvOiutv, Diod. xv. 57 ; Hellen. vi. 4, 29. 
— Alexander and Thebe : Pint. Pelop. 28 (he afterwards wooed the widew of 
his father-in-law ; who was therefore the second wife of the latter, and 
probably a Theban lady : Hellen. vi. 4, 37). 

474 History of Greece. (BookVL 

Th b n i - ^ ne uftEustakable designs of his ambition. The 
tervention in Thebans were of course still less inclined to 


Missions of make common cause with his successors. Taught 

Pelopidas. ° 

369-8 experience by recent events, they necessarily 
gave a keener attention to Thessalian affairs ; 
it behooved them to allow neither a Tyrannis of over- 
bearing power to be erected, nor on the other hand a 
firm footing to be established there by Macedonia. Their 
line of policy was accordingly clearly marked out for them ; 
it was to protect the Thessalian cities against all oppression, 
whether from within or from without, and to be the cham- 
pions of the autonomy of the communities here as they 
were in Peloponnesus, so as thereby to secure their influence 
in the country. Their successes against Sparta had 
heightened their courage, so that they unhesitatingly 
entered upon a new theatre of war ; and about the period 
when Epaminondas was for the second time marching 
through Peloponnesus, Pelopidas led a Theban army into 

His proceedings there led to the most favorable results. 
He liberated Larisa, and regulated the affairs of Thessaly 
on the principles of free communal constitutions ; and 
then passed on into Macedonia, where he settled the dis- 
putes as to the throne, which had broken out between 
Alexander and the pretender Ptolemseus. The proud 
Aleuadse placed themselves under the protection of 
Thebes ; the king of Macedonia gave his brother as a 
hostage into the hands of Pelopidas ; and the Tyrant of 
Pherse consented to a treaty, in which he had to recognize 
the independence of the liberated cities, and doubtless to 
promise a military contingent to the Thebans. 

The untrustworthy character of Alexander soon neces- 
sitated a second mission. Meanwhile the authority of 
Thebes in Thessaly seemed to have been so firmly estab- 
lished, and Pelopidas personally had so much confidence 
in himself and in his good cause, that he undertook to gq 

Cuxf. il] y/ie Offensive Wars of Thebes. 475 

to Thessaly without an army and accompanied only by 
Ismenias, in order to call the Tyrant to account; — a pro 
ceeding which quite recalls the security and self-confidence 
with which the officers of Sparta had formerly appeared 
in the Greek states (vol. i. p. 312). He hereupon col- 
lected a body of mercenaries, with whom he passed into 
Macedonia, where King Alexander had been slain by 
Ptoleinaeus. Having been deserted by his mercenaries, he 
fell into great danger here ; but Ptolemaeus attached too 
high an importance to a good understanding with Thebes, 
and concluded a fair treaty w r ith Pelopidas. He met with 
worse fortune on his way back. He marched with a 
newly-hired body of mercenaries against Pharsalus, with 
the intent of chastising the troops which had betrayed 
him ; and here unexpectedly met with a strong p e i pidas 
army of the Tyrant of Pherse, who took ad- gfiJfEgJS 
vantage of Pelopidas' want of caution, to make erSj 
prisoners of him and his companion. 

This act of violence suddenly changed the situation of 
affairs. It was the signal for a new war. Thebes eagerly 
armed, while Alexander of Pherse had to look out for 
other allies. He accordingly applied to Athens, because 
there he might presume most jealousy to prevail against 
Thebes ; nor was he deceived in his expectation. The 
Athenians joyously accepted his money and his homage, 
immediately concluded an alliance with him, and de- 
spatched thirty ships and 1,000 foot-soldiers in his support. 
But the chief advantage now reaped by the Tyrant lay in 
the fact, that the Thebans had at that time voluntarily 
deprived themselves of their best general. Epaminondas 
had been dismissed from office (p. 461) ; he was serving as 
a private soldier under Cleomenes. The army was not in- 
considerable ; it numbered 7,000 well-armed warriors and 
700 horsemen ; but the true leadership was wanting. 
Cleomenes and Hypatus had made a rapid advance, but 
were forced by lack of supplies to retreat, without being 

476 History of Greece. [BookVL 

able to give battle to the enemies swarming around them. 
But it was during the retreat itself that their troubles first 
began. The enemy was enabled by his superior strength 
in horsemen and light-armed troops to inflict extreme 
damage upon the Thebans ; they lost many men, and 
fiually were reduced to so disastrous a condition, that the 
army unanimously demanded Epaminondas as its leader. 
No sooner had he assumed its direction, than confidence 
and order was restored ; the terror inspired by his name 
crippled the attacks of the foe, and the skilfulness of his 
generalship preserved the army. 

and liberated. The ^est TQ su\t of this unfortunate campaign 
01. ciii. i (b. was the revulsion which took place in the 
c. 368). sentiments of the Thebans towards Epami- 

nondas, and his re-establishment in the office of general. 
After filling up the gaps in the army, so far as this was 
indispensable, he immediately took the field again (b. c. 
368 or 367 ; 01. ciii. 1), in order to break the arrogance of 
the Tyrant, before the latter could firmly establish himself 
in the land. It was a difficult task ; for the life of Epami- 
nondas' friend was in danger, if Alexander were driven to 
desperate measures. Epaminondas contrived to solve the 
problem ; by his resolute proceedings in Thessaly he 
managed completely to discourage the enemy, so that the 
latter regarded it as a great piece of good fortune, when a 
truce of thirty days was granted him on condition of his 
surrendering his prisoners. But for Pelopidas even the 
period of his imprisonment had been a season of glory ; 
for in it he had proved his indomitable heroism, and 
even while his life depended upon the will of the Ty- 
rant, had expressed his loathing of him with courageous 

Although in fact no definite ends had been secured by 
the truce, yet it was necessary for the present to rest satis- 

* Pelopidasin Thessaly : Diod. xi. 67; Plut. Pelop. 26 ff.; Polyb. yiii. 1. 

chap, ii.] y^ Offensive Wars of Thebes. 477 

fied with the results obtained ; for in the meantime other 
and more important transactions had come into the fore- 
ground, which for the next few years diverted the attention 
of the Thebans from Thessaly. Thebes had been victorious 
in the north and in the south ; she was indisputably the 
most powerful state of the Greek mainland, the only state 
which pursued a definite policy and counted among its 
citizens men naturally qualified to lead Greece. 

In spite of these successes the result was small. The 
old system had been destroyed, the overbearing power of 
Sparta had been annihilated; but instead of a new and 
fixed order of relations, there was perceptible among the 
Hellenic tribes nothing but an increase of agitation and 

In the first instance, Sparta, although deeply 
humbled, was not utterly crippled; she still federates of 
maintained herself by means of the fidelity of 
some of her confederates, who either, as e. g. Epidaurus, 
had never wavered, or in opposition to Thebes had now 
attached themselves to Sparta more closely than ever, as 
above all Corinth and Phlius; moreover, Sparta was as- 
sured of the favorable sentiments of Athens, and had 
found an important ally in Dionysius of Syracuse. 

Again, the states in Peloponnesus, which had 

7 . Lycomedes 

taken arms against Sparta, were in relations in Arcadia. 
of anything but concord with one another and /b ^^ 4 
with Thebes. Hitherto Thebes had been the 
leader of the Peloponnesian Separate League. She had 
given the example and the impulse to the rising; Epami- 
nondas had directed it ; to him were in the main due all 
the results which had been achieved; and his unselfish 
policy was assuredly suited for meriting a perfect confi- 
dence. The Arcadian people, suddenly disturbed in its 
rural conditions of life, and drawn without preparation into 
the political movement of the times, was incapable of set- 

478 History of Greece. [BookVI. 

tling into moderation and stability. Passionate orators 
gained influence over the assemblies which met in the mar- 
ket-place of Megalopolis, and which were entirely devoid 
of men, who, experienced in public affairs, spoke the lan- 
guage of prudence. The leading orator was Lycomedes 
of Mantinea. The Arcadians, he said, were the most an- 
cient people of the peninsula, and at the same time the 
most numerous and the most warlike. Their arm was 
needed wherever brave men were in requisition, in the east 
and in the west of the Hellenic world. Without them, the 
Spartans would never have reached Athens, nor the The- 
bans Sparta and Gytheum. Why, then, should they 
always only shed their blood for the glory of foreigners, 
and be the squires of others? An end ought to be put to 
this. The Arcadians could shift for themselves. As in- 
habitants of the central land, of the heart of the peninsula, 
they were not only the first settlers in it, but also its natu- 
ral lords and masters, and only by establishing this mas- 
tership would they secure the real prize of the struggle, 
and set the true seal upon their newly-acquired indepen- 

Hitherto Lycomedes became the hero of the day. He 
was omnipotent ; he filled up according to his choice the 
posts in the administration and in the army ; he introduced 
a demagogic dictatorship, and excited among the Arca- 
dians a transport of ardor for war. He bade them now 
prove, that they stood in no need of the Thebans for the 
execution of the glorious deeds. They hastened to the aid 
of the Argives, who had in the course of an attack upon 
Epidaurus come to be hard pressed by the Athenians and 
Corinthians ; and they hereupon carried on the contest 
against Sparta on their own account. After they had 
taken Pallana in the upper valley of the Eurotas, they 
further endeavored to penetrate into the interior from 
the coast. They surprised Asine, the ancient seaport near 
Gytheum, overcame the garrison and slew its commander, 

chap, il] rpfe Qff en ^ ve yr ar8 j Thebes. 479 

the Spartiate Geranor. Of this style of warfare the 
Arcadians were masters ; as hardy Highlanders well prac- 
tised in the military craft, indefatigable pedestrians, and 
acquainted with all the roads, they were pre-eminently 
capable of terrifying their enemies by unexpected on- 
slaughts. The success of their expeditions raised their 
courage to a pitch of blind self-confidence, and wherever 
their bands arrived, they recklessly gave themselves up to 
a blind greed for booty. After this fashion 
they could not indeed make anv friends among between the 

' J ° Arcadians 

the Peloponnesians ; of whom the Eleans had and Eleans - 
the least cause for satisfaction with them. For in rising 
against Sparta the Eleans had chiefly had in view the re- 
covery of those parts of their territory which had been 
taken from them by the Spartans (p. 208). But the Ar- 
cadians had no intention of assisting them to this end ; 
they appealed to the circumstance, that the inhabitants of 
Triphylia declared themselves to be their fellow-tribes- 
men ; and they were by no means inclined to let slip this 
opportunity of extending the territory of Arcadia to the 
sea-coast. Thus a bitter hostility arose between the two 
neighboring states ; and since at the same time the The- 
bans were extremely wroth at the conduct of the Arcadi- 
ans, and justly complained of their ingratitude, a complete 
separation had come to pass between those states, whose 
common interests should have most caused them to rely 
upon one another. 

In order to heighten the confusion in Greek affairs, an 
intervention was added from abroad. 

At that time the satrapy of Phrygia was Attempte 
held by the Persian Ariobarzanes, a friend £omake CUS 
of Antalcidas. He from the first favored P eace - 
the Lacedaemonians, and was the less inclined , 01 * SiL\* 

(B. C. obe). 

to allow the annihilation of their state, be- 
cause he was himself secretly ambitious to extend his 
power and make himself independent. He was therefor© 

480 History of Greece. [Bookvi. 

interested in preserving those states from which he might at 
the critical moment look for support. He accordingly took 
advantage of the position of the Great King, as recognized 
in the Peace of Antalcidas, in order in his name to sum- 
mon a congress, which was to serve for the establishment 
of the national peace, but in reality to prevent the en- 
croachments of Arcadia and the further humiliation of 
Sparta. For this purpose Ariobarzanes had at command 
a skilful agent, who had already long enjoyed his confi- 
dence, a Greek of Abydus, Philiscus by name, who had 
made his fortune as a captain of mercenaries. This man 
appeared at Delphi with Persian powers, and, which was 
of more importance, with Persian money. Negotiations 
took place between the Lacedsemonians, the Athenians 
and the Thebans. The chief subject of discussion was 

It was endeavored to induce Thebes to give way on this 
head ; but it was of course out of the question that she 
should consent to destroy her own work, and to sacrifice 
Messenia with its newly completed city to the Spartans. 
Her refusal brought all negotiations to a standstill ; and 
Philiscus assembled an army of mercenaries, in order 
to proceed to active measures in favor of Sparta. Although 
he was himself recalled to Asia, he made over 2,000 mer- 
cenaries, paid by him in advance, to the Spartans, who 
thus after all alone profited from the confused condition 
of affairs. For the division which had occurred in the 
camp of their adversaries gave them fresh encouragement, 
which was increased by their agreements with the Atheni- 
ans, who prepared to furnish occupation to Thebes in the 
north, and by new succor from Sicily, consisting of Celtic 
bands in the pay of Dionysius. 

The For the Spartans it was now above all neces- 

sary " S sar y *° secure their own frontiers. The inso- 
of Sparta. l en t incursions of the Arcadians had provoked 

{■a n QfiQ \ 

an inexpressible wrath ; and yet the youthful 

Chap. II.] The Offensive Wars of Thebes. 481 

son of Agesilaus, the fiery Archidamus, was precisely the 
man to stimulate and take advantage of the hot eagerness 
for war possessing the Lacedaemonians. Accompanied by 
the Celtic auxiliaries, he passed up through the valley of 
the CEnus, took Caryse, and chastised the mountaineers for 
their defection ; and then penetrated into Southern Arca- 
dia. The Celts were soon on their way back to Sparta, be- 
cause, as their leader Cissides declared, their period of ser- 
vice had expired. But on their march back they were 
surrounded by the Messenians, so that they had in haste to 
apply for Spartan succor. Archidamus approached, but 
simultaneously the Arcadians and Argives also drew near, 
in such a fashion as to block the enemy's way back into 
Laconia. It had been an act of folly, to prevent the de- 
parture of the Celts ; but it was still more insane to oblige 
the hostile forces, at a moment when they were about to 
disperse, to common action and to a desperate self-defence. 
The most terrible punishment befell this arrogant self-con- 
fidence. The Spartans, fighting for their lives, under the 
lead of the son of their king, encouraged by his example 
and by favorable omens, charged their enemies with such 
vehemence, as to break them up in an instant. Nor could 
there be any question of an orderly retreat ; so that thou- 
sands were put to death by the horsemen and the Celts, 
while of the Lacedaemonians not a single man is stated to 
have fallen. This was the so-called " tearless victory " — a 
victory which after so many disasters first revived confi- 
dence at Sparta.* 

Agesilaus, accompanied by the authorities of the city, 
came forth to welcome his son with congratulations ; but 
the defeat of the Arcadians gave almost as much pleasure 
at Thebes and Elis as it had given at Sparta. It was re- 

* Lycomedes: Diod. xv. 69; 62 (here rightly J&avnvvfc) ; treated with 
great disfavor by Xenophon, Hellen. vii. 1, 23.— Ariobarzanes and Philiscus : 
Diod. xv. 90; Hellen. vii. 1, 27.— Pint. Ages. 33: oSaxpvs /max>) (Diod. xv. 72; 
Hellen. vii. 1, 22); at Midea or Malea Peloponnesoe, i. 336. 


482 History of Greece. [BooxVi 

cognized that arrogance had met with its just punishment, 
and it was hoped that the lesson given would have its 
effect. The Eleans hoped that concessions would be made 
to them with regard to Triphylia, and the Thebans, that 
the Arcadians would now perceive how they required pru- 
dent guidance, and without Thebes could do nothing. 

Epammondas was doubtless among all the Thebans 
most devoid of malicious satisfaction in the calamities of 
others ; he sorrowed to find confusion and quarrels inces- 
santly renewing themselves among the Greek states ; and 
he was anxious for nothing but to see a fixed order of 
things at last established. He had gained his main ob- 
jects, the union of Boeotia, the restriction of Sparta to her 
ancient territory, the regeneration of Messenia, the estab- 
lishment of the independence of Arcadia ; and he was 
solely intent upon having these results of his activity re- 
cognized as unalterable facts, and a system of international 
rights permanently founded upon them. He was ready to 
welcome any means leading to this result, so long as they 
were not opposed to his moral principles. It is therefore 
no matter of astonishment, that Thebes should have to this 
end applied to Persia ; nor is there any reason to assume, 
that this was done against the wish of Epaminondas. 
_ . For Thebes had from the first not stood in 


to snsa. the same attitude of enmity against Persia as 

(b.'c?368). had been assumed by the other states ; it was 
therefore no renunciation of her earlier history, such as 
was the case with Athens, for her to enter into negotiations 
with the Great King. Moreover, she sought no ally at 
Susa, as Sparta and Athens had done, nor was any man 
justified in accusing her of treason against the national 

The treaties had conceded a certain authority with re- 
gard to Greece to the Persians ; from them had proceeded 
the Peace, which constituted the basis of the existing sys- 
tem of states. The principles of the Peace of Antalcidas, 

Chap, ii.] j>j ie Offensive Wars of Thebes. 483 

which had only served the Spartans as means whereby to 
satisfy their ambition, had been first made a reality by 
Epaminondas. It would therefore be a great advantage, 
if by the recognition of these facts on the part of Persia 
the Spartans were deprived of their supposed legal basis of 
action. To regulate the state of relations between Greece 
and Persia, was after all the cardinal point of Greek for- 
eign policy and the special duty of the great power di- 
recting it ; and for Thebes to be able to negotiate as a 
great power at the court of Susa was therefore a great gain 
in the eyes of the Greeks themselves, as would be the re- 
cognition at that court of her claims to hold a position of 

To bring about a direct understanding, was moreover 
doubly important, because after the negotiations with 
Philiscus at Delphi (p. 480), whether he had actually re- 
ceived his powers from the Great King himself, or only 
from Ariobarzanes, Thebes might appear to have been the 
self-willed disturber of the peace. It behooved her to con- 
trovert this view, and to endeavor to assert her actual 
rights at Susa. Finally, the fact had to be taken into ac- 
count, that Sparta had already once more entered into 
fresh combinations with Persia, and that Athens enter- 
tained similar intentions. Sparta had after the death of 
Antalcidas deputed an envoy of the name of Euthycles. 
It therefore seemed necessary to counteract his en- 
deavors, lest the old Treaty of Peace should perchance be 
renewed, and Sparta be provided with resources for re- 
suming her old policy. To this circumstance accordingly 
the Thebans chiefly pointed, when they called upon their 
confederates to arrange a joint embassy to Susa. The 
Arcadians and Eleans responded to the summons ; and 
Pelopidas and Ismenias conducted the embassy in the 
name of Thebes. The Athenians hastened to depute Leon 
and Timagoras, to represent their interests in Susa. The 
envoys seem this time also, as had been done on former 


History of Greece. 

[Book VL 

occasions (vol. iii. p. 514), to have travelled unsuspicious* 
ly in one another's company. 

At the Persian court the envoys of course were highly 
welcome ; for their mission amounted to a new concession 
on the part of the Hellenes, that they could not manage 
their affairs without the Great King, and to a new hom- 
age voluntarily offered to his power. The bloody war be- 
tween the states was converted into a diplomatic contest, 
which was decided by the personal character and action 
of the envoys. 

The Thebans had the advantage from the first. They 
were preceded by the fame of their deeds ; and after the 
sufferings which the Persians had had to undergo from 
the arrogance of Agesilaus, they welcomed the news of 
Leuctra as joyful tidings, and admired the heroes who 

contrived to restrict to the valley of the Eurotas the very 
state which had only recently intended to conquer Asia. 
Antalcidas personally experienced the revulsion in the 
sentiments of the Persian court towards Sparta ; his pro- 
posals were frigidly rejected ; and, meeting with contempt 
at home as well as at Susa, he is said in the depth of his 
vexation to have committed suicide. 

Neither with Sparta nor with Athens had the Persians 
been able to establish permanent relations of confidence ; 
the case was different with Thebes. From this city the 
Persians had never met with ill-treatment ; they had been 
connected with it by relations of mutual hospitality since 
the days of Xerxes (vol. ii. p. 315) ; Thebes had at that 
time been their most faithful ally, and had in consequence 
of her fidelity been made to undergo extreme hardships. 
Now, gratefulness was one of the most prominent charac- 
teristics of the Persians ; and they likewise had a just esti- 
mation of true manliness. Thus a decisive significance at- 
tached to the chivalrous individuality of Pelopidas, to his 
generous bearing, and absolute unselfishness ; while he 
was admirably supported in the transaction of business by 

Chap.ii.j 2}^ Of ens ; ve Wars of Thebes. 485 

the adroitness of Ismenias. In comparison with the other 
embassies, the Thebans were given full credit Pelo .. 
for their straightforwardness of speech, clear- and Artaxer- 
ness of intentions, and open honesty of expres- Q . ... 
sion. Pelopidas was unmistakably preferred c. 368-7). 
to all the rest, and his proposals were thoroughly ap- 
proved by the Great King. In the first instance, there- 
fore, an end was put to the relations between Sparta and 
Persia, as set on foot by Antalcidas ; Sparta ceased to be 
the state exclusively enjoying the confidence of Persia. 
Next, the condition of things brought about by Thebes 
was recognized as lawfully established — in particular, 
therefore, the independence of Messenia. But Thebes de- 
sired yet more than this. At the present moment, when 
she was endeavoring firmly to establish her position, no 
state was more in her way than Athens, with whom she 
had in all sincerity, but without success, endeavored to es- 
tablish amicable relations. Thebes might feel convinced, 
that the Athenians would oppose and hinder every step 
forward taken by her in Peloponnesus as well as in Thes- 
saly and Macedonia ; and a feeling of bitterness on her 
part against Athens was only natural. Now, for Persia 
too the Attic fleet was invariably an object of more ap- 
prehensions than was anything else ; and thus the The- 
bans were gratified by a royal decree, containing the deep- 
est humiliation for Athens, viz. the order that she should 
dismantle her ships-of-war and draw them on shore, in 
other words disarm and make herself defenceless. Her 
claims on Amphipolis too, although they had been recog- 
nized at the congress in Sparta, were expressly rejected, 
that city being placed under the royal protection. 

The result of the embassy to Susa was R eS uits of 
equivalent to a fresh victory for Thebes. A the embassy. 
transformation of the Peace of Antalcidas in 01. cm. 1 (a. 

c. 368-7). 

her favor had been brought to pass ; a new 

system of states under Persian superintendence had been 

48G History of Greece. [Book vl 

established in compliance with her proposals ; Thebes, in- 
timately allied with Persia, had obtained a recognition of 
her primacy, and was entrusted with the execution of the 
treaties. But how insecure were these results ; how little 
reliance could be placed upon the Great King on the one 
hand, and on the other upon the assent of the Greek states 
to the agreement concluded at Susa ! 

The latter became evident first. For when hereupon a 
congress of states was summoned to Thebes, where a new 
confederacy was to be formed on the basis of the treaty, 
nothing was effected. Not one of the envoys declared 
that he was furnished with powers to take the oath ; while 
of all the states represented the Arcadians showed the 
sternest front, whose envoy at Susa had found himself 
treated with less consideration than the Elean, and had 
given the most vivid description of the miserable condi- 
tion of the Persian empire to his countrymen. Lycomedes 
therefore protested at Thebes against any intervention 
of Persian authority, entirely disputed the right of the 
Thebans to hold the diets in their city, and finally in the 
name of Arcadia formally seceded from the congress. 

Hereupon the Thebans attempted another way of pro- 
cedure. They sent envoys to the several states individu- 
ally, and propounded the treaty for their acceptance. But 
this attempt likewise failed. The Corinthians, giving 
reasons similar to those advanced by the Arcadians, defi- 
antly refused acceptance ; and the envoys returned home 
with the royal letter, without having achieved anything. 
The entire endeavor to assert a claim, sanctioned by the 
express authority of the Great King, to the hegemony, and 
to establish a new system of states by Persian mediation, 
proved fruitless. Thebes met with a stronger resistance 
than she had expected ; and this resistance was all the 
more unpleasant, because it gave itself the aspect of 
honorable and national motives, although in reality it was 
only caused by an obstinate determination on the part of 

chap. ii. ] The Offensive Wars of Thebes. 487 

individual states, to pursue each the policy of its own 
particular choice. Iu any case Thebes could not but per- 
ceive, that force of arms alone could bring about a fixed 
system of relations.* 

Thebes, therefore, once more armed; and Third 
Epaminondas, whose successful operations in I^fon^nto 
Thessaly had restored to him the full conn- f|^P° n - 
dence of his fellow-citizens, for the third time m 

led an army into Peloponnesus. Corinth and ( B - c - 3G7 )- 
Arcadia maintaining a hostile attitude, it was now indis* 
pensable to establish a firm footing at other points ; and 
for this purpose no region was more important than 
Achaia, because it was of the highest importance for Thebes 
to have the control of the Corinthian Gulf. In Thebes 
the coast-towns of Achaia aristocratic constitu- and Achaia - 
tions prevailed, such as had been set up there < B - c - 367 -> 
during the period of Spartan supremacy. Summer. 
Epaminondas proceeded here with the highest wisdom ; 
he pledged himself to the families which directed the pub- 
lic affairs of the several communities, that no violent 
changes should take place ; so that, being far distant from 
Sparta, they without difficulty joined the Thebans, while 
at the same time they renounced the cities on the opposite 
shore dependent upon them, viz. Naupactus and Calydon. 
This was a genuine gain for the power of the Thebans in 
the Corinthian Gulf; and likewise for their power by land, 
because they now no longer needed the passes of the Isth- 
mus, in order to reach Peloponnesus. 

* The embassy to Artaxerxes (Hellen. vii. 1, 33 ; Plut, Pelop. 30; Artax. 22) 
is placed by Grote, on insufficient grounds, before the detention in prison 
of Pelopidas. Schafer, Demosth. i. 82 ; Sievers, 2S5, 397. Antalcidas' suicide 
by refusal of food : Plut. Artax. 22. — Persian guarantee for the autonomy of 
Amphipolis demanded : Demosth. xix. 137; Rehdantz, Iph. 131. The provi- 
sions hostile to Amphipolis are certainly not creditable to the Thebans; 
but it should be taken into account that Amphipolis had itself driven the 
Thebans to this policy, because it so coldly declined any connexion with 
Thebes, and thereby made impossible the establishment of a fixed order 
in Greek affairs by means of Greek states. 

488 History of Greece. [BookVL 

These measures, notwithstanding, produced much dis 
content in Thebes itself, and still more among the confed* 
erates. That the governing families should have been 
tenderly treated, was declared to be treason against the 
principle of popular liberty acknowledged by all the states 
in arms against Sparta ; inasmuch as the bond between 
them, their union and common strength, was democracy. 
Cities governed by aristocrats never ceased to remain 
secret allies of Sparta ; and whoever anywhere maintained 
and supported the aristocrats, could not but be in secret 
connivance with the Spartans. So little was the policy of 
Epaminondas understood, who certainly had a loftier end 
in view than a democratic propaganda, and who desired 
not to excite party-passions, but to appease them. 

The Arcadians made complaints at Thebes, where they 
found willing listeners. The same party-spirit was domi- 
nant here, and it was thought necessary to treat the 
Arcadians with consideration, although no rational man 
could fail to perceive, that in spite of all concessions no 
reliance was to be placed upon that people. The Thebans 
therefore simply put an end to the treaties which had been 
concluded, sent governors into the cities of Achaia, and 
expelled the noble families. Thus fraternal unity had 
been re-established among the allies ; but at the same time 
the signal had been given for a new cival war, which 
seized upon the north of the peninsula and made itself as 
much felt among the Arcadians as anywhere. For the 
expelled families maintained themselves in Arcadia as 
armed bands, which, having been betrayed by Thebes, re- 
turned to the side of Sparta, and in expeditions of plunder 
laid a heavy hand upon the Arcadian borders, so as to 
avenge the injustice inflicted upon them.* 
„ . The example once set exercised its effects in 

Euphron 1 

ofSicyon. ve t other quarters. At Sicyon the internal 

* Interferences of Sparta in the affairs of the Aehseans : Thuc. v. 82,- 
Peloponnesos, i. 417. 

chap. ii. I f } ie Offensive Wars of Thebes. 489 

affairs of the city had been likewise left intact, and it had 
been thought sufficient to number this important commu- 
nity among the members of the confederacy. Among the 
noble Sicyonians a citizen of the name of Euphron now 
came forward, an ambitious man, upon whom special 
confidence had formerly been reposed at Sparta. This 
personage, in consequence of the proceedings in Achaia, 
entered into negotiations with the allies, and declared 
himself ready to overthrow the ruling families in Sicyon 
also, to establish a popular government there, and by these 
means for the first time to attach his native city in a 
really trustworthy manner to their cause. The Arcadi- 
ans and Argive3 eagerly assented to his proposals, and 
Euphron brought about a revolution, in consequence of 
which he became personally the commander of the troops 
and, with the aid of mercenaries, master of the city. The 
entire political system of the community was radically 
changed ; the ancient families were driven into exile ; 
their possessions were confiscated ; legal proceedings were 
instituted against all the members of the wealthier classes 
as pretended friends of Sparta ; property belonging to the 
temples was seized ; and a multitude of new citizens were 
admitted into the civic body. An absolute rule of force 
had been called into life ; and the new Tyrant carried on 
his proceedings with such violence, as in the end to oblige 
the allies themselves to interfere against him. Euphron 
had to take flight. While effecting his escape, he imme- 
diately changed his line of policy ; before embarking, he 
surrendered the port to the Spartans ; hastened to Athens, 
and returned thence with a band of mercenaries. But he 
was unable to maintain himself at Sicyon, and repaired to 
Thebes, in order here to intrigue for new combinations. 
Certain party-adversaries who had followed him to Thebes, 
murdered him in the Cadmea. The assassin justified his 
deed as Tyrannicide, and was acquitted ; but at Sicyon 
itself there remained so large a number of adherents of 


490 History of Greece. [ B °°* vi. 

this Euphron, that a tomb and sanctuary were erected to 
him as a Hero in the market-place. Thus we recognize 
in the case of Euphron the model type of the most reck- 
less personal ambition, and at the same time the uttei 
insecurity which characterized current opinion on men 
and on questions of public law. 

Thebes ^e a ff a ^ rs of Peloponnesus were yet further 

felsfon°of complicated by a fresh intervention on the 
oropus. p ar t f Athens. About this time the Athenians 

(b°c.' Si)' 2 l° st Oropus, the city at the mouth of the Aso- 
pus, the possession of which had been in dispute 
from ancient times, and which was a position they could, 
on account of the traffic with Eubcea, hardly afford to 
spare. They had lost it in the Decelean War (vol. iii. p. 
483), but had again recovered possession of it after the 
Peace of Antalcidas ; but since it had been the intention of 
the statesmen of Thebes to restore and unite Boeotia in its 
full extent, the important coast-district on the Euboean 
Sea could not but form a principal object of their atten- 
tion. It behooved them to endeavor to drive out the 
Athenians; and for this purpose a welcome opportunity 
was offered by the party-movements among the ever un- 
trustworthy and unsettled population of Oropus in the 
year after the Persian embassy. The party hostile to the 
Athenians was expelled by its adversaries; but subse- 
quently returned into the city with the aid of Euboean Ty- 
rants (p. 468.) The Athenians armed to recover possession 
of Oropus ; but before they had succeeded in this, the Thc- 
bans contrived to have the disputed city given up to them ; 
and no sooner had they once become masters of it, than 
they showed themselves fully determined to remain such.* 

* As to the chronology of events connected with Euphron, Xenophon is 
to be followed, as against Diod. xv. 17. Xenophon decisively dates the 
beginning of the Tyrannis after the third expedition of Epaminondas 
(Thirl wall, vol. v. p. 129).— Oropus : HeUen. vii. 4, 1 ; Diod. xv. 76. Polyzelua 
was then still archon, 01. ciii. 2, according to the new Schol. ad iEsch., \ 85 
Cf. Schilfer, Neue Jahrb. fur Philol, 1866, p. 26. 

chap, ilj T ] ie Off ms i ve Wars of Thebes. 491 

This occurrence produced extreme bitterness of feeling 
at Athens, and this not only against Thebes, but equally 
against the allies of Athens herself, in particular against 
Sparta, by whom she saw herself forsaken in return for all 
her services as an ally. And this feeling predominated to 
such a degree, that the Athenians not only withdrew their 
auxiliary forces from Peloponnesus, (which they did imme- 
diately after the outbreak of the disturbances at Oropus,) 
but also themselves assumed a hostile attitude against 
Sparta, and thus indirectly conferred an advantage upon 
the Thebans. 

The Athenians once more conceived the idea c . 
of availing themselves of the weakness of R ea ? e ™ ilh . 

° Corinth and 

Sparta, to play an independent part in Pelo- Phlius. 
ponnesus, (p. 435), and to establish a firm footing in the 
north of the peninsula. In this scheme they specially had 
Corinth in view, since they generally had troops at the 
Isthmus. But this intention resulted in its direct contrary. 
For the Corinthians were warned in time ; they were ut- 
terly sick of the troubles of war ; yet now, when they 
could put no trust in the Athenians, they were to maintain 
at their own expense the forces necessary for their protec- 
tion against Thebes. This became intolerable to them. 
They therefore took occasion from this new danger, with 
which they were menaced by their own confederates, to 
make representations as to their situation at Sparta. They 
declared that, loyal as they were, they must yet take steps 
to secure a neutral position. If they were to carry on the 
contest without ceasing, they would exhaust themselves to 
such a degree, as never again to be able to be of use to the 
Spartans; reason therefore demanded that they should 
spare themselves now. The same inclination towards 
peace prevailed at Phlius, the most faithful of all the cities 
confederated with Sparta. Phlius had to suffer unspeaka- 
bly at the hands of the Arcadians and Argives ; and was 
subjected to a permanent state of siege. Sparta, unable 

492 History of Greece, [BookVL 

to give succor, assented to the cities coming to an under- 
standing with Thebes in accordance with their interests. 
Corinth, Phlius, and probably also Epidaurus, now esta- 
blished relations with Thebes, recognized the peace offered 
by her, and undertook to furnish military contingents, on 
the condition, however, of not being forced to fight against 
the ancient head of the confederation to which they had 
belonged. Thus affairs assumed a somewhat more tranquil 
aspect in the north of the peninsula; while new complica- 
tions were arising in its interior.* 

The Arcadians, under the leadership of Lycomedes, had 
no sooner observed this change in the policy of Athens, 
than they eagerly seized this opportunity for putting an 
end to the connexion with Thebes, which was intolerable 
to them. The authorities of the Arcadian confederation 
at the instigation of Lycomedes offered an alliance to the 
Athenians, who accepted it, without, however, on that ac- 
count renouncing their league with the Spartans. They 
were therefore simultaneously the allies of Sparta and of 
Arcadia, while the Arcadians again were simultaneously 
allied with Thebes and with Athens, although the latter 
was engaged in an open conflict with Thebes. At the 
same time the old border-war continued without interrup- 
tion in the mountains between Megalopolis and Laconia, 
and in this war the Syracusan auxiliaries likewise took 
part on the Spartan side; and finally, so as to fill up the 
measure of confusion, a war also broke out between Arca- 
dia and Elis. 

conflict Between these two states a deep feeling of 

Ellwand mutual ill-will had long prevailed. The 

Arcadia, Eleans found themselves deceived in their de- 

sire for the recovery of Lepreum (p. 203) ; and 
the Arcadians had likewise failed to forgive the Eleans for 
the malicious joy displayed by them after the "tearless 
victory" of Archidamus, and for the preference shown 

* Treaty of neutrality with Corinth and Phlius : HeUen. vii. 4 6 f. 

chap, ii.j T j ie Offensive Wars of Thebes. 493 

them at the court of Artaxerxes (p. 48G). Far from being 
willing to surrender the district of Triphylia with Le- 
preum, which had voluntarily joined them, they rather 
cast covetous glances upon the other territories of the rich 
land of their neighbors, and in particular upon the trea- 
sures of Olympia. They hoped that their conquest of 
Elis, which was an open country, would be further facili- 
tated by the circumstance, that a party favorable to them 
existed there, whose influence was constantly on the in- 
crease. But for this very reason the party hostile to the 
Arcadian democracy, which still held the helm of affairs 
in Elis, urged that decisive steps should be taken. The 
Eleans marched out, and took Lasion, a place high up in 
the mountains near the sources of the Peneus, which had 
fallen away from the Elean government and had joined 
Arcadia; but they were beaten back by the Arcadians, 
whose troops hereupon threatened the Elean capital and 
established themselves in the high-lying country above 

The Eleans were